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ABSTRACT 
Friederike Bruehoefener: Defining the West German Soldier:  
Military, Masculinity, and Society in West Germany, 1945-1989 
(under the direction of Karen Hagemann)  
This dissertation traces the emergence and development of concepts of military masculinity in 
West Germany in the four decades after the end of World War II. Between 1945 and 1989, 
representatives of the military, members of all major political parties, numerous social and 
protests groups as well as the media, repeatedly negotiated the function, constitution, and self-
image of the West German military and its soldiers. When the Bundeswehr was established in 
1955, it reinvigorated debates over contested concepts of military masculinity, understood as a 
set of mental, physical, and behavioral traits typical or significant for men serving in the armed 
forces. Contemporaries expressed competing ideas about what it meant to be a man in military 
uniform through their negotiations of soldiers’ rights and duties as well as their attempts to 
regulate their lives inside and outside of the barracks. 
By studying these discourses and policies at the intersection of the military, 
parliamentary politics, and civil society, this dissertation makes two important contributions. 
First, it shows that military masculinities are not only the result of military necessities and 
political agenda. They are also defined by changing cultural beliefs, social expectations and 
broader international developments. Second, it reveals that a gradual but important shift occurred 
in West Germany between the end of the Second World War and the collapse of the Berlin Wall. 
While traditional military values lost influence outside of the military, civilian norms and values 
became more important for the way society defined military masculinity. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In May 1955, Wolf Graf von Baudissin gave a lecture, titled “Our Duty to Defend” (Unsere 
Verteidigungspflicht), during a meeting of the Protestant Working Committee of the Christian 
Democratic Union (CDU) and the Christian Social Union (CSU). Baudissin was one of the most 
influential thinkers working on the establishment of the new West German armed forces—the 
Bundeswehr1 —in the 1950s. Following the defeat of the Nazi regime in May 1945, the 
victorious allies had pursued a rigorous agenda stipulating the complete demilitarization of 
Germany. Yet, increasing Cold War tensions soon led to a change in direction. Following the 
division of Germany, the western powers agreed in 1950 to foster the establishment of West 
German armed forces.2 Joining the Amt Blank—the precursor of the West German Ministry of 
Defense—in 1951, Baudissin and his colleagues developed a novel concept of military 
leadership that would become the official guiding principle of the Bundeswehr. Aimed at 
conflating citizen’s rights with military demands, the concept, which was termed Innere Führung 
(Inner Guidance),3 promoted a new type of soldier, the Bürger in Uniform (citizen in uniform).4 
                                                 
1 The West German military was only named Bundeswehr in February 1956. Beforehand contemporaries oftentimes 
used the term Wehrmacht when talking about the new armed forces. Yet, since this term refers to the German army 
between 1935 and 1945, I am using the term Bundeswehr to talk about the West German military. If contemporaries 
use the term Wehrmacht to talk about the West German Bundeswehr, an explanation will be given. 
2 Gerhard Wettig, Entmilitarisierung und Wiederbewaffnung in Deutschland, 1943–1955: Internationale 
Auseinandersetzungen um die Rolle der Deutschen in Europa (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1967). 
3 Since the term Innere Führung is difficult to translate, I use the German original in order to avoid misconception. 
For the problem of translation, see Donald Abenheim, Reforging the Iron Cross: The Search for Tradition in the 
West German Armed Forces (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), 44–45 (especially footnote 50).  
 
 
2 
Giving his speech against the background of the ongoing rearmament process, Baudissin 
addressed the status of the Bürger in Uniform. Distancing himself from previous military 
traditions, he argued against the notion that soldiers had to follow only military laws and could 
thus enjoy “timeless autonomy.”5 Instead, Baudissin stated, “the soldier is the child of his times 
and member of this people [Volk], just like any other citizen.”6 For him it was essential that 
soldierly life remained part of the “overall order” of society.7 He thus insisted that the rights and 
duties of civilian law applied to the soldier as much as they applied to every other citizen of the 
Federal Republic of Germany (FRG).  
In May 1955, Baudissin presented these principles in the hope, but without the certainty, 
that they would become reality. With today’s hindsight, it can be argued that his notion of the 
soldier as a “child of his times” did bear great meaning in the years to come, albeit in many 
different ways. The decision to rearm the Federal Republic represented a major shift in 
geopolitics, but it also posed a challenge to countless West Germans who had to come to terms 
                                                 
4 Due to the different concepts of citizen in uniform, which developed in the first half of the nineteenth century, I use 
the original German term Bürger in Uniform in order to talk about the West German concept. For the different 
concepts see, Ute Frevert, “Das jakobinische Modell: Allgemeine Wehrpflicht und Nationsbildung in Preußen-
Deutschland,” in Militär und Gesellschaft im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert, ed. Ute Frevert (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1997), 
17–47. For a discussion about whether Baudissin was the only “father” of the Innere Führung, see Dieter Krüger 
and Kerstin Wiese, “Zwischen Militärreform und Wehrpropaganda Wolf Graf von Baudissin im Amt Blank,” in 
Wolf Graf von Baudissin 1907 bis 1993, ed. Rudolf Schlaffer and Wolfgang Schmidt (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2007), 
99–126.  
5 Wolf Graf von Baudissin, “Unsere Verteidigungspflicht,” Presentation, 8 May 1955. Baudissin 
Dokumentationszentrum, folder: 55,8–2/1. See also, Wolf Graf von Baudissin, “Soldat in der offenen Gesellschaft: 
Der Staatsbürger in Uniform – Erziehungspflichten der Armee,” in Armee gegen den Krieg: Wert und Wirkung der 
Bundeswehr, ed. Wolfram von Raven (Stuttgart: Seewald Verlag, 1966), 268–306. For a discussion of the 
“autonomy” that previous German armies enjoyed see, Andreas Dietz, Das Primat der Politik in kaiserlicher Armee, 
Reichwehr, Wehrmacht und Bundeswehr (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2011). 
6 Ibid.  
7 Ibid.  
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with the idea of sending once again large numbers of men to the barracks. Having experienced 
total war and defeat, and having gone through a process of denazification and demilitarization, 
this was not an easy undertaking for many.8 As a result, rearmament sparked immediate debates 
that persisted even after the official formation of the Bundeswehr on November 12, 1955. In the 
following three decades, members of all major parties, military representatives, activists of 
different social movements, church groups, the labor unions, and the media—in short, large 
segments of West German society—continually negotiated what it meant to serve in the 
Bundeswehr.  
Crucial for the repeated attempts to define the ideal West German soldier were his sex 
and gender. From the outset, armed military service in the Bundeswehr was conceived as a duty 
limited to heterosexual men.9 Although it was constantly challenged, this gendered construction 
greatly influenced how West Germans formulated soldierly ideals. While negotiating important 
aspects such as the Bundeswehr’s combat readiness, the soldiers’ legal rights and duties, or while 
sketching soldiers’ lives inside and outside of the barracks, contemporaries expressed a multitude 
of competing notions of military masculinity—understood as sets of mental, physical, and 
behavioral traits seen as typical of or desirable in men serving in the armed forces. 
                                                 
8 For a discussion of postwar Germany’s living conditions and mentalities see, Jörg Echternkamp, Nach dem Krieg: 
Altagsnot, Neuorientierung und die Last der Vergangenheit, 1945–1949 (Zürich: Pendo, 2003). For a recent 
discussion on how much the United States’ occupation influenced this development, see Nawyn, Kathleen J., 
“‘Striking at the roots of German Militarism’: Efforts to Demilitarize German society and Culture in American-
occupied Wurttemberg-Baden, 1945-1949,” Ph.D. diss. The University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, 2008. See 
further Kristen Dolan, “Isolating Nazism: Civilian Internment in American Occupied Germany, 1944–1950.” PhD 
diss., University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 2013. 
9 For literature on the exclusion of women see Swantje Kraake, Frauen zur Bundeswehr: Analyse und Verlauf einer 
Diskussion (Frankfurt a. M.: Lang, 1992). For the exclusion of gay men see Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, 
“Vermerk Rechtsprechung der Wehrdienstgerichte Nr. 21/61, VR II 6,” 18 July 1961. Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv 
Freiburg (hereafter: BArch F), BW 1/115011. 
 
 
4 
These masculine concepts are at the center of this dissertation. Looking at the ways that 
West Germans negotiated the image, role, and function of the Bundeswehr, the following study 
focuses on the concepts of military masculinity that pervaded these debates. It identifies which 
notions of military masculinity contemporaries employed after the end of World War II and 
traces why and how these ideas changed over time. Doing so, this dissertation first analyzes 
which individuals and social groups, by voicing particular ideas of military masculinity, shaped 
the discourse on the image and role of the Bundeswehr and its soldiers in different time periods. 
Second, the study asks which different and conflicting concepts of military masculinity these 
groups and individuals formulated, and how these oftentimes contrarian concepts influenced 
each other. Third, it investigates which social, cultural, and political factors—both national and 
international—shaped this discourse. 
Tracing the construction and development of military masculinities, this gendered 
perspective sheds new light on the changing relations between West German society and the 
military, because contested concepts of military masculinity represent above all struggles over 
national identities, social norms, and values as well as military and political agendas.10 The focus 
on military masculinities is hence ideal to show that Bundeswehr soldiers and officers—as 
discursive objects—were indeed men of their times. Soldierly ideals did not represent timeless, 
static constructions. On the contrary, the man in uniform was the object and product of 
interlinked negotiations taking place between military experts, representatives of the leading 
political parties, and members of civil society. Ideas that were formulated inside the Ministry of 
Defense and documented in military regulations, guidelines, and public statements compelled 
                                                 
10 For this argument see for example, Ute Frevert, A Nation in Barracks: Modern Germany, Military Conscription 
and Civil Society (Oxford and New York: Berg, 2004), 1.  
 
 
5 
different members of the parliament, extra-parliamentary protest groups, the media, and 
‘ordinary’ citizens to react—affirmatively or antagonistically. In turn, arguments about the 
qualities and behavior of Bundeswehr soldiers and officers made in the realms of civil society 
and parliamentary politics impinged on ideas voiced within of the Ministry of Defense and 
forced the military to react as well.  
Of course, the negotiations did not take place in a vacuum. Both international and 
national developments greatly influenced how West German society negotiated military 
masculinities in different periods. First, the politics of the Cold War were decisive in shaping 
how parliamentarians, military representatives, and extra-parliamentary agents sought to 
delineate the masculine traits of their troops. With the Bundeswehr being solely defined as a 
defensive force, a recurrent object of contestation was the question of what mental and 
behavioral traits West German soldiers had to possess in order to defend West Germany against 
possible attacks from the Soviet Union.11 In addition to addressing issues such as physical 
prowess, contemporaries considered soldiers’ sexual behavior as vital to the Bundeswehr’s 
defensive mission. Second, the memory of Prussian military tradition and practices and, above 
all, its catastrophic power during the Third Reich, functioned as a foil against which 
contemporaries formulated soldierly ideals.12 Heated debates unfolded, for instance, over the 
question of whether the moral code of the German Army of the German Empire could function 
as a role model for the marital lives of Bundeswehr officers and soldiers. Finally, changing 
                                                 
11 See for example, Michael Geyer, “Cold War Angst: The Case of West-German Opposition to Rearmament and 
Nuclear Weapons”, in Miracle Years: A Cultural History of West Germany, 1949–1968, ed. Hanna Schissler 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), 376–408. 
12 See Frank Pauli, Wehrmachtsoffiziere in der Bundeswehr: Das kriegsgediente Offizierkorps der Bundeswehr und 
die Innere Führung 1955 bis 1970 (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2010). 
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domestic cultural and social currents shaped how West Germans evaluated the masculine image 
of soldiers and officers. In the four decades following the end of World War II, many West 
Germans changed their attitudes towards military service, war, and peace and continuously re-
evaluated, for example, the meaning of religious principles, the role of men and women in 
society, and the values that should underpin the process of child-rearing.13 As social norms and 
values shifted over time, so did the ways that contemporaries evaluated the masculine traits of 
the West German soldier.  
In addition to these three important factors, the negotiation of military masculinities 
evolved around the constant question about the extent to which soldiers and officers could be 
allowed to be children of their times. How and to what extent could one align military demands, 
customs, and laws with the claims and privileges of a civilian life? By developing the concept of 
the Innere Führung and the model of the Bürger in Uniform, Wolf Graf von Baudissin sought to 
bridge this divide. This “balancing act” (Spagat),14 as historian Ute Frevert has called it, 
continued to shape almost every debate about the position and function of the Bundeswehr and 
its soldiers that took place in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s. The constant struggle over the extent 
to which West German soldiers had to submit their rights and freedoms, which they enjoyed as 
civilians, to the necessities and customs of military life and service was also at the heart of the 
negotiations of masculine concepts. 
                                                 
13 On the issue of changing values, see Ulrich Herbert, ed., Wandlungsprozesse in Westdeutschland: Belastung, 
Integration, Liberalisierung 1945–1980 (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2002); Klaus Naumann, “Heldentum und 
Friedensmacht: Militärische und Zivile Werte im 20. Jahrhundert,” in Alte Werte – Neue Werte Schlaglichter des 
Wertewandels, ed. Andreas Rödder and Wolfgang Elz (Götting: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2008), 150–156. 
14 The term is used in the original German version of Ute Frevert studies on military conscription in Germany. See 
Ute Frevert, Die Kasernierte Nation: Militärdienst und Zivilgesellschaft in Deutschland (Munich: Beck, 2001), 335. 
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Analyzing these negotiations, this dissertation argues furthermore that following World 
War II a gradual shift occurred, which foregrounded the changing rules and norms of civilian 
life. In terms of the Bürger in Uniform, the soldier’s status as a male citizen of the Federal 
Republic who enjoyed certain rights and privileges became more important than military 
demands that were attached to the status of wearing a uniform. As ideals and norms associated 
with the military became less valuable to larger segments of society,15 the ever-changing civilian 
norms and values became more important for how contemporaries defined the ideal West 
German man in military uniform. To be sure, the Bundeswehr was not turned into a civilian 
institution in which soldiers were allowed the exact same freedoms as their civilian counterparts. 
Upon entering the barracks, West German men were subject to a particular set of regulations. 
Moreover, the exclusion of women and gay men was not challenged fundamentally until the 
dawn of the twenty-first century.16 Yet, even though it was proposed repeatedly, neither the idea 
that West German society should conform to military norms, nor the claim that the Bundeswehr 
had to be shielded against civilian influences (re)gained a foothold. Instead, calls for the 
Bundeswehr to adapt to extra-military ideals and values grew louder.  
                                                 
15 For this argument see for example Konrad H. Jarausch, After Hitler: Recivilizing Germans, 1945–1995 (Oxford 
and New York: Oxford University Press, 2006). 
16 In January 2000 the European Court of Justice (ECJ) judged that the general exclusion of women from military 
service violated Basic Law See, Jens Rainer Ahrens, “Verzögerte Anpassung und Radikaler Wandel: Zum 
parlamentarischen Diskurs über Frauen in den Streikräften seit Gründung der Bundeswehr,“ in Frauen im Militär: 
Empirische Befunde und Perspektiven zur Integration von Frauen in die Streitkräfte, ed. Jens-Rainer Ahrens, Maja 
Apelt, and Christiane Bender (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2005), 32–41. At the same time, 
military laws were changed fundamentally that homosexuality would was no longer a reason for being discriminated 
against—for example, not being promoted.  
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1. Historiography 
Seeking to shed light on this gradual shift by analyzing the development of military masculinities 
at the intersection of the military apparatus, parliamentary politics, and civil society, this 
dissertation engages different strands of historiography. First, it seeks to contribute to scholarly 
work that has studied the extent to which (West) German society underwent a fundamental 
change of attitude after 1945.17 Historians such as Thomas Kühne suggest that beginning with 
the end of World War II, West Germans increasingly refrained from cherishing military norms 
and from accepting the military as a positive symbol of national prowess.18 In addition to 
continuous protests against nuclear weapons, this shift was reflected in the ways that West 
Germans judged conscientious objectors. While conscientious objectors were still frowned upon 
and called “wussies” in the 1950s and early 1960s, alternative civilian service (Zivildienst) had 
gained recognition by the 1970s as a valuable educational institution for young men.19 Without 
ignoring the significance of conscientious objection, the following study contributes to this 
historiography by bringing into focus the societal debates surrounding the masculine image of 
the more than 5,701,387 men who served in the West German military until 1989. It shows that 
the change in social custom and values was by no means a linear, but rather a contested 
development.  
                                                 
17 Jarausch, After Hitler. 
18 Thomas Kühne, “‘Friedenskultur’, Zeitgeschichte und Historische Friedensforschung,” in Von der Kriegskultur 
zur Friedenskultur? Zum Mentalitätswandel in Deutschland seit 1945, ed. Thomas Kühne (Münster: Lit, 2000), 13–
33; Wolfram Wette, “Kann man aus der Geschichte lernen? Historische Friedensforschung,“ in Friedens- und 
Konfliktforschung in Deutschland: Eine Bestandsaufnahme, ed. Ulrich Eckern et al (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag, 2004), 
83–97. For this argument from a European and longue durée perspective, see James J. Seehan, Where Have all the 
Soldiers Gone? The Transformation of Modern Europe (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2008).  
19 H. J. Bartjes, “Der Zivildienst als die Modernere ‘Schule der Nation’?“ in Von der Kriegskultur zur 
Friedenskultur? Zum Mentalitätswandel in Deutschland seit 1945, ed. Thomas Kühne (Münster: Lit, 2000), 130–
145. See further, H. J. Bartjes, Der Zivildienst als Sozialisationsinstanz (Weinheim: Juventa, 1996). 
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Tracing this crooked history, my dissertation further engages with the work of historians 
who have analyzed the recurring military and parliamentary disputes about the image, role, and 
function of the armed forces.20 From very early on, studies have analyzed the controversies that 
accompanied the establishment of the Bundeswehr in the 1950s and the creation a new type of 
soldier.21 For instance, Detlef Bald, one of the leading historians in the field, argues that initial 
attempts to formulate new guidelines and decrees, which would build the basis of the new 
military, were saturated with both “democratic postulates” and conservative, traditionalist 
recommendations. Due to this Janus-faced framework, West Germany witnessed recurring 
debates about military traditions that were overshadowed by the legacy of the most recent 
military history of Germany.22  
Moving beyond the formation period of the armed forces, scholars have eagerly studied 
whether the ideals of the Bürger in Uniform and the Innere Führung were upheld or whether the 
Bundeswehr returned to the military ideals of its predecessors: the Reichswehr and Wehrmacht.23 
                                                 
20 See the most comprehensive works, Lutz Köllner, ed., Anfänge westdeutscher Sicherheitspolitik 1945-1956, Bd. 
2, Die EVG-Phase (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1989); Hans Ehlert, ed., Anfänge westdeutscher Sicherheitspolitik 1945–
1956, Bd. 3, Die NATO-Option (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1993). See also: Hans-Jochim Harder and Norbert 
Wiggershaus, Tradition und Reform in den Aufbaujahren der Bundeswehr (Herford: Mittler, 1985). For the political 
debates see further, Dietrich Wagner, FDP und Wiederbewaffnung: Die Wehrpolititsche Orientierung der Liberalen 
in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1949–1955 (Boppard: Boldt, 1978); Gordon D. Drummond, The German Social 
Democrats in Opposition, 1949–1960: The Case Agianst Rearmament (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 
1982). 
21 See in particular the anthologies, Hilmar Linnenkamp and Dieter S. Lutz, eds., Innere Führung: Zum Gedenken 
an Wolf Graf von Baudissin (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1995); Rudolf Schlaffer, ed., Wolf Graf von Baudissin, 1907–
1993: Modernisierer zwischen totalitärer Herrschaft und freiheitlicher Ordnung (Munich Oldenbourg, 2007). See 
further, Angelika Dörfler-Dierken, Graf von Baudissin: Als Mensch hinter den Waffen (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & 
Ruprecht, 2006). 
22 Detlef Bald, “Bundeswehr und Gesellschaftlicher Aufbruch 1968: Die Widerstände des Militärs in Unna gegen 
die Demokratisierung”, Westfälische Forschungen 48 (1998): 297–309. 
23 Abenheim, Reforging; Martin Kutz, “Militär und Gesellschaft im Deutschland der Nachkriegszeit (1946–1995),” 
in Militär und Gesellschaft im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert, ed. Ute Frevert (Stuttgart: Klett, 1997), 277–312. Detlef 
Bald, Die Bundeswehr: Eine kritische Geschichte 1955–2005 (Munich: Beck, 2005), 10. See further, Detlef Bald, 
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Scholars emphasize that the value and meaning of the Bundeswehr’s leadership concepts were 
constantly challenged. Given the importance that the military as a “school of the nation” 
assumed in nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century German history, they stress the repeated 
disputes about whether and to what extent the Innere Führung should imply an educational task 
(Erziehungsauftrag) or whether it should be geared entirely towards combat training.24 Although 
recent studies emphasize that these disputes were also influenced by West Germany’s changing 
male youth culture,25  they rarely explore the full meaning of this history and generally ignore 
the gender ideals that underscored the debates.  
This omission is most likely due to the perception, common among some traditional 
military historians of the Bundeswehr, that the two categories—soldier and man—are naturally 
congruent. Since soldiers’ male sex is considered a natural given, it does not need to be analyzed 
systematically.26 However, this oversight first ignores the historical processes that led to the 
creation of the Bundeswehr as a “men’s society.” Second, it overlooks the extent to which 
notions of masculinity influenced the Bundeswehr’s self-representations, its structures, customs, 
                                                 
Johann Klotz, and Wolfram Wette, Mythos Wehrmacht: Nachkriegsdebatten und Traditionspflege (Berlin: Aufbau 
Verlag, 2001). 
24 See for example: Kai Uwe Bormann, “’Als ‘Schule der Nation’ überfordert: Konzeptionelle Überlegungen zur 
Erziehung der Soldaten in der Aufbauphase der Bundeswehr,” in Reform, Reorganisation, Transformation: Zum 
Wandel in deutschen Streitkräften von den preußischen Heeresreformen bis zur Transformation der Bundeswehr, ed. 
Karl-Heinz Lutz, Martin Rink and Marcus von Salisch (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2010), 345–368; Kai Uwe Bormann, 
“Erziehung des Soldaten: Herzstück der Inneren Führung,” in Wolf Graf von Baudissin 1907–1993: Modernisierer 
zwischen totalitärer Herrschaft und freiheitlicher Ordnung, ed. Rudolf J. Schlaffer and Wolfgang Schmidt (Munich: 
Oldenbourg, 2007), 111–126; Detlef Bald, “Bundeswehr und Gesellschaftlicher Aufbruch 1968: Die Widerstände 
des Militärs in Unna gegen die Demokratisierung,” Westfälische Forschungen 48 (1998): 297–309. 
25 See for example Frank Nägler, Der gewollte Soldat und sein Wandel: Personelle Rüstung und Innere Führung in 
den Aufbaujahren der Bundeswehr 1956 bis 1964/65 (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2010).  
26 For this observation in general see Karen Hagemann, “Military, War, and the Mainstreams: Gendering Modern 
German Military History,” in Gendering Modern German History: Rewriting Historiography, ed. Karen Hagemann 
and Jean H. Quataert (New York: Berghan Books, 2011), 63–85. 
 
 
11 
and norms. The significance becomes clear in the few military studies that discuss the masculine 
self-image of the military. For instance, Thorsten Loch’s historical study, which analyzes the 
advertisement campaigns of the Bundeswehr, argues that most brochures or placards portrayed a 
“post heroic” soldierly image. 27 Yet, Loch also shows that in contrast to the neutral ads of the 
1950s, the military developed a successful advertisement campaign in the 1960s and 1970s that 
pictured soldiers as charming “model boys” (Musterknaben) with manly-erotic charisma. While 
Loch thus shows that masculine images played a vital role in the ways that the Ministry of 
Defense wanted to present the Bundeswehr, he does not explore the broader historical context of 
these representations.  
Seeking to show that military masculinities were the result of interlinked debates taking 
place at the arena of parliamentary politics, the military, and civil society, this project builds not 
only on Loch’s work, but also engages with studies that focus on the developments within civil 
society. Scholarship focusing on the different social and protest movements, which developed in 
West Germany between the 1940s and 1980s, reveals that the Bundeswehr’s role and self-image 
was not only negotiated behind barracks fences or in governmental offices.28 Focusing on West 
                                                 
27 Thorsten Loch, Das Gesicht der Bundeswehr: Kommunikationsstrategien in der Freiwilligenwerbung der 
Bundeswehr 1965–1989 (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2008). See further, Thorsten Loch, “Soldatenbilder im Wandel: Die 
Nachwuchswerbung der Bundeswehr in Werbeanzeigen,” in Visual History. Ein Studienbuch, ed. Gerhard Paul 
(Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2006), 265–282. See also Klus Naumman, “Schlachtfeld und Geselligkeit: 
Die ständische Bürgerlichkeit des Bundeswehroffiziers,” in Bürgertum nach 1945, ed. Manfred Hettling and Bernd 
Ulrich (Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 2005), 310–346. For the argument of a post-heroic area see Herfried 
Münkler, Der Wandel des Kriegs: Von der Symmetrie zur Asymmetrie (Baden-Baden: Velbrück Wissenschaft, 
2006). 
28 Holger Nehring, Politics of Security: British and West German Protest Movements and the Early Cold War, 
1945–1970 (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2013); Alice H. Cooper, Paradoxes of Peace: German 
Peace Movement since 1945 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996); Josef Janning, Hans-Josef Legrand, 
Helmut Zander, and Ulrich Albrecht, eds., Friedensbewegung, Entwicklungen und Folgen in der Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland, Europa und den USA (Cologne: Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, 1987); Karl A. Otto, Vom 
Ostermarsch zur APO: Geschichte der Außerparlamentarischen Opposition in der Bundesrepublik 1960–1970 
(Frankfurt a. M. and New York: Campus, 1977).  
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Germany’s rearmament, for instance, researchers emphasize that the energetic opposition of 
various protest and peace groups was greatly influenced by the gendered perception of the 
Bundeswehr and military service.29 Looking further into the 1960s and early 1970s,30 studies 
stress, on the one hand, that the cultural and social changes that gripped society during this 
period, impinged greatly on internal military discussion and decision-making processes.31 On the 
other, scholars reveal that extra-parliamentary protest and social groups paid close attention to 
military practices and evaluated them very differently.32  
Scholarship that studies the late 1970s and early 1980s shows, moreover, that disputes 
about the masculine complexion of the Bundeswehr and its soldiers intensified due to the rising 
tensions of the Cold War. Historians such as Belinda Davis observe, for instance, that the early 
1980s witnessed an increasing rhetoric, which explicitly denounced war and military service as 
products of and breeding grounds for excessively aggressive “guys” (Macker) and “gunmen” 
                                                 
29 Martin Werner, Die “Ohne mich“-Bewegung: Die bundesdeutsche Friedensbewegung im deutsch-deutschen 
Kalten Krieg (1949–1955) (Münster: Münster Verl, 2006); Eckart Dietzelbinger, Die westdeutsche 
Friedensbewegung 1948 bis 1955: Die Protestaktionen gegen die Remilitarisierung der Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland (Cologne: Pahl-Rugenstein, 1984); Klaus-Jürgen Bremm, “Wehrhaft wider Willen? Die Debatte um 
die Bewaffnung Westdeutschlands in den fünfziger Jahren,” in Entschieden für Frieden: 50 Jahre Bundeswehr 
1955–2005, ed. Klaus-Jürgen Bremm¸ Hans-Hubertus Mack and Martin Rink (Freiburg: Rombach, 2005), 283–297. 
30 For general overviews, see Boris Spernol, Notstand der Demokratie: Der Protest gegen die Notstandsgesetze und 
die Frage der NS-Vergangenheit (Essen: Klartext, 2008); Ute Kätzel, “Geschlecht, Gewalt und Pazifismus: 1968 
und die Anti-Vietnamkriegsbewegung in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland,” in Frieden, Gewalt, Geschlecht: 
Friedens- und Konfliktforschung als Geschlechterforschung, ed. Jennifer Davy, Karen Hagemann, and Ute Kätzel 
(Essen: Klartext, 2005), 222–243. 
31 Nicole Tidemann, “Lange Männerhaare als Jugendkulturelles Zeichen nach 1945,” in Haar tragen: Eine 
kulturwissenschaftliche Annährung, ed. Christian Janecke (Cologne: Böhlau, 2004); Angelika Dörfler Dieken, “Die 
Bedeutung des Jahrs 1968 für die Innere Führung,” in Zurückgestutzt, Sinnentleert, Unverstanden: Die Innere 
Führung der Bundeswehr, ed. Detlef Bald (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2008), 65–84. 
32 Patrick Bernhard, Zivildienst zwischen Reform und Revolte: Eine bundesdeutsche Institution im gesellschaftlichen 
Wandel, 1961–1982 (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2005), 131; Patrick Berhard “An der ‘Friedensfront’: Die APO, der 
Zivildienst und der gesellschaftliche Aufbruch der sechziger Jahre,” in Wo “1968” liegt: Reform und Revolte in der 
Geschichte der Bundesrepublik, ed. Christina von Hodenberg and Detlef Siegfried (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und 
Ruprecht, 2006), 164–200.  
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(Flintenkerle). 33 Building on these studies, this dissertation shows that the masculine concepts, 
which were formulated by groups and individuals within civil society, responded to and, in turn, 
informed opinions articulated by politicians of West Germany’s primary parties and by leading 
representatives of the Bundeswehr.  
By exploring these dynamics, this dissertation engages above all studies focusing on the 
history of gender and masculinity in West Germany. Feminist scholars have argued since the 
early 1990s that the successful functioning of the military as an institution depends on the 
acceptance of shared masculine ideals.34 Focusing mainly on the subjectivity of soldiers, Ruth 
Seifert, the leading German scholar in the field, stress that the military is an ideal site to observe 
the construction of masculinity, because the institution itself is defined as “masculine” as are 
military values and habitual norms. Masculine concepts, however, also respond to and are 
informed by different social and cultural structures and beliefs. The ways in which soldierly 
masculinity is fashioned are not only expressions of military demands, but of societal 
expectations.35  
                                                 
33 Belinda Davis, “‘Women’s Strength and Crazy Male Power’: Gendered Language in the West German Peace 
Movement of the 1980s,” in Frieden, Gewalt, Geschlecht: Friedens- und Konfliktforschung als 
Geschlechterforschung, ed. Jennifer Davy, Karen Hagemann and Ute Kätzel (Essen: Klartext: 2005), 244–265. See 
further Susanne Schregel, Der Atomkrieg vor der Wohnungstür: Eine Politikgeschichte der neuen 
Friedensbewegung in der Bundesrepublik 1970–1985 (Frankfur a. M. and New York: Campus, 2011). 
34 See for example, Monika Szcezepaniak, Militärische Männlichkeiten in Deutschland und Österreich im Umfeld 
des Großen Krieges: Konstruktionen und Dekonstruktionen (Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2011); Joshua 
Goldstein, War and Gender: How Gender Shapes the War System and Vice Versa (Cambridge, Mass.: Cambridge 
University Press, 2001), 252. See further, Frank J. Barrett, “Die Konstruktion hegemonialer Männlichkeit in 
Organisationen: Das Beispiel der US-Marine,” Soziale Konstruktionen: Militär und Geschlechterverhältnis, ed. 
Christine Eifle and Ruth Seifert (Münster: Dampfboot, 1996), 71–91. 
35 Ruth Seifert, Militär-Kultur-Identität: Individualisierung, Geschlechterverhältnisse und die soziale Konstruktion 
des Soldaten (Bremen: Edition Temme, 1995). See further Ruth Seifert, Individualisierungsprozesse, 
Geschlechterverhältnisse und die soziale Konstruktion des Soldaten. Eine theoretische und empirische Studie zur 
soldatischen Subjektivität und zu ihrer Wechselwirkung mit der Gesellschaft (Munich: SOWI, 1993). 
 
 
14 
Yet, as indicated above, this early call by feminist scholars has not translated into an 
increased analytical focus on the concepts of military masculinities—their construction, their 
contested nature, and their change over time—in West Germany. Indeed, the last decades 
witnessed the publication of numerous studies analyzing the relation between concepts 
masculinity, war and the military in nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century Germany. These 
studies argue that masculine ideals influenced and in turn represented the formulation of national 
identities as well as social and political agendas.36 Despite these fruitful results, only a few 
studies have explored history of military masculinities in postwar West Germany. Looking at 
West Germany, Ute Frevert argues that with the end of World War II the belief in military 
service as a “school of the nation” and a paragon for socially accepted and heroic masculine 
behavior began to vanish.37 Indeed, while in the early 1950s a great majority still perceived the 
military as a “good pedagogical institution” for young men, by the 1970s, Frevert argues, West 
Germans had largely come to negate the significance of the military as a valuable “school of the 
nation.” While Frevert’s study highlights major developments that took place after 1945, it lacks 
                                                 
36 For the early nineteenth century see for example, Karen Hagemann, Mannlicher Muth und Teutsche Ehre: Nation, 
Militär und Geschlecht zur Zeit der Antinapoleonischen Kriege Preußens (Paderborn: F. Schöningh, 2002); Karen 
Hagemann, “Of ‘Manly Valor’ and ‘German Honor: Nation, War and Masculinity in the Age of the Prussian 
Uprising against Napoleon,” Central European History, 30 (1997), 187–220. For the Wilhelmine Empire see 
Marcus Funck, “Ready for War? Conceptions of Military Manliness in the Prusso-German Officers Corps before the 
First World War,” in Home/Front. The Military, War and Gender in Twentieth Century Germany, ed. Karen 
Hagemann and Stefanie Schüler-Springorum (Oxford and New York: Berg, 2002), 43–67; Thomas Rohrkrämer, 
“Das Militär als Männerbund? Männlichkeit im Deutschen Kaiserreich,” Westfälische Forschungen 45 (1995): 169–
187.  
37 Frevert, Nation in Barracks. See also, Ute Frevert. “Heldentum und Opferwille, Ordnung und Disziplin: 
Militärische Werte in der zivilen Gesellschaft,” in Alte Werte – Neue Werte: Schlaglichter des Wertewandels, ed. 
Andreas Rödder and Wolfgang Elz (Götting: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2008), 139–150. Ute Frevert, “Das Militär 
als Schule der Männlichkeiten,” in Männlichkeiten und Moderne: Geschlecht in den Wissenskulturen um 1900, ed. 
Ulrike Brunotte (Bielefeld: Transcript Verlag, 2008), 57–75. See also Kutz, “Militär und Gesellschaft.” 
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the depth—as she notes herself38—to explain all the struggles and contingencies that shaped this 
history.   
Seeking to provide the necessary depth, this dissertation contributes to the multitude of 
studies by gender and cultural historians who have paid special attention to the emergence of 
new masculine concepts after the end of World War II. These studies point to the fact that 
concepts of military masculinity responded to non-military norms and values. Highlighting that 
the sociopolitical reconstruction of Germany took place also along gendered lines, historian 
Robert G. Moeller stresses for instance that returning POWs were fashioned as loving, gentle 
family men due to changed attitudes towards military values and norms.39 These new masculine 
concepts corresponded, as Frank Biess argues, “precisely to the tamed militarism of the new 
West German army and its ideal soldier as the ‘citizen in uniform’.”40  
Culture and gender studies show, moreover, that masculine ideals expressed in the realm 
of civil society were formulated in relation or contrast to military ideals and expectations. 
Looking at ideals of parenting and parenthood in the 1950s and 1960s, scholar Till von Rahden 
points to a shift away from including military customs and values in the daily education of 
                                                 
38 Frevert, Nation in Barracks, 7. 
39 Robert G. Moeller, “'The Last Soldiers of the Great War’ and Tales of Family Reunions in the Federal Republic of 
Germany,” Signs 24 (1998), 129–145; Robert G. Moeller, “Heimkehr ins Vaterland: Die Remaskulinisierung 
Westdeutschlands in den fünfziger Jahren,” Militärgeschichtliche Zeitung (60) 2001, 403–436; Robert G. Moeller, 
War Stories: The Search for a Usable Past in the Federal Republic of Germany (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 2001).  
40 See for example Frank Biess, “Survivors of Totalitarianism: Returning POWs and the Reconstruction of 
Masculine Citizenship in West Germany, 1945–1955,” in The Miracle Years: A Cultural History of West Germany, 
1949-1968 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), 57–82, here 72; Frank Biess, Homecomings: Returning 
POWs and the Legacies of Defeat in Postwar Germany (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006), 43. See 
further Uta Poiger, “A New, ‘Western’ Hero? Reconstructing German Masculinity in the 1950s”, Signs 24 (1998): 
147–162; Uta Poiger, “Rebels with a Cause? American Popular Culture, the 1956 Youth Riots and the New 
Conceptions of Masculinity in East and West Germany,” in American Impact on Postwar Germany, ed. Reiner 
Pommerin (New York: Berghan Books, 1995), 93–124. 
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children, especially boys.41 The development of new masculine ideals in contrast or in relation to 
military norms and values continued well into the 1970s. Focusing on the extra-parliamentary 
protests and the changing youth culture, historians emphasize that the style of West Germany’s 
“bums” and hippies” was seen as provocation and as a threat to military ideals.42 Building upon 
these studies, this dissertation answers these scholars’ call to conduct more research on the 
emergence and transformation of concepts of masculinity after 1945.43 
2. Theory and Method 
In order to contribute to recent scholarship, this study draws on the methodological approaches 
of discourse analysis, recent works on civil society, gender history, the history of masculinities, 
and the history of sexuality. Looking at historical changes and cultural differences, historians 
have come to analyze masculinities not only in terms of identity formation, but also as discursive 
constructs. 44 Yet, scholarly understanding of what a “discourse” is and how it should be 
                                                 
41 Till van Rahden, “Religion, Vaterschaft und die Suche nach Demokratie in der Frühen Bundesrepublik,” in Ehe, 
Familie, Verwandtschaft: Vergesellschaftung in Religion und sozialer Lebenswelt, ed. Andreas Holzem and Ines 
Weber (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2008), 437–458. See also, Paul Betts, “Manners, Morality, and Civilization: 
Reflections on Postwar Germany Etiquette Books,” in Histories of the Aftermath. The Legacies of the Second World 
War in Europe, ed. Frank Biess and Robert G. Moeller (New York: Berghan Books, 2010), 196–214; Kasper Maase, 
“‘Lässig‘ kontra ‘zackig’: Nachkriegsjugend und Männlichkeit in Geschlechtergeschichtlicher Perspektive,” in Sag 
mir, wo die Mädchen sind: Beiträge zur Geschlechtergeschichte der Jugend, ed. Benninghaus, Christina and Kerstin 
Kohtz (Köln: Böhlau, 1999), 79–101. 
42 See Detlef Siegfried, “White Negro: The Fascination of the Authentic in the West German Counter Culture of the 
1960s,” in Changing the World, Changing Oneself: Political Protest and Collective Identities in West Germany and 
the U.S. in the 1960s and 1970s, ed. Belinda Davis, Wilfried Mausbach, Martin Klimke, and Carla MacDougall 
(New York: Berghan Books, 2013), 191–214. 
43 Richard Bessel, “Was bleibt vom Krieg? Deutsche Nachkriegsgeschichte(n) aus geschlechtlicher Perspektive: 
Eine Einführung,” Militärgeschichtliche Zeitung 60 (2001): 297–305.  
44 For early approaches see Thomas Kühne, “Männergeschichte als Geschlechtergeschichte,” in Männergeschichte – 
Geschlechtergeschichte: Männlichkeit im Wandel der Moderne (Frankfurt a. M. and New York: Campus, 1996), 7–
30, here 8.  See also, Thomas Kühne, “Frieden, Krieg und Ambivalenz: Historische Friedensforschung als 
Geschlechterforschung,” in Frieden, Gewalt, Geschlecht: Friedens- und Konfliktforschung als 
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analyzed differs widely across disciplines. Even though I do not dare to solve the question 
discussed by numerous scholars of how “discourse,” “subjectivity,” “agency,” and “experience” 
are related,45 this study is based on the understanding that the individuals and social groups who 
participate in the negotiations of masculine concepts are not an undefined discursive mass. 
Instead, I acknowledge—to use Roger Chartier’s words—the “inventive capacities of individuals 
and communities” that are limited, nonetheless, by certain “constraints, norms and 
convention.”46 This understanding allows for the critical analysis of discursive contributions by 
political parties and parliamentarians, military representatives and experts, as well as by different 
extra-parliamentary groups that shaped civil society. To this effect, this study does not analyze 
the self-perception and identity formation of individual soldiers, but explores the ways that 
society at large talked about the Bundeswehr and the West German soldier.47  
Following this understanding, my study furthermore employs recent scholarship on civil 
society. The last decade has witnessed a new debate about how “civil society” can be defined 
and how it—if at all—can be used as methodological concept. Approaches and proposals 
generally evolve around three definitions: the “field-logical,” the “action-logical,” and the 
                                                 
Geschlechterforschung, ed. Jennifer Davy, Karen Hagemann and Ute Kätzel (Essen: Klartext, 2005), 55–72. See 
further John Tosh, “What Should Historians do with Masculinity,” History Workshop Journal 38 (1994): 179–202, 
reprinted with minor revisions in John Tosh, Manliness and Masculinity in Nineteenth-Century Britain: Essays on 
Gender, Family, and Empire (London: Pearson Longman, 2005), 29–58. 
45 For a discussion of this problem, see Kathleen Canning, “Feminist History after the Linguistic Turn: Historicizing 
Discourse and Experience,” Signs (1994): 368–404, reprinted in: Kathleen Canning, Gender History in Practice: 
Historical Perspectives on Bodies, Class & Citizenship (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 2006).   
46 Roger Chartier, On the Edge of the Cliff: History, Language, and Practices (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1997), 20. 
47 See for this argument the introductions by Stefan Dudink, Karen Hagemann, and John Horne, in: Masculinities in 
Politics and War: Gendering Modern History (Manchester and New York: Berg, 2004). See further, Karen 
Hagemann, Mannlicher Muth, 63–65. 
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“normative.”48 Notwithstanding the caveats and problems associated with any of these 
approaches, the following analysis follows the “action-logical” definition of civil society to 
acknowledge the discursive powers of groups and actors that generally functioned outside the 
realm of parliamentary politics and the military apparatus. To be sure, this threefold division is 
somewhat arbitrary, because the boundaries between the different realms are not fixed, but 
permeable. Moreover, the individuals and groups who act in either arena not only change over 
time, but they also cross the boundaries.49 Yet, this triad is nonetheless useful, because it allows 
me to acknowledge the context within and the background against which individuals and groups 
expressed their opinions. It enables me to analyze how different social and protest movements as 
well as the media influenced the negotiations of military masculinities.50 Thus, this study can 
reveal how different concepts of military masculinity that were formulated by leading 
parliamentarians, military commands, and extra-parliamentary activists influenced each other.  
Seeking to map the interlinked discursive development of military masculinities in West 
Germany after 1945, this study surely approaches a difficult topic. Scholars working in the field 
of historical masculinity studies have emphasized that the workings of masculine concepts that 
are considered “normal,” are very often difficult to grasp. They are located, as Martina Kessel 
                                                 
48 For a discussion of the different definitions of civil society see, Karen Hagemman, “Civil Society Gendered: 
Rethinking Theories and Practices,” in Civil Society and Gender Justice. Historical and Comparative Perspectives, 
ed. Karen Hagemann, Sonya Michel and Gunilla Budde (New York: Berghan Books, 2008), 17–42; Jürgen Kocka, 
“Civil Society from a Historical Perspective,” European Review 12 (2004): 65–79. See also the anthology by John 
Keane, ed., Civil Society: Berlin Perspectives (New York: Berghahn Books, 2006).  
49 For a critical discussion, see Hagemann, “Civil Society Gendered.” 
50 Karl Christian Führer, Knut Hickethier, and Axel Schildt, “Öffentlichkeit, Medien, Geschichte,” AfS 41 (2001): 1–
38. 
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puts it, “everywhere and nowhere.”51 Accepted notions of masculinity appear as such a universal 
and self-evident category that their existence and dominance in historical sources are often hard 
to detect. Scholars looking for these masculinities frequently encounter a “discursive 
emptiness.”52 To a certain extent, this holds true for concepts of military masculinity. If the male 
sex of the soldier is viewed as natural, his masculinity becomes almost indistinct in a muddle of 
soldierly qualities.  
In order to overcome the ‘threat’ of this discursive emptiness this dissertation first 
employs gender as the most important category of historical analysis. This approach enables the 
exploration of how masculine ideals are constructed and change. Following historian Joan W. 
Scott, I understand gender as both an important subject of investigation and as a method of doing 
research that can illuminate a whole range of social cleavages and cultural practices. Gender is 
not only a constitutive element of social relationships based on perceived differences between 
the sexes, but also a primary means of signifying relationships of power.53 As Scott has 
emphasized, gender as a methodology is mainly about asking historical questions: “[I]t is above 
all an invitation to think critically about how the meanings of sexed bodies are produced, 
deployed, and changed.”54  
                                                 
51 Martina Kessel, “Heterogene Männlichkeit: Skizzen zur gegenwärtigen Geschlechterforschung,” in Handbuch der 
Kulturwissenschaften, Vol. 3: Themen und Tendenzen, ed. Friedrich Jaeger et al (Stuttgart: Metzler, 2004), 372–384, 
here 376.  
52 See Franz X. Eder, Kultur der Begierde: Eine Geschichte der Sexualität (Munich: Beck, 2002), 27. For this 
discussion see also Martin Lücke, Männlichkeit in Unordnung. Homosexualität und männliche Prostitution in 
Kaiserreich und Weimarer Republik (Frankfurt a. M. and New York: Campus, 2008), 13–14. 
53 See as a classical text: J.W. Scott, “Gender: A Useful Category of Historical Analysis,” reprinted in Gender and 
the Politics of History, ed. idem (New York, 1988), 28–50. For a more recent debate see, “AHR Forum: Revisiting 
“Gender: A Useful Category of Historical Analysis,” The American Historical Review 113 (2008), 1344–1430. 
54 J.W. Scott, “Unanswered Questions,” in: AHR Forum, 1422–1430. 
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While applying this dynamic concept of gender, this study also engages with the 
extensive literature on the history of masculinity. In her path-breaking study Masculinities, 
Raewyn Connell argues for the existence of multiple masculinities that are related to each other 
in a hierarchy of power.55 At the top resides what Connell calls a “hegemonic masculinity,” 
against which other—competing or compliant—masculinities are measured and subordinated: 
“At any given time, one form of masculinity rather than others is culturally exalted.”56 In view of 
this hierarchy, Connell and other scholars emphasize that masculinity almost never functions as a 
category on its own, detached from other factors. On the contrary, competing masculine concepts 
and the position they achieve in the hierarchy are informed by and related to other categories of 
difference such as class, race, religion, age, and sexuality.57  
Despite its shortcomings,58 Connell’s approach is useful, for it prevents seeing concepts 
of military masculinity as monolithic entities.59 Looking at the military, for instance, it is 
important to consider the masculine traits associated with officers in contrast and relation to the 
qualities ascribed to young draftees. The understanding that one masculine ideal is defined by 
                                                 
55 R. Connell, Masculinities (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005), 77.  
56 Ibid. 
57 For the discussion of the construction of a specific masculinity in relation to other masculine variations see also 
Jürgen Martschukat and Olaf Stieglitz, “Mannigfaltigkeit: Perspektiven einer historischen Männlichkeitsforschung,” 
Werkstatt Geschichte 29 (2001): 4–7.  
58 Scholars have highlighted, for instance, that Connell, on the one hand, does not pay enough attention to the 
histories of individual masculinity formations and, on the other, overemphasizes the importance of patriarchy. For a 
critique of Connell’s concept see: John Tosh, “Hegemonic Masculinity and the History of Gender” in Masculinities 
in Politics and War, ed. Stefan Dudink, Karen Hagemann, and John Tosh (Manchester and New York: Berg, 2004), 
41–58. See also, Lücke, Männlichkeit, 38–45. 
59 See for example the articles in Paul Higate, Military Masculinities: Identity and State (Westport: Praeger, 2003). 
See further: Szczepaniak, Militärische Männlichkeiten.  
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other masculine variations furthermore points to the relation between military masculinities and 
the characteristics ascribed to men who—for various reasons—do not do not serve in the armed 
forces. By addressing, for example, the attributes associated with men who were excluded from 
compulsory military service or prohibited from serving, this dissertation is able to discern how 
contemporaries envisioned the ideal West German soldier. To this effect, ‘normal’ or ideal 
notions of masculinity are defined from the margins.60  
In addition to the ‘masculine other’, scholarship has highlighted moreover that 
masculinities are oftentimes, though not inevitably, constructed in relation or in contrast to 
women and concepts of femininity.61 Even though femininities are not the main focus of this 
dissertation, they play a very important role in the analysis. Women—as women, mothers, 
significant others, sexual partners, or soldiers—and the qualities ascribed to them functioned as 
an important parameter that contemporaries used to talk about the ideal male Bürger in 
Uniform.62 While discussing, for instance, the roles of wives and mothers, contemporaries 
formulated not only concepts of femininity; they also defined the West German man in uniform. 
Thus, by acknowledging how contemporaries discussed women’s relation to the military, this 
dissertation is able to plumb concepts of military masculinity. 
In this respect, my dissertation further draws on the history of sexuality, because the 
masculine concepts that contemporaries formulated also invoked notions of male sexuality. Like 
                                                 
60 Lücke, Männlichkeit, 38–45. 
61 For the relational character of femininity and masculinity, see as an early approach Kühne, "Männergeschichte als 
Geschlechtergeschichte,” 11. For a critique see, Claudia Opitz-Belakhal, “’Krise der Männlichkeit’: Ein nützliches 
Konzept der Geschlechtergeschichte,” L’Homme 19 (2008): 31–49, here 31.  
62 See, Irene Stoehr, “Phalanx der Frauen? Wiederaufrüstung und Weiblichkeit in Westdeutschland 1950–1957," in 
Soziale Konstruktion: Militär und Geschlechterverhältnis, ed. Christine Eifler and Ruth Seifert (Münster: 
Dampfboot, 1999), 187–204.   
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concepts of masculinity, this study approaches sexuality as a discursive construct. Instead of 
considering sexuality to be a naturally given fact, it is important to examine the ways in which a 
particular “sexual nature” is ascribed to and expected from the historical subject; in this case the 
West German soldiers and officers.63 As discussed above, the Bundeswehr was conceived as a 
homosocial, yet strictly heterosexual “men’s society” from the outset. This construction caused 
many contemporaries, who took an eager interest in the Bundeswehr, to address the sexual 
behavior and desires of men and pondered how military would affect soldiers’ sexuality. 
Influenced by the social, cultural, and political circumstances that surrounded them, West 
Germans attached specific meaning to the sexual desires and behavior of Bundeswehr troops. It 
led, for example, to repeated disputes that brought not only women as the sexual other, but also 
homosexuality and “the homosexual” into the limelight.  
3. Sources 
An exploration into the emergence and development of concepts of military masculinities at the 
link between parliamentary politics, the military, and civil society, requires the analysis of a 
broad variety of primary sources. Following the proposed methodological triad, the analysis must 
first gauge concepts and ideas that were formulated within the halls of the Ministry of Defense 
and the Bundeswehr leadership. For this part of the analysis, sources housed in the federal 
archives in Freiburg (Germany) are paramount. This repository houses not only the records of 
the Department for the Preparation of the West German Defense Contribution (Deutsche 
                                                 
63 Michel Foucault, History of Sexuality: An Introduction, Vol. 1 (New York: Vintage, 1990), 105. For a discussion 
of masculinity and sexuality see also Lücke, Männlichkeit. For the relation between military and sexuality see for 
example, Angelika Tramitz, “Nach dem Zapfenstreich: Anmerkungen zur Sexualität des Offiziers,” in 
Willensmenschen: Über Deutsche Offiziere, ed. Ursula Breymayer et al (Frankfurt a. M.: Fischer Taschenbuch 
Verlag, 1999), 211–226.  
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Dienststellen zur Vorbereitung der Europäischen Verteidigungsgemeinschaft, BW9), but also the 
papers of the Minister of Defense (Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, BW I), the Chief of 
Federal Armed Forces Staff and General Staff of the Armed Forces (Generalinspekteur und 
Führungsstab der Streitkräfte, BW 2) and the Center Innere Führung (BW 11 II). The minutes of 
staff meetings, memos, notes, external and internal correspondence, but also unpublished internal 
studies, military regulations, and decrees, reveal how the Bundeswehr leadership and military 
experts working in the Ministry of Defense conceived of the function and image of the 
Bundeswehr and the West German soldier. In addition to published documents such as speeches, 
handbooks, and regulations these archival have not only enabled me two trace how military 
experts and representatives negotiated among each other, but they reveal how the Bundeswehr 
leadership reacted to masculine ideals that were formulated in the West German parliament and 
in civil society.  
In order to successfully shed light on the ways that West German political parties and 
parliamentarians sought to define the Bundeswehr and its soldiers throughout the years, the 
Federal Archive in Bonn and the different political archives are vitally important. In addition to 
the documents of the parties’ Bundestag factions, which contain the minutes of meetings and 
correspondence, the party archives of CDU/CSU, FDP, SPD, and Die Grünen also house the 
papers of security and defense committees that negotiated issues relating to the Bundeswehr. 
Moving beyond the internal documentation of the individual parties, the records of the West 
German parliament provide the necessary insights into the ways parliamentarians negotiated the 
image of the West German soldier and formulated diverse notions of military masculinity. In 
addition to the negotiations of the Bundestag, for example, I have also gauged the minutes of the 
Parliamentary Committee for Defense—which are partly published, but mainly housed in 
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Parlamentsarchiv des Deutschen Bundestags (Parliamentary Archive of the German Bundestag). 
In addition to shedding light on how the military experts of different political parties talked about 
the Bundeswehr behind closed doors, these records also reveal how the image of the West 
German soldier were negotiated by Bundeswehr representatives and the parliament. After all, 
military and civilian representatives of the Ministry of Defense were constant participants.   
Turning finally to the realm of civil society, the analysis of mainstream newspapers and 
magazines such as Der Spiegel, DIE ZEIT, Die Welt, and the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 
was important to gauge the prevailing opinions, major perspectives, and trends. Upon identifying 
individuals and groups that predominantly participated in the negotiations about the function and 
image of the Bundeswehr, I studied magazines and journals, brochures and leaflets of influential 
extra-parliamentary—including different peace, student and women’s organization— 
organizations at the Archive Social Movements (Archiv Soziale Bewegungen) and the Hamburg 
Institute for Social Research (Institut für Sozialforschungen). In addition to examining the 
records of the German Confederation of Labor Unions (Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund, or DGB), 
I investigated the records at the Central Archive of the Protestant Church (Zentral Archiv der 
Evangelischen Kirche) and the Archive of the Military Bishop of the Catholic Church (Archiv 
des Katholischen Militärbischofs) in order to understand how labor unions as well as the 
Catholic and the Protestant churches sought to participate in the definition of the Bundeswehr 
and its soldiers. Moreover, these archives as well as the different party archives and the military 
archive in Freiburg were vital to a grasp of how not only organized groups, but also ‘ordinary’ 
West Germans conceived of the West German man in military uniform. The records at these 
various repositories contain letters, requests, and commentaries that citizens and organized 
groups sent to their political and religious representatives, the military leadership, and the 
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government in order to voice their opinions about the Bundeswehr. In sum, the combined 
analysis of published and archival sources as enabled me to trace how West German society as a 
whole negotiated concepts of military masculinity between the 1940s and 1980s.  
4. Organization 
In order to reveal the developments of the concepts of military masculinity, this dissertation 
proceeds chronologically. Based on my analysis of primary and secondary sources, I have 
identified specific periods during which concepts of military masculinity were most intensively 
negotiated. Functioning as a prelude, the first part—“A Postwar Project: The Demilitarization of 
Occupied West Germany, 1945–1948”—analyzes the emergence of new masculine ideals at the 
end of World War II. Following a discussion of Allied demilitarization and re-education 
procedures, it shows how Germans living mainly in the Western occupation zones reevaluated 
the relation between military, civil society, and masculinity. While arguing that many Germans 
bid farewell to the military and military success as symbols of national prowess, on the one hand, 
and to soldierly qualities as the epitome of manliness, on the other, this part also emphasizes that 
the belief that military service would have positive effects on young men's character did prevail 
in large segments of society.64 These competing ideas were important for the subsequent 
negotiations.  
 The second part “Defining the New Soldier: Debates about Military Masculinity before 
the Rearmament of the FRG, 1949–1954” analyzes the masculine concepts that emerged during 
the negotiations surrounding the European Defense Community (EDC). While participating in 
                                                 
64 See, Jörg Echternkamp, “Arbeit am Mythos: Soldatengenerationen der Wehrmacht im Urteil der west- und 
ostdeutschen Nachkriegsgesellschaft,” in Nachkrieg in Deutschland, ed. Klaus Naumann (Hamburg: Hamburger 
Edition, 2001),  421–443 
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the international negotiations, members of the Amt Blank and government officials assembled to 
carve out the rules and regulations that would define not only the European, but also the West 
German soldier.65 This process first and foremost resulted in the gendered definition of military 
service. Agreeing that only men, not women could be compelled to serve, they set out to define 
the behavioral and mental traits of the future soldiers. Influenced by vociferous anti-rearmament 
protests that swept the Federal Republic in the early 1950s, the soldierly image that emerged 
during this period was a hybrid. Seeking to overcome the legacy of the Nazi regime and World 
War II, contemporaries were eager to create a military that would fit the new democratic and 
peaceful ideals of the Federal Republic. However, since the new armed forces were supposed to 
also function as a bulwark against the Communist East, negotiations seesawed between the 
thoroughly trained soldiers who would bravely defend West Germany and Europe, on the one 
hand, and as a restrained Bürger in Uniform, who was a loving family man, on the other. 
The subsequent third part “Expectations and Experience: The Discourse on Soldier’s 
Social and Moral Standards during the Formation Period of the Bundeswehr, 1955–1964” 
focuses on the debates that erupted after the resolution to rearm West Germany in the context of 
NATO. Following the decision to establish the Bundeswehr as national armed forces and 
implement a draft, tens of thousands of young men were called up for service. This development 
triggered new debates about the social ramifications of military life. Although many West 
Germans maintained that the military could inculcate men with socially acceptable, domestic 
qualities, a parallel discourse developed, which questioned the social value of military life and, 
instead, cautioned that a barracked all-male institution had the potential to negatively influence 
the sexual and social behavior of young men. Eager to establish and maintain good relations 
                                                 
65 See for example Nägler, Der gewollte Soldat, 32–36. 
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between civil society and the military, this part argues that government officials, 
parliamentarians of all primary parties, and military experts stressed that the soldiers had to 
embrace the ideal of monogamous Christian family breadwinner. 
As the fourth part “Between Left-Wing Rejection and Right-Wing Critique: The 
Changing Image of the Bundeswehrsoldat, 1964–1976” shows, the efforts to guide the soldiers’ 
sexual and social behavior were significant for the disputes that erupted in the mid-1960s. 
During this period, the Federal Republic witnessed almost a “counter revolution” of conservative 
Bundeswehr generals who argued that the military and West German society as a whole had to 
embrace to the image of men as born defenders and the soldier as a hardened fighter.66 These 
calls for a new soldierly ideal collided, however, with arguments of the extra-parliamentary 
protestors who were unsettled by the establishment of Chancellor Kiesinger’s Grand Coalition in 
1966. Fearing that the Federal Republic was turning into an authoritarian, fascist state, the 
majority of activists cautioned that the Bundeswehr produced violent male behavior, which 
would eventually endangered the peace and stability of West Germany. This multifold criticism 
fundamentally influenced parliamentary politics. Above all, this part shows, Willy Brandt’s 
Social-Liberal Coalition instated a series of measures that represented a direct response to 
different lines of argument. As a result, the West German soldier of the 1970s was posited as a 
critical and reflective thinker who served in the Bundeswehr to protect the peace and stability of 
West Germany and Western Europe.   
The fifth and final part, “Challenged Military Manliness: The Quest for a New Man in 
Uniform, 1977–1989” focuses in particular on the late 1970s to early/mid-1980s.67 During this 
                                                 
66 Abenheim, Reforging. 
67 This limitation is in part due to the fact that German regulations prohibit researchers to access archival material 
that is less than thirty years old. While the Ministry of Defense graciously lifted some restrictions, for example, this 
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time, the masculine image of West German soldier came under fire yet again; this time a 
growing number of leftist intellectuals, peace activists, and women’s groups who complained 
that the Bundeswehr was a destructive force that not only endangered West Germany’s peace and 
stability, but that also produced violent notions of masculinity. This understanding came to the 
fore, first, following the proposal by government officials in 1978 to recruit women as soldiers. 
Second, the question of whether gay men should be allowed to serve in the Bundeswehr 
instigated more debates. In particular, the discharge of General Günter Kießling, the Commander 
of NATO land forces and deputy to the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, due to 
allegations that he was gay caused a public outcry.68 At a time when peace activists protested 
NATO’s double track decision, Kießling’s discharge was seen as the result of a homophobic and 
hyper-masculine military culture that had to be changed.  
By closely examining these periods, this dissertation sheds light on the emergence and 
development of concepts of military masculinity during the four decades following the end of 
World War II. Slightly revising Wolf Graf von Baudissin’s 1955 dictum, the following analysis 
shows that the West German soldier was certainly a man of his times, because the function and 
image of the Bundeswehr were discussed at the intersection of the military, parliamentary 
politics, and civil society. As such, the concepts of military masculinity that contemporaries 
formulated and that were reflected in parliamentary politics as well as in military guidelines and 
regulations, are not solely the product of governmental demands and military necessities. They 
were also formed by the claims formulated in civil society by individuals and groups. Because of 
                                                 
one they did not. However, the intensity with which contemporaries debated masculine concepts certainly peaked in 
the early/mid-1980s and would not be trumped until the unification of the two Germanys.  
68 Thomas Ramge, Die großen Polit-Skandale: Eine andere Geschichte der Bundesrepublik (Frankfurt: Campus, 
2003), 180–197. 
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these interactions and influences, the image of the Bundeswehr and the West German soldiers 
and officers changed over time; preventing military ideals and customs from becoming decisive 
for civil society.   
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PART I 
A POSTWAR PROJECT: THE DEMILITARIZATION OF OCCUPIED WEST 
GERMANY, 1945-1948
During the first days of May 1945, the “total war” that Adolf Hitler and the Nazis had inflicted 
upon Europe ended with the total defeat of National Socialist Germany. After more than five and 
a half years of unprecedented brutal warfare, Alfred Jodl, Chief of the Operations Staff of the 
Armed Forces High Command signed Germany’s unconditional surrender. While Jodl’s 
signature in Reims on May 7 and the second capitulation ceremony in Berlin on May 9 officially 
documented the collapse of the Nationalist Socialist regime, the total defeat of Nazi Germany 
was visible throughout the entire country and all previously occupied regions. Devastated 
landscapes, mountains of rubble, piles of corpses, wounded civilians and soldiers, as well as the 
increasing presence of victorious enemy forces, made it unmistakably clear to Germans that their 
country had lost the war.69  
In addition to the physical destruction, the subsequent dissolution of the German state and 
the Allied occupation left Germans in no doubt that they had been utterly defeated. Immediately 
following the capitulation, the victorious allies set about establishing comprehensive occupation 
regimes that they had already begun to plan in the summer of 1941. In August 1941, President 
Franklin D. Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston Churchill resolved that Germany, upon its 
                                                 
69 This is not to suggest that the end of the Second World War was swift. On the contrary, the collapse of Nazi 
Germany occurred at different times and in different circumstances. The ways in which Germans experienced the 
shift from war to postwar varied widely, depending on their status (civilian or soldiers), their geographical location, 
the ferocity of previous fighting as well as their age and gender. On the question of the transition from war to 
postwar, see for example Richard Bessel, Germany 1945: From War to Peace (New York: Harper Collins, 2009), 
140. See also Edward Norman Peterson, The Many Faces of Defeat: The German People's Experience in 1945 (New 
York: Peter Lang Publishing, 1990).  
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defeat, was to be disarmed permanently. Two years later at the Tehran Conference, the United 
States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union agreed that Germany’s demilitarization should 
include dismantling its industrial capacity to make war. This vision of a postwar Germany 
entirely stripped of its ability to wage war culminated at the Yalta Conference in February 1945 
and the Potsdam Conference in July 1945, where the “Big Three” vowed not only to 
demilitarize, denazify, decentralize and to dissolve the big industrial cartels. They also declared 
to introduce democratic self-government. To realize this vision, the victorious powers, now 
joined by France, divided Germany into four occupation zones, and implemented specific 
programs that aimed at the implementation of the five Ds: Germany’s demilitarization, 
denazification, decentralization, decartelization, and democratization.70  
Historians, political scientists, and sociologists have written extensively on the total 
defeat of Nazi Germany and the subsequent Allied occupation. Much of this scholarship focuses 
on the logistics and politics of the occupation within the context of the Cold War.71 In addition, 
cultural and political historians have analyzed the Allies’ motives for demilitarizing Germany 
and their use of cultural and social practices to promote a more thorough process of 
                                                 
70 For extracts from the report on the Potsdam Conference, see Beate Ruhm von Oppen, ed., Documents on 
Germany under Occupation, 1945–1954 (London: OUP, 1955), 40–50. For a comprehensive overview see 
Wolfgang Benz, Deutschland unter alliierter Besatzung 1945–1949/55 (Berlin: Akademie, 1999).  
71 For an overview of Allied occupation, see Benz, Deutschland unter alliierter Besatzung. See also Klaus-Dietmar 
Henke, Die amerikanische Besetzung Deutschlands (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1995). For the French occupation, see 
Klaus Dietmar Henke, Politische Säuberung unter französischer Besatzung: Die Entnazifizierung in Württemberg-
Hohenzollern (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1981). For the British occupation politics see for example Ian D. 
Turner, ed., Reconstruction of Post-War Germany: British Occupation Policy and the Western Zones, 1945–1955 
(New York: Berg Publisher, 1989). For the Sowjet occupation, see for example Damian van Melis, Entnazifizierung 
in Mecklenburg Vorpommern: Herrschaft und Verwaltung, 1945–1948 (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1999); Helga A 
Welsh, Revolutionärer Wandel auf Befehl? Entnazifizierungs- und Personalpolitik in Thüringen und Sachsen (1945–
1948) (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1989).  
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democratization.72 Intrigued by the idea of a German Sonderweg (special path) after 1945—a 
path that led from an excessively militarized, war-prone country to a society of peace-loving 
conscientious objectors that would abandon the draft entirely in 2010—scholars have also sought 
to measure the extent to which the experience of total defeat and Allied occupation influenced 
and changed German society. 73 To better understand how the unprecedented brutality of the war 
and Allied occupation reshaped German mentality, scholars have paid attention to the ways 
Germans in the western occupation zones dealt with returning prisoners of war, regarded military 
systems and customs and reacted to the Allied demilitarization policies.74 
Utilizing this literature, this section analyzes how the turmoil of the last months of the 
war and the Allied occupation enabled both conflicting and complementary attitudes toward war 
and the military—its representatives, its customs and its values—to evolve. These developments 
are of vital importance for understanding how West Germans reacted to the idea of rearmament, 
the eventual establishment of the Bundeswehr and the introduction of universal male 
conscription in the 1950s. The complex attitudes that emerged during the last months of the war 
and the early years of occupation reached far beyond the early debates surrounding the 
                                                 
72 See James F. Tent, Mission on the Rhine: Reeducation in American-Occupied Germany (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1982). See further, Heide Fehrenbach, Cinema in Democratizing Germany: Reconstructing National 
Identity after Hitler (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1995); Dolan, “Isolating Nazism.” For the 
French efforts see for example the article by Angelika Ruge-Schatz, “Grundprobleme der Kulturpolitik in der 
Französischen Besatzungszone,“ in Die Deutschlandpolitik Frankreichs und die Französische Zone, 1945–1949, ed. 
Claus Scharf und Hans-Jürgen Schröder (Wiesbaden: F. Steiner, 1983), 91–110. For British efforts see for example, 
Friedhelm Boll, Auf der Suche nach Demokratie: Britische und Deutsche Jugendinitiativen in Niedersachsen nach 
1945 (Bonn: Dietz, 1994). 
73 For the argument that the attitude of many Germans changed dramatically during the last days of the war and 
during the early postwar years, see Jarausch, After Hitler who also includes a discussion of East Germany in his 
analysis. See also Kühne, “‘Friedenskultur,’” 13–33; Wette, “Kann man aus der Geschichte lernen?,” 83–97. 
74 See for example, Biess, Homecomings; Moeller, “The Last Soldiers”; Moeller, “Heimkehr ins Vaterland”; Geyer, 
“Cold War Angst”; Elizabeth Heineman, “The Hour of the Woman: Memories of Germany's ‘Crisis Years’ and 
West German National Identity,” American Historical Review 101 (1996): 354–395. 
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Bundeswehr. They would influence the ways in which West Germans debated and redefined 
ideals of military masculinity in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s. In order to obtain a fuller 
understanding of the meaning of the recurring debates about the masculine complexion of the 
Bundeswehr and the masculine traits of the Bundeswehr soldiers and officers, those notions must 
be analyzed in relation to the early years of the postwar occupation. 
This part thus begins by discussing the agenda of the occupation forces and the ways in 
which the Western Allies sought both to demilitarize Germany and to “re-educate”75 the 
Germans. In a second step, it examines German responses to “total defeat” and the occupation 
programs focusing in particular on how contemporaries assessed the meaning of warfare and the 
value of the military. Looking at different active social groups—including veterans, youth 
groups, and women’s associations—as well as opinion polls, this second part shows that, while 
overall West Germans changed their perceptions about waging war, their attitudes towards 
military service and soldiering remained ambivalent.  
1. Allied Plans and Policies to Demilitarize Postwar Germany 
During the Yalta Conference in February 1945, Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin laid down their 
plans for a defeated postwar Germany:  
It is our inflexible purpose to destroy German militarism and Nazism and to 
ensure that Germany will never again be able to disturb the peace of the world. 
We are determined to disarm and disband all German armed forces; break up for 
all time the German General Staff […] remove and destroy all military 
equipment; eliminate or control all German industry that shall be used for military 
production; bring all war criminals to just and swift justice and […] remove all 
                                                 
75 According to James F. Tent, Allied postwar planners coined the term “reeducation” while the Second World War 
was still in full swing. During the first two postwar years, the term shifted from reeducation to reorientation, because 
the first was perceived as too limited and one-dimensional. See Tent, Mission on the Rhine, 254.  
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Nazi and militarist influence from public office and from all cultural and 
economic life of the German people. 76 
The prime motive behind this ambitious agenda was the firm belief that German militarism, 
especially Prussian militarism, was the major reason for the outbreak of World War II. 
Addressing the House of Commons two years earlier, in September 1943, Churchill had argued 
that “Nazi tyranny” and “Prussian Militarism” were the two “main elements” that influenced 
German life.77 The Prime Minister’s belief was shared by many. It was an “a priori assumption” 
that influenced the agenda of President Roosevelt, many governmental debates in Britain, 
France, and the United States, as well as the final occupation planning of these powers.78  
The speeches, debates and documents that laid down Allied occupation policies lacked, 
however, a coherent definition of what “militarism” was and what a German “militarist” actually 
looked like. While discussing the military history of Germany and the peculiarities of the 
“German people,” US representatives, for instance, did not rely on a single conception of 
militarism. Members of the US government, such as Secretary of State Cordell Hull, frequently 
equated militarism with aggression, meaning that Germany was a war-prone country always 
preparing for or engaged in war.79 Seeking to identify German “militarists,” American, British 
                                                 
76 Quoted in Bessel, Germany 1945, 279–280. For a detailed assessment of the Yalta Conference see Benz, 
Deutschland unter alliierter Besatzung, 81–119.  
77 Charles Eade, ed., Onwards to Victory: War Speeches by the Right Hon. Winston S. Churchill C.H., M.P. 1943 
(London, 1944), 204.  
78 See Nawyn, “‘Striking at the Roots,” 47. For a discussion of these images in the French case see Willis, The 
French in Germany, 92–95. For the British perspective, see Keith Robbins, Present and Past: British Images of 
Germany in the First Half of the Twentieth Century and Their Historical Legacy (Göttingen: Wallstein Verlag, 
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79 Nawyn, “Striking at the Roots,” 53. See also Dolan, “Isolating Nazism,” 34–42. 
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and French postwar planners settled on those who had actively promoted, prepared and directed 
World War II.80 Although this very broad definition included media barons, industrialists, 
political administrators, teachers, and journalists, Allied forces focused primarily on elites within 
the German armed forces. Many US officials, as well as their British and French counterparts, 
associated militarism with Prussia and the German officer corps. Seen as the ultimate 
personification of German militarism, officials stressed in particular the dominance of Prussian 
Junkers—aristocratic families holding large portions of land east of the Elbe River—in the 
German armed forces.81 According to government officials and influential intellectuals, the 
Prussian Junkers and with them most of military’s higher command had developed a “military 
mentality” that transgressed all legitimate military thinking and fueled National Socialism. In 
light of this perception, it was only logical for the Western Allies to insist on the disarmament of 
the entire German military and especially the German General Staff. Speaking in front of the US 
congress in September 1943, President Roosevelt addressed the politicians in this spirit. He 
claimed not only that Hitler and all Nazis had to be defeated, but that the “war-breeding gangs of 
militarists must be rooted out of Germany—and out of Japan—if we are to have any real 
assurance of future peace […].”82 Consequently, following the defeat of Nazi Germany, former 
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German career officers would face the heaviest charges at the hands of the Allied occupation 
forces.  
Nevertheless, the Allies were not only concerned about the “militaristic thinking” of 
high-ranking Nazis or the influential officer corps. American, British and French postwar 
planners also believed that “militaristic thinking” pervaded German society. Indeed, it was the 
militaristic mentality of German society as a whole that had enabled the military establishment to 
maintain its influence for so long and allowed Hitler to pursue his destructive war. 83 As a result, 
government officials of all Allied powers concluded that the mere removal of all high-ranking 
officers and the disarmament of all armed forces would not suffice. If the Allies wanted to 
eliminate Nazism and German militarism once and for all and ensure long-term peace, they had 
to deal with the entire German nation, not just its elites.84  
This ambitious agenda, however, did not translate immediately into the comprehensive 
social and cultural programs. In the case of the Soviet Union and France, concerns about the 
countries’ own recovery, security and demands for reparations prevailed at first. Because the 
Soviet Union and France had suffered major invasions at the hands of Germany, Joseph Stalin 
and Charles de Gaulle were eager to re-assert the power of their respective countries and ensure 
that Germany could never again wage war against its neighbors.85 Given the utter destructiveness 
of World War II, the reconstruction of France and Russia was, not surprisingly, deemed more 
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important than the re-education and thus reconstruction of the defeated Germany. Due to this 
political agenda, the idea of Germany’s reeducation and reorientation played at first a minor role 
in French and Soviet policy, even though some French intellectual and political leaders had 
developed plans to convert Germany into “civilized” country, taking the French as an example.86  
The British and US governments likewise did not lack political hardliners who put 
Germany’s reeducation and reorientation last and primarily aimed for a politics of revenge. Most 
famously US Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau produced the rigid “Morgenthau Plan,” 
which envisioned a deindustrialized, agrarian post-war Germany. Morgenthau’s British 
counterpart was the Chief Diplomatic Advisor to the British Government between 1938 and 
1941, Robert Gilbert Vansittart, who referred to the Germans as a “race of hooligans.”87 Toward 
the end of the war, however, it was Winston Churchill who proclaimed that the Germans 
“combine in the most deadly manner the qualities of the warrior and slave.”88 Emphasizing that 
the “German people” had “twice in our lifetime, and also three times in that of our fathers […] 
plunged the world into their wars of expansion and aggression,” Churchill demanded that harsh 
measures be taken to prevent any future German resurgence.89  
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The De-militarization and Re-Orientation Policies of the Western Allies during the First 
Postwar Years 
Despite these aggressive statements, Britain’s as well as American long-term perspectives came 
to focus on the “re-education” and “re-orientation” of the German society as well as the reform 
of Germany’s political structures. This agenda was mainly due to the experience of World War I 
and the interwar period. Since plans to keep Germany from waging another war by eradicating 
its “physical ability to commit acts of aggression” had failed after 1918, Allied planners came to 
agree that this time they also had to succeed in destroying Germany’s aggressive “spirit.”90 
Moreover, the continuing tensions between the Western powers and the Soviets, which already 
complicated wartime planning, led the Western Allies to consider the Western parts of Germany 
as potential allies. Yet, in order to form such an alliance, the German mentality and politics 
needed to be altered. 
Before the British, French or American occupation forces could introduce specific 
programs to advance their agenda of “re-education” and “re-orientation,” however, they first 
needed to address more urgent problems, which stemmed both from the transition from war to 
postwar and from fighting to occupation. Upon their arrival and victory in Germany, Allied 
commanders faced extraordinary logistical problems ranging from the handling of wounded and 
displaced people, clearing rubble, establishing a functioning administrative system and, above 
all, ensuring the security of the Allied troops. In particular, the establishment of security 
represented a major challenge given the massive number of German soldiers and the weapons 
that were still in their hands. By the end of the war, nearly 10 million soldiers were still serving 
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in the Wehrmacht. Apart from the question of how to guard, shelter, and feed so many people, 
the problem of disarmament seemed to be even more urgent. In order to ensure security for their 
own troops and simultaneously transform the physical landscape of Germany from that of a war-
waging nation to a defeated and demilitarized country, bunkers, launching sites for rockets, anti-
aircraft positions, and mine fields had to be destroyed, and the soldiers had to be disarmed.91 
These security concerns also influenced the internment of large segments of West German 
society. Determined to detain Nazi ideologues, supporters, and affiliates, members of the military 
General Staff and High Command, members of paramilitary organizations such as the 
Sturmabteilung (SA) and Schutzstaffel (SS); and leaders of the Hitler Youth, League for German 
Girls, and Labor Front, Allied forces established a net of military and civilian internment 
camps.92  
While the physical demilitarization of Germany was underway, Allied policy makers 
initiated directives that tackled almost every aspect of German social life.93 One of the first steps 
occupation officials took was the banning of military uniforms. Even though members of the 
Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) had initially refrained from banning 
military uniforms due to the shortage of proper clothing in postwar Germany, in July of 1945 the 
Allied Control Council (ACC) issued new directives that explicitly prohibited the wearing of 
military uniforms, thus changing the symbolic meaning of military clothing. Moreover, German 
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soldiers were forced to take off their military medals, badges or any National Socialist insignia.94 
The reason Allied officials chose to ban military clothing and decoration was, as historian 
Konrad H. Jarausch has phrased it, their ambition to break entirely “the defeated population’s 
emotional bond to the military.”95 Since members of SHAEF, the ACC and US President 
Roosevelt saw the uniforms as tailored symbols of Prussian militarism, they had to be removed. 
Recognizing, moreover, that postwar Germany would be a “society of women,”96 Allied postwar 
planners worried about the effect uniforms could have on Germany’s female population. Due to 
the common belief that Germans, and especially German women, were fond of hardened men in 
wrinkle-free uniforms with shiny buttons and decorative braids, Allied officials were certain that 
they had to ban military clothing as one of the first steps in changing the German attitudes 
toward the military.97  
In addition, Allied officials also considered the display of German and especially Nazi 
flags as well as the notorious “Sieg heil” salutation to be offensive. Thus American policymakers 
soon banned the display and the saluting of military and of Nazi flags, the playing of military 
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music or anthems, as well as the performance of military parades and formations, a procedure 
welcomed by some German reporters.98 During the first weeks of the occupation, Allied troops 
also began to rename streets and places and to tear down suspicious street signs. In occupied 
Germany, there would be, of course, no place for a Adolf-Hitler-Straße (Adolf-Hitler-Street) or 
even for a Hindenburgbrücke (Hindenburg Bridge).99 From the public streets and places Allied 
occupation forces also descended upon museums and libraries and inspected drawers, file 
cabinets and bookshelves in order to confiscate and destroy Nazi propaganda, militaristic 
literature and military training manuals. The Allied forces thus sought not only to change the 
physical and cultural landscape of Germany, but also to alter social life and cultural symbols of 
National Socialism and German military tradition.100  
The purging of Germany’s social and cultural institutions went hand in hand with the 
reorientation of specific social groups such as Germany’s youth. Traveling through Germany as a 
correspondent for the official army magazine, Army Talk, in the summer and fall of 1945, 
journalist Julian Bach noted that “Young people under nineteen are consistently more Nazi-
minded than their elders, young girls more Nazi minded than young boys […].”101 Bach was not 
alone in arguing that young men and women had been swayed the most by the preaching of the 
Nazi regime. American, British and French postwar planners agreed that if Germany was to be 
re-oriented towards democracy, they needed to focus first and foremost on the German youth. 
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Even though they were not aware of all the details concerning Nazi youth education and 
indoctrination, wartime policymakers knew that the great majority of German youngsters had 
been indoctrinated according to National Socialist’s ideals and had undergone paramilitary 
training.102 Arguing that “man is the product of his environment,” Raymond Schmittlein, head of 
the French Directorate of Public Education, insisted, for example, that the German youth had to 
be placed and educated in a completely different learning environment.103 Consequently, 
government officials first set out to purge German schools of any and all militaristic and Nazi 
influence: Tainted personnel would be dismissed, school curricula and lesson plans changed and 
suspicious textbooks removed from the shelves and, if need be, students’ book bags.104 Second, 
Allied directives targeted schools’ athletic programs. To ensure that Germans, and especially 
German juveniles, would never again form an emotional bond to the military, the ACC issued an 
order to close all clubs, associations or schools that were connected to the military or fostered 
military training. After dissolving the veterans’ association in August, ACC officials banned all 
athletic activities that in any way resembled paramilitary training.105  
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Whereas the question of how to deal with the German youth seemed unambiguous, the 
same would not hold true in the case of German women. As mentioned above, Allied officials 
recognized already in 1944 that—whenever they would finally defeat Germany—German 
women would far outnumber German men and that the occupation forces would have to reckon 
with this imbalance. However, officials and others did not agree on whether German women 
would pose a threat to Germany’s democratic reconstruction. Whereas observers such as 
journalist Julian Bach and some government officials noted that women had been—in 
comparison to men—especially prone to Nazism and were still very receptive to military 
customs and values,106 others perceived German women as apolitical and not as prone to Nazism 
as men.107 Despite these frictions, the Allies soon began to promote special women’s magazines 
and radio programs, implement cultural exchange programs, and “encourage women to play a 
part in Local Government and Public Service.”108 In their effort to reeducate and stir Germans in 
the direction of democratic self-government, the Allies sought to get women involved in this 
political process too.  
By targeting particular social groups and institutions, the West Allies implemented 
comprehensive demilitarization and re-orientation programs that fundamentally shaped West 
German attitudes towards military service and war. The presence of Allied forces and the 
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comprehensive attempts to eradicate German Nazism and military greatly influenced the ways 
negotiated rearmament in the following years.  
2. Conflicting Attitudes towards War and the Military in Postwar West Germany 
However, Allied postwar programs were not the only events, however, that influenced (West) 
German attitudes. For many Germans—soldiers and civilians alike—the moment of evaluating 
their own military zeal and the rightness of the war came even before the victorious allies fully 
established their demilitarization and reorientation programs. Seeking to understand how World 
War II and especially its traumatic end shaped Germany’s postwar society, historians emphasize 
the bloodbath of the final four months. After the Wehrmacht had fought successful battles and 
tormented enemy soldiers and the civilian population of occupied territory with unimaginable 
forms of violence, by 1945 the tide had turned decisively. As historian Richard Bessel has 
pointed out, “never has there been a killing frenzy to match what occurred in Germany at the 
beginning of 1945.”109 Between January and April 1945, the German Wehrmacht lost almost 1,5 
million soldiers and auxiliaries. Stressing the intensity of the killing, Bessel argues that the 
fighting that took place at the end of the war left an indelible mark on German soldiers and 
civilians who experienced and survived it. 
Despite the increasing brutality and the devastating losses during the last month of the 
war, many of the almost 10 million men and women who were still serving in May 1945 
continued to fight.110 They did so for very different reasons. While some still believed in the 
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National Socialist cause and thought that Germany could still win the war, many soldiers—
especially on the Eastern Front—would not stop fighting out of sheer fear of what would happen 
to the mainly female German population if the Russians were to win and occupy Germany. 
Especially during the last months of the war, the Nazi propaganda machine flooded Germany 
with horrific imagery of “subhumane” and “animalistic” Russians who would rape every German 
woman they could get their hands on, and murder innocent elder people and children.111  Other 
soldiers, however, simply tried to hold the lines because of the draconian measures that leading 
Wehrmacht and SS officers employed to keep men from deserting. To ensure that every German 
man continued to fight to the death for the Reich and Führer, the regime sent “death squads” to 
the front lines that were empowered to execute Wehrmacht soldiers who seemed to have deserted 
or lost their units. German men who abandoned their position thus had more to fear from their 
own regime than from the enemy.112 
Yet, historians emphasize that the draconian measures used by the Wehrmacht leadership 
could not avert the chaos that marked the last weeks of the German armed forces. Since most of 
the last battles fought in the European theater of World War II took place within Germany, it 
became easier for Wehrmacht soldiers to leave their units. Even though many soldiers would still 
cling to their military outfit, hundreds chose to change their uniforms into civilian dresses and 
                                                 
For these numbers and a discussion of the history of these women, the historiography and memory, see Karen 
Hagemann, “Mobilizing Women for War: The History, Historiography, and Memory of German Women’s War 
Service in the Two World Wars,” Journal of Military History, 75: 3 (October 2011): 1055–1093. 
111 See Atina Grossmann, “A Question of Silence: The Rape of German Women by Occupation Soldiers,” in West 
Germany Under Construction: Politics, Society, and Culture in the Adenauer Era, ed. Robert G. Moeller (Ann 
Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1997), 33–52.  
112 See Richard Bessel, Nazism and War (New York: Modern Library, 2006), 175–177. These measures greatly 
trumped the “shock therapy” that medical Wehrmacht personnel used to “heal” “psychotic” patients in field 
hospitals. For this digression see Svenja Goltermann, Die Gesellschaft der Überlebenden: Deutsche 
Kriegsheimkehrer und ihre Gewalterfahrungen im Zweiten Weltkrieg (Munich: Dt. Verl.-Anst, 2009), 181–189. 
 
 
46 
melt into a civilian population that spoke the same language and oftentimes encouraged the 
eagerness with which many soldiers would renounce their military duties.113 In the fall of 1944 
and the spring of 1945, when the lines of the Wehrmacht were crumbling and World War II was 
fought at the doorsteps of most German homes, civilians and soldiers alike lost their conception 
of warfare as a symbol of national superiority, if they had not done so before. The war had turned 
into a horrendous nightmare.114 Told mainly by women, the civilian tales of suffering at the end 
of the war included the horrors of air raids that destroyed houses, farms, and livestock. 
According to rough estimates, by the end of the war 20–30 percent of the houses in the western 
part of Germany had been lost.115 In addition, German women who survived bombings, 
starvation, and expulsion still had good reasons to fear enemy forces. For many German women 
and girls living in the east, the end of World War II came in the form of sexual violence.116 
Given the deprivations and violence of the war, civilians understandably did not want the last 
stand of the Third Reich to be in their own backyards. Writing on April 30, 1945 about the last 
fights in Deisendorf, a village near Lake Constance, Private Karl Jering noted in his diary that he 
was pressured to “immediately put on civilian clothes,” because the village was now “an open 
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city and all soldiers had to leave immediately.”117 Whereas Wehrmacht soldiers had once stood 
as the shining heroes of the Third Reich, during the final month of the war many civilians saw 
them as a threat to a more peaceful defeat and postwar life. 
The willingness with which many soldiers, especially those of the lower ranks, 
abandoned their military uniforms continued after the official end of the war. Numerous accounts 
by former Wehrmacht soldiers attest to the great relief many men felt when they were finally 
able to take off their uniforms.118 Interviewed by the Stuttgarter Zeitung in January 1946, a 
returning POW complained about the difficulties he had in obtaining civilian clothing. Eager to 
get rid of his uniform he lamented, “I had no yearning for tails, a tuxedo, no, only for—finally, 
after six years—getting out of the uniform and putting on something civilian-like.”119 As 
historian Kathleen Nawyn explains, many German soldiers eagerly embraced their new civilian 
life for numerous reasons. As mentioned above, multiple directives and bans were implemented 
following the Allies’ victory that rendered the wearing of military uniforms impossible. Second, 
for Wehrmacht soldiers and officers, who had to fear Allied internment and prosecution, donning 
civilian clothing was a welcome disguise. Third, after six years of war, the now ragged, tattered, 
and dirty uniforms represented not only Germany’s defeat, but also the defeat of the individual 
soldier who wore it. For many soldiers, their uniforms stood as physical reminders of the war and 
defeat they wanted to forget. Fourth, in contrast to soldiers and officers who had volunteered for 
military service, the identity of thousands of draftees was not shaped primarily by military life. 
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Hence, many did not lament the loss of their military life and clothing, but were happy to return 
to families and civilian careers.120  
Although numerous, especially lower-rank soldiers were happy to hide, mothball or 
destroy their uniforms and, with them, all memories of the lost war, this would not hold true for 
many officers who had joined the ranks voluntarily and had made the military their profession. 
Among the more than 10 million POWs that the Allied forces interned at the end of the war were 
numerous high-ranking officers and also members of the former German general staff.121 Subject 
to different treatment than enlisted men, most general staff officers ranking from captain to 
colonel underwent careful screening during their internment. They would then be discharged of 
their POW status, and either moved to civilian internment camps or—in case of alleged war 
criminals and witnesses—to Dachau and Nuremberg.122 Those high-ranking officers who were 
not put on trial usually returned home after two years, stripped of their status and majestic aura. 
Often ill, injured and dressed in the same ragged uniforms as enlisted men, many high-ranking 
officers were but mere shadows of their former selves. Despite the experience of barbarous 
warfare, total defeat and, in many cases, harsh internment, some officers refused to relinquish 
their uniforms, as they saw no need to dissociate themselves from their former lives and military 
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careers. In contrast to many Wehrmacht draftees, most of these officers thought of soldiering as 
their profession and not as a temporary occupation. During the glorious days of the Third Reich, 
the military had offered these men a comfortable life that not only brought financial benefits, but 
also heightened social status. Now stripped of their former privileges and imprisoned, ex-officers 
found themselves in a miserable situation. Not surprisingly, many left the internment camps 
bitter and resentful of the treatment they experienced at the hands of the Allied forces.123 
Compounding their discontent were, on the one hand, various allied directives that 
targeted former Wehrmacht, SS, SA, and Gestapo personnel and, on the other, their reception by 
the German civilian population. Eager to weaken the social status of Germany’s military elites 
and to prevent them from regaining strength, the Allies enacted directives—above all the ACC’s 
Law No. 34 from August 20, 1946— that made illegal all veterans organizations and all other 
military and “quasi-military” groups as well as associations that were considered keeping 
militarism alive. The law moreover confiscated the financial assets of veterans and veteran 
associations, proscribed the preferential treatment of former military personnel over civilians, 
and prohibited the restoration of a military pension following previous German models.124 In 
addition to being deprived of their social status, former Wehrmacht personnel now had to make 
their way to the public welfare centers (Führsorgeämter).125 For many married and family men 
this fate entailed the inability to function as the traditional male supporter and breadwinner of 
their family.  
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Anti-War and Anti-Military Attitudes in Postwar West Germany 
Upon returning home during the early postwar years, many former high-ranking officers, and 
enlisted men also encountered a society that questioned the achievements of the German 
military.126 To be sure, numerous news reports and photographs depicting returning POWs bear 
witness to the warm welcome former soldiers received from families and friends. After month of 
worrying about the whereabouts of family members who fought at the front,127 many Germans 
were just relieved that their sons, brothers and husbands were alive and had returned home.128 
Yet, whereas German society welcomed back its men, it did not necessarily welcome back its 
soldiers. Believing that something had changed in postwar Germany, the American journalist 
Julian Bach remarked, for instance, “unlike 1919, the returning German soldier has been greeted, 
not as ‘hero’ with flowers thrown in his path as he marched home […] but as an ‘unfortunate 
fool’ as he comes home straggling in off a crowed train in a half destroyed station.”129 The cold 
welcome at bombed-out train stations was intensified by hostile attitudes towards military 
symbols. Ignoring the severe lack of proper civilian clothing and fabrics, some civilians 
criticized men who returned home and continued to wear their uniform.130 
                                                 
126 Kühne, Kameradschaft, 225. 
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In many families the profound joy of welcoming back fathers, husbands, and sons were 
also soon overshadowed by the daily hardships of living in a defeated, war-torn country and by 
the physical and mental suffering of individual men. While they had greatly anticipated the 
return of their loved-ones, many German women soon learned that returning soldiers were not 
able to provide the hoped-for support, stability and authority.  Instead, many war veterans were 
soon considered an additional burden.131 Thus, for many veteran families, the war and men’s 
military service did not pay off in the ways that the National Socialist regime had promised for 
so long.  
This profound change of attitude was not only visible at train stations all over Germany. 
Based on data collected between April 26, 1946 and August 4, 1947, OMGUS representatives 
reported that 96 percent of the people interviewed rejected the statement “Only by war can the 
human spirit be glorified,” while 94 percent agreed with the statement “War does not pay off.”132 
This profound “No More War!” (Nie wieder Krieg!) attitude that had been characteristic of the 
peace movement during the Weimar Republic”133 was also reflected in public statements by 
important political leaders. During a founding ceremony of the Social Democratic Party (SPD) in 
southern Wurttemberg on February 10, 1946, Carlo Schmid, a leading member of the party, 
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proclaimed that he never again wanted “to send our sons into the barracks.”134 Even if Germany 
was to become the battlefield in yet another war, Schmid declared, he did not want German 
people to participate: “ […] well, then we will cease to exist knowing that it was not us who 
committed and encouraged the crime.”135 For Schmid, the possibility of Germany, that is 
German men, causing or even participating in yet another war, was unthinkable. 
As Schmid rejected any attempt to draft young men once again for the military and send 
them off to battle, he voiced an opinion that would find its most vivid expression in author 
Wolfgang Borchert’s 1947 “This is our manifesto.” The manifesto—published with his famous 
story Draußen vor der Tür (The Men Outside)—represented a clear statement against war and 
military service in which Borchert criticized the idea of war as an expression of superb 
manliness:  
Virile (männlicher) song of men – did no one hear the children bawling away 
their fear of purple maw of the guns?  
Heroic song of men – did they not hear the hearts, sobbing when they sang 
upidee, the grimy, the crusty, the bearded, the lousy?136  
Insisting that the war had made German men neither “hard” nor “rough,”137 Borchert challenged 
the belief propagated in nineteenth-century and Nazi Germany that only military service could 
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turn men into “real” men who would prove their superiority on the battlefield.138 In light of the 
millions of deaths and the hundreds of thousands of wounded soldiers returning home, many 
Germans bid farewell to war as a measure of national superiority made visible by men of 
outstanding martial and manly qualities. 
In addition to literary works, the extent to which many, especially younger Germans had 
changed their attitude towards military service and war became clear in the arguments 
surrounding the creation of constitutions for the new federal states (Länder). As mentioned 
above, the defeat of National Socialist Germany entailed the dissolution of the German Reich. In 
reaction to the politics of the Soviet Union and eager to establish a federal democratic 
government, the Western Allies began to reconstruct and establish new federal states in 1946. 
This process entailed the development of state constitutions that began in the American zone in 
1946. Three of the first Länder to receive constitutions were Bavaria, Hessen, and Württemberg-
Baden.139 The contents of the state constitutions differed greatly with respect to war and military 
service. The Bavarian constitution of 1947, for instance, codified the right of every male “state 
citizen” (Staatsbürger) to refuse to render “war service.”140 In addition to showing that the 
possibility of a new war was thinkable, the provision bears witness to the understanding that if 
Germany would participate in yet another war, West German men should have the right to object 
to military service. 
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In contrast, Württemberg-Baden’s constitution did not include such a right.141 In the fall 
of 1947, the Württemberg-Baden’s constitution and state parliament (Landestag) in Stuttgart 
came under fire because of this shortcoming. Unsettled by the growing tensions between the 
Soviet Union and the Western Allies to which both parties reacted by increasing their military 
presence in central Europe, German adolescents became greatly concerned about the probability 
of a new war. Recognizing that West Germany’s youth, especially adolescent males, would be 
the first to be sent to the frontlines of this new war, Stuttgart’s youth parliament—representing 
roughly 37,000 organized young people—asked the legislators to amend the state’s constitution 
in such a way that no one could be forced to serve in the military—either by bearing arms or in 
any auxiliary capacity.142 Following intense negotiations, in April 1948 the state parliament 
accepted a law stating that “No one shall be forced to render war service with arms.”143 Although 
the terminology used was gender neutral, the parliamentary debates showed that most 
participants thought mainly of men when discussing the right to object to military service. A 
member of the Christian Democratic Union opposed the youth parliament’s request by arguing in 
parliament that if the law was approved, the defense of the “fatherland” would be left to “old 
hags and spinsters”—an eventuality the CDU politician did not support.144  
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By expressing their unwillingness to serve in any military capacity, Stuttgart’s youth 
parliament put an official spin on a general attitude that pervaded many youth groups across the 
country. The declaration “We are all sick and tired of being soldiers,”145 as recorded by US 
government officials in September 1948, was an attitude held by hundreds of young men. The 
refusal to become a soldier once again was eagerly expressed by organized youth members of the 
labor unions. Although the Confederation of German Trade Unions (Deutscher 
Gewerkschaftsbund, DGB), founded on October 12, 1949 and representing nearly 5 million 
members, would come to support rearmament in the 1950s, the regional labor unions and many 
of their industrial branches established in 1946 and 1947 in all four Allied zones, were much less 
sympathetic. In the late 1940s, the Hessian Youth Executive Board of the Industrial Union of 
Chemistry, Paper, and Ceramic declared for example that they did not intend to “march into 
death” for “cheap cheers of praise” or “cheap medals.”146 The group thus rejected the 
glorification of soldiering and warfare that prevailed in Nazi and Imperial Germany.  
The critical attitude of the union’s youth can be explained by the experiences many 
young people in their late teens had undergone during the last years of World War II and during 
the first years of Allied occupation. Their traumatic experiences during the Endkampf (final 
battle) at the front and home front—for example, as part of the Volkssturm—help to explain the 
postwar reluctance of young men even to think about armed forces and military service.147 Even 
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though signs of the Third Reich’s inevitable defeat were already visible along the front lines in 
late summer 1944, surrender was not an option for the National Socialist leadership. Accepting 
only total victory or total defeat, the Nazis began accepting volunteers as young as sixteen years 
old. Thus by 1945 the war had claimed the lives of approximately 462,000 young men born 
between 1925 and 1929. 148 Added to the death toll of the young soldiers was a high number of 
civilian casualties, because those who had escaped recruitment and stayed home were, in many 
cases, not better off. While working in war industries and enduring food shortages, children and 
adolescents could not escape the omnipresence of death. As the lines of the Wehrmacht began 
crumbling, their lives were ruled more and more by starvation, forced evacuations, lack of 
housing, horror stories about advancing enemy troops, frightful nights in air raid shelters, as well 
as the loss of friends and family members.149  
In light of these experiences, the union’s youth executive board seems to have expressed 
the opinion of many young men and women of their generation, when it maintained that instead 
of going to war, they wanted to “live and work for ourselves, for our families and our 
country.”150 Supported by other youth organizations such as the social-democratic organization 
Socialist Youth of Germany, the Falcons (Sozialistische Jugend Deutschlands – Die Falken), 
which was re-founded in April 1947, the adolescents rejected the notion of gaining honor and 
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praise by participating in war. Instead of fighting for their families on the front line, young men 
sought to support and protect their families by entering the civilian work force.151 
Most importantly, this strong emphasis on the right to refuse any form of military service 
also accompanied the drafting of West Germany’s constitution, the Basic Law. Following the 
meeting of constitutional experts at former Herrenchiemsee Abbey in Bavaria, the Parliamentary 
Council, consisting of 70 state delegates, convened in the fall of 1948 to deliberate the first draft 
of the Basic Law. During the meeting of the main committee, the leading politician of the 
Communist Party, Heinz Renner, petitioned that the Basic Law should grant “every citizen” the 
right to refuse conscription.152 By proposing an article that would govern the right to refuse 
military service, Renner could feel certain that he had the support of many peace activists. The 
members of the Parliamentary Council had received petitions from citizens and social groups 
who wanted not only to affirm their longing for peace, but also to ensure that the right to refuse 
military service was included in the Basic Law.153 Among the groups who petitioned were the 
Berliner Women’s League 1947 (Berliner Frauenbund 1947) and the German Peace Society 
(Deutsche Friedensgesellschaft, DFG). Originally founded in 1892, the DFG—as one of the 
leading peace organizations—was reestablished in 1945. Assuming that only male citizens would 
be threatened by a military draft, the DFG maintained that the constitution should explicitly grant 
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every German the right to refuse war or military service of any kind, “without fearing any 
negative repercussion for his own person, his family and his fortune.”154   
Renner’s petition was not only supported by extra-parliamentary groups, but also by the 
SPD-politician Fritz Eberhard, against whom the Nazis had issued an arrest warrant because he 
was a member of the International Socialist Militant League (Internationale Sozialistische 
Kampfbund). 155  Despite his support, the Social Democratic proposal, which was discussed on 
December 3, 1948, was rather limited. It stated that “[n]o one may be forced against his 
conscience to render armed war service” (Kriegsdienst mit der Waffe).156 According the SPD 
representatives only members of small religious groups—including Jehovah’s Witnesses, 
Mennonites or Quakers—that had already born witness to their “true conscience” during the 
reign of the National Socialists could make use of this right.157 This meant that according to the 
SPD proposal only a small number of people who had followed their religious beliefs and 
refused military service despite the terror and pressure of the Nazi regime would be allowed to 
refuse armed war service in the future.  
While the politicians thus stated that they had learned their lessons from World War II, 
their decision to restrict the right to refuse “war service” was also influenced by the growing 
tensions of the Cold War. Given the communist threat, Eberhard and others also argued that in 
order for the future West Germany to defend itself only a limited group of people could be 
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allowed to become conscientious objectors.158 For SPD-politicians Georg-August Zinn, who 
would become the prime minister of Hessen in 1950, the proposed article should above all not 
enable “quitters” (Drückeberger) from refusing to fulfill their military duty.159 By seeking to 
prevent the anticipated “abuse” of the article, Zinn employed a gendered stereotype that Nazi 
propaganda had exploited extensively during World War II and that still bore significant 
meaning in postwar Germany. Men who refused to participate in battle and fight alongside his 
comrades until the end were spurned as cowards or quitters.160  
In contrast to the SPD politicians who wanted to include the right to refuse war service in 
the Basic Law, the FDP politician Theodor Heuss, who would become the first president of the 
Federal Republic in 1949, refused the proposal point-blank. Anticipating that militarists might 
see him as one of their own, while pacifists would scorn him as a “reactionary,” Heuss cautioned 
against a “mass-wearing of conscience”161 (Abnutzung des Gewissens) if the SPD’s proposal 
would be put into action. He maintained that members of the above mentioned religious groups 
could still render some form of military service without weapons.162 Yet, Theodor Heuss’ 
argument would not bear fruit for his parliamentary colleagues did not believe that Germans 
would abuse the right to refuse armed war service. Thus, in the end, the Basic Law that would 
take effect on 23 May 1949 included the right to object military service: Article 4, Sub-clause 3 
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stated that “[n]o one may be compelled against his conscience to render war service as an armed 
combatant. Full particulars are regulated by federal Law.”163   
Continuing Positive Perceptions of Military Service  
Notwithstanding the legal codification of conscientious objection, the unambiguous results of 
opinion polls and the dismissive attitude of peace activists, women’s associations, and Christian, 
socialist and union-based youth groups, Germany’s early postwar attitude toward war, military 
service, and soldiering would prove to be far more complex. For instance, these sentiments were 
not shared by many former Nazis and Wehrmacht members who held officer ranks. Moreover, in 
light of the rising Cold War tensions, conservative politicians in the CDU and its sister party, the 
Christian Social Union of Bavaria (Christlich Soziale Union in Bayern, CSU) became more and 
more concerned about the anti-military and anti-war attitudes. Seeking to come to terms with 
Germany’s military past, others tried to differentiate between the atrocities of the NS-State and 
its political and military leaders and the performance of the ordinary Wehrmacht soldiers and 
officers.  
This complexity of conflicting attitudes becomes apparent, for example, in the reactions 
of the German public to the Nuremberg war crime trials that began in November of 1945. In the 
course of the individual trials, the interrogation of leading Wehrmacht officers and the results of 
the hearings made the headlines of German newspapers, thereby informing the public of the 
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findings.164 Even though the prosecutors at the German denazification tribunals declared the vast 
majority of officers to be innocent of war crimes, postwar rhetoric still labeled them as potential 
militarists.  Following the perceived “dishonorable” treatment during Allied internment, the 
Nuremberg tribunals stirred anger and indignation among many officers as they claimed that the 
Allies had singled them out for unjust punishment and defamation. In contrast to enraged 
officers, many Germans seemed to have ignored the Nuremberg Proceedings. 165 They were 
either preoccupied with the devastation of their own lives or simply chose to ignore unpleasant 
facts about their past. Others, glad to have escaped blame, expressed satisfaction that responsible 
members of the Nazi leadership were being tried. After all, the trials suggested that the majority 
had only “followed orders from above.” Guilt and responsibility for all atrocities of the Third 
Reich were delegated to the political and military leadership of the NS state.166  
This attitude allowed conservative-minded Germans as well as former officers and 
soldiers to portray the German Wehrmacht as ensnared and manipulated by the National Socialist 
regime. As a result, a specific ideal of German Soldatentum (soldierdome) emerged from the 
trials intact. As historian Jörg Echternkamp points out, one of the results of the war crime trials 
was a distinction between the misguided National Socialist soldier, on the one hand, and 
timeless, positive soldierly values on the other. Looking at the licensed press in occupied West 
Germany, Echternkamp argues that in the wake of the trials journalists, politicians and former 
Wehrmacht soldiers sought to defend the honor of what they believed to be a “true” and 
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“normal” soldier.167 This kind of soldier was not only characterized by many as a “nice guy” 
(feiner Kerl), but he was said to embody timeless values such as honor, discipline, vigor and 
chivalry. The National Socialists, the argument went, had, however, hijacked and corrupted the 
ideal of the true, honorable soldier and turned it into the perverted version of the 
Kommisskopf.168  
In addition to distinguishing the “true” and honorable soldier from the Nationalist 
Socialist sort, conservative contemporaries eagerly drew a distinction between Soldatentum and 
militarism. Writing in 1947, Gottfried Hansen, the former Wehrmacht Admiral and now 
functionary of the newly founded German veteran associations,169 stated that “[m]ilitarism is a 
political lesson.” For him militarism was identical with a brutal, bellicose policy of an 
ideologically misguided state like the Third Reich. In contrast, he defined Soldatentum as “a 
conception of duty, of absolute human virtues like love of country and loyalty, obedience and 
bravery.”170 While such a distinction was often made by former soldiers such as Hansen for self-
serving purposes, it was not limited to veterans. Studies conducted by Allied research officials 
indicate that many others in post-war Germany, especially so-called “opinion leaders,” supported 
this distinction too. To learn more about their beliefs, OMGUS interviewed, in the fall and 
                                                 
167 Echternkamp, “Arbeit am Mythos,” 437. See further Kühne, Kameradschaft, 230–231. 
168 Kommisskopf is a difficult term to translate. This pejorative term is used to describe a soldier who embodies 
military values and customs in a negative way. A Kommisskopf is generally associated with slavish obedience, the 
lack of individual, critical thinking and overtly harsh drill. Echternkamp, “Arbeit am Mythos,” 441.  
169 Gottfried Hansen was also one of the most active former Wehrmacht generals who fought for the “rights” of 
former soldiers and against decrees such as ACC’s Law No. 34. See Manig, Die Politik der Ehre, 93–98. 
170 Quoted and translated in Lockenour, Soldiers as Citizens, 14. For the history of the concept of militarism and its 
critics, see Werner Conze and Michael Geyer, “Militarismus,” in Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe: Historisches 
Lexikon zur politisch-sozialen Sprache in Deutschland, Vol. 4 (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1978), 1–47. 
 
 
63 
summer of 1947, approximately 200 people, including public officials, representatives of various 
political parties, church representatives, educators, publishers as well as “representatives of 
labor, business and other professions” in the four zones. Based on these interviews OMGUS 
officials reported in early 1948 that these “opinion leaders” exhibited a “strong tendency […] to 
differentiate between militarism—which was usually condemned—and Soldatentum, for which 
the majority expressed anything from toleration to admiration.”171 According to the results of an 
Information Control Review, Political Analysis and Public Opinion, most respondents had 
moreover described militarism as an attitude “characterized by an exaggeration of the healthy 
and natural instinct of defense, and a distortion and overemphasis of genuine soldierdome.”172 
According to this formulation, being a soldier and having armed forces was not only seen as a 
natural instinct of any society and therefore normal, but also inherently good and beneficial.  
While the ideal of a “genuine” Soldatentum hence survived the total defeat of the German 
armies, it was not the only such ideal to survive the war. Intrigued by the German state of mind, 
OGMUS officials had furthermore developed a questionnaire for the interviewed “opinion 
leaders” that focused among other things on the issue of “military education as a form of 
character building.”173 According to the general results of the questionnaire, the majority stated 
that Germany’s postwar youth needed to be taught “discipline, order and respect for society.”174 
The report quoted leading figures such as Berlin based Protestant Otto Dilschneider, a member 
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of the Church Council of the Old-Prussian Union (Kirchenleitung der Evangelischen Kirche der 
altpreußischen Union) and the 1945-founded Cultural Association for the Renewal of Germany 
(Kulturbund zur demokratischen Erneuerung Deutschlands),175who argued that conscription 
could have positive effects on German male youth. Linking military and Christian duty, he also 
asserted that a “man must learn to bear arms as well as his cross.”176 Dilschneider expressed the 
conviction both that military service was a duty that men, and especially Christian men, had to 
carry, and also that military service would have positive effects on the behavior and character of 
young men. This traditional belief reached back to the era of the Anti-Napoleonic Wars. The 
implementation of “universal conscription” for young men in Prussia in 1813 and 1814 entailed 
not only a close link between military service and civic rights, but also the conception of military 
service as a rite of passage from boyhood to manhood.177 
In contrast to this opinion, however, the OMGUS report on “German militarism” further 
stated that the majority of interviewees had expressed opinions similar to that of the Bavarian 
deputy prime minister, Joseph Müller, who had been imprisoned by the Nazis as a member of the 
Catholic resistance in Bavaria. Surviving the concentration camps of Buchenwald and 
Flossenbürg, he was the first elected leader of the CSU in 1945. Two years after the end of 
World War II, Müller believed that military training could indeed inculcate young men with 
positive virtues such as “love of order, cleanliness, respect for duty, and a sense of group 
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feeling.”178 Yet, while he clearly valued these characteristics, he further insisted that they could 
also be developed by “less dangerous methods.”179  In light of the Second World War, the report 
noted, the majority of respondents “considered the dangers of renascent militarism too great” to 
permit the reintroduction of military service in order to train and educate young Germans.180 
While the conviction that military service could inculcate in young men valuable and socially 
actable traits thus survived the world wars, it did not do so without suffering damage. Although 
German “opinion leaders” in 1947 were clearly able to imagine the reintroduction of military 
service in some form, they feared that the use of military training as an educational tool could 
result in a recurrence of German (or rather Prussian) militarism, which could again engulf 
Germany in the catastrophe of war. 
Conclusion 
To be sure, the limited results of OMGUS questionnaires and studies from 1947 should not be 
generalized. Yet, if analyzed together with Germans’ reactions to the Nuremberg trials, they shed 
light on important continuities that run counter to the general process of physical and mental 
demilitarization. Without doubt, in the light of total war and defeat, an overwhelming majority of 
Germans who had previously heralded governments’ military ambitions began to regard warfare 
as a horrendous nightmare. Instead of offering men the ultimate possibility to prove their 
manliness, for most Germans war had now been transformed into an event that would leave 
behind innumerable corpses as well as crippled and embittered veterans. Hence, most Germans 
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wanted never again to see the establishment of German armed forces or Germany’s involvement 
into any kind of war. Yet neither military values nor the concept of Soldatentum were 
irrecoverable.  Contemporaries continued to believe in a timeless and beneficial soldierly virtue, 
free of National Socialist ideology and militarism that existed independently of political 
circumstances. Seeing military service as a duty generally fulfilled by men, many Germans were 
certain that the military was one of many institutions that could inculcate socially accepted 
manly qualities. Although these ideas might seem inconsequential, they would both complicate 
West Germany’s rearmament process in the 1950s and enable West Germans to accept the 
introduction of universal male conscription.  
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PART II: 
DEFINING THE NEW SOLDIER: DEBATES ABOUT MILITARY MASCULINITY 
BEFORE THE REARMAMENT OF THE FRG, 1949–1954
In December 1948, it seemed as if American, British, and French postwar planners had struggled 
in vain. Allied occupation forces already evaluated their efforts to reeducate the West German 
population while the individual demilitarization and democratization programs were still 
underway. Writing about various kinds of social gatherings in and around the southern town of 
Heidelberg, US officials noted that the “American Military Government has not succeeded in 
convincing the Germans that war and militarism are evil.”181 After all, the observers reported, 
some Germans were already demanding the establishment of a new German army and stated that 
they would gladly don another set of military uniforms. Yet, a few months later, in April 1949, 
another OMGUS intelligence report indicated that German men had no intentions of fighting 
another war:  
Much has been heard about preventing Germany from waging an aggressive war 
in the future. Judging from the reactions obtained from these plain people who 
walk the streets anonymously and who must do all the real fighting when a war 
actually presents itself, it will be difficult to get Germany to fight even a 
defensive war. The plain man on the street has had enough of war. He is tired of 
it, afraid of it, and wants nothing more to do with it.182
                                                 
181 Intelligence Report, 23 Dec 48, Dec 48, NA, RG 260, OMGUS, OMGWB, Box 458, F: Weekly Intelligence 
Reports. 4 Nov. 48 to 27 Jan. 49 Vol. IV. Quoted in Nawyn, “Striking at the Roots,” 486. 
182 Intelligence Report, 24 Mar 49, NA, RG 260, OMGUS, Box 458, F: Weekly Intelligence Reports. 3 Feb. 49 to 28 
Aug. 49 Vol. V. 
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In contrast to the previous observation, this report suggested that “ordinary” Germans had 
learned their lessons and that Allied officials had succeeded in eradicating Germans’ military 
zeal.  
These contradictory observations, which indicated that Germans harbored conflicting 
attitudes towards war and soldiering, puzzled not only US officials who had been assigned to 
implement West Germany’s complete demilitarization. They also complicated the work of the 
Allied and West German officials who sought to respond to the growing Cold War tensions by 
putting West Germans back into military uniforms. The relationship between the Western Allies 
and the Soviet Union was already strained at the end of World War II, because both parties had 
very different ideas about how to handle defeated Germany. But in the late 1940s disagreements 
grew to outright hostilities. Following conflicts in the Allied Control Council and the beginning 
of the Berlin Blockade in the summer of 1948, United States officials began debating secretly the 
option of including West Germany in a joint Western defense effort. As international relations 
continued to deteriorate in the early 1950s, secret considerations turned into public deliberations. 
By 1952, the United States, Britain, and France, together with the Benelux (Belgium, the 
Netherlands, and Luxembourg) and Italy openly supported the establishment of a West German 
contingent in the context of a European Defense Community (EDC).183  
These decisions represented not only an extraordinary turn in international geopolitics. 
Following a period that was marked by total war and defeat, complete demilitarization and 
democratic reorientation, the decision also posed an enormous challenge to the entire West 
German society. Given Germans’ contentious attitudes, the possible need for West German 
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Plevenplan  (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1982), 325–402. 
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troops stirred immediate public reactions and, in most cases, outright protest. Already worried 
about the rising global tensions, several leftist youth groups, liberal women’s associations, and 
Christian peace activists continued to express strong anti-war and anti-military sentiments.184 
Others however, especially several veterans’ associations and conservative youth groups, did not 
reject rearmament. They only rejected it as long as former Wehrmacht personnel were still being 
“defamed” and detained by the Allies.185   
Inside the parliamentary halls and governmental offices of the newly founded Federal 
Republic of Germany, the idea of rearming the country led to several debates of unprecedented 
vehemence. Whereas the first chancellor of the Federal Republic, Konrad Adenauer, and the 
small majority of his governing coalitions186 embraced the idea of West German armed forces, 
his political opponents—most notably, the KPD and the SPD—keenly rejected it.187 The conflict 
of opinions stemmed not only from the political convictions of individual politicians and 
factions, but also from the different lessons parliamentarians had learned during and after World 
War II, their interpretation of Soviet power and politics, and their attitude towards the 
establishment of a joint European Defense Community.  
                                                 
184 For an early, but still standard study see, Dietzfelbinger, Die Westdeutsche Friedensbewegung. See also, Werner, 
Die Ohne-Mich-Bewegung.  
185 Manig, Politik der Ehre; Lockenour, Soldiers as Citizens. 
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Bloc/League of Expellees and Deprived of Rights (GB/BHE).  
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Finally, the quarrels between the military experts—including former Reichswehr and 
Wehrmacht officers—whom Adenauer appointed to hash out the details of West Germany’s 
rearmament were just as fierce. Responding to the disagreements between the different political 
parties and the extra-parliamentary protests, the military experts struggled to outline the contours 
of a new West German soldier that would be distinct from its predecessors. These disputes were 
especially intense because the plans focused on a West German contingent that would be part of 
a European defense force and not on an autonomous, national military.188 Consequently, the 
establishment of a West German contingent and the search for a new type of soldier developed 
into a process that would occupy all parts of society and divide the young Federal Republic. 
In light of their vehemence and importance, the early stages of West Germany’s 
rearmament debate have attracted a great deal of scholarly attention. Focusing on the political 
negotiations, studies highlight how the rising tensions of the Cold War complicated West 
Germany’s quest for new soldiers.189 On the national level, studies have analyzed the 
controversies that erupted as government officials and military experts sought to craft blueprints 
for the new West German troops. The findings of these studies have been enriched by analyses 
of the protest organized against the rearmament policy.190 These are important studies, but their 
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insights could have been even greater if they had included the results of recent scholarship that 
focuses on the cultural and gender history of the early postwar period.191 Historians such as 
Robert G. Moeller argue that the ways in which Germans coped with the aftermath of World 
War II involved the re-negotiation of social norms, family structures, and gender roles. In 
particular, the ideal of the “complete” nuclear family was part and parcel of West Germany’s 
postwar reconstruction.192 Rejecting notions of a highly militarized and aggressive masculinity 
that had dominated the Nazi era, this ideal centered on the image of West German men as 
“tamed” breadwinners.193  
Closely examining these strands of the literature, this part pays close attention to the 
gendered definition of military service. The conviction that military service was a man’s first and 
foremost duty was widespread and shaped the rhetoric of extra-parliamentary protests as well as 
the parliamentary debates and legal decisions. However, this conviction was not yet set in stone. 
Although women’s military service was quickly ruled out, it constituted a conscious and real 
choice that contemporaries, and especially the legislature, had to make. Moreover, the decision 
to limit military service to the male population influenced the ways in which military experts 
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and social history of postwar Germany. See for instance, Hanna Schissler, ed, The Miracle Years: A Cultural 
History of West Germany, 1949–1968 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001); Robert G. Moeller, ed., West 
Germany Under Construction: Politics, Society, and Culture in the Adenauer Era (Ann Arbor: University of 
Michigan Press, 1997). For an earlier anthology focusing on social history and economics see, Axel Schildt and 
Arnold Sywottek, ed., Modernisierung im Wiederaufbau: Die westdeutsche Gesellschaft der 50er Jahre (Bonn: 
Dietz, 1993).  
192 See, Robert G. Moeller, “The Last Soldiers of the Great”; Moeller, War Stories; Biess, Homecomings. See 
further, Susan Jeffords, “The ‘Remasculinization’ of Germany in the 1950s: Discussion,” Signs, 24 (1998): 163–
169. 
193 Uta Poiger, “A New, ‘Western’ Hero,” 147–162. See also, Frank Biess, “Men of Reconstruction, the 
Reconstruction of Men: Returning POWs in East and West Germany,” in Home/Front. The Military, War, and 
Gender in Twentieth Century Germany, ed. Karen Hagemann and Stephanie Schüler-Springorum (Oxford and New 
York: Berg, 2002), 335–358. Frank Biess, “‘Pioneers of a New Germany’ Returning POWs from the Soviet Union 
and the Making of East German Citizens, 1945–1950,” Central European History 32 (1999): 143–180. 
 
 
72 
delineated the rights and duties of the future West German and, by extension, West European 
soldier. Paying attention to this construction is important because it reveals how the definition of 
the West German man in uniform was shaped by international currents as well as by national 
evolving social and cultural norms. Specific ideas of femininity and masculinity were among the 
most important of these norms. Those ideas guided extra-parliamentary activists, 
parliamentarians, government officials, and military experts in their reexamination of men’s 
social and military roles in the postwar world.  
In order to trace the processes that led to this gendered construction of military service, 
the following pages first offer a brief description of the international negotiations that established 
the overall framework of the rearmament debate. The subsequent pages analyze opinion polls 
and the most outspoken and influential extra-parliamentary groups in order to reveal the 
conflicting opinions about rearmament, war and military service that permeated civil society. In 
a third step, this part turns to the debates taking place in the Bundestag and the related 
committees during which military service was defined and codified as a man’s duty. Finally, this 
part discusses the initial struggles of the personnel working for the Amt Blank—the predecessor 
of the West German Ministry of Defense—to sketch a blueprint for the West German man in 
uniform they judged suitable for the Federal Republic and Western Europe.  
1. The Cold War, International Politics and Allied Plans for the Rearmament of the FRG 
 Early disagreements between the Western Allies and the Soviet Union about Germany’s postwar 
future developed, by the late 1940s, into outright hostilities. In particular, the question whether a 
common political and economic system should be introduced led to serious discord. Agitated by 
the efforts of the Western Allies to unite their occupation zones economically and politically, the 
Soviet Union claimed that the United States, France and Britain did not intend to continue the 
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joint four-power collaboration. Thus, the Soviet government discontinued its participation in the 
Allied Control Council in March 1948. Simultaneously, American and British military and 
political experts noticed alarming signs that military-style organizations were being established 
in the Soviet occupation zone. Having reorganized and increased their border police from 3,778 
men at the end of 1947 to more than 9,000 in April 1948, the Soviet Military Administration in 
Germany (SMAD) on 3 July 1948 ordered the creation of barracked police units (kasernierte 
Bereitschaften). The Western Allies’ concerns heightened even more in June 1948, when the 
Soviet Union began blockading West Berlin. In an attempt to gain greater and possibly full 
control over the entire city, the Soviet Union blocked Western Allies’ railway and road access to 
the sector of Berlin that was under Western control.194 
Given this development, military and political experts in the United States began 
pondering the option of including those parts of Germany that were under the control of Britain, 
France and the US in a combined Western defense effort. Experts such as the political scientist 
Carl J. Friedrich, an advisor to General Clay, argued that an independent state could not survive 
without its own defense forces. Given the imminent threat from the east, Friedrich was joined by 
various Allied generals who considered Germany’s rearmament to be a military necessity: If the 
Rhine River was to become once again a front line, it would only hold if it was supported by 
“German men” whose martial skills were “among the highest in the world.”195 Even Charles De 
Gaulle, who in 1945 was still seeking ways to prevent Germany from invading France ever 
                                                 
194 See Wettig, Entmilitarisierung und Wiederbewaffnung, 221–224; Norbert Wiggershaus, “Von Potsdam zum 
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again, believed that his country and the rest of Western Europe could not be protected without 
German forces. 
To be sure, this is not to suggest that Allied military leaders were enthusiastic about the 
possible return of the German Pikelhaube or Stahlhelm. Even after the formation of the two 
Germanys in May and October 1949, the idea of rearming a former enemy remained a very 
sensitive topic. British, French and US politicians repeatedly announced that they had no 
intention whatsoever of allowing the newly founded Federal Republic of Germany to establish 
armed forces. For instance, shortly after Chancellor Konrad Adenauer announced in an interview 
with the Ohio-based Cleveland Plain Dealer in December 1949 that his government was willing 
to contribute to a Western defense effort, the Western Allies ordered a new decree to eliminate 
militarism in Germany.196 By doing so, they reaffirmed the Petersburg Agreement of November 
1949, which ordered the Federal Republic to remain demilitarized and to prevent the 
reestablishment of armed forces of any kind.197 
The contents of the American statements changed considerably, however, after 25 June 
1950, when North Korean troops—supported by Soviet soldiers—invaded South Korea. Since 
American leaders were now certain that the Soviet Union would employ military force to achieve 
its goals, Washington began to advocate openly that West Germany participate in a European 
defense effort.198 Even though the French Premier, René Pleven, already in October 1950 
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proposed to rearm the Federal Republic in the context of a joint European defense effort, the 
implantation of a modified version of his plan require nearly two years. On 26 May 1952, the 
Federal Republic and the three Western allies signed the General Treaty, which would end 
Germany’s status of occupation and grant it rights as a sovereign state. On the following day, 
Italy, the Benelux nations, France, and the Federal Republic signed the treaty that instituted the 
creation of the European Defense Committee (EDC) to which the Federal Republic would 
contribute.199 Instead of envisioning a national, autonomous West Germany military, however, 
the treaty aimed to establish a West German contingent that would be closely embedded in 
supranational structures and report to the European Command instead of a national government.  
In the wake of this agreement, representatives of all six countries descended upon Paris to 
negotiate the details of a joint European defense force. These negotiations came to an abrupt halt 
on 30 August 1954, however, when the French Assembly rejected the EDC and West Germany’s 
participation in it.200 Yet, until the French Non!, the plan to rearm West Germany as part of the 
European Defense Community formed the context in which West Germans debated the prospect 
of new armed forces and sought to define a new type of German soldier.  
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2. Attitudes towards the Western Defense Plans and Rearmament in West German Society 
With the remnants of World War II still conspicuous throughout the entire country, the German 
population on both sides of the Iron Curtain carefully observed the diplomatic moves of the 
Soviet Union and the Western powers. As soon as the first rumors about the potential re-
establishment of a West German military force entered international communications channels, 
West German media eagerly conveyed the news to its readers and listeners. The news that a 
West German military force could soon become reality not only shocked those who wrote 
newspaper headlines and radio reports, but unsettled large strata of society and prompted 
individuals as well as larger organizations to take a stand.  
Within weeks, the scattered local and regional peace activism that had dominated the late 
1940s developed into a broad, “spontaneous movement”201 against the rearmament plans. 
Although the activism that erupted in the first weeks of 1950 was soon widely referred to as the 
Ohne-Mich movement (literally: “Without me”),202 the protesters were a variegated crowd. The 
demonstrations against West Germany’s rearmament encompassed peace activists from all strata 
of society, including many members of the KPD and SPD, socialist and communist youth 
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groups, sub-divisions of the Confederation of Trade Unions, numerous women’s organizations, 
many members of the Protestant Church, and  some Catholics.203  
These groups’ diverse anti-military and anti-war sentiments conflicted with the views of 
many others who did not reject rearmament wholeheartedly or even supported it. Among those 
who embraced Adenauer’s security and military politics were conservative student and youth 
groups associated with the governing parties as well as with the leadership of the Catholic 
Church in West Germany.204 Although representatives of veteran associations were convinced 
that the “free countries” in the West had to defend themselves, they maintained that the Federal 
Republic would contribute to a European defense effort only if the Western allies lifted the 
obloquy they inflicted on former Wehrmacht soldiers.205 While these conflicting opinions 
represented to some extent a continuation of previous arguments, the plan to establish a West 
German contingent as part of a Western European defense force heightened the tensions. 
West German Anti-Military and Anti-War Sentiments as Reflected in Opinion Polls 
Opinion polls are an especially valuable tool to plumb West German opinions about the 
establishment of West German troops, military service and warfare. In addition to the Western 
Allies, who continued their careful observation of German attitudes, the Adenauer government 
commissioned numerous surveys. While these surveys clearly indicate the concerns of the 
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entities that commissioned and conducted them, analyzed carefully they also shed light on the 
myriad of West German citizens’ views and the development of those views over time.  
A great number of polls conducted in the last months of 1949 and during the early 1950s 
reveal a deep aversion against establishing a West German military force. Already in mid- and 
late-December 1949, the US Allied High Commission interviewed 1,500 Germans living in the 
American zone, 250 in Berlin and 150 in Bremen. The High Commission for Occupied Germany 
(HICOG) reported that, when asked if they favored rearmament, 71% of the interviewees in the 
US zone, 67% in Bremen and 50% in Berlin answered in the negative.206 The numerical 
differences between, on the one hand, the US zone and Bremen and, on the other, Berlin can be 
explained by the fact that Berliners had firsthand experience with the immediate tensions of the 
Cold War. Most likely, the Berlin Blockade showed many Berliners how fast the Cold War could 
become hot and how vulnerable a West German state would be without a defensive force.207 The 
results of HICOG’s survey furthermore matched the outcome of an opinion poll conducted by 
one of the leading German market research institutes, EMNID, during the months of December 
1949 and January 1950. Presupposing that future West German troops would all be  men, 
EMNID reported that “75 percent of West Germans” rejected the idea of “becoming a soldier” or 
seeing their sons or husbands becoming soldiers again.208 
Respondents who rejected the idea of putting West German men into a new set of 
uniforms did so for various reasons. First, having just experienced total war and defeat, many 
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respondents linked the establishment of new troops to the horrors of warfare.  Interviewees 
noted, for instance, that “any rearmament leads to war;” “armies mean war and war means 
hardship and distress,” “people should no longer be killed in combat,” and “military forces have 
never brought anything good to Germany.”209 Having forgotten neither the cruelty of World War 
II nor the hardship of the early postwar years, an overwhelming majority of Germans did not 
intend to send new cohorts of men to the battlefields. Second, some respondents rejected 
rearmament not because of pacifist sentiments, but because of “national if not outright nationalist 
attitudes.”210 Complaining that the Western Allies had treated Germans “like criminals,” a 
middle-aged man working in a coalmine expressed no intention of “playing soldier again.”211 By 
rejecting the idea of participating in a pan-European army and, simultaneously, arguing that the 
Western Allies had “defamed” Germans, interviewees continued to express the nationalist 
sentiments that emerged almost immediately after May 1945. Third, the rejection of becoming 
the Allies’ henchman was closely connected to the commonly expressed attitude that the Federal 
Republic and the West German society was not worth fighting for. Lamenting moral decay, 
young men and war veterans alike stated that they had no intention of  defending the “thousand 
naked legs” printed in the illustrated press, the “Negro-Samba-Boogie-Woogie-Roar,” or 
“women’s boxing.”212 According to such nationalist and conservative judgments, a society that 
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would value a culture that turned racial and gender boundaries upside down was not worth 
fighting for. As they thus deprecated American culture and despised its influence in postwar 
Germany, the interviewees voiced an opinion that was quite common during the postwar years, 
especially among the West German middle-class. For many “high-brow” German critics, 
American culture was nothing more than trivial, commercial, and overly sexual.213 
At a first glance, these results suggest that West German citizens by and large rejected the 
establishment of a West German military force in the context of a European Defense Force. Yet, 
West Germany’s postwar attitudes toward rearmament were far more complex than that. In 
addition to fluctuating over time, the results of other surveys implied that West Germans would 
not refuse any type of rearmament. For instance, in February 1952—the month during which the 
West German Bundestag convened to debate the issue of rearmament in lengthy and widely 
broadcast sessions—more interviewees voted for than against the establishment of an 
“independent German army.”214 In October 1952 and March 1953, the results reversed, however, 
only to change again in August 1953. 
In addition to being influenced by the national political climate, international 
developments caused these fluctuations as well. While, as Michael Geyer points out, the Korean 
War did not influence the results significantly, the East German uprising in 1953 certainly did. 
As Soviet troops crushed the protest of East German workers, West Germans reacted 
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accordingly: almost 50 percent of the respondents to Allensbach’s survey were in favor of 
establishing a West German army and less than 40 percent voted against it.215 The Soviet use of 
force in nearby East Germany led more West Germans to acknowledge their need for protection 
and inclined more of them to favor the establishment of a West German military force. 
If West German attitudes toward rearmament in general were diverse, so were their 
opinions of military service. Assuming that West German men would by and large make up the 
West German force, US pollsters closely observed men’s attitudes. On 6 July 1951, one year 
after the beginning of the Korean War, HICOG published a survey titled “Current Thinking On 
West German Defense Participation.” HICOG had asked 347 men if they would participate in a 
West European army. According to the results only 3 percent of the respondents who would be 
eligible for military service indicated that they would serve voluntarily, while 70 percent replied 
that they would serve only if drafted, and 20 percent said they would refuse any service.216 
Although the low rate of men who indicated that they would join the ranks voluntarily suggests a 
widespread rejection of military service, it is important to notice that the majority of men 
indicated that they would not ignore a draft call and would fulfill their military “duty.” 
To complicate the picture even more, it is worth looking at the minority of people who 
did not wholeheartedly reject rearmament and favored compulsory military service. In contrast to 
the 75 percent of respondents who reject military service, EMNID reported in its January 1950 
survey that “only” 63 percent of the people interviewed rejected the idea of compulsory military 
service. Emphasizing that the respondents did not harbor any “bellicose sentiments,” EMNID 
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reported that they wanted to see “the educational [erzieherisch] value of having a military 
preserved.”217 Whereas the EMNID survey did not explain what erzieherisch meant, both 
HICOG officials and the Allensbach Institute expanded on this issue. Allensbach Institute noted 
in October 1951 that housewives, workers, famers and veterans, who were in favor of the draft, 
responded that “being a soldier” had always been a good Erziehung because it taught men, and 
especially young men, “discipline”, “orderliness”, and “civility.”218 Viewing military service as a 
man’s task, respondents thus believed that the military would provide young men with qualities 
that were valued far beyond the barracks. Interviewed by EMNID in the early 1950s, many West 
German parents indicated that teaching their children discipline, love of orderliness and diligence 
was one of their main parenting goals.219 As long as military service was thought of as an 
institution that would fulfill a social function and not as an instrument for waging another war, a 
number of West Germans attributed some positive meaning to it.  
Arguing, moreover, that military training and service “hadn’t harmed anyone” (hat noch 
keinem geschadet), for a few West Germans military service even represented an opportunity to 
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turn boys and average men into “hardened” real men.220 This particular form of “re-
masculinization”221 seemed especially important since the experience of war and the turmoil of 
the early postwar years had challenged the traditional gender order, and this imbalance had not 
been adjusted yet. In December 1951, an eighty years old war veteran wrote to the first Federal 
President of Germany, Theodor Heuss, maintaining that the military had the capability of 
restoring the blurred boundaries between men and women. Stating that “in his days” he and his 
comrades had been released from military service “as men,” the veteran advocated compulsory 
military service because it would restore among other things “the difference between the female 
and the male sex, with respect to the hair cut.”222 Although, the veteran referred only to the 
haircut, his letter highlights the trouble many West Germans expressed respecting the changed 
postwar gender relations. As war and postwar had blurred the lines between men’s and women’s 
traditional roles in society, some contemporaries looked to the military as a way to correct this 
perceived error. 
This letter and the detailed results of various opinion polls indicate that in early postwar 
West Germany a positive evaluation of military service, which focused on the military’s 
educational function, lingered on. While some groups sought to defend a positive, timeless image 
of soldiering, others expressed the belief that military service could still serve a valuable 
educational function. These convictions stood, however, in clear contrast to negative opinions 
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that the majority of interviewees expressed. Although the devastation of World War II and the 
harsh postwar conditions had not turned West Germans into wholehearted pacifists, many had 
already bid farewell to the notion that military service and war could serve as measures of 
national superiority. 
Early Protest against West Germany’s Rearmament  
The dismissive attitude that these opinion polls reflect corresponded with sentiments expressed 
by members of the peace and Ohne Mich movement. As indicated above, concerned citizens and 
a great number of individual protest groups organized rallies all over Germany, distributed 
pamphlets, and mailed agitated letters to leading politicians as soon as news about the possible 
establishment of West German armed forces broke. Beginning in early 1950, the protests of the 
Ohne Mich movement intensified during the next two years.223 The organizational diversity of 
this movement reflects the array of reasons protesters opposed rearmament. Still troubled by the 
destruction of World War II, leading members of the Protestant Church as well as countless 
activists such as the German Peace Society sought to promote peaceful cooperation. Other 
activists such as the communist youth organization Free German Youth (Freie Deutsche Jugend, 
FDJ) were greatly influenced by the East German government. Since West Germany would not 
be allowed to establish autonomous troops, but would be integrated in a Western European army 
that would increase the German-German divide, they feared that West German soldiers would be 
nothing more than henchmen of the Western allies.224  
                                                 
223 Dietzfelbinger, Die westdeutsche Friedensbewegung, 77–78; Lutz Hoeth, Die Wiederbewaffnung Deutschlands 
in den Jahren 1945–1958 und die Haltung der Evangelischen Kirche (Norderstedt: Book on Demand, 2008).   
224 Dietzfelbinger, Die Westdeutsche Friedensbewegung, 82–84; Volkmann, “Die Innenpolitische Dimension,” 572. 
 
 
85 
Despite their differing reasons, protesters were united in their vision that, the 
establishment of armed forces would have severe consequences not only for the Federal 
Republic, but also for the West German men and their families who would have to don military 
uniforms. The focus on the gendered construction of military service is nowhere clearer than 
among the West German women who participated in anti-rearmament protests. Historians such 
as Florence Hervé and Irene Stoehr stress that women represented some of the most active and 
most influential peace protesters in the late 1940s and early 1950s.225 Women raised their voices 
both individually and as members of special women’s organizations. The groups involved in 
organized demonstrations included most notably the West German section of the World 
Organization of Mothers of All Nations, WOMAN (Weltorganisation der Mütter aller Nationen) 
and the West German wing of the Democratic Women’s League of Germany (Demokratischer 
Frauenbund Deutschland, DFD), that were both founded in 1947. Their protest was joined in 
1952 by the West German Women’s Peace Movement (Westdeutsche Frauenfriedensbewegung, 
WFFB). Representing tens of thousands of women,226 these three groups organized numerous 
conferences and street rallies, wrote letters to leading politicians, and distributed thousands of 
leaflets.227  
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Central to the protest of WOMAN, the DFD, and the WFFB was the distinction between 
military politics and war as a man-made undertaking and women as bearers of new life. Drawing 
extensively on the image of women as the more peaceful sex, female activists argued that they 
had to act “for the sake of life and peace [especially] if the governing men were not able to do 
so.”228 During the Women’s Peace Congress in Munich on 30 September 1950, the attending 
1,000 female delegates embraced a manifest which stated that women should ask their men “not 
to work for war,” to teach their sons about conscientious objection, and to raise their sons and 
daughters in a spirit of peace and friendship.229 To this effect women also condemned centuries-
old rhetoric that had focused on women’s patriotic duties. In 1952, for instance, members of the 
WFFB announced that they did not intend once again to become the “mothers of heroes” 
(Heldenmütter) who would celebrate the “heroic death” (Heldentod) of their sons in battle. This 
language, which dated back to the period of the Anti-Napoleonic Wars (1813-15)230 and was 
exploited extensively during the Nazi period, was judged inappropriate in light of the horrors of 
World War II. According to the activists, women and men had to work together peacefully to 
prevent the remilitarization of Germany and the outbreak of another war.  
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This idea was reinforced by the division of Germany. The existence of an East and West 
Germany was anathema to many activists and the call for unification dominated many of their 
protests. The WFFB, DFD, and many other protestors emphasized that Germany’s division had 
not only cut a country in half, but had also separated entire families. As a result, activists worried 
that West German men would soon have to fight against their East German relatives on the other 
side of the Iron Curtain. Yet, instead of seeing their “sons” meeting on the battlefields of Europe, 
women maintained that mothers wanted their men and boys to be reunited and able to “shake 
hands.”231 Therefore, the WFFB and DFD demanded that West German men in leadership 
positions communicate with the “German men of the ‘other Germany’” to reunite the two 
German halves and prevent a “brothers’ war” 232  
The protest against rearmament and men’s military service also included a discussion of 
men’s roles in society. On 21 December 1949, the Südwestdeutscher Rundfunk (South-West 
German Radio Broadcast) broadcast a show that tackled the question “Shall there be soldiers 
again?”233 During the show, the host asked the widow of a church minister, who also had lost her 
brother in World War II, about her opinion. Agitated by the idea of a new German army, the 
widow responded: “At the very thought that my adolescent sons have also to wear the grey coat 
and endure everything that is connected with it, I would like to cry out and shout: No, and once 
again no!”234 In light of the signing of the General Treaty in 1952, the South-West German 
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Radio Broadcast further received several letters stressing that “every rational and motherly 
woman” and “every responsible human being” could only oppose rearmament.235 Maintaining 
that “men belong to their families,”236 women bid farewell to the notion so dominant during the 
early twentieth century that a man’s true purpose lay in heroically defending his home and 
fatherland on the battlefield. Emphasizing that men’s main function was to support and 
“complete” their families as husbands and fathers, women tap a line of argument that was 
prevalent in postwar West Germany. As scholars such as Elizabeth Heineman and Robert G. 
Moeller highlight, the reconstruction of West German male-breadwinner families was part and 
parcel of West Germany’s postwar reconstruction as a whole.237 The quest for “complete 
families” was at the heart of West German identity politics in the early postwar decades. The 
conception of such “complete families” significantly influenced the debate about rearmament.   
This focus on the social roles of men and the gendered character of military service was 
not limited to women’s protests. It also influenced the arguments of other activists, most notably 
the movement for a nation-wide plebiscite. In January 1951, the “Congress Against 
Remilitarization” took place in Essen, a town in the Ruhr area of North Rhine-Westphalia. This 
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event was organized by the Committee of Fighters for Peace in West Germany (Komitee der 
Kämpfer für den Frieden in Westdeutschland or Westdeutsches Friedenskomitee). Founded in 
May 1949, the committee was intended to be a pan-German organization, but its structures and 
work were heavily influenced by the East German Socialist Unity Party Germany (Sozialistische 
Einheitspartei Deutschland, SED).238 During the congress, a diverse group of 1,700 delegates239 
expressed their deep concerns for the “well-being of our Vaterland.”240 Maintaining that foreign 
powers were forcing the German people to prepare for a “third world war”, the congress’ 
manifest referred to the German fear that soon all “men fit for military service” would be 
recruited as a result of the war-mongering.241 Eager to prevent these fears from becoming reality, 
the delegates called for a referendum.  
In their advertisement for the plebiscite, activists sought to address all Germans: “men 
and women, boys and girls, workers, farmers, middle class persons [Mittelständler], civil 
servants, artists and scientists” were asked to object to rearmament.242 To leave no doubt about 
the severity of the issue, the gendered construction of military service and relations between 
                                                 
238 Michael Lemke, Einheit oder Sozialismus? Die Deutschlandpolitik der SED 1949–1961 (Wien: Böhlau, 2001), 
54 
239 Despite the communist influence the delegates were a potpourri of activists, including officers and major 
generals, representatives of craftsman guilds and trade associations, church ministers, authors, artists, and cultural 
managers as well as doctors, bank managers, farmers and forest wardens. See, Zander, Die Kampagne. 
240 Quoted in Dietzelbringer, Die westdeutsche Friedensbewegung, 96. [Italics added, FB.] 
241 Ibid. 
242 See pamphlet “An alle die Frieden wollen!,” Komitee der Kämpfer für den Frieden in Westdeutschland, 
April/May 1950, AdsD, Sammlung Flugblätter und Flugschriften, 6/FLBL003011, online at: 
http://archiv2.fes.de/objekt_start.fau?prj=fes&dm=Flugschriften&ref=2762 (last accessed: 13 July 2013). 
 
 
90 
“women and mothers” and “their men and sons” received special attention.243 Pamphlets and 
leaflets invoked the suffering of women during World War II who had been worried sick about 
their brothers, sons, and husbands who had been sent off to the front lines. Although these 
documents reinforced a traditional gendered image of warfare and military service, they 
simultaneously reversed the rhetoric of men acting as defenders and women as needing 
protection. According to the subcommittee working on the plebiscite, women in postwar West 
Germany had to protect and safeguard their men against the demands of the state. In their appeal, 
the committee called on their fellow citizens to “help women and mothers to defend the lives of 
their husbands and sons!”244 Before and during World War II, German men went to war 
characterized as heroic defenders of the German fatherland and its female population. In postwar 
West Germany, women rallied against rearmament in order to keep their men off the battlefields.  
According to the organizers, millions of West Germans agreed with their arguments. To 
be sure, the Adenauer government prohibited the referendum, arguing that it was controlled by 
the SED and represented an attack on the “free democratic basic order.”245 Yet supported by 
leading church representatives and former government officials, the organizers were able to 
collect an astounding number of votes. Taking into account the possibility of double votes and 
voter fraud, between four and eight million people opposed the establishment of a new military 
force, a number large enough to suggest that the majority of West Germans were against 
rearmament.246 
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The Supporters of a New West German Military  
Although results of the referendum were impressive and the anti-rearmament protests 
widespread, these sentiments were neither unanimous nor universal. As the opinion polls already 
indicated, West German attitudes towards the re-establishment of a military force were much 
more diverse. In the late 1940s and early 1950s, several conservative journalists, student and 
youth organizations, and veterans associations raised their voices in favor of a West German 
armed force.  
Two of the youth and student organizations that sought to influence Adenauer’s security 
politics as well as  the establishment of new armed forces were the Young Union (Junge Union), 
which was associated with the governing CDU, and the student society of the FDP, the Liberal 
Student League Germany (Liberale Studentenbund Deutschland, LSD). Although the Young 
Union and the LSD generally followed their parties’ agenda and supported the idea of rearming 
West Germany, they did so with reservations. Although members of the Young Union, the LSD 
and other youth organizations believed that rearmament was necessary in order to protect “free” 
Western Europe and the Federal Republic against Communism, they also fear expressed anxiety 
about a renascent German militarism. For instance, in November 1950 the weekly newspaper 
DIE ZEIT published an article titled “Youth on Rearmament” written by a young student. In 
contrast to the many youth groups that protested Adenauer’s politics in the streets of German 
cities, this student argued that the “young generation of today is certainly convinced that 
Bolshevism can only be successfully opposed in the long run through the use of arms.”247 Yet, 
despite being aware of the Russian threat, most of his contemporaries spoke of rearmament “only 
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with great displeasure.”248 This refusal, the student maintained, was not only informed by 
pacifism, but also by a certain mistrust of the older generation. Adolescents were especially 
suspicious of the “mess-hall lingo and barracks-yard jargon” of former soldiers, who believed 
that governmental leadership had to smell “a shot of [gun] powder” in order to be effective.249 
Arguing that the “old style” drill was ineffective, the student was sure that the German youth 
wanted “the military, also in Germany, to finally assume a civilian character.”250 As he criticized 
former German armies for having adhered to harmful practices, the student expressed the 
common sentiment that if West Germany was to rearm, the new military had to be started from 
scratch.  
As the negotiations about the establishment of West German armed forces continued and 
the necessary international treaties were signed, these kinds of concerns resulted in clearly 
formulated demands and eager attempts to influence the political decision-making process. 251 In 
1952, the LSD published the pamphlet “Citizen—Army—State: The Demands of the Liberal 
Student League Germany regarding a Future Military Constitution.”252 Supporting the idea of 
rearmament, the group formulated clear ideas about the future West German soldier. Central to 
the groups’ claim was the image of the “citizen soldier” (Bürgersoldat) who was not only part of 
his military unit, but also member of society. Even though the LSD considered the army to be “a 
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first-rate educational factor” (Erziehungsfaktor), it maintained that the training of the European 
armed forces must not begin with the “breaking” of the recruit’s personality.253 Only if young 
recruits could continue to develop their own character and become mature citizens, would the 
“rigor of the physical and military training” fulfill its purpose. Along with several other more 
conservative student and youth groups that supported rearmament, the LSD believed that a 
rigorously trained West German army was necessary to defend Western European against the 
Russians. Fearing, however, that rearmament could lead to the revival of previous harmful 
German military practices, a new relation between the military services and society needed to be 
established. According to the students’ postwar understanding, West German men in military 
uniform were citizens first and soldiers second.   
The students’ criticism of the older generation and previous military practices clearly 
vexed another important group that conditionally supported rearmament: veterans’ associations 
and former high-ranking officers. Former officers, who supported Adenauer’s military and 
security policies, tied their support for rearmament to the acquittal of the German soldier. In 
December 1950, Gottfried Hansen, chairman of the League of former Wehrmacht members who, 
along with their dependents, were entitled to state benefits (Bund versorgungsberechtigter 
ehemaliger Wehrmachtsangehöriger und deren Hinterbliebenen) complained about the 
“slanderous” behavior in a letter to Harry S. Truman, Dean Acheson, and other statesmen. 
Agreeing that “the occident and furthermore the United States” had to defend its freedom against 
any threat from the East, Hansen maintained that German men who were imbued with the 
“soldierly ethos of duty” had to contribute to this defense effort.254 Yet, Hansen argued that 
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German men could never develop the necessary ethos and defend “the occident” against the east 
as long as their “comrades, who only fulfilled their soldierly duty” were still held captive by 
those “people with whose sons they should fight together for freedom and peace of the world.”255 
The European Defense Community could only be successful, according to Hansen, if all soldiers 
were treated equally.  
Whereas Hansen’s positive appraisal of soldiering ran counter to the opinion of many 
lower-rank soldiers who returned from World War II disenchanted,256 it reverberated with many 
high-ranking officers. Reacting to the student’s article in DIE ZEIT, Sven von Mitzlaff, who by 
his own account had served as a recruit instructor, platoon leader, squadron leader, and as a 
member of the general staff of the Wehrmacht, wrote an agitated letter to the editor. Having 
evaluated his own service, Mitzlaff concluded that neither “depersonalization” nor “mess-hall 
lingo and barracks-yard jargon” had been characteristic of his military training.257 While Mitzlaff 
obviously sought to defend not only the German military but his own life choices, his statement 
was seconded by many other Wehrmacht veterans.258 As plans for West Germany’s rearmament 
progressed, daily newspapers, magazines and specialized journals published comments by 
former Wehrmacht personnel, who argued that German military training had always been shaped 
by men who valued “personal responsibility” and “trust,” but opposed “blind obedience” and 
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“abuse.”259 Convinced that German armies had always been composed of men with superior 
masculine qualities, veterans affirmed their belief in a timeless and inherently good ideal of 
soldiering.260 
Although their efforts have been especially well documented and analyzed, veterans and 
youth groups were not the only organizations that sought to get involved in the debate about 
West Germany’s rearmament. As noted above, women’s groups also tried to influence the public 
discussion. Although most vehemently opposed rearmament, a few women’s groups viewed 
rearmament as an opportunity. One was the German Federation of Working Women (Deutscher 
Verband Berufstätiger Frauen), which viewed rearmament as an employment opportunity for 
women. On March 6, 1954, Hildegard Kienzle-Weinmann, its vice president, met with 
representatives of the Amt Blank to discuss women’s participation in the personnel build-up of 
the European Defense Community.261 Originally founded in 1931, the federation had re-
constituted itself after World War II, seeking to improve the rights and conditions of working 
women. Kienzle-Weinmann wanted to ensure that women’s employment in the EDC would 
receive due consideration. During the meeting, the representatives of the Amt Blank and vice 
president agreed that women—“if they were equally qualified”—could be employed as office 
workers, but certainly not in positions that would require “direct contact with the troops.”262 In 
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light of this agreement, the record of this meeting concluded that the EDC would most likely 
offer “fewer employment opportunities than the Federal Mail Service.”263   
Even though the majority of the West German population opposed rearmament, an 
analysis of opinion polls and the public disputes that occurred in the late 1940s and early 1950s 
reveals a multitude of opinions about war, armed forces, and military service. West German 
society in the early 1950s was neither wholeheartedly pacifistic nor bellicose. Despite a variety 
of opinions, the majority shared a clearly gendered vision of military service and the new armed 
forces. Assuming that West German men would be sent to serve in the EDC, postwar West 
Germans’ concerns focused especially on the effects a new armed forces would have not only on 
society as a whole but on West German men in particular.  
3. Parliamentary Disputes about the Rearmament of the FRG  
While the conflicting opinions that West Germans expressed in newspaper articles and radio 
shows, pamphlets, leaflets, and on the streets, were reacting to national and international security 
politics, those opinions in turn significantly shaped parliamentary discussions and decision-
making processes. Above all, they represented a challenge to Chancellor Konrad Adenauer and 
his government. Adenauer was an eager but tactical advocate of rearmament. Even before taking 
office, the chancellor had met with former Wehrmacht soldiers to discuss West Germany’s 
security and military situation.264 Once elected, he was careful at first not openly to express his 
willingness to contribute to a Western defense effort. This changed after some months. In his 
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interview with the Cleveland Plain Dealer in December 1949, Adenauer emphasized publicly, 
for the first time, the Allies’ responsibility to protect the newly founded Republic or to make 
arrangements that would enable the FRG to protect itself. While rejecting the idea of 
independent, national armed forces, the chancellor favored the establishment of a West German 
contingent as part of a West European defense force under European leadership.265 
This interview had a huge impact. For Adenauer’s West German opponents, the 
chancellor’s approbation of the possibility of establishing a West German contingent came as a 
surprise, because two years earlier Adenauer had wholeheartedly embraced the complete 
demilitarization of Germany. Advocating the destruction of all war industries, he even imagined 
that in terms of international law Germany “could be neutralized like Switzerland.”266 Even a 
few weeks before the interview with the US newspaper, the chancellor had assured his critics 
that he opposed the idea of putting West German men into uniform.267 Until his interview with 
the Cleveland Plain Dealer, contemporaries thus believed that Konrad Adenauer would be the 
chancellor of a demilitarized, if not an entirely neutralized Federal Republic. 
Debates about the Introduction of a West German Army in the Bundestag  
Given this situation, Adenauer’s bold statements not only offended the former Western allies, 
they also troubled his opponents and even some of his political allies. Since many of Adenauer’s 
critics were members of the West German parliament, the chancellor needed to appeal to the 
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Bundestag. The legislative power to approve rearmament rested with this institution, and 
Adenauer’s party had failed to achieve an absolute majority in the first national elections in 
August 1949. Seeking to appease his international and national critics, Adenauer emphasized that 
he had “emphatically repudiated” the idea of West Germany’s rearmament. During his address to 
the Bundestag on 16 December 1949, he maintained that he had at best considered the 
deployment of a West German contingent within the context of a “European Confederation.”268  
One year later, having received the support of the Western Allies, the chancellor’s views 
were quite different. During a meeting of the Bundestag in November 1950, Adenauer made it 
clear that he viewed the establishment of armed forces as a natural right that every state—
including the Federal Republic—possessed. In light of the Korean War, he insisted that it was 
imperative for the FRG to make use of this right to protect itself against Soviet Russia. If West 
Germans did not want to surrender their lives and freedom to the yoke of the USSR, the Federal 
Republic had to establish an armed force. If West Germany failed to defend itself, the chancellor 
maintained, the Federal Republic would be integrated into the “Soviet-Russian sphere of power” 
and the “German people” would have to endure “slavery and exploitation.”269 A similar 
depiction of Russia and the “Russian threat” had been used by National Socialist propaganda to 
ensure that Wehrmacht soldiers would hold the line. In the context of the Cold War, the image of 
the brutal Russian would function as an argument to prepare West Germans for rearmament.270 
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Defending his push for West German troops, Adenauer’s speech also illustrated the 
government’s ideas about who would bear the main responsibility for taking up arms. Rehashing 
the brutal behavior of the Soviet soldiers towards “poor, defenseless” men and women at the end 
of World War II, he argued that defending his “home and freedom” against any threat from the 
east was “imperative” for every “reasonable” male citizen.271 In making these claims, Adenauer 
could feel certain that he would have the support of the extremely right-wing German Imperial 
Party (Deutsche Reichspartei, DRP). For the DRP politician Heinrich Leuchtgens, rearmament 
was above all a question of national self-preservation and identity. “For a man who thinks 
nationally,” he argued, it was self-evident that West Germany needed to establish powerful 
armed forces in order to keep “the Russians” from attacking. He “who loves freedom, who loves 
his fatherland and who loves his people,” the politician maintained, “must also defend it against 
any threat.”272 For both Leuchtgens and Adenauer, the task of becoming soldiers in order to 
defend the Federal Republic was reserved for West German men.  
This understanding was shared and elaborated by Richard Jaeger, a jurist who had joined 
the SA at the age of 20 in 1933 and now led the state executive committee of the CDU’s 
Bavarian sister-party, the CSU.273 During the Bundestag debate on 8 February 1952, Jaeger 
pondered the ways in which West Germany’s rearmament could be achieved. He supported the 
idea that every male citizen should fulfill his “duty of self-defense” (Notwehrpflicht). 
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Emphasizing the defensive role of a new West German force, Jaeger added that the “duty of a 
paterfamilias to defend his wife and children” could be equated with the duty of the “younger 
generation” that would have to endure military conscription in order to defend “their mothers, 
their sisters, their brides …”274 against any army coming from the communist east. While 
assigning women to the domestic sphere of home and family, Jaeger and his Christian-
conservative colleagues, most of whom were catholics, evoked the traditional image of the man 
as the “forceful protector” of that sphere.275 This powerful traditional image of the family, 
headed by a male protector and breadwinner, as the nucleus of West German society and state 
permeated the government’s quest for rearmament.  
Notwithstanding the support of the German Imperial Party, Adenauer’s and Jaeger’s 
speeches were aggressive because they needed to respond to three major sources of opposition. 
First, the Adenauer government was reacting to the dissenting votes of peace activists and 
members of the Ohne Mich movement. One of the parliamentarians of the Bundestag who 
responded to women’s concerns was CDU politician Aenne Brauksiepe, a member of the 
Catholic Women’s League.276 In a speech in February 1952, she addressed in particular the 
concerns of the women protesting outside of the Bundestag. According to Brauksiepe, many 
women were against the establishment of armed forces because they feared that rearmament 
would destroy their families. Therefore, she maintained, the government should highlight social 
politics that would demonstrate that rearmament would not destroy the traditional family. In 
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Brauksiepe’s view, the Adenauer government needed to emphasize that their policies were 
rooted in the “unswerving belief” that the family was of “indestructible value” to society. Only 
then, she asserted, would women be willing to send their sons and husbands once again to the 
barracks.277  
Although Brauksiepe insisted that her colleagues had to take the concerns of West 
German women seriously, she also reminded her fellow citizens that West Germany’s defense 
was no longer just a national issue. Arguing for rearmament, she argued that West German men 
and women were bound in an “emergency community” (Notgemeinschaft) with the men and 
women of other Western countries. Consequently, Brauksiepe maintained, West Germans would 
need to make sacrifices in order to maintain peace.278 The plan to establish a West German force 
that would not be autonomous but integrated instead into a West European defense force hence 
functioned as an important argument for the government’s policy.  
Adenauer had to react not only to the Ohne Mich protestors but to opposition within the 
ranks of his own party and coalition. Although a many CDU members favored rearmament, there 
were dissenters. The disputes among members of the governing parties were exemplified by 
Gustav Heinemann’s resignation as Minister of Interior in October 1950; he left the CDU 
1952.279 From 1949 to 1955, Heinemann was the president of the all-German Synod of the 
Protestant Churches of Germany and was among the founders of the German Protestant Church 
Congress (Deutscher Evangelischer Kirchentag), a congress of the Protestant laity. His 
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resignation and his subsequent role as a leader of the Ohne Mich movement was, however, only 
the tip of the iceberg. Adenauer’s advocacy for rearmament and the ways in which he pursued 
his agenda caused great resentment not only among members of his own party but also among 
the Free Democrats.280 In addition to demanding the establishment of an autonomous national 
military, the FDP considered the “rehabilitation” of the older generations of German soldiers a 
prerequisite for rearmament. Yet, even though the FDP disagreed with many of Adenauer’s ideas 
and would remained divided over particular details of rearmament, the majority of liberal 
politicians endorsed the chancellor’s overall plan to establish an armed force, insisting that it was 
a right every state possessed. Moreover, the Free Democrats agreed with Adenauer and Jaeger 
that it was every man’s duty to defend the Federal Republic and all its inhabitants.281  
The FDP’s call for rearmament was also grounded in the hope that new armed forces 
would serve a social function. In an internal report distributed in January 1953, the Free 
Democrats stressed the educational value of military service. The document argued that young 
men could gain “technical skills” and simultaneously form a “strong personality” during military 
training.282 In tune with their overall political focus, the FDP hoped that young men would leave 
the Bundeswehr as “masters of the machine,” who would be valuable in the labor market.283 In 
an increasingly technological army, the party maintained, young men would learn skills that 
would not only enable them to fight and win wars but to succeed in the civilian workforce.    
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While Adenauer was able to keep his governing coalition in check, the opposing parties 
were not to be persuaded, representing a third source of opposition. One of the first female 
parliamentarians who went to the lectern and opposed Adenauer’s agenda was the chairwoman 
of the catholic Center Party (Zentrumspartei) and peace activists, Helene Wessel, one of the 
founders of the Emergency Group for Peace in Europe (Notgemeinschaft für den Frieden in 
Europa). Responding to Adenauer’s initial statement in December 1949, Wessel declared that 
her party would “strongly oppose any form of remilitarization.”284 By defending her party’s 
decision, Wessel first argued that it was precisely the captivity of former Wehrmacht soldiers 
that forbade rearmament. Criticizing the treatment German soldiers at the hands of the occupying 
powers, she maintained that no other defeated country had ever been “dragged through dung” as 
Germany had after 1945.285  
In addition to using the “victimhood” or German soldiers as leverage, Helene Wessel also 
pointed to the numerous protests staged by women. Maintaining close ties with the women’s 
peace movement, she emphatically reminded the members of the Bundestag that “women detest 
war.”286 Portraying women as the peaceful sex, Wessel argued that women’s longing for peace 
was a major reason war should be outlawed. Taking the youth protests against rearmament into 
account, Wessel also maintained that German youth had “already experienced the misery of the 
                                                 
284 VDB, Der Deutsche Bundestag, 24. Sitzung, 16 December 1949, 740–741. In addition to being chairwoman of 
the Center Party, Wessel was closely connected to the Mothers’ Movement that opposed West Germany’s 
rearmament. Cf. Stoehr, “Cold War Communities,” 326. For Wessel’s political biography and her stance on 
rearmament see also, Elisabeth Friese, Helene Wessel (1898–1969): Von der Zentrumspartei zur Sozialdemokratie 
(Essen: Klartext, 1993), 147–154. 
285 VDB, Der Deutsche Bundestag, 24. Sitzung, 16 December 1949, 740–741.  
286 Ibid. 
 
 
104 
battle fields and made too many sacrifices.” Thus, she deemed it impossible to expect any young 
German men “to lose more years as soldiers.”287  
Wessel’s opposition to the government’s policies was applauded by her own party and by 
the SPD, of which she would become a member in 1957.288 Even though leading figures among 
the Social Democrats did not absolutely reject the idea of a national armed force, many of them 
objected to the ways in which the conservative government sought to implement rearmament.289 
Erich Ollenhauer, the deputy leader and later chairman of the party, stressed that Social 
Democrats declined to consider rearmament under the present circumstances. Ollenhauer, who 
would join Paulskirchen movement against rearmament in 1955, was especially disgruntled by 
what he considered Adenauer’s overreaching use of the power of his office. The chancellor of 
the Federal Republic, he maintained, could not legally consider rearmament without consulting 
the other branches of government.290 Furthermore, in November 1950, Kurt Schumacher, first 
leader of the Social Democratic party after 1945, claimed that the chancellor’s and his coalition’s 
emphasis on the defense of “woman and child and house and farm” was mere propaganda.291 He 
                                                 
287 Ibid. 
288 After the Center Party ceased to exist in 1953, Wessel was an elected representative of the All-German People’s 
Party (Gesamtdeutsche Volkspartei, GVP), which she and Gustav Heinemann founded. After this party’s dissolution, 
Wessel joined the SPD. Cf. Stoehr, “Cold War Communities,” 333n58. 
289 For the SPD’s position see Drummond, The German Social Democrats in Opposition. See also Ulrike Wasmuht, 
“Friedensbewegungen: Vom traditionellen Pazifismus zu neuen politischen Bewegungen,” in Der Kalte Krieg: 
Vorspiel zum Frieden?, ed. Arnold Sywottek (Münster: LIT Verlag, 1994), 128–139; Adam Seipp, “A Reasonable 
‘Yes’: The Social Democrats and West German Rearmament, 1945–1956,” in Rearming Germany, ed. James S. 
Corum (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2011), 55–70.  
290 See the statements by Erich Ollenhauer from March 19, 1953 (Document 160) and Fritz Erler from 1952 
(Document 159), printed in Christoph Buttterwegge and Heinz-Gerd Hofschen, Sozialdemoraktie: Krieg und 
Frieden (Heilbronn: Distel Verlag, 1984), 280–284. 
291 VDB, Der Deutsche Bundestag, 98. Sitzung, 8 November 1950, 3569. 
 
 
105 
cautioned that justifying rearmament by appealing to the emotion of fear would be 
counterproductive. Schumacher’s argument against rearmament was informed by West 
Germany’s postwar status of conditional sovereignty as codified by the Occupation Statute of 
Germany, and he demanded that the Federal Republic become an equal partner with the Allies, 
rather than just their auxiliaries.292 Moreover, Schumacher and his fellow party members argued 
that West Germany’s ill-considered rearmament would lead hinder Germany’s unification.293 
In addition to the SPD, the KPD proved to be one of the most outspoken critics of the 
rearmament agenda until the party was banned in 1956. Reacting to the extra-parliamentary 
protests of women’s groups, Max Reimann, chairman of the party, demanded that the 
government discontinue its pursuit of rearmament because the tears of the “children and 
mothers,” who had lost their husbands and sons in the “fascist raid” had not yet dried.294 In 
addition to the continued suffering of German women, the KPD presented various other reasons 
for opposing rearmament. Exploiting the widespread protests that continued on the streets of 
West German towns and cities, the KPD attacked the Allied occupation in order to support their 
claims. Without mentioning the Soviet occupation of East Germany, KPD politician Friedrich 
Rische denounced the former Western Allies as “foreign masters” who kept the Federal Republic 
occupied. Because the West German boys and girls had seen enough horrors during and 
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immediately after the war, Rische maintained, they should not be forced to “yield their own 
blood for foreign powers.”295   
Given the various competing party lines and personal opinions, the questions of whether, 
how and why the Federal Republic should be allowed to establish military troops remained 
contested territory and influenced subsequent debates about amendments to the Basic Law.   
The Amendment of the West German Basic Law 
In light of parliamentary opposition and strong anti-militarization protests outside the Bundestag, 
it seemed unlikely that the chancellor would be able to persist in his effort to establish a West 
German armed force. The elections of 1953, however, disabused Adenauer’s severest critics of 
any notions of him changing his agenda. Receiving even more votes than in the first elections in 
1949, the CDU celebrated a stunning victory.296 Adenauer’s new center-right coalition enjoyed a 
two-thirds majority and was able to pursue its rearmament plans without any problems. This 
change was necessary because, as noted earlier, the original version, promulgated in 1948, 
included neither an article that would govern military policies nor an article that would empower 
the government to introduce any form of military service.  
In December 1953, the CDU/CSU and the FDP introduced competing bills to correct 
these omissions.297 The two proposals called for the amendment of Article 32a, Sub-Clause 2 
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that would, if ratified, read: “Military Service can be introduced through federal law.” The 
proposals were debated by the Committee for Judiciary and Constitutional Law and the 
Committee for Questions of European Security in early 1954. Even though the committees were 
composed of members of the governing parties and the opposition, the parliamentarians 
immediately agreed on one fundamental idea: compulsory military service (Wehrpflicht) was a 
duty that rested solely with the Federal Republic’s male citizens. Military service, as Karl 
Weber, a CDU politician and trained lawyer, declared during a meeting of the Federal Law 
Committee on 9 February 1954, “traditionally never referred to women” but was always limited 
to men. Without being specific, he justified this opinion on the grounds of women’s and men’s 
“fundamentally different nature.”298 Tradition and the perceived difference between the two 
sexes yielded this gendered understanding of military service.  
In addition to the perceived “natural” differences between women and men, Germany’s 
most recent history functioned as an important disincentive to rearmament. The National 
Socialist leadership had mobilized more than 500,000 women for auxiliary service in the 
Wehrmacht between 1939 and 1945 and thus broken the tradition to which Weber was referring.  
Understandably, West German politicians did not want to follow in Hitler’s footsteps.299 
Appalled by the idea of recruiting “young girls” once again as anti-aircraft-axillaries, Adolf 
Arndt, parliamentary secretary and legal expert for the SPD, declared that he did not want to see 
women “armed as riflewomen” (Flintenweiber).300 Referring to Flintenweiber, the SPD 
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politician used an image that emerged in the literature of German World War I veterans who 
joined the paramilitary and anti-communist Freikorps (Free Corps) during the 1918/19 
revolution. In their memoires and diaries, Freikorps members stylized themselves as Germany’s 
defenders against the Bolshevik “red floods” and “rifle-women.”301 During World War II, the 
National Socialist leadership employed this imagery in their propaganda to denounce the Soviet 
Union in general and, particularly, their military practices, which systematically included women 
in the army. Continuing to decry the military service of women, Adolf Arndt used the image of 
the Flintenweiber as a warning against the revival of militarism, Nazism and communism. 
According to him and many other parliamentarians, women’s armed military service was a sign 
that the state had become totalitarian and militaristic.  
 The “ample experiences”302 from World War II even prompted West German politicians 
to contradict the conviction of the former Western Allies. Maintaining that the Adenauer 
government supported only the recruitment of men, CDU politician Helene Weber argued that 
she did not want to follow the “unfortunate” example of the United States or England, both of 
which had enlisted women for various forms of military service.303 Embracing this position 
wholeheartedly, Theodor Blank, deputy to the chancellor for questions relating to the increase of 
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allied troops (Beauftragten des Bundeskanzlers für die mit der Vermehrung der alliierten 
Truppen zusammenhängenden Fragen), argued that women’s recruitment would not help 
Europe. Having been appointed in October 1950, Blank and his staff were—at first covertly— 
responsible for planning West Germany’s defense contribution and rearmament. If the European 
countries, Blank maintained, with the support of the United States, “would be unable to defend 
themselves,” it would be impossible to defend the “fatherland” with armed forces composed 
female auxiliaries.304 Indeed, the chancellor’s deputy stated that he would not object to female 
service entirely, as long it was done on a voluntary basis and without weapons. Nonetheless, he 
hoped that the parliamentarians would formulate specific regulations against female recruitment. 
Such a formulation, Blank argued, would give him a great advantage during negotiations about 
the European Defense Community. If the Basic Law was amended accordingly, he and his staff 
could argue that the recruitment of women was unconstitutional.305 As Blank’s statement shows, 
the desire to preclude women’s access to armed military service and thus clearly to define 
postwar West German gender norms, even prompted government officials to reject the practices 
of other democracies.  
Notwithstanding this agreement across party lines, the codification of military service as 
a duty incumbent only upon men proved to be difficult to enforce. As FDP politician, Marie-
Elisabeth Lüders put it, the parliamentarians could not solely consider the “safeguard of 
women.” According to Lüders, who had worked for the Ministry of War in 1916, the 
                                                 
304 Der Deutsche Bundestag, Stenographisches Protokoll der 7. Sitzung des Ausschusses für Fragen der 
europäischen Sicherheit, 22 February 1954, printed in Brundo Thoß, ed., Der Bundestagsausschuss für 
Verteidigung: Der Ausschuss für Fragen der Europäischen Sicherheit, Januar 1953 bis Juli 1954 (Düsseldorf, 
2010).  
305 Ibid. 
 
 
110 
parliamentarians also had “every reason to think of the men”306 who would be obligated to take 
up arms. This raised a question about equal treatment of the sexes. During the meeting on 
February 9, 1954, Adolf Arndt triggered a debate about Article 3, Sub-clause 2 of the Basic Law, 
which stated that “men and women are equal.”307 Even though the SPD-politician also opposed 
the recruitment of women, he warned that the parliamentarians had to deal with the “problem of 
equality before the law.”308  
Arndt’s focus on Article 3 was most likely prompted by contemporary arguments against 
the idea that military service was solely a man’s duty. While West Germany’s rearmament was 
debated in the Bundestag in 1952, a lawyer mailed three letters to Arndt maintaining that limiting 
military service to men had become obsolete and illegal. Forcing only West Germany’s male 
population to render military service would discriminate against men by favoring women.309 
Ignoring the many disadvantages that both West German single and married women faced in the 
workforce,310 the lawyer argued that women would have an unfair advantage on the job market. 
In addition, the lawyer claimed that Germany’s most recent history had shown that the exclusion 
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of women could no longer be justified on the basis of their “bodily and psychologically 
peculiarities.”311 On the contrary, according to the letter, women had proven their physical 
capabilities during the gruesome last months of the war and the early postwar years.  
In his replies to the lawyer, Arndt argued that stressing women’s qualities in the present 
situation would be “psychologically incomprehensible” for many contemporaries.312 Without 
giving much detailed information, the SPD politician maintained that for “the man on the street” 
it would appear self-evident that in this case men and women “had to be treated unequally.”313 
Even though Arndt did not change his mind in the years to come, he repeatedly pointed to the 
problem of equality during the parliamentary committee meetings. He cautioned that young men 
would feel that they were not being treated as women’s equals. If only men had to serve in the 
armed forces, they could lose valuable time for vocational training and then face disadvantages 
on the job market.314 According to Arndt, the civilian careers of men and the reconstruction of 
the complete male breadwinner family should not be jeopardized by the introduction of 
compulsory military service.  
Trying to counter Arndt’s concerns, which were quite common in postwar Europe,315 
CDU member Helene Weber, vice-chairwoman of the Catholic Women’s League and leader of 
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CDU/CSU’s Women’s Union, recalled an earlier CDU statement about the equality of men and 
women. She declared that in this case her faction and party wished to interpret Article 3 in a way 
that equality for women meant “something different” than for men.316 Endorsing Weber’s 
argument, FDP politician Marie Elisabeth Lüders further stated that the question of whether 
women should be recruited or not “had nothing to do with the question of equality before the 
law.”317 Maintaining that “men are no not women” and “women are not men,” she cautioned that 
“equality” should not be confused with “leveling” (Gleichmacherei). Because women “could not 
handle weapons,” and men “could not handle babies,” she argued that military service had to be 
limited to men.318  
By claiming that “handling weapons” was a talent only men possessed, Lüders could feel 
confident that she would have the support all her colleagues. Given how negatively 
parliamentarians viewed women’s military service—as exemplified in the discussion of the 
Flintenweiber—Lüders did not encounter opposition. Even though parliamentarians were unable 
to formulate a precise definition of what constituted a weapon, they agreed that armed military 
service (Dienst an der Waffe) was above all a man’s task.319 Instead of armed service, 
parliamentarians such as Hans Jochim Merkatz, a member of the conservative DB or German 
Party, stated that women could be employed in military jobs that “usually” had been exercised by 
women and that would “match women’s character.” For Merkatz, these appropriate jobs were 
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mainly auxiliary positions in the “kitchen, nursing, office” or “administering” soldiers’ 
clothing.320 If women wanted to work in the military voluntarily as nurses, kitchen help, or 
cleaning ladies, the parliamentarians did not object. Considering, however, that during a “total 
war” every citizen would be needed to help defending his or her “fatherland,” the committee 
members accepted the idea that women could be recruited for “compulsory service” if  
international developments demanded it.321  
Following the committee’s repeated consideration and the Bundestag’s approval, the 
amended Basic Law finally stated that the regulation of “foreign affairs as well as defense, 
including military service of men aged eighteen and the protection of the civilian society” rested 
solely with the federal government.322 Based on the perceived difference between the sexes and 
the experience of World War II, West German parliamentarians clearly defined compulsory 
military service as a man’s duty and thus cemented traditional gender norms that portrayed men 
as the protectors of home, country, and the female sphere.  
4. Debates in the Amt Blank about the “Staatsbürger in Uniform” and the European Defense 
Community  
The military future of West Germany was not solely defined and decided in the realm of the 
Bundestag and its parliamentary subcommittees. Long before West German parliamentarians 
agreed on the codification of military service, Konrad Adenauer had already used his power as 
chancellor to create the Center for Service to the Homeland (Zentrale für Heimatdienst, ZfH) in 
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the spring/summer of 1950. The ZfH functioned covertly as the office for former Wehrmacht 
General Gerhard von Schwerin, who had been in charge of various panzer divisions during 
World War II. Adenauer commissioned Schwerin to deliberate the details of West Germany’s 
potential defense contribution and the nature of a future West German military force.  
In October 1950, the Zentrale für Heimatdienst invited fifteen men who had served in the 
Wehrmacht and were deemed “untainted” by the NS State to the Cloister Himmerod near the 
capital of Bonn.323 Among the men who attended the meeting were the former General of the 
Infantry, Herman Foertsch,324 Hans Speidel, who served as Chief of Staff to Field Marshal Erwin 
Rommel, Adolf Heusinger, who briefly served as the Chief of the General Staff of the Army in 
World War II, the former Captain with the General Staff, Wolf Graf von Baudissin, and the staff-
officer Johann Adolf Graf von Kielmansegg. Convening for three days, the group discussed the 
international preconditions that had to be fulfilled before the Federal Republic could establish a 
military force, made organizational proposals, and developed guidelines for the troops’ military 
training.  
Likewise, the group discussed the “ethical and moral principles” that should shape the 
life and work of future West German soldiers. Because of serious disagreement among the 
participants, the final memorandum—the Himmeroder Denkschrift—tackled the question of the 
soldier’s image, duty, and education only briefly.  The document stated that the Federal Republic 
                                                 
323 See, Pauli, Wehrmachtoffiziere; Abenheim, Reforging, 52. 
324 His participation was controversial, since he had participated in the formulation of the Führereid (Hitler Oath) in 
1934. Instead of pledging loyalty to a constitution, the German Wehrmacht would pledge personal loyalty to Hitler. 
See Sebastian Conrad, Auf der Suche nach der verlorenen Nation: Geschichtsschreibung in Westdeutschland und 
Japan, 1945–1960 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht), 250–255. 
 
 
115 
had to create a “fundamentally new” type of soldier and devise a new “inner structure”325 that 
would guide military life. Given “Europe’s current state of emergency,” the memorandum 
acknowledged that West German soldiers could not serve or fight only for a national cause, but 
for all Western Europe. Yet since this progressive notion was hotly contested during the meeting, 
the memorandum also cautioned that future soldiers should always combine their obligation 
toward “Europe’s goods and ideals” with a “healthy” portion of love for their fatherland.”326  
The conflicting ideas outlined in the Himmeroder Denkschrift functioned as an important 
basis for subsequent discussions both in Bonn and Paris. As stated earlier, the chancellor 
appointed CDU politician Theodor Blank as his deputy for questions relating to the increase of 
allied troops. But this job title was a façade. Until becoming the official Ministry for Defense in 
1955, the Amt Blank was charged with planning and implementing West Germany’s defense 
contribution.327 In addition to the discussions and planning that took place in Bonn, officials of 
the Amt had to travel to Paris in order to negotiate the future structure of the EDC with delegates 
of the other European powers.  
A document especially significant for delineating the future West European and West 
German soldier was known as the discipline générale. If sanctioned and implemented, the 
European discipline générale would have stipulated the rights and duties of all troops 
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participating in the European Defense Community.328  Even though the EDC eventually failed 
and drafts of the discipline générale vanished into various European desk drawers, the Paris 
negotiations along with the discussion taking place in the Amt Blank shed light on how West 
German officials sought to define military service as a man’s duty. In addition, the discipline 
générale  also shows that the formulation of masculine concepts were not only shaped by the 
international context of the Cold War and European integration, but also by the experience of 
two world wars and West Germany’s postwar attempts to reconstruct life and society in the wake 
of total war and defeat.  
Defining the New West German Man in Military Uniform  
Analyzing the beginning of West Germany’s rearmament, scholars have paid close attention to 
the workings of the Amt Blank and especially to the sub-division Innere Führung. Initially 
founded as a sub-division responsible for the development of a concept of the inner structure of 
the future armed forces, the staff assigned to this office was predominantly in charge of 
sketching the contours of the new West German soldier and redefining the ideals of military 
education and training. Although he was considered an outside by many, Wolf Graf von 
Baudissin was very influential in the subdivision Innere Führung. Having participated in the 
meetings at Cloister Himmerod, the former Wehrmacht Captain joined the Amt Blank in May 
1951, where he worked closely with Johann-Adolf Graf von Kielmansegg, and Ulrich de 
Maizière, a former General Staff Officer with the Supreme High Command of the Wehrmacht.329 
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Although their proposals were contested ab initio, their ideas and definitions would form the 
guiding principles of the West German armed forces.  
Eager to prevent Germany’s recent military history from repeating itself, Baudissin, 
Kielmansegg, and Maizière were convinced that the Federal Republic had to create a new type of 
soldier and fundamentally rethink the military’s inner structure. Therefore they developed a 
tripartite image of the new soldier and citizen, which was based on the understanding that 
women’s armed service would violate “moral law” (das Sittengesetz)330 and that only West 
German men would be drafted to serve as soldiers in the European Defense Community. This 
new soldier should be a man who would be a “good state citizen,” (guter Staatsbürger), “free 
man” (freier Mensch), and “full-fledged” soldier.  
If men’s task was to defend both Europe and his “German home and family,” the military 
had to become an integral part of the Federal Republic. Otherwise the new West German military 
would follow the deterrent example of the Reichswehr during the Weimar era and become a 
“state within the state.”331 Baudissin in his colleagues were convinced that the “dangerous 
dualism” between soldier and citizen had to be abolished, because the West German soldier 
would otherwise be unable to “stand his ground at the inner front of the Cold War” in a “manly” 
manner (seinen Mann stehen). 332 Since the future West German soldier would be obliged to 
defend the Federal Republic and Western Europe against the totalitarian regime of the Soviet 
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Union and an ideology that was based on denying “personal values” and “total submission of the 
individual,” they believed it imperative that the West German soldier become part of the 
democratic and pluralistic system he was supposed to defend.333 Both previous German military 
traditions and the ideological subjugation of individuality in the Soviet Union were the “other” 
against which officials sought to define the new West German soldier.  
The idea that the soldier should be a “good state citizen” was closely connected to the 
second conviction, the notion that the soldier should also be a “free man.” In June 1953, Adolf 
Heusinger, who became the chief of the Amt Blank’s military office in 1952, Baudissin and 
Kielmansegg presented their plans to the parliamentary Committee for Questions of European 
Defense. In addition to granting soldiers certain political rights, they explained, the future 
military should ensure the development of each soldier’s personality, limited only by the 
boundaries of “military discipline and confidentiality.”334 Referring to the Reichswehr in the 
years between “1920 and 1930”, Heusinger complained that many of its soldiers were so eager to 
fit in and fulfill their troops’ expectations that they rarely had the chance to develop their own 
personality. Inferring that this had led to the success of the Third Reich, the former Wehrmacht 
general maintained that future West German troops should be trained in a way that would enable 
even a man perceived by his comrades as a “weirdo” to thrive.335  
Notwithstanding the claim that future serviceman should participate in society and 
politics as other good citizens do, military planners also insisted that the new soldiers become 
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“full-fledged” soldiers, thoroughly drilled and trained. This belief rested on the assumption that 
the future citizens in uniforms would soon be obliged to move to the battle field. Although 
scientific developments made it likely that future wars would be fought with atomic weapons, 
military experts as well as parliamentarians still anticipated that the West German soldier would 
engage in front-line battle against Russian soldiers. In order for the future soldier to defend 
Europe, his fatherland West Germany, and his home, he would need to combat the “rigor of the 
East” (Härte des Ostens).336 Although Heusinger’s argument was based on the perceived 
military strength and superiority of the Soviets in Eastern Europe, it was also influenced by the 
stereotypical image of “the Russian,” and in particular the image of the barbaric Red Army 
soldier. This image also motivated German forces at the end of World War II.337 This image, 
which pervaded many discussions in the Amt Blank, was elaborated by former General of the 
Artillery, Friedrich-Wilhelm Hauck338 during a conference for former soldiers organized at the 
Protestant Academy in Bad Boll near Stuttgart, in 1952. In his speech Hauck claimed that the 
soldier of the Red Army was “fanaticized, disciplined, tough” and “indifferent to casualties.”339 
Moreover, Hauck maintained, the Red Army’s command displayed an exceptional “ruthlessness 
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against everything human.”340 Because of this pejorative and alarming image of the Soviet 
soldier, officials argued that West German soldiers needed to be trained with the utmost rigor.  
Moreover, the pervasive image of the Red Army soldier allowed West German officials 
to deduce the behavior that would be expected from the future West German man in uniform. 
Presenting his “Thoughts about the Image of the Soldier” during the conference in Bad Boll in 
1953, Wolf Graf von Baudissin warned against the “mechanical-totalitarian” soldier that had 
fought on both the German and on the Russian side of World War II. According to him, this type 
of serviceman was characterized by “blind obedience,” by the dissolution of any “sense of 
community,” and by “barbarism.”341 If the Federal Republic used this model for its own army, 
Baudissin argued, West Germany would surrender itself to the East. Instead, the West German 
man in uniform needed to be imbued with humane as well as Christian values and display 
“chivalrous” behavior” (ritterlich).342 
Arguing that an officer could always turn into a “director of mass murder” if he ignored 
the importance of common humanity,343 Baudissin and his supporters agreed that the West 
German soldier should be inspired by a “reverence for life” and the awareness that he had to 
“help the helpless,” which meant women, children, and the elderly.344 Influenced by the “total” 
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warfare that had dominated World War II and by the perception of barbaric enemy troops, West 
German planners such as Baudissin sought to define the West German and, by extension, the 
European man as an effective soldier who would at the same time be bound by “moral and 
chivalrous” behavior.345 
The West German Soldier between “Manneszucht” and Discipline 
The agenda of the Amt Blank to develop an army of men who would simultaneously be 
restrained, “full-fledged” soldiers, “free men,” and “good state citizens” was quite ambitious, 
because it represented—as Ute Frevert has termed it— a “splits” (Spagat).346 The Amt Blank’s 
idea meant that the future West German man in uniform needed to be morally, physically, and 
intellectually the inhabitant of two spheres: both the military and civilian society. The proposals 
made by Baudissin, Kielmansegg, and Maizière were, however, forcefully contested, for they 
necessitated the reevaluation of military traditions, laws, and practices. First, the proponents of 
the new soldierly image had to face the criticism of other staff members working at the Amt 
Blank. Many conservative and traditionalist military experts opposed a far-reaching overhaul of 
military traditions. Second, determined to discuss their agenda with a broader public, members of 
the Amt Blank had to wrestle with the ideas and comments of the politicians, theologians, and 
sociologists who attended several meetings and workshops. Finally, the question of which rules 
and guidelines future soldiers should follow was debated not only on a national level. Employees 
of the Amt Blank had also to consider the debates about the European Defense Community, 
which were taking place in Paris.  
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Beginning in the fall of 1951, representatives of Italy, Benelux, France, and the Federal 
Republic convened in Paris to discuss the details of the European Defense Committee. The 
German delegation consisted of fifteen former officers. In the Amt Blank, the special task force 
“S” chaired by Adolf Graf von Kielmansegg was in charge of all issues relating to the EVG 
conference. Presiding over all the issues, however, was the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.347 In 
addition to the technicalities of strategies and tactics, the discipline générale was one of the 
major issues that the representatives needed to negotiate and formulate.348 These negotiations 
proved to be complicated, for the liberalizing idea of the Amt Blank met some resistance in Paris. 
Eager to establish an efficient West European army, British and French military leaders hoped 
that the German planners would display once again their “well-known talent” to establish the 
kind of armed forces they had come to dislike, though those forces had been admired in previous 
wars.  The West German delegation had no intention, however, of meeting these expectations. 
On the contrary, when the French presented their draft of the European discipline code, Theodor 
Blank was alarmed because he thought that the draft “was worse than anything the Nazis had 
tried to do.”349 Consequently, many of the German delegates’ proposals surprised the other 
delegations.  
One of the many contested aspects of the discipline générale was the very term 
discipline. In Paris, the West German delegation soon came to recognize that the French and the 
Italian representatives sought to introduce a formal form of discipline, to which the West 
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German delegates referred to as Manneszucht (literally: man’s discipline).350 While the gendered 
term Manneszucht, which implied the notion of chastisement or punishment, was clearly 
understood as a form of military discipline and subordination, during the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries the two terms—Manneszucht and discipline—were often used 
complementarily.351 In addition to the notion of obeying military orders, the term Manneszucht 
had also moral implications. According to one of the leading German lexicons, upholding 
Manneszucht was especially important if “morally questionable elements” were rife among the 
soldiers.352 The use and exaggeration of the term Manneszucht was at its peak during the terror 
under the Nazi regime. Deserters in particular were sentenced to death because they violated 
military Manneszucht.353  
This understanding of discipline, however, contradicted the conviction of many staff 
members of the Amt Blank. In 1953, for instance, Baudissin emphasized that a distinction needed 
to be made between an “outer”—as favored by the French and Italians—and an “inner” 
discipline. Promoting soldierly ideals, Baudissin argued that coerced discipline or Manneszucht 
would not be sufficient anymore. Instead of forcing external discipline onto the soldier, he 
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himself would be obliged to develop an “inner discipline,” an “inner mental attitude.”354 
According to Baudissin, this “inner discipline” would develop if the soldier recognized that he 
had to submit himself to the “demands of the community” without, however, abandoning his 
“personal sense of responsibility.” Only if the future soldier could develop this kind of discipline 
would he become an effective fighter. Such a sense of responsibility would also make him 
immune to “emotional crudeness” and passive acceptance.355   
Not everybody supported Baudissin’s concept of the Staatsbürger in Uniform and his 
ideas about military discipline and practices.356 In particular, many conservative Wehrmacht 
veterans—inside and outside the Amt Blank—took offence and soon ridiculed the new military 
ideals as “Inner Strangulation” (Inneres Gewürge).357 One of the earliest and most militant critics 
of the new soldierly concept was Bogislaw von Bonin. After serving as the chief of various 
Panzerkorps, he became Chief of the Operational Branch of the Army General Staff in 1944. 
Allowing Army Group A to retreat from Warsaw in January 1945, Bonin disobeyed a direct 
order of Adolf Hitler, for which he was imprisoned in the concentration camps of Flossenbürg 
and Dachau. Joining the Amt Blank in 1952, Bonin became the advocate of traditional 
Wehrmacht practices and soon criticized Baudissin and Kielmansegg, going so far as to call them 
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“dreamers” (Traumtänzer).358 Since future West German troops would have to confront the 
armed forces of the Soviet Union, Bonin believed that the virtues of the old Wehrmacht had to be 
revived and traditional notions of Manneszucht upheld. While he was seeking to put as many 
obstacles as possible in the paths of Baudissin and Kielmansegg, Bonin himself was forced 
eventually to resign. Following numerous internal quarrels and complaints, which received a lot 
of press coverage, Bonin left the Amt Blank in 1953.                   
Despite his dismissal, Bonin could be certain to have the support of other former 
Wehrmacht generals such as Georg von Sodenstern, who was awarded the Knight's Cross of the 
Iron Cross for battlefield bravery in 1940. Like Bonin, Sodenstern believed in a timeless ideal of 
soldiering that combined the “metaphysical” qualities of “undying manliness” (Ewigmännlichen) 
and “primordial ferocity” (Urkämpferischen). Seeing officers as the keepers of Germany’s “most 
magnificent possession, its manliness” as well as its defenders against the Soviet Union, he 
consequently dismissed the “citizen soldier” as a “suicidal” concept that would endanger the 
Federal Republic.359 Instead, West German needed to produce valuable “fighters” if they wanted 
to win any battle. According to Bonin and Sodenstern, who represented only two of Baudissin’s 
numerous opponents, the soldier’s combat readiness and value was grounded in his superior 
masculinity. Based on this understanding, many military experts argued vehemently against 
Baudissin’s “crazy and special ideals” (Spinnereien und Sondereinfällen), that is against his ideal 
of the Innere Führung and the Staatsbürger in Uniform.360   
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In addition to countering the criticism of former Wehrmacht generals, Baudissin and his 
colleagues had to defend their ideas during many meetings the Amt organized to involve a 
broader public in the military reforms.361 One of these events was an expert conference the Amt 
Blank held on June 6 and 7, 1953 to discuss “problems” related to the European discipline 
générale. Debating the right form of discipline to which European troops should adhere, one of 
the invited guests, Professor Hartmann,362 expressed displeasure with the wording of the code. 
Lamenting that the draft did not include “valued” soldierly qualities such bravery or courage, he 
argued that the code implied that all that was necessary for a good army was that it be well 
drilled.363 Instead, the professor maintained that the code should “discuss discipline in terms of 
Manneszucht or the order that must be maintained.” He stated that the “soldierly mind” would 
understand that Manneszucht was necessary to turn the troops into an “orderly, forceful 
whole.”364 For Hartmann, the term Manneszucht clearly bore moral implications that would 
ensure military effectiveness.  
Hartmann’s argument was supported by another academic commentator, university 
professor Erich Rothacker.365 Arguing that the term discipline (Disziplin) was useless, because it 
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was a “foreign word” that soldiers would be unable to understand, Rothacker lamented that the 
discipline générale did not refer to terms such as “bravery,” “decisiveness,” “self-control” and 
“self-discipline” (Selbstzucht). For him, it was of the utmost importance that the Parisian 
discipline générale include the notion of Zucht (discipline/chastisement). Directly connecting 
these attributes to the soldiers’ sex, he maintained that the discipline code needed to refer to 
manliness (Mannhaftigkeit) “and everything that is connected to it,” because manliness “had 
been regarded at all times as something valuable.”366 Thus, Rothacker explicitly linked effective 
military discipline to exceptional manly attitudes and behavior.  
Although the argument that Manneszucht was essential to a successful military force 
flourished in Bonn and Brussels, proponents of the new approach to military training were not to 
be deterred. Responding to Rothacker and Hartmann, Baudissin maintained that Manneszucht 
was not an appropriate word to use. Although he had asserted earlier that manliness was an 
essential “prerequisite” for future soldiers, Baudissin insisted that Manneszucht was not 
discipline future soldiers should display. During the expert conference in Siegburg in 1953, he 
first of all maintained that Manneszucht was a “hackneyed” term unsuitable to present 
conditions. Baudissin and his colleagues hence favored a form of discipline that would match 
their tripartite concept of the future West German soldier.367 
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Debating the Discipline Générale and the Marriage Decree 
The problem of defining a pan-European military discipline that would not hinder West German 
plans to implement a new soldierly ideal proved especially difficult during discussion of 
individual articles of the discipline générale that were to regulate the soldier’s life inside and 
outside the barracks. One feature of the discipline générale that was up for debate was the 
question of whether European soldiers should be required to obtain a permit before entering into 
marriage. This aspect of the Parisian negotiations has been generally overlooked by historians, 
who have focused more on debates about the soldiers’ political rights and about how soldiers 
should be punished if they broke the law.368 Yet the arguments over marriage illuminate not only 
the complicated process of creating a pan-European defense force. They also shed light on the 
centrality of the concept of the family in West German discourse and the way specific family 
values influenced the debates about rearmament.  
Early drafts of the European disciplinary code that circulated in the summer months of 
1952 included the rule that officers on active duty, non-commissioned officers, and men 
(Mannschaften) who had been recruited for active service could only marry if they had received 
written approval from the military authorities.369 An internal preliminary comment, which 
circulated within the Amt Blank in late July 1952, stated that an obligation to obtain a marriage 
permit was “absurd,” because marriage was a “private affair” and restrictions would violate the 
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Deutschland im Rahmen der EVG,” in Anfänge westdeutscher Sicherheitspolitik 1945–1956, ed. Lutz Köllner et al, 
vol 2, Die EVG-Phase (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1990), 684. 
369 Tanscription “Commite Interim AIRE De La Conference Pour L’Organisation de la communante Europeanne de 
defense, Paris,” 17 July 1952. BArch F, BW 9/ 532, 314. The articles referring to a marriage decree varied. The 
marriage decree was debated as part of the “civic and political rights and duties of the soldier,” and as part of the 
“outward appearance of discipline.”   
 
 
129 
“personal freedoms” of the soldier.370 Despite this rejection of a marriage decree, the official 
response of the West German delegation considered the possibility of having professional 
soldiers report their marriage plans three months in advance. “Armed forces,” the West German 
delegation stated, “had considerable interest in selection of wives of their soldiers, because the 
human effectiveness of the individual [soldier] also depended on the mental attitude of his wife 
[...]”371 Consequently, if the commander decided that a woman was not “law-abiding” and 
impeccable in her “moral behavior” (sittlich und kriminell einwandfrei), he could and should 
inform the soldier about his findings and emphasize that his marriage would most likely call his 
future employment “considerably” into question.372  
The difference between the two statements resulted, first, from the West German 
delegation’s effort to simplify their negotiations with representatives of the other European 
countries. Whereas the West German delegation expressed doubts about a possible marriage 
decree, delegations from other countries seemed eager to include such a decree in the discipline 
code.373 Second, the discrepancy arose from conflicting opinions among the Amt Blank’s own 
legal and military experts. Since the delegations in Paris disagreed, the question of marriage 
remained on the international agenda and thus required more internal consideration. Meeting in 
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February and March 1953, West German officials discussed possible “regulations of marriage.” 
Contrary to the first preliminary comment, the experts discussed the matter on the basis of a legal 
statement which emphasized that a military marriage decree would not violate the West German 
Basic Law. According to the statement, a marriage decree would neither violate Article 2 
(development of the individual) of the Basic Law nor the constitutionally protected “institution 
of marriage.”374 Deliberating whether a soldier’s private life as an individual had to comply with 
“official requirements,” the experts tackled both the situation of young volunteers and recruits 
and possible regulations for professional soldiers.  
The situation of young soldiers was negotiated in two meetings, which were attended by 
military attaché Werner Kaminski, Ambassador Hellmuth Roth, and the former Captain and the 
chief deputy of the office of Innere Führung, Heinz Karst, amongst others.375 The participants in 
these meetings voiced concern about what they called “early marriages.” Because of the horrific 
effects of World War II, the protocol stated, many young people wanted to marry early because 
they were searching for some kind of “domesticity,” which they had all been missing for a long 
time.376 Yet the legal and military experts viewed this search for “domesticity” as something that 
would distract men from becoming real soldiers. Even though West German men were expected 
to join the military in order to defend their fatherland, family and home, discussants argued that a 
family could represent a “mental burden,” which could prevent the soldier from becoming part of 
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the “military community.”377 If soldiers married too early, the protocol stated, they would run the 
risk of developing neither an esprit de corps nor a “will to serve” (Einsatzwille). Maintaining 
furthermore that military service represented the final stage of a man’s Erziehung, some experts 
believed that becoming a husband first would put this important stage of education and training 
in jeopardy.378  
Whereas the discussants favored a marriage decree based on their understanding of 
military necessity, eventually the legal experts and military representatives agreed that, at least 
for recruits, no marriage decree should be introduced. The reasons the discussants refrained from 
voting for a marriage decree were twofold. First, some discussants raised the concern that 
limiting the soldier’s “personal freedoms” by limiting his freedom to marry whomever he 
chooses would violate an essential feature of the concept of the Staatsbürger in Uniform.379 The 
second reason discussants rejected the idea of a marriage decree concerned “children born out of 
wedlock.”380 Maintaining that children should be born not to single mothers, but into families, 
some discussants stressed that a soldier, whose “girl” was expecting a child, should always be 
granted the possibility of marrying her. In light of this pressing matter and in the absence of 
“imperative military necessities,” the protocol concluded that the military should refrain from 
introducing a marriage decree for recruits.381  
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The marriage of professional soldiers was, however, another issue, discussed at length 
during an evening meeting on May 22, 1953. According to the protocol, discussants favored a 
marriage decree for professional soldiers because they believed that in a “men’s society” such as 
the military it was important that a man who chose to become a professional soldier develop a 
“mindset” entirely focused on his work.382 Developing this mindset was important because it 
would not only determine his effectiveness but also indicate his position within this “men’s 
society.”383 A professional soldier could only act as a superior to young soldiers, the protocol 
stated, if he established the right attitude. In addition to impeding a man’s position as a superior, 
an unwise marriage could hinder soldiers from effectively juggling the demands of their military 
and civilian lives. According to the protocol, some discussants believed that the military had first 
to form the character of a soldier and turn him into a mature man before he could be both 
husband and soldier.384 Although the protocol noted that some discussants had objected to this 
line of argument because they believed that a woman could influence the soldiers’ education in a 
positive way, the final draft included at least some form of marriage restriction.385  
Even though the experts expressed conflicting opinions respecting the marriage of young 
soldiers and professional soldiers, both strands of argument were based on the idea that some 
women would be inappropriate as soldiers’ wives. According to the protocols, military and legal 
experts deemed it necessary to discuss criteria that future wives would be obliged to fulfill. 
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Defining such criteria, however, proved to be a delicate matter. One of the early drafts of the 
EVG’s discipline code had demanded rather vaguely that a superior’s “refusal of the contract of 
marriage” could only be motivated by “serious reasons” and not by “considerations of class, 
fortune or social situation.”386 As discussions proceeded, West German officials remained vague 
in their attempts to formulate minimum standards or requirements that soldiers’ wives had to 
fulfill. Some officials believed that not only the soldiers’ own “character and conduct” should be 
elite, but their wives’ should be too. Yet the officials proved unable to specify what particular 
qualities they had in mind.  According to the protocol of the meeting on March 16, 1953, “social 
qualities” or “level of education” could not be used as benchmarks. Instead, only the “most 
primitive requirements” could be applied to decide whether a woman was acceptable. The 
document, however, did not specify the exact content of these “primitive” prerequisites. It only 
stated that the discussants found those requirements important to prevent “undesirable 
influences” from entering the military.387 
Notwithstanding this vagueness, the idea that some women were better suited for 
becoming soldiers’ wives than others was debated not only within the context of the European 
discipline code. The idea also guided the social conventions of the Amt Blank during these years. 
In fact, the internal records of the Amt Blank can shed light on what the “most primitive 
requirements” were. The manners and behavior of wives were noted, for instance, by Heinz 
Karst. Reporting on August 27, 1953 that Gerhard G.388 and his wife had paid him a visit, Heinz 
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Karst remarked that G.’s wife was an “especially nice, educated woman whose entire habitus 
speaks for her husband.”389 By declaring that G.’s wife was a worthy companion to her husband, 
Heinz Karst not only expressed expectations members of the Amt Blank valued; he was also in 
tune with the social conventions that guided bourgeois society.390 Expecting women to be the 
proper and well-behaved companions of their husbands, women who did not meet these norms 
were harshly criticized. In contrast to his positive judgment about G.’s wife, seven months later 
Karst criticized a member of the West German delegation to Paris. Referring to reports of his 
colleagues, he noted that the marriage of the man in question was not “happy” and that his wife 
moved around Bonn “quite flamboyantly and depraved.”391 According to Karst, the social and 
professional standing of a man in military uniform depended as much on the behavior of his wife 
as on his own judgment and behavior.  
Notwithstanding the continuing, widespread belief that the soldier’s reputation depended 
on the quality of his marriage and the behavior of his wife, the terms of the military delegations’ 
debates about a marriage decree changed in 1953. In light of the conflicting opinions on the 
matter, in late spring drafts of the discipline code asserted that with respect to certain “areas of 
public life” the soldier had to follow the regulations of his home country.392 This transferred onto 
the national level the question of whether the future man in uniform could choose whatever 
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woman he preferred. On the national level, however, the marriage decree was not much debated, 
except on a few occasions, in the Committee for Questions of European Defense.  
On May 21, 1953, the Committee for Questions of European Defense met to discuss a 
draft of the Volunteer Law and how it would relate to individual articles of the Basic Law. In this 
context, the committee members discussed Article 2, Subsection 1 of the Basic Law, which 
guaranteed the “development of the individual” (Entfaltung der Persönlichkeit), and tackled the 
issue of marriage regulations. At that time, committee chairman, CSU politician, and future 
Minister of Defense, Franz Joseph Strauß informed his colleagues that the “contract of the 
European Defense Committee” would not include any measures that would regulate or limit 
soldiers’ marital freedoms. He announced that the Adenauer government did not intend to 
implement any restrictions.393  
Notwithstanding this affirmation, the sheer mention of a marriage decree upset the 
opposition. SPD politician Fritz Erler, who was—according to the protocol— especially 
disgruntled, expressed his hope that for the Amt Blank “the development of the individual” meant 
“something more than just marriage.”394 For members of the SPD, the question of whether 
soldiers needed the approval of their superiors before they could get married was a sensitive 
topic, because it touched more basic laws than Article 2. Internal proceedings show that for the 
SPD the question of a marriage decree was also related to Article 6 of the Basic Law, which 
stated that the Federal Republic of Germany granted constitutional protection to the institution of 
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marriage and family.395 According to the Social Democrats, a restriction of marriage would 
violate this basic right.396 If the future West German soldier was supposed to be a good citizen 
and free man, the SPD maintained, he should also be encouraged to be husband and father at the 
same time. Parliamentarian Helmut Schmidt argued that officers “should have the nerve also to 
push a baby stroller, as is common in the United States army.”397 While this documentation 
shows that the political discourse of the early 1950s that focused on reconstruction of the 
“complete” male breadwinner clearly influenced how contemporaries judged military legislation, 
Helmut Schmidt’s vehemence can also be read as a reaction to his time as a Wehrmacht officer 
in the 1940s. In order to marry his partner Loki Glaser in 1942 he had to get permission from his 
military superior.398 
The question of which path the European discipline générale should take and whether 
servicemen should be allowed to marry whomever they chose was taken off the table in August 
of 1954, however, when the French national assembly withdrew their support of the European 
Defense committee. The French Non! put an end to the western attempts to create a European 
defense force in which Germany would participate . In reaction to the decision of the French 
national assembly, representatives of Belgium, Canada, Italy, France, Luxembourg, the 
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Netherlands, the United Kingdom, the United States and West Germany met in Paris and 
London, in September and October respectively, to determine West Germany’s status. One of 
many results of the two conferences was that West Germany would join NATO and be allowed 
to establish a 500,000-man conscription army.  
Conclusion 
Despite this abrupt rift, the issues that contemporaries discussed in the late 1940s and early 
1950s would prove fundamental for all subsequent discussions about the West German military 
and the masculinity of West German soldiers and officers. The debates about the Federal 
Republic’s contribution to the European Defense Community cemented not only the gendered 
construction of military service but also the traditional social gender norms. Received ideas 
about men’s and women’s natural social roles and attitudes toward the military practices of 
different totalitarian regimes determined that compulsory and voluntary armed military service 
would be limited to men. In postwar West Germany men had to act as the defenders both of 
Western Europe and the Federal Republic, whereas women, as mothers, wives, sisters, and 
girlfriends, were assigned to the domestic sphere. Thus, the debate about rearmament cemented 
traditional gender relations. This definition influenced the protests of Ohne Mich activists, 
permeated the debates in the Bundestag and related committees, and influenced legislative 
decisions pertaining to the amendment of the Basic Law as well as the ways in which the West 
German delegation negotiated the laws of the EDC. 
The qualities that contemporaries consequently attributed to and required from the future 
West German man in uniform were influenced by both national and international currents. The 
masculine image that extra-parliamentary activists, government officials, and representatives 
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engaged with alternated between full-fledged soldiers of the traditional “manly” sort on the one 
hand, and gentle, restrained family men on the other. As scholars have pointed out, the 
reconstruction of postwar West German society focused heavily on the ideal of the male 
breadwinner family. This ideal influenced the actions of peace activists who sought to prevent 
rearmament and keep West German families united by protecting West German husbands, sons, 
and fathers from being drafted for military service. It also shaped the rhetoric of the Adenauer 
government: While equating men’s military service with the duties that men had to fulfill as 
heads of their families and households, the government was eager to put to rest any fear that 
rearmament would put West German men and their families at risk. Finally, seeking to devise a 
blueprint for the future troops, representatives of the Amt Blank had to discuss soldiers’ rights 
and duties, including their right to marry.  
As contemporaries discussed the West German soldier as an integral part of their families 
and, by extension, of society, the Soviet threat loomed large. Convinced that the European 
Defense Community would need to face Russia’s Red army in battle, the Soviet soldier 
functioned as a bogey against which the West German and Western European man was defined. 
The West German man in uniform should be able to withstand the Russian threat not only 
through combat strength, but also through superior mental and behavioral capacities. The West 
German soldier was envisioned as simultaneously a gentle person and a vigorous combatant.  
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PART III 
EXPECTATIONS AND EXPERIENCE: THE DISCOURSE ON SOLDIER’S SOCIAL 
AND MORAL STANDARDS DURING THE FORMATION PERIOD OF THE 
BUNDESWEHR, 1955–1964 
As stated above, the plan to establish a European Defense Community (EDC) was up for debate 
in the French assembly in August 1954. The main point of contestation was the participation of 
West Germany. After heated debates during which opponents of the plan reminded their 
colleagues that France was about to ally with the Germans who “invaded us in 1792, in 1814, in 
1815, in 1914 and in 1940,”399 the parliamentarians voted 319 to 264 against the EDC. The vote 
upset not only the international leadership, including President Eisenhower and Chancellor 
Konrad Adenauer. It also necessitated a rethinking of the ways in which West Germany could be 
integrated into a Western defense force and function as a bulwark against the Communist East. A 
possible alternative was discussed only a month later. In September and October 1954, 
representatives of the Benelux, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, and the 
United States met in London to determine the future of the Federal Republic. After rather brief 
negotiations, the different parties agreed that West Germany should be integrated into NATO.400   
Following the negotiations in London, representatives met again in the French capital at 
the end of October to sign the Paris Treaty. In addition to regulating the Federal Republic’s 
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integration into NATO, the document included a so-called General Treaty that codified the 
Federal Republic’s qualified sovereignty and ended its occupation status. Moreover, instead of a 
contingent that would be put under European command, the Federal Republic was to establish 
national armed forces that—following the proposal of the Adenauer government—would consist 
of twelve divisions and 500,000 men by 1958.401 This goal was to be achieved by accepting 
voluntary conscription in order to establish a functioning officer corps and by introducing 
compulsory military service for men age 18 and older.402 Despite heated debates between 
Adenauer’s governing coalition and the opposition, the Bundestag eventually ratified the Paris 
Treaty in February 1955. Consequently, the Federal Republic gained its sovereignty on May 5, 
1955 and joined NATO officially on May 9, 1955.  
In the wake of these agreements the first 1,000 volunteers entered the barracks in the 
cities of Andernach (army), Nörvenich (air force) and Wilhelmshaven (navy) in January 1956. 
Fifteen months later, on April 1, 1957, the first cohort of draftees followed. As this beginning 
suggests, the ambitious goal to have a 500,000 men strong military at the end of 1958 was not 
reached.403 The government revised its plans already in March 1956 and the Bundeswehr 
counted just 170,562 men in November 1958. Only in 1965 did the Bundeswehr reach the 
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1955–1975 (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2006), 23–27. 
403 See Nägler, Der gewollte Soldat, 291–292. 
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strength of 449,800 men and the last of 12 divisions was put under NATO control. This was the 
final step that officially concluded the formation period of the Bundeswehr.404  
Notwithstanding the slow progress, the establishment of the Bundeswehr as a national 
defense force and the implementation of compulsory military service triggered a new wave of 
disputes, because West Germans continued to express conflicting opinions about rearmament.405 
Points of contention were numerous. Given the target size of the Bundeswehr—which exceeded 
for example the strength of the German Reichswehr during peacetime (1919–1935)406—
discussions erupted about the possible social implication of recruiting such a large number of 
men. Women’s organizations, religious youth groups, welfare workers, citizens living near 
military structures as well as government-critical newspapers became increasingly concerned 
with the possible negative effects that military life could have on young men’s social and sexual 
behavior. In contrast, a considerable number of school principals, parents, enthusiastic veterans, 
and conservative news outlets continued to propagate the idea that military training could 
inculcate young men with socially acceptable manners and turn them into citizens who would 
improve the social fabric of the FRG. While disputing this issue, contemporaries also disagreed 
about the methods military commanders should employ to train young recruits. In contrast to 
supporters of the Innere Führung, some conservative journalists and Wehrmacht veterans called 
for stern discipline and traditional drill pratices.407 
                                                 
404 Not until the mid-1970s was the initial proposal of 500,000 men almost reached. See Schmidt, Integration und 
Wandel, 26–27; Nägler, Der gewollte Soldat, 2.  
405 Bremm, “Wehrhaft wider Willen,” 283–297.  
406 In comparison, the Versailles treaty limited the Reichswehr (1919–1935) to 100,000 men. 
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The public’s preoccupation with the potential positive and negative effects of military life 
immediately concerned the conservative Adenauer government, members of the Bundestag, and 
the military leadership. Eager to turn the Bundeswehr’s establishment into a success story, the 
government sought to capitalize the positive sentiments, while at the same time seeking to 
counter any concerns that could jeopardize its realization. Fervent to ensure positive relations 
between the troops and society, military commanders and employees of the Ministry for Defense 
furthermore devised numerous regulations, decrees, and handbooks that explicitly targeted 
soldiers’ social and sexual behavior. The goal of these efforts was to inculcate recruits with 
social ideals and manners that were agreeable to a broad public.  
This struggle over the establishment of the Bundeswehr and the implementation of 
conscription was, however, more than an attempt to shape West German military politics. It was 
also a continuing struggle to define the social and moral boundaries of West German society. 
Scholars working on West German postwar history have long departed from the view that the 
Adenauer era was a lethargic period with already rigidly defined principles.408 They highlight 
instead that the 1950s and early 1960s were a period during which contemporaries eagerly 
negotiated moral norms and social values.409 Continuing to consider the heterosexual Christian 
male-breadwinner family as the backbone of a functioning democracy, the Adenauer 
                                                 
408 See, Axel Schildt and Arnold Sywottek, “‘Reconstruction’ and ‘Modernization’: West German Social History 
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government, conservative church representatives, and welfare workers ventured to strengthen 
this family ideal against liberal counter-narratives and in contrast to the family politics of the 
GDR.410 Amidst this process, the recruitment of the first cohorts of men offered West Germans 
another important way to negotiate not only socially acceptable male behavior, but also specific 
gender relations that every young man should embrace upon entering the barracks. Following the 
dominant discourse, disputes over the military centered on the soldiers and officers as 
heterosexual, monogamous men who were or aspired to become the head of a nuclear family.  
In order to shed light on this history, this part first turns to the parliamentary negotiations 
of compulsory military service, for they cemented the gender of the West German soldiers and 
officers. From there, it discusses contemporary reactions to the establishment of the Bundeswehr 
as a national conscription army by analyzing opinion polls and media reports as well as critical 
statements by individual citizens, religious and social welfare groups. Finally, this part addresses 
the different ways in which government officials, members of all leading parties as well as the 
military command sought to counter the public’s concerns about the social behavior of the West 
German troops.  
                                                 
410 Heineman, What Difference Does a Husband Make?, 122; Moeller, “Reconstructing the Family in 
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1. Parliamentary Negotiations over the Ideal of the Bundeswehr Soldier 
The international agreements of the mid-1950s required a new legal framework that would 
regulate the workings and function of the West German troops. One major issue was, without 
question, the regulation of conscription. In the summer of 1955, the Bundestag and the 
responsible parliamentary committees began negotiating the necessary amendments to the Basic 
Law as well as the Freiwilligengesetz (Law Governing the Legal Status of Volunteers), which 
was soon replaced by Soldatengesetz (Law Governing the Legal Status of Soldiers), and the 
Wehrpflichtgesetz (Law Governing the Recruitment of Men for Compulsory Military Service).  
At the beginning of the negotiations, Theodor Blank informed the Bundestag about the 
government’s agenda. According to the minister, the government planned to introduce 
compulsory military service “in times of peace” for men between the age of eighteen and forty-
five.411 Men would be drafted for a period of eighteen-month basic military service 
(Grundwehrdienst) at the age of twenty and, on occasion, called back for temporary military 
exercises (Wehrübungen).412 In the “case of emergency” (Ernstfall), however, the government 
reserved the right to make men’s military service permanent. Although the minister did not use 
the word “war,” it was clear that an armed conflict between the newly declared Warsaw Pact, on 
the one side, and the United States and its NATO partners, on the other, would lead to the 
extension of compulsory military service.413 At the same time, the proposals also stipulated that a 
                                                 
411 VDB, Der Deutsche Bundestag, 92. Sitzung, 27 June 1955, 5216. See further, Ehlert, “Innenpolitische 
Auseinandersetzungen.” 
412 VDB, Der Deutsche Bundestag, 92. Sitzung, 27 June 1955, 5217. 
413 Ibid. 
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man’s conscience and social responsibilities could curtail the demands of the state. In addition to 
keeping the constitutional right to apply for conscientious objection, the government considered 
measures to free or exempt men from military service if their recruitment would interfere 
significantly with their health, education, and practical training, or their personal life.414  
By outlining the scope of compulsory military service, Blank addressed issues that would 
lead to lengthy and intense Bundestag sessions.415 The negotiations of the Wehrpflichtgesetz 
were especially fierce, because parliamentarians’ opinions were not solely defined by whether 
they belonged to Adenauer’s governing coalition or to the opposition. To be sure, continuing to 
challenge Adenauer’s security and military politics, the oppositional Social Democrats objected 
to the introduction of the compulsory military service. Yet, over the course of the debates, the 
FDP and the All-German Bloc/League of Expellees and Deprived of Rights (GB/BHE) turned 
into renegade coalition partners. Even though the FDP generally supported the idea of 
compulsory military service for men, they did not approve of the ways in which Chancellor 
Adenauer and his supporters pursued their political agenda. Criticizing Adenauer and his 
ministers, the FDP politician Erich Mende stated, for example, that the government should have 
prepared the reading of the Wehrpflichtgesetz more carefully, because this law would encroach 
upon a “German man’s life and liberty” like no other law had done before.416   
                                                 
414 Ibid. 
415 The deliberations of the Wehrpflichtgesetz span three sessions. The second session, for instance, lasted sixteen 
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Since the negotiations of the laws were truly intense, they have received a lot of scholarly 
attention. While military and political scholars have, for example, addressed the quarrels over the 
length of compulsory military service—eighteen, fifteen, or twelve months—feminist historians 
have stressed the exclusion of women from military service.417 Given the horrific treatment of 
men who refused to serve, scholars have furthermore highlighted the novel status of 
conscientious objectors and the exemption of clerics as one of the most important aspects of the 
rearmament debate.418 Building upon this scholarship, the following analysis stresses that the 
introduction of compulsory military service also led to the reinforcement of West Germany’s 
postwar gender order, which cemented men’s role as the protector of the West German home and 
family and assigned women to the sphere that needed protection. Although this division was 
quickly defined, negotiations about men’s duties were contested, for the difficult question that 
parliamentarians had to answer was whether a man—as husband, father or son—had to protect 
his home and family by joining the armed forces or by staying home and working for the 
family’s livelihood. 
Bundestag Debates about the Exclusion of Women from Military Service 
Even though West Germany’s Basic Law already codified the exclusion of women from military 
service, the changing circumstances of West Germany’s rearmament triggered new debates about 
how compulsory military service needed to be limited to men.419 The arguments that 
                                                 
417 See, Janßen, Frauen ans Gewehr; Kraake, Frauen zur Bundeswehr. See also: Franz W. Seidler, Frauen zu den 
Waffen? Marketenderinnen, Helferinnen, Soldatinnen (Bonn: Bernard & Graefe Verlag GmbH & Co. KG, 1998), 
206–223. 
418 Bernhard, Zivildienst. 
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parliamentarians put forth in the mid-1950s resembled those of the early debates. Speaking for 
the Adenauer government, the CSU politician and chairman of the Committee for Defense, 
Richard Jaeger, emphasized once more that military service as a “moral duty” that every West 
German male citizen had to fulfill.420 Referring to the fact that the West German military was 
established solely as a defensive force, he argued in 1956 that it was the duty of the “German 
Volk” to defend itself against a “Soviet-Russian attack.”421 Although a private male citizen 
(Privatmann) was not obliged to defend himself against an attack and could chose to be killed, 
Jaeger maintained that this freedom did not apply to a “paterfamilias” who was responsible for 
his wife and children.422 Similar to the early 1950s, CDU/CSU politicians argued that men were 
responsible for defending West Germany, their homes and families against any threats from the 
East.    
The experience and memories of the Third Reich continued to play an important role as 
well. Portraying a gender order in which women needed protection and men provided this 
protection, Jaeger also made it clear that a reversal of this order was unacceptable. In June 1955, 
he maintained that the national socialist League of German Girls (Bund Deutscher Mädel, BDM) 
marching in lockstep epitomized the “triumph of militarism and the perversion of true 
soldierdome” (Soldatentum).423 For Jaeger, organizing women in a military fashion like the 
Nazis represented a deviation from the ways in which both normal non-militarized societies and 
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ordinary militaries functioned. In societies that had not been consumed by the workings of 
militarism the female sphere and military practices were unrelated. 
In arguing that women should not serve in the West German armed forces, Jaeger could 
be certain that he had the continuing support of his colleagues. Even though the amendments of 
the Basic Law as well as the passing of the Wehrpflichtgesetz were controversial, representatives 
of all parties still agreed that military duties—especially the bearing of arms—did not apply to 
women. For instance, FDP politician Marie-Elisabeth Lüders and CDU politician Elisabeth 
Schwarzhaupt argued that in order to prevent women from serving in the armed forces their 
constitutional rights could be curtailed. Albeit the Basic Law allowed women “to choose their 
occupation, place of work and place of education freely,” the two parliamentarians maintained 
that in the case of armed military service this freedom had its limits.424 Although Lüders and 
Schwarzhaupt were eagerly fighting for women’s “equality within marriage and the family” 
during this period,425 they did not advocate for an unlimited form of gender equality. In the case 
of national defense, they contended, some of the rights and duties stipulated by the Basic Law 
should apply to men only in order for the state to protect its female citizens.  
The SPD did not challenge the CDU/CSU and FDP’s eagerness to bar women from 
compulsory and armed military service. For example, Reinhold Rehs, who had commanded the 
Air Raid Warning Service of the German-occupied city of Danzig from 1944 to 1945, argued 
that if the Federal Republic decided to recruit women for service in the armed forces it would 
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eventually take the same ideological path the German Democratic Republic had taken.426 
Although the GDR did not introduce compulsory military service until 1962, the SED had 
already incorporated the notion of pre-military education into the state’s Youth Law. In 1952, the 
SED also founded the Society for Sport and Technique (Gesellschaft für Sport und Technik), 
which offered military sport exercises for both girls and boys so that they would be prepared for 
military service.427 Most likely aware of these developments, Rehs and others agreed that the 
Federal Republic had the “moral” obligation to distinguish themselves from the GDR and 
exempt women from military service.428 
As a result, the amended Basic Law of 1956 as well as the different laws that governed 
military service stipulated that compulsory military service and, above all, armed military service 
applied to men only.429 Recruiting women for duties that would help the Federal Republic to 
defend itself against any external or internal threats was only thinkable if these duties could be 
fulfilled outside of the realm of the troops and without weapons. Beginning in 1957, for instance, 
parliamentarians repeatedly discussed the shortfalls of the medical service. In light of the Suez 
Crisis (1956/57), the Israeli occupation of the Gaza Strip in November 1956, and the Hungarian 
Revolution of October/November 1956, members of the Committee for Defense pondered the 
conscription of women as First Aid personnel in order to provide care for the civilian population 
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in case of an emergency.430 After all, “taking care” of other people was considered suitable for 
women and a task that corresponded with their skills.431  
This understanding was underlined once more in the early 1960s, due to the beginning 
negotiations of new emergency laws. Accompanied by intense protest inside and outside of the 
Bundestag, the Adenauer government introduced emergency laws that would be included in the 
Basic Law.432 Proposed in 1958, 1960 and 1962, the laws would have greatly extended the 
powers of the executive and enabled the conscription of women for civilian duties 
(Notdienstgesetz). In this context, Adenauer’s government also considered the deployment of 
women as nurses, civil air raid protection personnel, telephone operators, and mechanics in order 
to free men to fight and to strengthen civil defense.433 While the proposals were disputed 
intensively, one constitutional provision was not challenged: by and large, all political parties 
continued to agree that compulsory military service and, above all, armed military service 
applied to men only and was, under no circumstances, to be extended to women.434  
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Parliamentary Debates about the Limitations of Compulsory Military Service for Men 
While the implementation of the Wehrpflicht thus cemented once more a traditional gender 
order, it also prompted disputes about whether military service should be compulsory for all 
eligible West German men as soon as they turned eighteen. As scholars have pointed out, the 
Wehrpflichtgesetz caused new discussions about the status of conscientious objectors as well as 
the exemption of clerics and students.435 Moreover, members of the Bundestag concerned 
themselves with the status of orphans and young men who were the last-living male members of 
their families, on the one hand, and the treatment of GDR refugees and men whose close 
relatives lived in East Germany, on the other. 
Despite the consensus that parliamentarians reached with respect to the “women’s 
problem,”436 the negotiations of this ‘men’s problem’ were not as easy. To be sure, the 
governments’ draft of the Wehrpflichtgesetz included a number of reasons for which men could 
be exempt from military service or could defer their recruitment. First, men could be spared from 
military service temporarily if their recruitment would jeopardize the well-being and 
maintenance of their families, especially their “needy parents.” Second, the draft envisioned the 
deferment of military duty if a draftee was indispensable for the continuing maintenance of his 
parents’ business. Underlining the importance of men’s role as the breadwinners of their 
families, the government sought to support families by considering their economic situation. 
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Third, the government’s draft allowed for the deferment or exemption of men who had family 
ties in the GDR. While recruits could apply for deferment if their service would present a 
particular hardship to first-degree relations, the proposal also stipulated that people who migrated 
into the Federal Republic would be liable to military service after one year. 
According to members of the SPD, however, the government’s draft was insufficient, for 
it considered neither the horrors of World War II nor the division of Germany fully.437 To that 
effect, the Social Democrats introduced a counterproposal. First, they wanted to ensure the 
exemption of male orphans whose parents (one or both) had died due to “war damages” such as 
injuries sustained during hostilities and military actions or because of violent measures used by 
the National Socialist regime.438 Second, the SPD wanted to allow young men whose first-degree 
relatives lived in “Soviet occupied Germany”—including East Berlin—to be able to request the 
deferment of their recruitment.439  
Although the faction of the FDP supported the SPD’s ideas, the party initially introduced 
its own counterproposal, which went beyond that of the Social Democrats.440 Whereas the SPD 
proposed to only defer the recruitment of draftees who had close relatives living in East 
Germany, the Free Democrats sought to completely exempt these men. In addition, the Free 
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Democrats proposed that draftees “of whom all brothers or, if no brothers existed, all sisters, or, 
if no siblings existed, whose father had died as a result of damages as defined by § 1 of the 
Federal War Victims Relief Act“441 could be exempt from military service upon application. In 
this way it went beyond the SPD’s proposal that focused solely on orphans 
Both the SPD and the FDP justified their counter-proposals by emphasizing the ideal of 
the unified German family. Focusing on the GDR, FDP politician and member of the party’s 
national board, Herta Ilk, argued that the government’s proposal would put unbearable hardship 
onto families that were divided by the Iron Curtain.442 She feared above all that, if the Federal 
Republic recruited young men whose families lived in the GDR, the East German regime would 
mostly likely pressure and punish the soldiers’ families based on the idea of family liability 
(Sippenhaft). Stating that her party was “deeply committed” to Article 6 of the Basic Law, which 
dictated that marriage and family enjoyed the state’s special protection, Ilk maintained that the 
FDP would not support any actions that jeopardized “the relationship between parents and their 
children.”443  
Ilk’s argument was seconded by the SPD. The party’s military expert Fritz Ehler 
reasoned that the introduction of compulsory military service would lead to an even greater 
divide between the FRG and the GDR, because it would tear apart many more families.444 
Ehler’s colleague Louise Schroeder from West Berlin urged the Adenauer government to 
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consider the suffering of East German mothers who had one son in the GDR and one in the 
Federal Republic. If the Bundestag passed the Wehrpflichtgesetz, she argued, one son would be 
drafted into the West German armed forces, while the other would be pressured to join the 
National People’s Army.445 Emphasizing once more the threat of a “brothers’ war,”446 the SPD 
parliamentarians were eager to prevent the introduction of compulsory military service. 
The mutual support expressed by SPD and FDP politicians applied also to the status of 
orphans and men who were the last living sons of their families. The parties agreed for two main 
reasons. Focusing first on World War II, the FDP politician Elisabeth Lüders and SPD 
representative Helmut Bazille reminded their fellow parliamentarians that many German families 
had lost “five, six, seven or more sons”447 during the war. In addition, many young men had been 
exposed to endless misery during the immediate postwar years.448 These German families, 
Bazille concluded, had suffered enough and hence deserved some compensation. Second, both 
parties worried about the threat that future wars would pose to orphans and families who had but 
one male member. For instance, SPD politician Alfred Gleisner argued that his party wanted to 
spare last sons and male orphans in order to preserve families’ “name and bloodline” (im Namen 
und im Blut erhalten).449 This conviction was seconded by FDP politician Erich Mende. He 
declared in July 1956 that his party sought to preserve “the last remaining substance” of West 
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German families. In unison, the SPD and FDP thus underlined their point of view, which stressed 
the survival and unity of families above men’s military duty.  
Although the proposals of the Free Democrats and the Social Democrats were 
furthermore supported by GB/BHE, which was like the FDP part of Adenauer’s governing 
coalition,450 the CDU/CSU faction energetically rejected the counter-proposals for various 
reasons. During the Bundestag negotiations, CDU politicians argued that the exemptions and 
deferments stipulated in the government’s proposal were sufficient to tackle the hardship of 
certain groups of men.451 Focusing on the GDR, Ernst Majonica maintained that the Federal 
Republic could not spare any young people who had left East Germany. Since roughly 180,000 
young people had moved to West Germany between 1953 and 1956, he argued, the Federal 
Republic would lose 100,000 soldiers if the government did not recruit all able-bodied male 
immigrants.452 Moreover, the CDU/CSU did not want to completely exempt young men who had 
close personal ties to the GDR, because the party judged such a provision to be unfair. Portraying 
the Federal Republic as a free state that was only building an army “to protect peace,” Majonica 
and his colleagues contended that refugees from the Soviet zone (Zonenflüchtling) should be 
treated as “Germans among Germans” and “equal citizens with the same rights and duties.”453 
Allowing adolescents coming from the East to enjoy all the rights the Federal Republic had to 
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offer without imposing the same duties that West German men had to fulfill would leave the 
German male youth divided.454  
In addition to rejecting the SPD’s and FDP’s proposals respecting refugees from the 
GDR, CDU/CSU politicians had different ideas about how to deal with war-torn families and 
their last sons. Former colonel of the German General Staff, Fritz Berendsen, who functioned as 
one of the CDU’s military experts, criticized the SPD and the FDP for failing to distinguish 
between military service (Wehrdienst) and war service (Kriegsdienst).455 According to him, the 
purpose of the Wehrpflichtgesetz was not to wage war, but to enable the Federal Republic to 
defend itself. Unlike war service, he informed the Bundestag, military training was no more 
dangerous than “skiing in the mountains”, “underground mining” or “driving a car.”456 Instead of 
being dangerous, Berendsen found military basic training immensely useful, for it enabled West 
German men to defend themselves and their loved-ones.457 If the FDP and the SPD truly wanted 
to protect families’ last sons, he contended, they should prevent men from obtaining a driver’s 
license. 
However, against the background of internal government documents Berendsen’s 
argument reads to some extent like a pretext. Preparing for the Bundestag negotiations about the 
Wehrpflichtgesetz, Chancellor Adenauer asked the Ministry of Defense which kind of questions 
the opposition would most likely ask. Anticipating the request to exempt orphans and the last 
                                                 
454 VDB, 159. Sitzung, 7 July 1956, 8867–8868. See also the support expressed by Hasso von Manteuffel, a former 
FDP politician who know spoke for the Free People’s Party (Freie Volkspartei, FVP), Ibid, 8798–8799. 
455 VDB, Der Deutsche Bundestag, 157. Sitzung, 4 July 1956, 8615. 
456 VDB, Der Deutsche Bundestag, 159. Sitzung 7 July 1956, 8770–8771. 
457 VDB, Der Deutsche Bundestag, 157. Sitzung, 4 July 1956, 8615. 
 157 
 
living sons of war victims, the ministry’s stated that such an exemption was impossible. Statistics 
for the year 1955 indicated that 468,000 half-orphans lived within federal territory and fifty-two 
percent, roughly 290,000 of them were young men. Given these numbers, the ministry judged an 
exemption of these men unsustainable and instead suggested a “sparring” employment in the 
rear.458 Since the government was still planning to produce an army of 500,000 men, giving 
290,000 young men the option of not being recruited for military service seemed out of the 
question. 
Given these calculations, the Adenauer government was willing to make only small 
concessions. For the third reading of the Wehrpflichtgesetz, the CDU/CSU faction introduced an 
amendment to the proposed law that would exempt draftees of whom “all brothers, or if no 
brothers existed, all sisters” had died due to war damages or because of national socialist 
persecution. In contrast to the proposal brought forth by the SPD and the FDP, this document did 
not mention any parents. Thus, male orphans would not be exempt. Whereas the SPD thus 
opposed this amendment as well, the FDP eventually accepted the government’s draft of the law. 
Although the final version curtailed their own proposal, the party viewed it as the only way to 
have the law acknowledge the “heavy sacrifices” of Germany families.459  
The exemption of half- and full-orphans parents would only be recognized in 1960 when 
the Wehrpflichtgesetz was amended for the first time. On November 24, 1959 the government 
introduced a law to change the Wehrpflichtgesetz. Although a major part of the negotiation 
focused on the state’s attempt to recruit former Wehrmacht soldiers who were born in 1922 as 
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well as on the treatment of students and trainees,460 the Social Democrats once again proposed 
the exemptions of orphans and half-orphans whose father, mother, or both of their parents had 
died due to war damages and who had no siblings.461 Arguing that the Basic Law granted 
marriage and families special protection, the Social Democrats maintained that the state could 
not draft the only son of a war widow whose husband “fell” in combat shortly after their 
marriage. Given the family’s war sacrifice, SPD politician Bazille once again argued, the state 
could not expose this family to the risk of having its “last male blood carrier” (Blutsträger) killed 
during military service.462 
In 1959, the proposal of the SPD now divided the CDU/CSU parliamentarians. CDU 
politician Georg Kliesing rejected the proposal stating that the regulation would entail the 
“preferential treatment of the one-child-marriage and the discrimination of families with many 
children.”463 The equal treatment of women who had only one child and those who had raised 
more than one was not to his liking. According to Kliesing, raising one son was much easier than 
raising many. Having therefore enjoyed an easier life, war widows who had only one son did not 
deserve such benefits.464 Given these contingencies, he preferred the rejection of the SPD’s 
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proposal, in particular since the government already refrained from drafting widows’ only sons 
even though the law did not stipulate it.465  
Other CDU politicians, such as Johann Peter Josten and Hellmuth Heye however, agreed 
in part with the SPD. The two men approved the proposal to make the exemption of war widows’ 
only sons official.466 Although the two politicians wanted to take the “emotional burden” of 
nescience from these women, their support of the SPD’s proposal cannot be attributed simply to 
a sudden sympathy for widows’ suffering and hardship. Rather, the CDU’s partial change of 
position was also due to the understanding that in 1965—twenty years after the end of World 
War II—the issue of supporting war widows would become obsolete. Concerned about the 
Bundeswehr’s effectiveness, Heye maintained that the passing of the SPD’s proposal would not 
lead to a “weakening of the troops,” since now it would only affect a small number of war 
windows and their sons.467 
The subsequent passing of the amendment and the ways in which the Bundestag debated 
the implementation of compulsory military beforehand shows how parliamentarians negotiated 
military and family politics in the aftermath of World War II and in light of the looming Cold 
War tensions. The implementation of Wehrpflicht for men aged between 18 and 45 raised the 
question of whether men should ensure their families’ survival and well-being by becoming 
well-trained soldiers or by becoming male breadwinners and family men.  
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2. New Disputes about Compulsory Military Service in West German Society  
The parliamentary debates that preceded the implementation of compulsory military service were 
carefully observed by a broad public. After all, interest in West Germany’s rearmament did not 
fortify its intensity after the international decisions to make the Federal Republic part of NATO 
were reached. Between 1956 and 1964, the major research institutes Allensbach and EMNID 
continued to gauge people’s opinions about the Bundeswehr, while a growing number of 
newspapers, magazines and radio stations commented on every detail of rearmament, including 
the legislative process, the establishment of a military infrastructure, the recruitment of the first 
soldiers as well as the life in the garrisons and surrounding cities. Eager to influence West 
German military politics and governmental decisions, peace activists, religious organizations, 
youth and women’s groups sustained a constant flow of letters and commentaries that were sent 
to members of the Bundestag, the Adenauer government, and representatives of the Ministry of 
Defense.468  
While these documents show that West German society by and large came to terms with 
the Bundeswehr’s existence, this is not to say that protest against rearmament ceased to exist. 
Without question, peace activists and pacifists continued their protests against rearmament. 
However, the widespread protests against Adenauer’s military politics that dominated the early 
1950s, shifted to quarrels over the nature and function of the new armed forces. Instead of 
disputing whether the Federal Republic should establish armed forces, contemporaries became 
more concerned with the “how” of rearmament. In addition to disagreeing, for example, whether 
                                                 
468 Bremm, “Wehrhaft wider Willen.” 
 161 
 
the Bundeswehr should be equipped with nuclear weapons,469 concerned citizen as well as youth, 
welfare, religious and women’s organization focused on the men who were recruited during the 
formation period of the Bundestag. Considering both officers and soldiers, they pondered 
whether West German men possessed the qualities to join the Bundeswehr and, in turn, how 
military life and training would influence their character and behavior. 
Attitudes towards the Bundeswehr and Compulsory Military Service in Civil Society 
The establishment of the Bundeswehr as national armed forces and the implementation of 
universal conscription for men shaped the opinion surveys conducted by EMNID and Allensbach 
between 1955 and 1964. While the institutes added new sets of inquiry to their catalog, the ways 
in which interviewees responded to more traditional questions differed from the answers of the 
late-1940s and early 1950s. As Michael Geyer emphasizes, already in December 1956 had “the 
large majority of opponents to rearmament in 1950–51 […] turned into a sizable minority.”470 
Influenced by international developments, interviewees began to accept the existence of the 
Bundeswehr. In the summer of 1956, Allensbach repeatedly asked 2000 people471 whether they 
thought it was good or bad that West Germany had already begun building a new German army. 
In June 1956, 31 percent responded that they thought it was a good idea, whereas 47 percent 
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disagreed.472 Following the Hungarian Uprising in October and November 1956, which Soviet 
forces crashed brutally, results looked different: slightly more than 50 percent of people 
interviewed were now in favor of forming of a new army. And, they continued to be so. Opinion 
polls conducted in the late 1950s and early 1960s show that general support for the Bundeswehr 
stabilized on an average level of slightly more than 50 percent.473  
However, this change did not mean that West Germans now joyfully donned military 
uniforms to readily defend the Federal Republic against any threats from the East. Even though a 
substantial number of West Germans reconsidered their initial opposition to rearmament in light 
of the heightening tensions of the Cold War, the number of critics remained strong. Opinion 
surveys conducted in the early 1960s show that about 30 percent of interviewees still objected to 
the military, whereas 20 percent remained undecided.474 As these results indicate, West German 
attitudes towards the Bundeswehr remained ambiguous throughout the late 1950s and early 
1960s. 
The ambiguity ran deep, because West Germans also expressed disparate opinions about 
voluntary and compulsory military service. In February 1956, 43 percent of 1000 interviewees 
responded that they would not advise somebody to become a professional soldier and only 16 
percent said they would recommend it without any reservations.475 This solid rejection of 
voluntary service did not result in any strong support for a draft, however. Questioned whether 
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they would prefer an army composed of “specialists” who had joined the ranks voluntary or an 
army in which “everybody has to serve,” 44 percent of the interviewees were in favor of 
compulsory military service, whereas 37 percent voted for a professional army and 19 percent 
were undecided.476 Only if asked the right question, did interviewees support compulsory 
military service more strongly: in March 1956 Allensbach asked West Germans whether they 
thought that “every young man who is fit for military service” should be drafted. The question, 
which invoked a sense of equal treatment and responsibility, produced somewhat clearer 
margins: 51 percent supported the idea, whereas 31 voted against it and 18 percent were 
undecided.477 Notwithstanding this result, it was not before 1963 that conditional support for any 
kind of military service—that is, accepting military service as a necessary duty— reached the 40 
percent mark.478 Although West Germans slowly came to accept the Bundeswehr’s existence, 
becoming part of the troops of was an entirely different bargain.  
In addition to these overall trends, the research institutes itemized their reports and thus 
they reveal somewhat unsurprising, yet for the overall discussion significant results. Above all, 
young men (age group 16–29), who would predominantly be affected by military service, 
continued to express reservations against any form of conscription. Asked whether they preferred 
a professional army or universal conscription, only 38 percent of the young men voted for 
compulsory military service, whereas 51 percent preferred a professional army.479 However, the 
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majority of young men did not intend to volunteer. In July 1956, Allensbach asked 1066 young 
men who were born between 1929 and 1939 if they would volunteer to serve in the Bundeswehr 
for a period of eighteen months. The answer was almost unanimous: 79 percent responded that 
they would not volunteer.480 
According to the polls, young men did not want to serve for two main reasons: on the one 
hand they cited a general “dislike for the military” as well as general opposition to rearmament 
and, on the other, occupational reasons. To be sure, several respondents indicated that the only 
reason that could tempt young men to enlist was the belief that they would learn useful technical 
skills while serving in the armed forces.481 Yet, the majority of interviewees indicated that they 
viewed military service as a disruption of their civilian career path.482 This understanding was 
accompanied by a rather dismissive attitude toward volunteers. Asked why they thought anybody 
would join the armed forces voluntarily, a sizable majority of young men responded: because “he 
wants to be a professional soldier” or “he is keen to do it,”  “because he doesn’t want to work, he 
is work-shy” or “he is unhappy with his job, because he is unemployed.”483 In an economy that 
was booming—the so-called Wirtschaftswunder—and allowed for various civilian career paths, 
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military service seemed to be an obstacle and only a valuable option for those who were not able 
to succeed in postwar Germany’s flourishing labor force.484 
Given these findings, it does not come as a surprise that the Bundeswehr faced enormous 
recruitment problems from the very beginning. The entire formation period of the Bundeswehr 
was defined by a lack of young volunteers.485 This would not hold true, however, for the young 
men who were drafted into the armed forces in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Few protested the 
draft call by applying to become conscientious objectors. According to historians, this particular 
compliance was due to, first, the limited knowledge about the constitutional right to object to 
military service and the daunting application process.486  Second, the sense of responsibility and 
obligation discussed above could have influenced young draftee’s decisions as well. Third, 
reports by government officials indicate that young men living in remote areas and small villages 
without any cultural institutions such as movie theaters viewed the Bundeswehr as means of 
escape and occupational advancement.487 Finally, a variety of sources from the late 1950s show 
that a considerable number of West Germans continued to believe in the military as a school of 
proper masculinity and thus could not wait to send their sons to the barracks.488 Although these 
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layers of social pressure seem to not have been strong enough to turn young men into volunteers, 
they help explain why the implementation of compulsory military service was met with little 
resistance. 
As these results indicate, West Germans neither rejoiced in the establishment of the 
Bundeswehr as a national defense force, nor expressed profound animosity. To be sure, the value 
of volunteering for military service was universally questioned and compulsory military service 
was hardly celebrated. Yet, in the context of the growing Cold War tensions, the existence of the 
Bundeswehr was accepted increasingly.   
Media Reports about the Establishment of the Bundeswehr and the First Cohorts of Recruits 
The ambiguous opinions and reservations that the surveys reflect were also a topic of discussion 
in the West German mainstream media. The establishment of the Bundeswehr and the 
implementation of compulsory military service was comprehensively documented by all major 
outlets including the conservative daily newspapers Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung and Die 
Welt, the social-liberal weekly DIE ZEIT, as well by the government-critical, left-leaning 
monthly magazine Der Spiegel. The papers meticulously covered the international decision 
making process, the subsequent disputes in the Bundestag, the workings of the Amt Blank as well 
as the population’s reaction to rearmament. 
One set of events that received a great deal of attention in the late 1950s were the 
different ceremonies, during which the first volunteers were sworn in, and the arrivals of the first 
cohorts of recruits at the barracks’ gates. Reporting about these events, many papers were eager 
to gauge whether the establishment of the Bundeswehr marked the beginning of a new era or a 
militaristic relapse to the times of the Reichswehr and Wehrmacht. For instance, writing in Die 
Welt, which by and large favored rearmament, Hellmuth Brennecke reported about the major 
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ceremony on November 12, 1955, during which the first 101 volunteers were sworn in. The 
author observed that the ceremony was not accompanied by any cheers of “hurray”, music, or 
any kind of anthem; not even the German Song (Deutschlandlied) was played.489 For Brennecke 
and many other reporters, the lack of grandeur and excitement signaled a new beginning. 
To underline this impression, papers paid close attention to the ceremonies’ participants, 
both the recruits as well as the onlookers. Writing about the first navy volunteers who arrived in 
the city of Wilhelmshaven in January 1956, the Hamburg-based weekly DIE ZEIT stated that 
“the whole atmosphere has changed. And it is not just because of the misty air that all the voices 
sound damped.”490 According to the article “[n]o soldiers’ eyes were shining; no heels were 
snapped together.” Referring most likely to the excitement that accompanied the outbreak of 
World War I, the paper stated: “It was not the exodus of enthusiastic volunteers.”491 Given this 
lack of “pathos,” DIE ZEIT concluded that the new troops were certainly influenced by civil 
standards. A great achievement, which the reporter attributed to the “ten years of civil life” West 
Germany had experienced after the end of World War II.  
Even though such ‘satisfactory’ reports about the Bundeswehr’s civilian outlook 
continued to be published well into the early 1960s, their declarations were limited by critical 
comments about the young men who were recruited for military service. In August 1957, only a 
few months after the first recruits had entered the barracks, Die Welt published an article by the 
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journalist and military historian Walter Görlitz. In his article, Görlitz compared young men who 
had been called up for service to those who had not been, or not yet.492 Although he too 
maintained that the young recruits who were joining the Bundeswehr lacked the desired 
“pathos”, the journalist restricted his critique by arguing that the adolescent men who donned 
military uniforms generally exhibited more admirable features. In comparison to “the youth in 
the jazz cellars and casinos,” he maintained, young recruits were not perfect either, but they were 
“steadier, more determined.”493  
Görlitz’s assessment was by no means the only analysis of West Germany’s male youth 
and rearmament. As soon as the proposals to implement compulsory military service were made, 
the Federal Republic witnessed an increased interest in the situation and character of “today’s 
youth.”494 In addition to emphasizing that West Germany’s young men were by and large 
unwilling to serve, commentators complained about their behavior and mental qualities. Sending 
his ideas about the “military-psychological” (wehrpsychologische) preparation of the youth to the 
Amt Blank in 1955, a resident of Berlin-Charlottenburg maintained that West Germany’s young 
men lacked “a sense of responsibility […] sense of honor, dutifulness, […] and self-
discipline.”495 These shortcomings, the man and others stated, were the result of the total collapse 
of ideals after 1945, the absence of fathers and the overall “bleak childhood” many young people 
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endured during the early postwar years.496 Consequently, if the government wanted rearmament 
to be successful, the letter writer maintained, everybody had to try to change the youth’s mind 
and prepare it psychologically for military life.497  
The concern that something was amiss with West Germany’s male youth was widespread 
and not limited to the implementation of conscription. Rather, it was part of a broader social 
discourse. Uta Poiger argues, for instance, that widespread concerns about West Germany’s 
youth culture began to emerge in the early 1950s and expanded in the late 1950s and early 1960s. 
Influenced by sociologists such as Helmut Schelsky, many contemporaries argued that the 
Federal Republic’s postwar youth was more “skeptical” than previous generations. They were 
suspicious of their parents’ generation, ideas of national grandeur, and anything military.498 In 
this context, conservative government officials, church groups, the media and social-
conservative citizens became especially concerned with the so-called Halbstarken (literally: half-
strong). Well into the early 1960s this term was used for groups of “unruly” youngsters who 
drove around town on their mopeds and “loitered” in the streets while listening to the newest 
U.S. music hits and imitating American movie idols such as James Dean. For “orderly” West 
Germans, the behavior of such “twist-boys”499 was unacceptable and considered a threat not only 
to the successful functioning of the armed forces, but also to society as a whole. 
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The prevalent misgivings about West Germany’s male youth in conjunction with the 
establishment of the Bundeswehr were certainly grist to the mill of papers such as the left-liberal 
magazine Der Spiegel, which repeatedly questioned the politics of Chancellor Adenauer and his 
administration. In 1956, the magazine published a piece about the town of Fürstenau in Lower 
Saxony. According to Der Spiegel the residents were not entirely happy about the prospect of 
becoming a garrison city. Above all, aldermen were quoted saying that many of the young men, 
who would be drafted into the Bundeswehr, did not exhibit the “steadiness” that conformed to the 
“aspired soldierly representation in public.”500 While questioning the behavior of young men, the 
local officials also feared that the town would soon face an increase in “shady business,” because 
the Bundeswehr as a men’s society would attract prostitutes.501  
In writing about Fürstenau, Der Spiegel as well as other government-critical papers 
publicized a particular set of concerns that occupied many town officials and citizens living near 
military structures in the late 1950s and early 1960s. The establishments of military bases and 
barracks across the Federal Republic were in several instances accompanied by complaints of 
mayors or aldermen about possible “floods” of prostitutes.502 Their complaints joined a loud 
choir of moralizers who sought to define West German behavior by fulminating against 
extramarital sex, prostitution, contraception, and pornographic literature. Although prostitution 
                                                 
500 “Garnisionspläne: Umfrage am Biertisch,” Der Spiegel, November 26, 1956, 22. See also, “Liebe Leser,” 
Deutsche Volkszeitung, August 25, 1956, 2. 
501 “Garnisionspläne.” 
502 See “Invasion der leichten Mädchen: 100,000 Prostituierte überschwemmen Westdeutschland,” Deutsche 
Volkszeitung, August 1, 1959,16. See also the petition sent to the CDU by the magistrate of the small town of Sontra 
in Hessen, 11 November 1964. Archiv der Christlichen Partei Deutschland, CDU Bundestagfraktion, Arbeitskreis V: 
Auswärtiges, Verteidigung, 08-006, 012/2 (Korrespondenzen). For a discussion of garrison towns and cities as being 
at a special moral risk, see Schmidt, Integration und Wandel, 205, 364–365; Sybille Steinbacher, Wie der Sex nach 
Deutschland kam: Der Kampf um Sittlichkeit und Anstand in der frühen Bundesrepublik (Munich: Siedler, 2011), 
89. 
 171 
 
was not illegal in the 1950s, it was considered a “violation of morality.” At a time when the 
violent death of Frankfurt’s high-class call girl Rosemarie Nitribitt in 1957 made national 
headlines and,503 it does not come as a surprise that the prospect of prostitutes settling in close 
proximity to Bundeswehr establishments was unnerving to many “proper” citizens. 
Given the questionable reputation of West Germany’s male youth, some contemporaries 
even cautioned that West German recruits could pose a moral threat to “proper” young 
women.504 This concern becomes especially visible in the article “The Girl and The Soldiers” 
that the widely read women’s magazine Brigitte published in 1961.505 The two-page article was 
written in response to numerous letters that the editor had received and as an advice for young 
women about how they should deal with young men in uniform. According to the article’s 
author, young soldiers’ behavior towards women was indeed problematic. Quoting the famous 
French psychologist Gustav Le Bon, Brigitte argued that upon entering the military young men 
became part of a crowd (Teil einer Masse) that was exclusively male. Expressing common 
contemporary fears of the “masses” and “massification,”506 the article continued that young 
                                                 
503 For a discussion of Nitribitt and the perceived threat of “sexually active single women,” Heineman, What 
Difference, 232–234. See also, Volker Berghahn, “Recasting Bourgeois Germany,” in The Miracle Years: A 
Cultural History of West Germany, 1949–1968, ed. Hanna Schissler (Princeton: Princeton University Press), 326–
340. 
504 See for example official diary entry about the preparation for a meeting between Minister of Defense, Theodor 
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505 “Das Mädchen und die Soldaten,” Brigitte 14 (1961): 70–71. See also, Frevert, Kasernierte Nation, 348.  
506 Berghahn, “Recasting Bourgeois Germany.” See further, Axel Schildt, Konservatismus in Deutschland: Von den 
Anfängen im 18. Jahrhundert bis zur Gegenwart (Munich: C.H. Beck, 1998), 211–252. 
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recruits would “all the sudden see themselves as men” and “develop the desire to be recognized 
as men” by other men, but especially by women.507 Consequently, life in an all-male mass 
organization could lead to some unrestrained social and sexual behavior. Thus, Brigitte 
cautioned, young women should not fall for soldiers’ adventurous tales and romantic 
overtures.508  
Concerns about the qualities and the behavior of young recruits continued well into the 
1960s and were accompanied by debates about the training methods, the Bundeswehr should 
employ in order to deal with “unruly” youngsters.509 Whereas some commentators argued that 
Halbstarke in the Bundeswehr needed to be trained with modern educational methods, others 
believed that strict military discipline would do these young men good.510 The concerns about the 
young men’s questionable qualities culminated following a magazine article by the former 
Wehrmacht Admiral and acting Parliamentary Ombudsman of the Armed Forces, Hellmuth 
Heye. In the summer of 1964, Heye published a series of articles in the illustrated magazine 
Quick in which he warned that the Bundeswehr was about to become “a state within a state.”511 
Heye was agitated by the death of a nineteen-year-old recruit who was stationed in the city of 
Nagold. On July 25, 1963, the recruit suffered a heat stroke during a long march and died one 
                                                 
507 “Das Mädchen und die Soldaten.” 
508 Ibid. 
509. Ursula Rütt, “Die eingeengten Männer: Man drischt wieder fleißig Phrasen,” Deutsche Volkszeitung, October 23, 
195; Werner Höfer, “Schoßkind und Sorgenkind der Armee,” DIE ZEIT, July 3, 1964, 20. 
510 Luise S. to Minister of Defense, Franz Josef Strauß, November 6, 1961. BArch F, BWII/20217  Sigrid G. to 
Minister of Defense, Kai-Uwe von Hassel, 24 April 1963. BArch F, BW II/20217 
511 See In Sorge um die Bundeswehr, Dokumentationsreihe Quick-Berichte, 2 (Munich: Martens, 1964), 13.  
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week later. The subsequent court hearing revealed extraordinary harsh drill exercises that were 
practiced by the commanding officers. In this context, Heye stated that the Federal Republic was 
engaged in an “enormous process of change […] from an industrialized to a consumer 
society.”512 He believed that the Bundeswehr leadership as well as the government did not 
recognize this change and instead continued as always.513 For the ombudsman, this ignorance 
was particularly troublesome, because Bundeswehr commanders trained their troops with harsh, 
antiquated, and undemocratic methods.514  
In addition to incurring the hatred of military commanders and politicians who took 
offense and thought Heye’s critique was directed at them,515 the caused a media echo and 
prompted concerned citizens to send letters to Heye and Kai-Uwe von Hassel, the acting Minister 
of Defense (1963–1966). In addition to debating which kind of training methods Bundeswehr 
commanders should employ, Heye’s criticism caused concerned citizens to comment on the 
qualities of West Germany’s young men.516 The conflict showed that a number of West Germans 
were upset by the current “Americanized” youth culture and young men’s unwillingness to serve. 
Some of Heye’s harshest critics complained that West Germany’s youth, especially “the 
Halbstarken and those in leather jackets,” had not enjoyed a proper up-bringing and were often 
                                                 
512 Ibid. 
513 In Sorge um die Bundeswehr, 13. See also, John Zimmermann, Ulrich de Maizière: General der Bonner 
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delinquent, or had gone to ruin.517 Asking whether Heye would want to train these “twist-boys” 
himself, one letter writer concluded that adolescent recruits had to be trained strictly (eisern 
erzogen).518  Although more moderate critics such as a school rector informed Heye that “today’s 
youth is not bad, just different,” they still stressed that young men had experience no or simply 
the wrong kind of Erziehung at home. They had witnessed the defamation of German soldiers 
after 1945, and were blinded by the ruling “mentality of prosperity” (Wohlstandsgeist).519 Since 
the younger generation had not experienced much democracy or “true human values,” Heye’s 
critics maintained, the military faced an immense challenge and needed to adopt strict discipline, 
obedience, and drill practices; methods that stood in clear contrast to the ideals of Baudissin’s 
Innere Führung.  
As this media debate as well as the articles by Brigitte, Die Welt and Der Spiegel indicate 
the formation period of the Bundeswehr was defined by public disputes about whether the 
military was a school of proper masculinity or breeding ground for socially unacceptable male 
behavior and improper relations between the sexes. Influenced by the contemporary discourse 
about the “Americanization” of West German culture as well as the Halbstarken problem, a 
broad public paid close attention to the young men who entered the barracks in the late 1950s and 
early 1960s. Wondering whether West Germany’s young men were able to become proper 
Bundeswehr soldiers, contemporaries also pondered which for of training methods military 
commanders should employ. 
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Anxieties of Religious and Welfare Organizations about the Moral of the new Soldiers 
The assumption that military life and service could affect young men negatively occupied not 
only West Germany’s mainstream press and concerned citizen living in close proximity to 
military structures. With the question of whether the Federal Republic would establish armed 
forces answered, the issue also concerned church officials and religious groups, conservative 
women’s organization, and welfare workers. Eager to influence the ways in which the 
Bundeswehr was established, groups issued memoranda, sent letters to government 
representatives, and held workshops to discuss the issue.  
One of the groups that addresses the possible positive and negative effects of military life 
was the League of the German Catholic Youth (Bund der Deutschen Katholischen Jugend), 
which functioned as the umbrella organization for Catholic children and youth groups throughout 
the Federal Republic. Being re-founded after the end of World War II, the league soon counted 
more than 1 Million members.520 Following a general meeting in 1955, the league developed a 
comprehensive action plan in order to prepare a support network for young catholic recruits.521 
This document shows that even though the group supported the establishment of the 
Bundeswehr, it argued that military life “naturally” entailed many risks. In addition to cautioning 
against the emergence of “soldierly virtues as the measure of all things, the glorification of war 
[…], heroism and heroic death,” the league also pictured the military as an institution in which 
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men could fall victim to a lifestyle that instead of fostering “decency,” would lead to 
“debauchery.”522 Without being very explicit, the organization worried that a conscription army 
could create a basis for male behavior that would eventually endanger the value system of the 
Federal Republic. As a result the League of the German Catholic Youth urged the Adenauer 
government to pay close attention to the social and moral situation of young recruits.  
Whereas the Catholic Youth did not discuss the matter at length, the Working Group for 
Youth Care and Welfare (Arbeitsgemeinschaft Jugendpflege und Jugendfürsorge), which 
operated on a federal level, did. Meeting in Cologne in 1955, the group discussed the issue of 
“Youth Protection and Wehrmacht” (Jugendschutz und Wehrmacht).523 A final report of the 
meeting detailed various perils that its members associated with military service. One of their 
concerns was the excessive consumption of alcohol and tobacco. Even though the working group 
considered smoking and drinking to be typical “attributes of comradely etiquette,”524 it claimed 
that these habits represented a threat to the soldier’s safety and the army’s effective functioning. 
In the context of the Cold War, the Working Group was especially concerned about the threat of 
espionage. After all, the “enemy” could deposit alcohol (Beutealkohol) somewhere in order to 
trap soldiers.525 Accordingly, the working group argued that soldiers’ consumption of alcohol had 
to be carefully regulated. 
                                                 
522 Ibid. 
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Moreover, the Working Group worried about the possible sexual behavior of future 
soldiers. First, the final report cautioned against the emergence of homosexuality among the 
troops. Although the report did not elaborate on the issue, the fact that “sodomy between men” 
was still outlawed by the West German Criminal Code526 suggests that the Working Group feared 
the appearance of unlawful sexual behavior that would disturb the troops. Second, the welfare 
workers worried like so many others about prostitution. Judging prostitution unsuitable for West 
German soldiers and officers, the Working Group cautioned against the recurrence of Wehrmacht 
brothels.527 During World War II, the military leadership had set up several hundred of brothels 
across occupied Europe in order to serve the needs of German troops.528 Although the final report 
did not specify the extent to which the usage of brothels by the German Wehrmacht was 
discussed during the meeting, the mention of the issue shows at least that the Working Group was 
eager to ensure that the future West German troops would also distance themselves sexually from 
the Wehrmacht.  
The anxieties expressed by both Working Group for Youth Care and Welfare and League 
of the German Catholic Youth were rooted in the homosocial living conditions of young 
conscripts. Since military service was to apply to men only, the two groups like so many of their 
contemporaries discussed the Bundeswehr as a “men’s society.” For the Working Group, this all-
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male organization naturally entailed certain perils. Given the government’s proposals, the welfare 
professionals recognized that young men would generally begin their basic military service at the 
age of twenty. Having firm ideas about men’s sexual developments, the welfare professionals 
concluded that conscripts would enter the army while being in their “sexually most active 
age.”529 This was especially troubling because of the military’s living conditions. In contrast to 
other “men’s society” like the police, young recruits would live in barracks, detached from other 
civilians for a major part of their military service. Realizing that most garrisons were established 
in rather remote areas or at the peripheries of cities and towns, the welfare workers and others 
warned that recruits would have limited contact to the “normal population”—male and female 
civilians—even in their leisure time.530 According to the Working Group, quartering sexually 
active men in this way and detaching them from their friends, family and loved ones would soon 
lead to “improper behavior” that had the potential of disrupting the social fabric of the Federal 
Republic.531 As a result, welfare workers, religious groups and other concerned citizens urged 
government to carefully observe and regulate recruits life inside and outside of the barracks.  
As the documents of welfare professionals and religious groups as well as the media 
discussion show, the West German reservations against the Wehrpflicht was diverse. Although 
West Germans increasingly accepted the Bundeswehr’s existence, with the first male recruits 
entering the barracks, discussions of the possible negative and positive negatives of military 
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service increased. While some West Germans continued to consider the military as a school of 
proper masculinity, others contented that the Bundeswehr could foster improper male behavior.  
3. Governmental Concerns and Parliamentary Debates about Soldiers’ Social and Sexual 
Behavior  
The diverse opinions that West Germans expressed about the implementation of compulsory 
military service, the first cohorts of young men who entered the barracks, as well as about the 
possible negative and positive effects of military life greatly influenced the workings of the 
Adenauer government and concerned many members of the Bundestag in the late 1950s and early 
1960s. Determined to turn the establishment of the Bundeswehr into a success story, the 
Adenauer government paid close attention to and acted upon the results of opinion polls, media 
reports, and commentaries by individual citizens, welfare workers, and religious groups. While 
eagerly trying to capitalize the positive sentiments, the members of the government also sought to 
counter any concerns that could jeopardize rearmament.  
Analyzing the reactions and action of government representatives shows that the ways in 
which the Adenauer government conceived of military service and the West German man in 
uniform were shaped, on the one hand, by the context of the Cold War and, on the other, by the 
national discourse on proper male behavior and morals. It reveals that the ideal of the West 
German man in military uniform depended greatly on his ability to live a proper, family life.  
Early Attempts by the Adenauer Government to Promote Compulsory Military Service 
As discussed above, relevant laws to implement voluntary and compulsory military service were 
passed in the Bundestag in 1955 and 1956. The opinion surveys conducted by Allensbach and 
EMNID during this time indicated, however, that the majority of the West German population 
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would not embrace the government’s agenda gladly. Although most interviewees seemed to have 
come to terms with the inevitable establishment of the Bundeswehr, many of them were less 
eager to send West German men to the barracks. 
Given this well-documented reluctance, the Adenauer administration published a 
memorandum already in 1956 to promote the Wehrpflicht. The document, which the SPD 
emphatically criticized as unacceptable propaganda, listed several reasons for why the Federal 
Republic needed armed forces and to draft men for military service. It first and foremost 
emphasized that new armed forces and conscription were necessary due to the tensions of the 
Cold War, which—according to the memorandum—threatened West Germany’s security and 
endangered peace in Central Europe. Moreover, the memorandum stressed that introducing 
compulsory military service would have positive effects on society. Focusing on the young men 
who would be recruited, the text stated that the armed forces could offer “valuable training for 
life” by fostering comradeship and physical fitness.532 As Ute Frevert has suggested, this part of 
the memorandum was an attempt to both counter any doubts about the new armed forces and to 
sell compulsory military service by focusing on the military as a valuable educational 
institution.533 Since opinion surveys, newspaper commentaries, and letters sent to the Ministry of 
Defense indicated that a considerable number of West Germans still viewed military service as a 
period during which young men could learn desirable social traits, selling compulsory military as 
“training for life” seemed to be a good strategy. Yet the wording was not so plain as to suggest 
that the government wanted to reinstall the armed forces as a school of the nation and benchmark 
for society. 
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In addition, the attempts to promote the Wehrpflicht focused on documented 
unwillingness of young German men to take up arms in order to defend their home and country. 
CSU politician Richard Jaeger, for example, addressed the issue during the negotiations of the 
Volunteer Law in June 1955. While debating the details of the law, Jaeger informed his audience 
that the younger generation was “hostile towards and skeptical of ideologies and any form of 
pathos.”534 Moreover, he observed, many young men harbored far-reaching reservations against 
any form of military service. Yet, instead of harshly criticizing young men for their reservations, 
for Jaeger and other CDU/CSU politicians this behavior and skepticism was s “sign for a growing 
mental autonomy.”535 Looking back at his own generation, Hellmut Heye observed that young 
men of the postwar era developed doubts at an age when “we still exhibited too much uncritical 
enthusiasm and blind faith in authority.”536 Consequently, Jaeger and Heye argued that West 
German men should not be incited to join the armed forces because of blind zeal. Instead, West 
German men should develop an “ethos of freedom” and serve in the Bundeswehr earnestly and 
soberly. 537 After all, the new military was not established to showcase West German prowess, 
but to defend the West and the Federal Republic’s free democratic order. 
While pointing to the fact that the Bundeswehr was established as defensive force against 
possible attacks from the East, the politicians declarations can also be read as one of the 
government’s early attempts to reframe the youth’s reluctance in a way that was advantageous for 
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the government’s rearmament plans. Since scolding young men for not wanting to join the 
military was not acceptable in postwar West Germany, the government had to show 
understanding while at the same time trying to change young men’s minds.  
Parliamentary Concerns about the Moral and Sexual Misconduct of Young Recruits  
Of course, the perceived nationwide “unwillingness to serve” (Wehrunwille) was not the only 
problem the Adenauer government needed to tackle. Since complaints about the socially and 
sexually questionable behavior of soldiers and officers were visible in newspaper articles, reports 
by welfare worker and religious groups, as well as letters by individual citizen, members of the 
government were eager to tackle this issue as well. In particular, government representatives 
seated in the Committee for Defense addressed the problem the quite openly and pondered ways 
to solve it.  
One of the first parliamentarians to report complications was Willy Reichstein, who was 
a military doctor by training and a representative of the All-German Bloc/League of Expellees 
and Deprived of Rights party. In 1957, he described his visit to the Munster Training Area 
(Munsterlager) that was located in the idyllic, but sparsely—except for sheep—populated region 
of the Lüneburg Heath. According to Reichstein, the greatest complaint made by the 
commanding officers, military doctors, and married soldiers, who served at Munsterlager, was 
the lack of housing for soldiers’ families. In particular, soldiers who had been sent to the military 
base from other parts of Germany were frustrated, for they were unable to visit their families.538 
This situation was aggravated, Reichstein informed his colleagues, since the city of Hamburg—
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which was roughly fifty kilometers away—sent undesired remedies for this malaise. At a time 
when prostitution occupied the minds of many parliamentarians seated in the Bundestag,539 
Reichstein warned that every weekend “special trains with ‘slightly easy girls’” arrived from the 
Hanseatic city, causing a reduced will even among married soldiers to visit their families on the 
weekends.540  
Reichstein’s concern about the ill-advised living conditions and the resulting immoral 
behavior were second by the CDU politician Georg Kliesing. During a meeting of the Committee 
for Defense in October 1959, Kliesing complained about the fact that the Bundeswehr did not 
station all soldiers with their compatriots, but all across the Federal Republic. If soldiers were 
wrested away from their friends and families, Kliesing maintained, their morals would certainly 
be in danger.541 For the CDU politicians this situation was especially troublesome given the 
practice of the National Socialist regime. According to him, the Nazi regime had skillfully used 
the “control of licentiousness” to reach their political goals. One way in which the Nazis had 
induced controlled dissoluteness was, according to the CDU politician, by stationing young men 
away from their compatriots, friends, and family.542 Expressing the common belief that the Nazi 
regime had been defined by loose sexual morals from which the Federal Republic had to distance 
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itself,543 Kliesing argued that the Bundeswehr could not follow the National Socialists’ example 
of sexual permissiveness and deviance.  
For some CDU/CSU politicians the questionable sexual behavior of young men was, 
however, not solely caused by their living conditions. For his colleague, Paul Bausch, uprooting 
soldiers socially was not the only problem. According to Bausch, it was also the result of the 
masculine and sexual ideals that Bundeswehr soldiers and especially the officer corps nourished. 
Reporting about a visit he had paid to a garrison in Baden-Württemberg, Bausch argued that 
many Bundeswehr soldiers and officers acted on the assumption that “the soldier needed 
extramarital sex, he has to seek it, he has to have it.”544 Due to this particular understanding of 
manly sexual behavior, the CDU politician concluded, prostitutes represented a welcomed 
avocation. 
The concerns that Bausch expressed, were certainly not limited to the governing parties. 
They also concerned the parliamentary opposition. Although the Social Democrats had opposed 
Adenauer’s rearmament plans—including the establishment of the Bundeswehr as a national 
conscription army in 1956—the party officially changed course in the late 1950s. In 1959, the 
Social Democrats approved a new party program—the Godesberg Program—that officially 
documented the party’s “affirmation of national defense.”545 This change in politics was 
triggered, on the one hand, by the SPD’s repeated electoral defeats in 1949, 1953, and 1957 and, 
on the other, by a new generation of aspiring politicians who wanted to change the course of their 
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party. Interested in shaping West Germany’s military politics and seeking to improve the 
Bundeswehr’s overall situation, the party participated eagerly in debates that focused on the 
soldiers’ social and sexual behavior. 
In 1959, for instance, SPD politician Hans Merten agreed with Kliesing that the non-
compatriotic stationing bore many risks. However, he also contended that even if the military 
stationed soldiers with their compatriots, their moral was still in danger.546 Since many garrisons 
lacked canteens, pubs, or lounges, soldiers were in dire need of places where they could socialize 
properly. Reporting about a military base in Hessen, Merten stated that soldiers had to walk a 
couple of miles to their canteen. This arrangement was highly problematic, he assured his 
colleagues, because prostitutes had already settled along the way. As a result of this practice, the 
Hamburg-based SPD politician Helmut Schmidt complaint, many soldiers who entered the 
barracks as “virgins” (unberührt), would “indulge in what welfare records call ‘promiscuous 
behavior’” instead of striving for a healthy, monogamous relationship.547  
As Social Democrats, like their CDU counterparts, were hence concerned about soldiers’ 
contact to prostitutes, they also lamented the lack of “proper” women near military 
establishments. In October 1960, for instance, the SPD faction of the Bundestag circulated a 
memo that listed a “catalog of sorrows.” This list included among other things “desert garrisons” 
that were surrounded only by small “villages of maybe 800 souls.”548 According to the SPD, such 
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small and isolated villages were oftentimes overburdened with the sheer quantity of soldiers. 
Without offering a detailed interpretation or explanation, the memo stated that in these situations 
the “ratio of marriageable girls to soldiers is 1:100.”549  In accordance with members of the 
governing coalition, the SPD believed that military service should under no circumstances 
endanger the well-being of soldiers’ families, impede a young man’s marital prospects, or tempt 
soldiers to seek improper extramarital sex.   
In light of the severity and sensitive nature of this problem,550 members of the Committee 
for Defense looked to the Catholic and Protestant Churches for help. In 1957, the two state 
churches signed individual contracts with the Federal Republic, which provided for the offering 
of pastoral care and spiritual guidance in the context of the armed forces (Militärseelsorge).551 
One form of religious guidance that military chaplains would offer was the teaching and 
discussion of “life skills” in a semi-classroom setting (Lebenskundlicher Unterricht). Negotiating 
the format and goals of these lessons in February 1956, members of the Adenauer government as 
well as the opposition already agreed that:  
There are certain delicate issues, the relationship between man and woman and 
whatnot and we thought a theologian would be best suited to talk about this with 
the young people. We did not know who else we could entrust with this issue.552  
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Since neither the governing coalition nor the opposition wanted to leave “delicate issues” to 
chance or rely on the “self-regulation of the military,”553 the churches’ offerings became a 
welcomed and central framework in which the social and sexual behavior of young soldiers was 
discussed.  
The willingness with which parliamentarians consulted the churches was, however, not 
only motivated by the social well-being of soldiers and positive public relations. In the case of 
the Adenauer administration, the decision to offer soldiers guidance in matters of sexuality was 
also motivated by the international tensions of the Cold War. Representatives of the Catholic 
Church already noted in the mid-1950s that the state, the churches, and the soldiers had very 
different interests with respect to the Militärseelsorge. According to a memo, the churches were 
interested in the issue because of its “religious, dogmatic and moral content,” while soldiers were 
in want of entertainment as well as “orientation amid the chaos of opinions and views.”554 The 
Federal Republic as a state expected, in contrast, not only support in the area of military and 
personal education, but also an “ideological ‘orientation’” (weltanschauliche Ausrichtung), 
“morale,” and “immunization against Bolshevism.”555 With respect to the state’s interest, the 
church’s interpretation was proven correct by leading representatives of the government. During 
a meeting of the Committee of Defense, Richard Jaeger and Georg Kliesing agreed that only 
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soldiers who came from a “functioning” home and who had been raised as faithful Catholics or 
Protestants would be able to withstand “the chaos of Bolshevism.”556  
Given issue’s significance, the Adenauer government and the opposition were very 
interested in the workings of the Militärseelsorge. In 1959, three years after the first volunteers 
had entered the barracks, Military Vicar-General Georg Werthmann of the Catholic Church and 
Military Superintendent Friedrich Hoffmann of the Protestant Church presented an overview to 
the Committee for Defense. During this meeting, Military Vicar-General Werthmann confirmed 
the parliamentarians’ concerns. According to him, young soldiers did not think about 
fundamental questions such as the “atomic bomb,” but they were more concerned with the job 
market, girls and sexual adventures.557 Notwithstanding such problematic interests, Werthmann 
and his colleague were happy to report that the Ministry of Defense had already produced special 
reading material to guide the soldiers. According to Werthmann and Hofmann, the Ministry of 
Defense graciously supported the production of a booklet titled Soldier and Love, which was 
written by the Swiss neurologist and marriage counselor, Theodor Bovet.558 In light of the 
perceived urgency of the topic, the Ministry of Defense had ordered more than ten thousand 
special copies of the publication and gave a copy to as many soldiers as possible.559  
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This booklet was an illustrated guide designed to lead soldiers and officers to a 
heterosexual, monogamous life as a Christian family man. According to Soldier and Love, living 
this kind of life was not only vital to the effective functioning of the armed forces, but also 
necessary to prevent a “state of emergency” in West German families. The final section of the 
booklet—“Is Our Military Armor Enough?,”—stated, for instance, that the Federal Republic was 
not only threatened by an external military enemy, but even more so by “disrupted families” and 
“the shaking of the family home.”560 One internal enemy that threatened West German families 
was, according to Soldier and Love, the girls and women who “besieged the barracks after 
hours.”561 Warning that the “fruits,” which these women offered, were “rotten and upset the 
stomach,” the booklet urged Bundeswehr soldiers to search for “true love.”562  Of course, this 
kind of love could only be found in matrimony. Depicting the image of a smiling man embracing 
a woman who was holding a toddler in her arm, the text emphasized that the soldier should seek 
a marriage wherein the woman “was the heart and— independent of the equality before the 
law—the man was the head.”563 Reaffirming the ideal of the monogamous male-breadwinner 
family, the booklet concluded that only this kind of love and family could protect the Federal 
Republic against internal enemies (prostitutes) and external enemies (Bolshevism). 
Although the booklet represented an explicit and comprehensive instrument to guide 
soldiers into the safe haven of marriage, for some parliamentarians and church representatives 
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this was not enough. Following Helmut Schmidt’s suggestions, the Catholic Academy in 
Hohenheim and Protestant Academy in Bad Boll collaboratively organized a soldiers’ conference 
in June 1960 that was attended by sixty participants, including members of the Committee of 
Defense, members of the Ministry of Defense, officers, medical officers, military chaplains, and 
pedagogues.564  
The majority of the conference focused on the situation of the young men in barracks. 
Even though the participants agreed that a “distinctive men’s society” such as the Bundeswehr 
greatly influenced the behavior of young men, they concluded that a “special sexual crisis 
situation” did not exist.565 Nonetheless, the sexual education of the young soldiers was of the 
utmost importance to the participants, because they considered national security and soldiers’ 
sexuality to be closely connected. According to the final conference report, “subversive powers” 
(staatsfeindliche Mächte) could cause young soldiers to doubt the function of the Bundeswehr 
and question whether the Federal Republic was worth fighting for.566 This was problematic, the 
report stated, because a soldier could be driven into a “misusage of sexuality” if he did not feel 
that he was part of his Volk. Only if he was convinced that his service was worthwhile would the 
young man remain “sexually grounded.”567 Consequently, conference participants agreed that 
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sexual education had to be part of the soldier’s overall training and education, because the 
“willingness to serve, to discipline and order” and rejection of promiscuity were essential 
characteristics of a “true soldier.”568  
Like others before, the final conference report stated that greatest problem still to be 
solved was prostitution. Even though the report stressed that West German soldiers usually did 
not frequent prostitutes, it still agonized about the sheer number of prostitutes registered in 
various garrison cities. For instance, small town of Baumholder in Rhineland-Palatinate not only 
hosted 800 prostitutes, but that the service of these women was also directed by a “syndicate of 
pleasures.”569 Yet, the report noted that the high numbers were not caused by Bundeswehr, but by 
the Americans. According to historian Maria Höhn, U.S. occupation forces had turned the older 
Wehrmacht barracks into one of their biggest garrisons. The presence of thousands of U.S. 
soldiers spurred the town’s economy, including its nightlife. The number of prostitutes that 
frequented and worked around the city caused not only numerous lurid press reports, but also led 
government representatives to call Baumholder a “moral disaster area.”570  
Seeing the detachment of West German soldiers from prostitutes as a form of 
“counterintelligence,” the conference participants noted several remedies. Similar to the booklet 
Soldier and Love, the report stated that soldiers should be encouraged to follow a Christian life 
style and value family life. In order to achieve this goal, the participants agreed that the 
                                                 
568 Ibid., 7.  
569 Ibid, 7. 5,150 residents lived in Baumholder at the time. See the statistics of census bureau, 
http://www.infothek.statistik.rlp.de/neu/MeineHeimat/zeitreihe.aspx?l=3&id=3537&key=0713401005&kmaid=563
&zmaid=820&topic=4095&subject=20 (last accessed: 6 January 2013). 
570 Maria Höhn, GIs and Fräuleins: The German-American Encounter in 1950s West Germany (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina, 2002), 118–121. 
 192 
 
Bundeswehr should pay more attention to the location and the infrastructure of garrisons as well 
as to the daily curfew soldiers had to obey. These aspects would ensure that the young soldiers 
were kept away from prostitutes and, instead, have increased contact with proper women, 
including their mothers who they could visit regularly on the weekends.571 Another way to ensure 
the Bundeswehr’s moral character was a more careful recruitment of soldiers. Above all, the 
report indicated, men who had a record of sexual misdemeanor—including homosexuality and 
exhibitionism—should not be recruited.572 In addition to careful recruitment practices, the report 
noted also that “tough and versatile” training was useful. A challenging education and training 
was seen as a way to increase the self-esteem of a soldier and make him immune to sexual 
temptations. Such training could also be more punitive, for the report noted without much further 
explanation that “sexual swanks” could be exposed through tough training.573  
While these measures were listed only briefly, conference participants looked above all to 
leading and older officers to influence young soldiers. According to the report, officers played an 
essential role in turning young recruits into “responsible and happy citizens” (Bürger) who were 
able to deal properly with sexual issues.574 Above all, officers needed to influence recruits by 
exemplifying appropriate behavior toward women. The manners of commanding officers had to 
be guided by chivalry and respect.575 In addition, if officers’ wives were “motherly women,” they 
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should either live with their husbands on the military base or occasionally pick up their 
husbands—together with their children—after work. Such examples, the report concluded, would 
help young men to realize that “only true marriage […] like God intended it, could satisfy the 
need for security.”576 Imbued with Christian family values, the report thus made the heterosexual 
family with children the ultimate goal.  
The fact that members of the Committee for Defense participated in this conference and 
appreciated the publication of Soldier and Love shows that the social and sexual behavior of 
young Bundeswehr recruits was not a minor concern. Like welfare workers, citizens living near 
garrisons, and church groups, parliamentarians too worried about young men’s “dissolute” 
behavior. In the context of the Cold War and in light of the sexual politics of the Nazi period, the 
Adenauer government and members of the opposition agreed that the problem needed to be 
tackled by urging soldiers and officers to strive for the ideal of the complete breadwinner family.  
4. Military Attempts to Regulate the Behavior of the New Staatsbürger in Uniform 
The publication of the booklet Soldier and Love and the conference of the same name 
furthermore demonstrate that the social and sexual behavior of Bundeswehr recruits concerned 
not only members of the Committee for Defense and government officials. Beginning in 1957, 
the issue was also addressed on different levels within the Ministry of Defense, by the 
Bundeswehr’s highest-ranking military commanders, including the Chief of Federal Armed 
Forces Staff, and by commanders of military bases and districts. While the military command 
devised official instructions and regulations, the Ministry published decrees and educational 
booklets that addressed the social life in the armed forces. 
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Analyzed together, these documents show that the public concerns about the behavior of 
men in uniform greatly influenced the formative period of the Bundeswehr. To be sure, military 
training was shaped by the goal to establish a well-functioning army that would be able to help 
defend Western Europe and West Germany. Yet, eager to show the Bundeswehr in the best light 
possible, military leadership also sought to imbue the troops with qualities that were socially 
accepted. In response to Cold War tensions and the national moral discourse, these attempts 
focused on the masculine image of soldiers and officers as heterosexual men who were 
committed to their military duties and aspired to the bourgeoisie life of a well-respected 
husbands and family man.  
Bundeswehr Efforts to Identify and Deal with the “Improper” Behavior of Young Recruits 
Military attempts to detect questionable social and sexual behavior began as soon the first 
volunteers and draftees made their way to the barracks in 1956 and 1957 respectively. Already in 
1957, the Ministry of Defense published a small booklet with the title The First Hours: Advices 
for how to deal with Recruits during the First Days.577 This booklet was the first volume of the 
important official series Schriftenreihe Innere Führung. The overall purpose of this series was to 
inform the troops about the meaning of the Innere Führung and the new ideal of the Staatsbürger 
in Uniform. Divided into different thematic sub-series, the serial Erziehung explained not only 
the overall concepts, but also offered advice for commanding officers on what to expect from 
young recruits and how to deal with them. 
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Published in the sub-series Erziehung, the booklet The First Hours was written to inform 
commanding officers about the new generation of draftees. Influenced by sociological studies of 
the period, the text emphasized that West Germany’s youth “thought soberly, skeptically, and 
critically”.578 Consequently, commanders should avoid “pathos” and speeches about the 
greatness of German soldiering.579 Whereas the booklet considered this to be a positive 
development, the subsection “Character, Style, and Perils of Today’s Youth,” The First Hours 
alerted its readers to important problems. One of them was the absence of working parents from 
the home. While a working mother deprived her sons of important “motherly love” and a “sense 
of security,” absent fathers represented a lack of orientation.580 Because many fathers had to 
leave home to go to work, the booklet stated, many young men did neither experience fatherly 
discipline nor witnessed their fathers’ occupational achievements. Instead of copying their 
father’s occupational success, young men hence followed the housework of their mothers and “in 
fact lived their childhoods like little girls.”581 
While pointing out that parents who worked outside the home prevented many young 
men from living a life appropriate to their sex, the booklet also warned against the increasing 
sexualization of West Germany’s male youth. According to The First Hours young men in the 
1950s matured physically much faster and hit puberty at a much younger age because of the 
improving living standards. This was problematic because, one the one hand, young men’s 
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mental maturity did not follow suit and, on the other, West Germany’s “moral boundaries,” that 
for so long had regulated the relations between the sexes, were disappearing.582 As a result, 
young men were not only exposed to “the sexual” much earlier, but they were also “defenseless” 
against any external temptations.583 Arguing that West Germany’s entertainment industry was 
geared towards “the sexual, the criminal, and the sentimental,” the booklet stated that young men 
were downright “attacked” by the “flood of enticing, askew, and false impressions.”584 As The 
First Hours thus echoed many contemporary moralizers, who decried the “sexualization” of 
West German society,585 it predicted that the new cohorts of draftees would, in all likelihood, not 
only act differently than previous generations of recruits, but also needed different treatment.  
The problems that The First Hours addressed were even more emphasized in the seventh 
volume of the sub-series: Difficult Young Soldiers: Advice for Detection and Education. 
Published in 1961, the booklet’s content was devised by leading psychoanalyst Alexander 
Mitscherlich. Like Die First Hours, this booklet informed its readership—“older and […] 
experienced superiors”586—about the Bundeswehr’s “problem children” who suffered from 
                                                 
582 Ibid., 28. 
583 Ibid. 
584 Ibid., 29. 
585 See, Herzog, Sex after Fascism; Poiger, Krise der Männlichkeit, 228–235. 
586 Schwierige Junge Soldaten: Hinweise zum Erkennen und Erziehen, ed. Bundesministerium für Verteidigung 
(Bonn: s.n., 1961), 4 and 8. See also, Kai Uwe Bormann, “Als ‘Schule der Nation’ überfordert: Konzeptionelle 
Überlegungen zur Erziehung des Soldaten in der Aufbauphase der Bundeswehr,” in Reform, Reorganisation, 
Transformation: Zum Wandel in deutschen Streitkräften von den preussischen Heeresreformen bis zur 
Transformation der Bundeswehr, ed. Karl-Heinz Lutz, Martin Rink, and Marcus von Salisch (Munich: Oldebourg 
2010), 345–367.  
 197 
 
absent working parents and accelerated physical maturity.587 Addressing moreover “special 
perils,” Difficult Young Soldiers warned that soldiers with “weak characters” were prone to 
excessive alcohol consumption and could easily be tempted by the wrong women.588  More 
problematic than too much alcohol were, however, suicide attempts of weak-minded recruits as 
well as “sexual aberrations” like male homosexuality. For Difficult Young Soldiers, which 
discussed homosexuality even before it tackled soldiers’ suicides and traffic violations, this 
sexual behavior was problematic, because it was not only outlawed in West Germany, but also 
because gay men “sexually target” other men and thus disrupted the troops’ morale.589  
If Difficult Young Soldiers and The First Hours only predicted possible problems, 
military commanders all over the Federal Republic soon faced them. Internal correspondence 
between the leading generals and the legal advisor of the 6th military district in Bavaria show, for 
example, that the command was concerned about how to deal with soldiers who visited “louche 
streets and bars.”590 Working together with vice squads in Munich, the military police 
recognized that soldiers visited places, which normally would be avoided by “proper citizens,” 
because they were frequented by “prostitutes,” “souteneurs” (pimps), “homosexuals,” and “other 
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asocial elements”.591 Seeking legal advice on how to deal with these issues without violating 
soldiers’ personal rights, the commanders stated that this behavior unacceptable. By possibly 
engaging in sexual activities with prostitutes and gay men, the report noted, soldiers endangered 
their own health and, thus, their ability to serve. Moreover, they also damaged the “reputation of 
the Bundeswehr in public.” In addition to jeopardizing the Bundeswehr’s combat readiness, the 
commanding officers emphasized, conscripts who behaved improperly would jeopardize the 
“trust of the population.”592  
Military Strategies to Guide and Regulate Guide the Social and Sexual Behavior of the Troops 
Given that perils appeared to be numerous, soldierly misconduct rampant and the implications of 
both significant, the Bundeswehr’s high command and the Ministry for Defense tried its utmost 
to control and solve them. As discussed above, the chosen strategies included the publications of 
booklets such as Soldat und Liebe as well as the help of the Catholic and Protestant Churches in 
form of Militärseelsorge. In addition to these measures, the late 1950s and early 1960s witnessed 
the publication of several regulations and guidelines as well as court cases that targeted the social 
and sexual behavior of the Bundeswehr troops. The formation period was thus defined by a 
comprehensive attempt to define the morals of the troops in a way that they would met the 
military goals of the government and the social expectations of society. While many of these 
measures addressed all soldiers, a number of them specially targeted professional soldiers and 
the officer corps, because high-ranking, experienced officers were deemed vital for maintain the 
Bundeswehr’s manner and morals.  As living examples and through training practices, older 
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officers could ensure their subordinates’ proper behavior and thus uphold the Bundeswehr’s 
prestige.  
The cornerstone for this role was laid very early. In light of Germany’s disastrous past, 
the Himmerod Memorandum written in 1950 stated that the men who wanted to join the ranks 
and assume commanding positions had to be carefully selected. This initial suggestion became, 
after long discussion, reality in 1955, when the Bundestag sanctioned the establishment of the 
Acceptance Organization (Annahmeorganization) and the Personal Screening Board 
(Personalgutachterausschuss, PGA). Whereas the Acceptance Organization was responsible for 
the selection of all volunteers—independent of rank—who had or had not served in previous 
German armies, the PGA screened the officers of the rank colonel and higher. Having received 
more than 200,000 applications, the two organizations began the screening in fall of 1955.593  
The examination was divided into different sections, beginning with a discussion of the 
applicant’s resume. The questions tackled issues such as ethical warfare, military justice, the 
chain of command, the relation between the military and politics, and the concept of 
unconditional loyalty.594 Even though little is known about the actual proceedings of the 
interviews because those files were destroyed, the guidelines, which formed the basis of the 
screening, offer insight into the demands applicants had to meet. In order to ascertain whether an 
applicant was “qualified and mentally ready” for becoming a West German officer, the PGA 
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explored men’s previous military experience.595 In addition to requiring characteristics such as 
responsibility, truthfulness, and courage, the applicant had to show a good sense of camaraderie, 
“empathy and care.” Most likely against the background of the trial against hundreds of former 
Wehrmacht POWs, who were charged with maltreating their comrades during Allied 
imprisonment—the so-called Kameradenschinder trials—the guidelines stressed that “during 
imprisonment, the applicant must not have harmed the camaraderie and the reputation of the 
German soldier.”596  
In addition, the applicant’s interactions with civilians had to be impeccable as well. The 
guidelines for selecting professional soldiers and soldiers who would serve for a fixed period of 
time stated that candidates’ behavior during war had to be infused with “chivalry towards 
women” and with the “readiness to help the weak and the helpless.”597 By specifying these 
characteristics, the guidelines reflected the ideal of the Bürger in Uniform. In light of the 
brutality that had marked World War II, military reformers such as Wolf Graf von Baudissin 
were eager to make chivalry the benchmark for the West German soldier. Stating that “chivalry 
is not sign of weakness but a superior mental and intellectual attitude,” guidelines and laws such 
as the Soldatengesetz further emphasized that “the occidental tradition […] demanded above all 
the protection of all that is unprotected and defenseless.”598 Therefore the Christian soldier had 
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to protect not only women, children, old folks, the injured and the weak, but also the defenseless 
enemy against the “raw violence” of warfare.599  
Moving beyond a man’s conduct during war, the guidelines further specified that 
successful candidates “should have stood the test of life after war,” especially during the first 
hunger years following 1945. The chances of being considered for employment rose if an 
applicant had tried to find a “reputable occupation” and be integrated into “the civic work life” 
(bürgerliches Berufsleben). Despite the harsh postwar living conditions, applicants had to show 
furthermore that their financial situation was in order and that they did not live beyond their 
means.600 It was, however, not only the applicants’ financial means that had to be orderly; his 
family life had to be as well. Without going into too much detail, the guidelines stated that in 
case an applicant and his wife lived apart or were divorced, the screening board had to 
investigate the “applicant’s behavior” more carefully. 
The precise meaning of investigating the applicant’s behavior becomes apparent in 
several newspapers and the records of the Ministry for Defense. Restating the details of the PGA 
guidelines in October 1955, the local newspaper Lübecker Nachrichten criticized that Ministry 
for Defense requested court materials in case of a divorce. Although the newspaper agreed that 
an applicant’s family life had to be in order, he maintained that the review of divorce 
proceedings represented an unreasonable intrusion into a person’s privacy.601 Notwithstanding 
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the critical reception, the PGA requested divorce proceeding and the Ministry for Defense 
continued this practice over the course of the formative period of the Bundeswehr.602 
The reason for why the Ministry for Defense wanted to see the proceedings was to gauge 
the circumstances behind the divorce. Though sources from the mid-1950s are not available, the 
records of military courts from the late 1950s and early 1960s show that several soldiers and 
officers were charged with adultery, oftentimes in combination with a “breach of duty.” For 
example, already in December 1957—less than a year after the first recruits entered the 
barracks—a court penalized an officer for having “an adulterous affair with a prostitute,” who 
accompanied him during business trips and to whom he had disclosed official secrets. According 
to the verdict, the culprit did not only ignore his duty to serve West Germany “loyally,” but his 
behavior also violated Article 17, Sub-Clause 2 of the Soldatengesetz that required him to act in 
a manner that would not harm the reputation of the armed forces.603  
If the selection of the first volunteers set the stage for defining the social and moral 
standards of the Bundeswehr, the establishment of the first garrisons in the late 1950s triggered a 
new wave of directives and regulations. One of the most contested was the Heiratserlaß 
(Marriage Decree) that the Ministry of Defense under the aegis of the conservative CSU 
politician Franz Josef Strauß, issued on February 15, 1958.604 Having succeeded Theodor Blank 
as Minister of Defense in October 1956, Strauß welcomed regulations and advice books that 
embraced military and social values that had been accepted during the times of the 
                                                 
602 “Bundeswehr verlangt Scheidungsakten,” DIE ZEIT, December 26, 1957, 1. See also a directive issued by the 
Ministry for Defense in November 1959, BArch F, BW I/ 66 188. 
603 VR II 6 – Az . 25-01-50-00, August 8, 1960. BArch F, BW I/66148. 
604 “Heirat des Soldaten,” in Ministerialblatt des Bundesministers für Verteidigung, February 15, 1958, 95–96. 
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Reichswehr.605 Although Strauß had assured his parliamentary colleagues in 1953 that the 
Federal Republic would any marriage restrictions, in 1958 the plan looked different.  
Resembling to some extent the restrictions that members of the Amt Blank had negotiated 
in the context of the European discipline générale, the decree stated that soldiers could get 
married like any other citizen and without needing the permission of their superiors. However, 
the Heiratserlaß also cautioned that the soldier’s obligation to live a life that did not damage the 
reputation of the Bundeswehr also applied to his marriage.606 According to the decree, living an 
impeccable life meant first that soldiers should not contract debts that could become a burden to 
their marriage and family. Second, the Heiratserlaß advised professional soldiers, non-
commissioned officers, and officers against marrying during the first five years of service, 
because life during this time was generally determined by extensive work hours, relocations, and 
barracked living conditions. These issues, the decree warned, could endanger the important 
coalescence of married couples. Third, the soldier should only choose a woman who had an 
“undisputed reputation,” whose family was “respectable” and who did not have any contacts to 
“subversive circles” (staatsfeindliche Kreise).607 The soldier’s choice of a proper wife was 
certainly the most important point of the decree, because only in this case did the decree 
emphasize possible professional consequences: if a soldier or officer chose to marry a woman 
who “lived a scandalous or immoral life” or endangered the security of the Federal Republic 
through her actions, the decree warned, he had to anticipate official consequences. In particular, 
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an imprudent marriage could put into questions officers’ soldierly skills and aptitude to function 
as a superior.608 
Although the majority of employees in the Ministry of Defense accepted the intention to 
advise soldiers in matters of marriage,609 the decree was highly criticized by government-critical 
newspapers and by several parliamentarians. In March 1958, the SPD politicians Karl Wilhelm 
Berkhan and Karl Wienand questioned the ministry’s intention behind the marriage decree 
during a meeting of the Committee of Defense.610 The Social Democrats were particularly 
concerned about the ministry’s suggestion that soldiers should marry only women with an 
irreproachable reputation. For SPD, the decree’s formulation was too close to the marriage 
permits required by the Wehrmacht in the 1930s and 1940s.611 During a session of the 
Bundestag, SPD politician Helmut Schmidt warned once again that the marriage decree could 
become a political measure that would enable the Bundeswehr to not only revive a sense of 
honor special and limited to the military profession (Standesehre), but also to exclude 
undesirable groups and individuals such as “communists” and “alcoholics.”612 While Social 
Democrats like Schmidt thought it necessary that the military tried to influence young recruits’ 
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609 Even Wolf Graf von Baudissin, for example, did not criticize the decree stating that the ministry had issues it 
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612 Verhandlungen des Deutschen Bundestag, 73. Sitzung, 10 June 1959. Parlamentsarchiv Berlin, Bestand 3119, 
A1/50-Prot. 102 
 205 
 
sexual behavior, regulating soldiers’ private and marital life through decrees that bore 
resemblance to Reichswehr and Wehrmacht laws was a whole different bargain.  
Schmidt’s concerns were not unfounded. Between 1959 and 1964, the Ministry of 
Defense under the leadership of Franz Joseph Strauß and his successor Kai Uwe von Hassel 
sought to influence the behavior of soldiers and officers in a comprehensive, strict, and 
conservative way.613 In 1959, for instance, the Chief of Federal Armed Forces Staff, Adolf 
Heusinger, released guidelines devised for commanders and official use only. These pieces of 
advice included a small, but explicit section regarding soldiers’ virtuous and proper behavior. 
Tackling the issue of alcohol consumption, the document noted that some soldiers mistakenly 
thought that the excessive consumption of alcohol was a manly act.614 While accepting 
occasional drinking in informal settings, the guidelines stated that excessive drinking was 
anything but a practice that would recommend a man. Arguing moreover that a process of 
“sexualization” had begun to take place in the army, Heusinger criticized the use of what he 
perceived as overly aggressive language and “dirty jokes.” 615 This way of conversing was 
unacceptable, he argued, because it revealed the verbal “immaturity and squalidness” (Unreife 
und Unsauberkeit) of the soldiers and officers who used them616 For Heusinger, this behavior 
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was particularly inappropriate for commanding officers who should act as a good example for 
their subordinates.  
This demand that especially high-ranking and older officers should set a good example 
for their subordinates eventually culminated in comprehensive studies and one particular booklet. 
Following the distribution of an internal communique with the title Social Life of the Officer 
Corps in 1958,617 a group of young staff officers and captains put together a comprehensive 
internal study entitled Style and Form of the Officer Corps.618 These documents formed the basis 
for the comprehensive etiquette book Style and Form: Advices for Education and Self-Education, 
which the ministry eventually published in 1965.619  
In sharp contrast to the ideals of Bürger in Uniform, the internal study and communique 
stressed that the Bundeswehr needed an officer corps with “elite characteristics”.620 Advocates of 
this idea such as General Heinz Karst argued that the Bundeswehr required a special 
compendium that would consider the peculiarities of military life. Although he had worked 
alongside Wolf Graf von Baudissin in the office Innere Führung in the early 1950s, over the 
course of the late 1950s and the 1960s Karst became an outspoken critic of Baudissin and his 
concept of the Bürger in Uniform. In doing so he joined a number of Bundeswehr commanders 
who dismissed the ideals of the Innere Führung and instead returned to routine drill practices in 
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order to produce “fearless fighters.”621 Believing that the Bürger in Uniform was a useless 
concept and the military reforms of the 1950s made the Bundeswehr soft, they demanded 
soldiers’ complete obedience and utter discipline.622 While propagating more rigorous and 
traditional training methods, Karst also maintained that being a soldier was a job sui generis and 
stated “that the officer corps needed more definite manners than a civilian.”623  
 Informed by this kind of reasoning, young staff officers and captains argued that if the 
officer corps of the Bundeswehr followed superior manners, society would accept the armed 
forces more easily and the officer corps’ superior manner could function as a benchmark for 
society. This attempt to turn the Bundeswehr’s officer corps into a “school of the nation” was, 
however, rejected not only by representatives of the Ministry of Defense who wanted to counter 
the demands of conservative Bundeswehr commanders and who did not want to give the 
impression that the Bundeswehr was becoming an elite institution. According to Brigadier 
General Wolfgang Köstlin of the office Innere Führung, the plan was also rejected by several 
Bundeswehr inspectors and commanding generals, who thought that the teachings of regular 
etiquette books could be easily transferred into the military sphere.624  
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Despite this high-ranking opposition, Style and Form was eventually published.625 
According to the preface, however, the Ministry of Defense did not publish the booklet to 
establish an exclusive set of manners that was only binding for soldiers. Instead, the author 
sought to offer an addition to the style and etiquette books that were already available on the 
regular book market.626 And indeed, Style and Form lacked explicit phrases or wording that 
would suggest the image of the officer corps as an elitist institution disconnected from the 
civilian world. Yet, booklet blended bourgeoisie norms common in other etiquette books with 
demands and expectations specific to the military.627 The West German soldier, and above all the 
officer corps, had to adhere to superior manners and customs. As such Style and Form 
represented a renunciation of the Baudissin’s concept of the Innere Führung, which did not want 
to infer with soldiers’ and officers’ private life in such an invasive manner. 
Though advertised as a valuable reading for the entire “soldierly community,” Style and 
Form addressed above all senior and junior officers, because of their responsibilities as leaders, 
trainers and educators.628 Reminding the military readership that a soldier was not only a “citizen 
of a democratic, constitutional state,” but also a “public servant” (Staatsdiener), the booklet 
stated that “a soldier does not let anybody exceed him in terms of civility and propriety.”629 In 
more than fifty pages Style and Form offered the officers a detailed description of areas in which 
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they had to reign supreme. With the help of several ironic caricatures, the booklet tackled topics 
such the soldier’s general appearance and demeanor, his behavior while on duty and in public as 
well as rules that had to be observed during social gatherings.  
Central to the soldier’s superior manners was the way in which he treated respectable 
women. While the booklet does not mention any “improper” women, it stated that act as a 
“cavalier” and help “ladies and other people who deserve respect.”630 In order to act “chivalrous” 
towards respectable people, officers were even allowed to temper with their strictly regulated 
appearance. According to the author of Style and Form, the military uniform was “a visible sign 
of the soldierly community” and the expression of both a particular way of life and a man’s inner 
disposition.631 Whereas an open collar or an umbrella hanging from an officer’s arm was seen as 
generally unacceptable, the booklet stated that soldiers and officers were permitted to carry an 
“open umbrella for a lady.”632 Style and Form thus attacked great meaning to military uniforms, 
portraying men who wore Bundeswehr uniforms as distinct from the rest of West German 
society. This clearly defined and superior image could only be distorted in favor of chivalrous 
behavior towards women.  
The treatment of respectable of women was furthermore connected to the ways in which 
Style and Form discussed the family. Echoing the intention of Soldier and Love, the regulations 
of the Personalgutachterausschuss, and the wording of the Heiratserlaß¸ the booklet stated that 
officers and soldiers should make sure that their bank account was balanced, because financial 
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“excess is not a sign of brilliancy or manliness, but of weakness.”633 An accurate bank account 
was furthermore considered vital for a “harmonious family life” and the fruitful interaction with 
comrades. Arguing that the “happy marriages” of superiors could have “educational effects” 
(erzieherisch wirken) on young officers and soldiers, the booklet discussed how officers could 
achieve these marriages. First of all, Style and Form noted, like many other texts before, that 
officers should chose their wives carefully. In addition to being able to keep secrets and 
understand the occupational problems of their husbands, officers’ wives—the booklet noted—
should be capable of keeping the house stylish and sedate, while not living beyond the family’s 
means. This would among other things ensure a happy family life that could also function as a 
good example for younger officers and soldiers.634 Emphasizing traditional gender norms, Style 
and Form fitted neatly into the social discourse of the 1950s and early 1960s that focused on the 
male-breadwinner family. At the same time, the Bundeswehr was portrayed a community with 
superior manners. Although Style and Form did not explicitly describe soldiering as job sui 
generis, its productions sheds light on the conservative shift that took place in the Ministry of 
Defense and the Bundeswehr in the late 1950s and early 1960s and that represented a 
renunciation of the Innere Führung. 
Conclusion  
The establishment of the Bundeswehr as a national defense force that would protect the 
Federal Republic against any threats from the East cemented traditional gender norms. Since 
compulsory military service was defined as a masculine undertaking, women were assigned to 
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the extra-military and domestic sphere of the family and household. In the context of the Cold 
War, this sphere was seen as particularly threatened by possible attacks and thus men in military 
uniform were above all stylized as the defenders of the West German home and family.  
Given the exclusion of women from military service, the Bundeswehr was soon discussed 
as a men’s society. Whereas some journalists, mothers, schoolteachers, and enthusiastic veterans 
continued to see the military as a palladium of ideal masculinity, concerned citizens, religious 
groups, and welfare workers argued that the military could foster improper sexual and social 
behavior. Even before the first men were recruited, contemporaries fretted about the emergence 
of homosexuality and prostitution. With the establishment of the first units these concerns grew 
more intense, because the shortage of “proper” women seemed to be counterbalanced by a 
surplus of “prostitutes.”   
Since these concerns were widespread and their implications significant. They were soon 
addressed by members of the government and the political opposition as well as by the Ministry 
of Defense and the Bundeswehr’s high-ranking officers. After all, any form of social and sexual 
debauchery was seen as a threat to soldiers’ health, to the effective functioning of the troops, and 
to the West German families that the Bundeswehr was supposed to protect. In the context of the 
Cold War, soldiers who engaged in improper sexual activities hence endangered the well-being 
and safety of the Federal Republic.   
While parliamentarians discussed the issue in internal communiques, at conferences, and 
during sessions of the Committee for Defense, the Ministry of Defense and the Bundeswehr’s 
leadership published a volley of guidelines, regulations, and decrees that tackled the social and 
sexual behavior of the troops. Influenced by a broader national discourse that sought to define 
the moral and social boundaries of the Federal Republic, the discussions and publications framed 
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matrimony and family as the ultimate remedy against promiscuity, prostitution, and 
homosexuality. As he was recruited to defend the state, homes, and families, the West German 
man in uniform was urged to aspire to the impeccable life of a married family man who was 
devoted to his wife and children.  
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PART IV 
LEFT-WING REJECTION AND RIGHT-WING CRITIQUE: THE IMAGE OF THE 
BUNDESWEHRSOLDAT, 1964-1976
Beginning in the mid-1960s, the image of the Bundeswehrsoldat as a heterosexual man who was 
both a merciful, restrained soldier and a devout head of his nuclear family came under new and 
heavy fire. On the one hand, this was due to the rise of the extra-parliamentary opposition or 
APO, a protest movement of “liberal, left-liberal, social democratic, or socialist organizations, 
coalitions and individuals engaged in oppositional activity outside the parliamentary process that 
took a critical stance toward the parliamentary system, parliamentary parties, and government 
policy.”635 The APO started as a movement against Chancellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger’s Grand 
Coalition of CDU/CSU and FDP and its push for new Emergency Laws (Notstandgesetze). 
Eventually passed on May 30, 1968, the Notstandgesetze added new emergency clauses to the 
Basic Law, which enabled the government to act in crises such as natural disasters, uprisings or 
war. 
On the other, the criticism came from a conservative surge among leading officers and 
generals, politicians and public intellectuals who were at odds with the far-reaching military 
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reforms of the 1950s. Lingering tensions within the Ministry of Defense and the Bundeswehr 
boiled over in the so-called “Crisis of the Generals” in 1966. In August, three generals— Air 
Force Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Werner Panitzki, Armed Forces Chief of Staff Heinrich 
Trettner, and Major General Günther Pape —resigned because they detested how civil-military 
hierarchies were structured within the Ministry of Defense.636 The resignation of the generals 
was, however, only the prelude to a much longer conflict within the armed forces and the 
Ministry of Defense. Between the mid-1960s and the early 1970s, West German society 
witnessed a series of statements by high-ranking, older generals and a younger generation of 
officers who called for an overhaul of existing military customs, norms, and values as well as 
West Germany’s political and social system.637  
One of their major claims was that the Bundeswehr did not possess the combat strength 
necessary to halt an attack initiated by the Soviet Union. Arguing that previous military reforms 
and especially the ideal of the Staatsbürger in Uniform had “softened” the Bundeswehr, 
members of the general staff such as Inspector of the Army and Lieutenant General, Albert 
Schnez, demanded less parliamentary control. Irritated, moreover, by West Germany’s changing 
youth culture and the intensifying extra-parliamentary protest, they called for a return to the 
soldierly image of the hardened “fighter” (Kämpfer). Although a number of liberal-minded 
military experts vehemently opposed these statements, a considerable number of younger 
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officers, veterans, conservative politicians, and journalists supported the conservative agenda and 
the masculine ideals it propagated.638  
This conservative shift alarmed extra-parliamentary activists who were dissatisfied with 
the political system and the agenda of the Grand Coalition.639 Possessing 90 percent of the 
Bundestag mandates, Kiesinger’s government was able to pass the highly controversial 
Emergency Laws, which also provided for the deployment of the Bundeswehr on West German 
soil in case of domestic unrest. The ratification of the law caused great uproar, because it first 
coincided with electoral victories of the ultra-right wing National Party of Germany 
(Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands or NPD) as well as the death of student Benno 
Ohnesorg during APO demonstrations against the visit of the Iranian Shah Mohammad Reza 
Pahlavi in June 1967. Stating that the Grand Coalition passed laws that resembled Nazi 
legislation, activists argued the Federal Republic was becoming a fascist state and that the 
Bundeswehr was the government’s willing instrument to implement its authoritarian agenda.640  
Different groups including left-liberal intellectuals and students such as the Socialist 
German Student Union (Sozialistischer Deutscher Studentenbund or SDS) drove this extra-
parliamentary opposition. Founded in 1946, the SDS had been the collegiate branch of the SPD. 
After the Social Democrats embraced rearmament, however, tensions arose, leading to a split 
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between the two groups. In addition, the politics of the Grand Coalition infuriated pacifists and 
peace activists such as the German section of the War Resisters’ International (Internationale der 
Kriegsdienstgegner, IK) and the Campaign for Democracy and Disarmament (Kampagne für 
Demokratie und Abrüstung). In 1963, the Easter March Campaign (Ostermarschbewegung) 
against anti-nuclear weapons, which had started in the 1950s, adopted the name Campaign for 
Disarmament (Kampagne für Abrüstung) and expanded it in 1968 to Campaign for Democracy 
and Disarmament.641 The groups’ critique that the Kiesinger’s government represented a threat 
to peace and stability was seconded by representatives of different labor unions as well as 
Catholic and Protestant clergy. Having already been active in the 1950s, the organization pushed 
the churches’ leadership to revisit their theological doctrines and to develop a more critical 
stance on military service. Finally, activists of the growing women’s movement like the Action 
Council for the Liberation of Women (Aktionsrat zur Befreiung der Frauen) and members of the 
slowly growing gay-rights movement, which protested the continuing discrimination of gay men, 
continued the struggle against the established political system and the politics of the Grand 
Coalition.642 
The politics of Kiesinger’s government and the conservative military surge, however, 
were not the only developments that caused APO activists to challenge the political and military 
system. On the international stage, the escalation of the Vietnam War under the presidency of 
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Lyndon B. Johnson (1963-1969) and the anti-colonial struggles in Africa and Asia helped trigger 
the intensification of protests in the 1960s. Joining the international movement against the 
Vietnam War and supporting the freedom struggle of colonized countries, protesters challenged 
the politics of the “First World,” including those of the Federal Republic. Seeking to stop 
Western imperialism activists developed a multitude of strategies, which also included protests 
against and the “infiltration” of the Bundeswehr.643  
On the national level, the activism that gripped West Germany in the mid-1960s was both 
catalyst and expression of a development that involved the entire society.644 Influenced by the 
Wirtschaftswunder of the 1950s, West Germany witnessed a gradual change of social norms and 
values that affected all areas of life including religion, sexuality, gender roles, family relations, 
education, and the military. For a growing number of West Germans, this change meant a 
farewell to ideals such as strict discipline, obedience, devout religiousness, and heterosexual 
monogamy.645 Viewing the Bundeswehr as a palladium of these values, activists criticized the 
West German soldier also as a symbol of passé ideals of masculinity. 
The escalation of both the military controversy and the APO protest in the late 1960s, 
which resulted in skyrocketing numbers of men refusing to serve in the Bundeswehr,646 affected 
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not only Kiesinger’s Grand coalition. It also determined the politics of Chancellor Willy Brandt’s 
Social-Liberal Coalition of SPD and FDP that came to power in 1969. In addition to compelling 
representatives of all primary parties to restate their opinions about the role of the armed forces, 
members Brandt’s coalition realized that military reforms were inevitable. As a result, Helmut 
Schmidt and Georg Leber, who served as the first social democratic Ministers of Defense from 
1969-1972 and 1972-1978 respectively, implemented a series of measures that changed the 
masculine image of the West German soldier.647   
Central to this development was once again the question of what function the armed 
forces should fulfill. In light of the national and international tensions, the political discourse 
reaffirmed the image of the Bundeswehr as a “peace-keeping” force that would protect the 
Federal Republic. Although parliamentarians argued that male activists and conscientious 
objectors endangered West Germany’s security and stability, the Social-Liberal Coalition also 
enacted new regulations that sought to accommodate the changing ideals of West Germany’s 
young men. While reaffirming the importance of compulsory military service for men, West 
German government officials were eager to portray the Bundeswehr in a way that made being a 
soldier more palatable to the men of the 1960s.648 
In order to illuminate the competing concepts of masculinity that APO activists as well as 
conservative Bundeswehr generals propagated and how these effected West German politics, this 
part details first the critique and ideas of men such as Heinz Karst and Albert Schnez. In a 
second step, it gauges the debates taking place in civil society, including the complete political 
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spectrum from the conservatives to the far Left. Finally, this part analyzes how Willy Brandt’s 
Social Democratic government reacted to the multilayered criticism by seeking to redefine the 
image of the West German man in uniform. 
1. Military Disputes about the Role and Function of the Armed Forces and the Contested 
Ideal of the Soldier 
In August 1966, West Germany witnessed what many contemporaries soon considered a revolt, 
if not a coup, against the civilian control of the armed forces. In August, three generals—Werner 
Panitzki, Heinrich Trettner, and Günther Pape—resigned, because they detested the structure of 
the civil-military hierarchy within the Ministry of Defense. Already disgruntled by the fact that 
the position of the Bundeswehr Chief of Staff had been subordinated to the civilian 
Undersecretary of Defense,649 they took offense at the “Union Decree.” On August 1, 1966, the 
Ministry of Defense issued a decree that gave soldiers the right to join a union. To be sure, 
soldiers could already join and be represented by the Bundeswehrverband (Bundeswehr 
Association). Founded in 1956 by military personnel, the Bundeswehrverband received support 
from the Ministry of Defense and thus held the monopoly in West German barracks. Yet, this 
domination broke in 1966 due to the protest of the Union for Public Service, Transportation, and 
Traffic (Gewerkschaft Öffentliche Dienste, Transport und Verkehr or ÖTV). The generals took 
the passing of the “Union Decree” as another sign for unjustified and unnecessary civilian 
interference.650  
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The resignation of the three men represented both a first culmination and a prelude to a 
much longer conflict, which some scholars have called a conservative “counter revolution” 
within the Ministry of Defense and the Bundeswehr.651 Over the course of the 1960s, several 
high-ranking, older generals including Heinz Karst and Army Chief of Staff Albert Schnez 
publicly called for the overhaul of existing military customs, norms, and values. The generals’ 
demands for more military autonomy was seconded by a number of younger officers, most 
notably thirty “Captains of Unna” who argued that West Germany had to once again embrace the 
value of the “fighting man.”652 Openly denouncing the military reforms of the 1950s—including 
the principles of the Innere Führung and the Staatsbürger in Uniform—they called for a different 
type of man who should serve in the Bundeswehr. In doing so, they not only closely linked 
combat readiness, masculinity, and sexuality, but they also argued that the very nature and 
behavior of West German men had to be geared towards military functionality. 
Conservative Military Demands for a Return to the Soldierly Ideal of the “Fighter”  
Central to the generals’ conservative “counter revolution” was General Heinz Karst. As 
addressed in Part II and III, Karst had worked alongside Wolf Graf von Baudissin in the Innere 
Führung office in the early 1950s. However, over the course of the late 1950s and especially in 
the early 1960s, the two men developed very different ideas about military leadership, training, 
and soldiers’ rights, turning Karst into a critic of the 1950s military reforms. Stating that being as 
soldier was a job sui generis, which demanded not only superior manners and devout patriotism 
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Detlef Bald, “Bundeswehr und gesellschaftlicher Aufbruch”; Ibid., “Die Militärreform,” 341–353. 
652 Bald, “Bundeswehr und gesellschaftlicher Aufbruch.” 
 
 
222 
 
(Vaterlandstreue), but also utmost discipline and obedience, he demanded the rethinking of 
military traditions and practices.653 After he commanded the 32nd Armored Infantry Division 
between 1963 and 1967, Karst was appointed General for Education of the Army (General des 
Erziehungs- und Bildungswesen des Heeres). During his time as infantry commander and 
General for Education, he leveled some of the harshest and most publicized criticism against the 
Innere Führung and the Staatsbürger in Uniform. In unison with other commanders he called 
once more and much more vociferous for the soldierly ideal of the “fighter.” 
For instance, the wake of the resignation of Panitzki, Trettner, and Pape, Karst felt 
“compelled to render an account of where we [military superiors] stand in state and society.”654 
His assessment was anything but uplifting, dissatisfied with the military leadership and with 
West German society. In 1967 and 1968, Karst issued several statements in which he criticized 
the Bundeswehr’s “lassitude of peacetime army training.”655 Condemning the premise that the 
Bundeswehr was established solely as a defensive force, he argued that the military’s function 
was to fight and win battles. Thus, Karst demanded once more the return to “realistic” training 
methods, which would prepare soldiers for the harshness of war. This form of training was 
especially necessary, he claimed, because West Germany’s economic success—the 
Wirtschaftswunder—had “urbanized” and weakened young men. According to him, realistic 
battle simulations would make up for this shortcoming by advancing young men’s knowledge 
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about nature and by bolstering their physical fitness. Subsequently, young West German men 
would become better soldiers who could defeat Soviet troops in battle.656  
Since other high-ranking military commanders such as the Vice Chief of Staff of the 
Army, Major General Hans Hellmuth Grashey, who publicly denounced the Innere Führung as a 
“mask,”657 seconded Karst’s resentment, the Grand Coalition’s Minister of Defense, Gerhard 
Schröder, and Armed Forces Chief of Staff, Ulrich de Maizière, thought it necessary to act. They 
ordered their service chiefs to prepare suggestions for how to reform the inner structure of the 
Bundeswehr. Submitting their proposals in 1969, the air force and navy leadership made 
unspectacular suggestions. Those of the army were, however, quite drastic. Under the aegis of 
the Army Chief of Staff Albert Schnez, six generals—among them Heinz Karst—compiled 
“Thoughts on Improving the Internal Order of the Army.”658 Though classified as “secret,” the 
document was leaked to the press in December 1969 and the so-called “Schnez Study” caused a 
storm of protest.  
The document was controversial because it reiterated not only some of Karst’s previous 
claims, but also moved well beyond them. In sharp contrast to the dominant parliamentary 
discourse that defined the Bundeswehr as a defensive force with the purpose of preserving peace 
in Central Europe, the authors maintained that it was not the military’s task to prevent war. This 
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duty lay with the political leadership.659 The Bundeswehr’s main purpose was to either keep 
foreign powers from attacking or, if deterrence did not work, fight and win any possible 
conflict.660 Along with redefining the Bundeswehr’s function, Schnez also wanted the West 
German armed forces to be recognized as a “community of combat, fate, and emergency” 
(Kampf-, Schicksal- und Notgemeinschaft).661 Employing terminology that was wide-spread 
during the Third Reich, the Schnez Study further emphasized that being a soldier was a job sui 
generis, which entailed a particular set of virtues such as “bravery,” “justice,” “camaraderie,” the 
“willingness to make sacrifices,” and “discipline.”662 Thus, the Schenz Study stood in sharp 
contrast to Innere Führung and the Staatsbürger in Uniform, which bid farewell to the notion 
that soldiering was a special and particularly valuable profession.  
Yet, according to the authors of the Schnez Study, the Bundeswehr was far being this 
superior military force. The shortcoming was due to major problems within the Ministry of 
Defense. According to the study, the ministry had an overly “sluggish” administration that 
prevented military commanders from being “flexible,” “independent” and from making “quick 
decisions.”663 Military superiors were unable to establish the necessary discipline among their 
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troops, because the current regulations were too complex and not based on discipline and 
obedience. Instead military leadership relied on men’s “voluntariness” and own “insights.” Thus, 
the Study concluded, the Bundeswehr was not an “assiduous army” and had gained the 
reputation for being an “army of bums.”664  
As the word “bums” indicates, the generals also faulted West Germany’s young men for 
the Bundeswehr’s inadequacies. Albert Schnez argued, for instance, that the young men who 
entered the barracks in the 1960s did not possess any superior qualities. To be sure, he stated, 
many young men had a positive attitude towards “family,” “community,” “nation” and “duty.”665 
After all, men went to battle to defend their “fatherland,” wives, and children. However, for most 
young men, these qualities were underdeveloped, if not in danger of being totally lost. Similar to 
Karst, Schnez argued that this was because many West Germans only valued the Bundeswehr as 
an institution that would inculcate young men with socially acceptable, domestic manners. 
Consequently, young men entered the military without a respectable canon of values.666 
Moreover, the Schnez Study stated that a considerable number of young men embraced a 
dangerous “utopian pacifism,” which undermined the “basic order of obedience and authority” 
and eventually “military morale.”667 Finally, the army generals blamed West Germany’s 
“growing prosperity” and “urbanization” for the young men’s weakness. Like Karst, the Schnez 
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Study stated that West Germany’s “affluent society” had made men too soft to meet the demands 
of “wartime reality.”668  
While this criticism represented another direct attack on the Innere Führung and the ideal 
of the Bürger in Uniform, the generals also responded to the geo-political developments of the 
1960s. In 1966, the United States began reducing its number of troops in Central Europe—
including West Germany—because of the Vietnam War. Shifting their focus to Asia, the United 
States pushed its European allies to adapt the strategy of “flexible response” that considered not 
only the possibility of conventional, but also of atomic warfare.669 Two years later, the United 
States’ redeployment of troops appeared especially troublesome. When Eastern Bloc armies 
invaded Czechoslovakia in late August 1968 to stop the Prague Spring, the likelihood of another 
war on European soil seemed to increase exponentially.  
In addition, the Schnez Study represented a reaction to the social and cultural changes 
that had gripped West German society in the 1960s.670 Economic, social, and political changes, 
which had begun to unfold in the 1950s, accelerated in the early 1960s, causing contemporaries 
to describe the Federal Republic as a “new society.”671 Because of the Wirtschaftswunder, many 
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West Germans enjoyed a range of completely new commodities stretching from kitchen 
appliances such as refrigerators to consumer electronics like televisions. Moreover, the material 
prosperity combined with changing labor market policies,672 allowed for the expansion of leisure 
time activists: if televisions, radios, and clubs furthered the developments of new music and 
dance scenes, then the spread of the automobile and air travel provided means for a new form of 
“mass tourism.”673 
These structural changes also entailed the development of new cultural and social norms, 
opinions, and ideals.674 Although scholars still debate the depth and scope of this development, 
they agree with sociologist Helmut Klage’s claim that values, which built on the acceptance of 
traditional authorities, became less important, whereas values that pertained to individual self-
realization and autonomy flourished.675 This change affected all areas of life. For instance, the 
number of West Germans who attributed great significance to values such as strict discipline, 
obedience, and self-restraint declined over the course of the long 1960s. To be sure, West 
Germans did not abandon these qualities immediately and entirely;676 but “independence” and 
“free will” became the educational goals for a growing number of parents and a younger 
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generation of men and women increasingly extolled them.677 In the late 1960s and early 1970s, 
for example, mothers and fathers sent letters to the Ministry of Defense stating that they did not 
raise their children to become “proud soldiers” and “war criminal[s]” without any self-
determination. Instead, they wanted their sons to become peace-loving and “mature” (mündig) 
“citizen of the world.”678 
This change also influenced how young men viewed military duty. Beginning in the mid-
1960s, the numbers of men who applied for conscientious objector status rose continuously.679 
While the number of men registered eligible for military service increased from 263,000 to 
390,000 between 1965 and 1969, the total number of men filing for conscientious objection rose 
from 3,437 to 14,420. This represented an increase from 1,3 percent to 3,7 percent. Although this 
trend did not yet pose any structural challenges to the Bundeswehr, the situation was nonetheless 
problematic as the number of soldiers who filed for conscientious objection rose. Between 1967 
and 1968, the number quadrupled from 871 to 3,495. Simultaneously, the number of volunteers 
plummeted. If the Bundeswehr had already had difficulty recruiting enough volunteers in the 
early 1960s, then the situation only intensified over the course of the decade.680  
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Greatly unsettled by the development, the army generals proposed a number of changes. 
The fundamental principle that guided these proposals was that society and the entire political 
apparatus had to be geared towards the effective functioning of the armed forces.681 In order for 
the Bundeswehr to win “total wars,” young men had to become “physically and psychologically 
tough fighter[s].” Linking combat readiness to men’s self-identity, the Schnez Study argued that 
West Germany’s male citizens had to feel “like the born defender[s] of [their] country.”682 To 
achieve this goal, the generals demanded not only harsher disciplinary punishments, but also the 
restriction of Paragraph 4 of the Basic Law, which granted the right to oppose military service.683 
Challenging the very existence of this constitutional right, Schnez and others argued that 
conscientious objection would allow men to “undermine military morale.”684  
In order to improve the Bundeswehr’s combat strength further, the Schnez Study called 
for new forms of military training. Closely connecting combat readiness and masculinity, Heinz 
Karst and Albert Schnez thought it necessary to avoid any “feminine” training methods. Under 
no circumstance, they stated, could the relationship between superiors and their soldiers resemble 
the way women took care of children. Instead of acting like a “nanny,” the Schnez Study 
emphasized, military commanders had to treat their soldiers “like men” if they wanted to train 
them successfully.685 Declaring that “being a soldier is tough” and that war demanded “a whole 
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man” the document called for the expansion of routine combat drills in order to teach young men 
to be “hard on themselves” and to achieve the necessary physical strength.686  
Seeking to ensure that inferior feminine characteristics and behavior did not infiltrate the 
Bundeswehr, the generals further argued that the family life of soldiers and officers had to be 
regulated carefully. In 1966, the Ministry of Defense commissioned psychologist Rudolf Warnke 
to study whether or not being a Bundeswehr officer was a job like any other.687 Developed in 
cooperation with Heinz Karst, the study was published in 1970.688 Warnke concluded that an 
officer “generally” enjoyed the same rights like any other male citizen, but that the “extent of his 
duties were definitely greater.”689 This fact, the publication stated, became especially apparent in 
the “‘wife and marriage’ Complex.” Continuing a line of argument developed in the late 1950s 
due to the perceived sexual misconduct of Bundeswehr soldiers, the study stated that while 
“fidelity in marriage was only a moral imperative for the members of [most] professions, it 
represented a constant obligation for officers.”690  
The study further informed its readership that “some unwritten laws” defined officers’ 
private and marital life. Although there were no regulations in place that enforced precise 
restrictions, “different forms of ‘social control’”691 still regulated the soldiers’ life. According to 
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the document, 66 percent of Bundeswehr commanders and 44 percent of company commanders 
were in favor of setting a minimum age at which officers could get married. Whereas the 
majority of younger officers were against the introduction of marriage restrictions, 
representatives of an older generation of commanders were willing to move well beyond the 
ministerial Marriage Decree of 1958, which had only issued recommendations and 
suggestions.692 Although West German men were supposed to join the Bundeswehr to defend 
their homes and families, commanders in favor of more restrictions argued they should not 
become preoccupied with marital life, because it would represent an obstacle to military 
camaraderie and thus military effectiveness.693 
While they thus wanted to regulate the troops’ marital life more strictly, Heinz Karst and 
Albert Schnez also emphasized that Bundeswehr officers and soldiers should not fall for the 
sexual temptations of modern society. In an interview with Der Spiegel in 1970, Schnez repeated 
his critique of West Germany’s affluence by complaining that many contemporaries “abandon 
themselves to pleasures without any restraint.”694 Responding to various kinds of critiques—
including leftist intellectuals’ claim that totalitarian states such as the Third Reich had been 
sexually repressive—the general stated that he was neither a “puritan” nor as “prudish as some 
totalitarian states.”695 Yet, he claimed that pin-up girls in soldiers’ lockers and “sex movies” in 
barrack theaters could definitely undermine the military combat strength. After all, he argued, the 
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history of Rome provided ample evidence for the demand that soldiers should lead cautious sex 
lives. Even though Schnez did not expand on the issue during the interview, he was most likely 
referring to the hypothesis that the Roman Empire fell because of pervasive decadence.696    
Military Arguments against the Conservative Shift within the Bundeswehr 
The generals’ redefinition of the Bundeswehr as a community of fate and combat, which should 
be composed of “tough fighters” who had to follow a particular moral codex, was by no means 
the only position that military representatives assumed between the mid-1960s and early 1970s. 
To be sure, thirty company commanders of the 7th Panzergrenadier division in Unna, near the 
West German city of Dortmund, repeated Karst and Schnez’s argument almost verbatim in 
December 1970s. Unsettled by the establishment of Willy Brandt’s Social-Liberal coalition and 
Helmut Schmidt as the new Minister of Defense, the “Captains of Unna” too called very publicly 
for the supremacy of the military as a fighting force.697 Yet, conservative “counter revolution” 
triggered a number of opposing responses. In addition to a group of eight lieutenants, who wrote 
a widely circulated paper against the Schnez Study in January 1970s, active and retired generals 
and officers such as Wolf Graf von Baudissin opposed the conservative demands.698 On the one 
hand, critics of Karst, Schnez, and the “Captains of Unna,” still believed in the ideals of the 
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Innere Führung. On the other, the cultural developments that changed West German society in 
the 1960s did not seem them. Openly denouncing the conservative proposals, opponents voiced 
different ideas’ about the Bundeswehr’s true purpose and the very nature of soldiering. In doing 
so, they invoked competing notions of military masculinity.  
 Heinz Karst and Albert Schnez’s statements represented an attack on the Innere 
Führung, directly challenging Wolf von Baudissin. Consequently, Baudissin, who retired from 
active service in 1967 and immediately joined the Social Democratic Party, received a great deal 
of attention. In addition to being interviewed by several newspapers, Baudissin also gave several 
talks in which he addressed the conservative military surge. In July 1968, for example, he spoke 
at the Kirchberg Monastery in Baden-Wuerttemberg. Entitled “The Soldier’s Contribution to 
Peacekeeping,” the talk represented a direct response to the demands voiced by Heinz Karst and 
other generals.699 Baudissin worried that both leading military commanders and a “considerable 
part of society” viewed being a soldier as job sui generis and as a duty that deserved special 
obeisance. They clung, he stated, to the “feudal” image of the soldier as an “‘eternal’ figure” and 
consequently considered any restrictions or critique as a “sacrilege and attack on the ‘estate’.”700  
Baudissin denounced this attitude as unsuitable for modern armies and repudiated the 
claim that young men needed to be more nature-oriented. Criticizing the soldierly image of the 
“nature-boy,” he declared that the Wirtschaftswunder and too much “rationality and modern 
technique” did not endanger soldiers’ combat readiness.701 Given the technical advancements of 
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both the military and society, Baudissin maintained that this argument was outdated. Questioning 
the masculine image that defined Karst and Schnez’s claims, Baudissin furthermore faulted the 
Bundeswehr leadership for interfering too much with soldiers’ private life. Aware of the claims 
that Bundeswehr soldiers and officers had to follow a special moral code, he complained that 
even soldiers’ families were expected to meet certain moral standards, which were irrelevant to 
the soldiers’ military and societal performance. According to Baudissin, the only reason for 
postulating such a “moral purism,” which created an “elitist self-image” was the self-interest of 
the soldierly “estate.”702 For him, the claim that Bundeswehr officers and soldiers had to follow a 
particular set of moral and social rules bore the danger of isolating the military from the rest of 
West German society. 
Several officers and generals seconded Baudissin’s rebukes in various forms. Two of the 
most elaborate examples were the academic works of First Lieutenant Reserve and student of 
sociology, Wido Mosen. As a student of Theodor Adorno and Ludwig Friedeburg, Mosen was a 
leading member of the Frankfurt-based Military-Political University Group (Wehrpolitische 
Hochschulgruppe). This university group considered the existence of the Bundeswehr a necessity 
and wanted to inform other students about security and military politics.703 Yet, instead of just 
promoting West Germany’s military politics, Mosen sought to foster critical analyses.704 His 
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eagerness to reflect on the Bundeswehr becomes apparent in his two monographs A Military 
Sociology: Technical and Authority Problems in Modern Armies and Bundeswehr: Elite of the 
Nation? that he published in 1967 and 1970 respectively. To be sure, in the last chapter of A 
Military Sociology, Mosen criticized the Innere Führung, calling it a “flimsy” ideology.705 Yet, 
he did not want to abolish it completely. Influenced by the 1966 “crisis of the generals,” he 
maintained that without this concept the Bundeswehr could become the “laboratory” of 
“authoritarian” leaders who believed their right to rule and command was not only a political 
necessity, but “ordained by god and nature.”706  
Mosen’s concerns about the conservative surge among military leaders greatly increased 
in the late 1960s. In his 1970 monograph Bundeswehr: Elite of the Nation?, he argued that many 
West German soldiers and officers considered themselves above civil society and the 
parliament.707 One central element of this “elitist” mindset was the “mythical idealization” of 
“genuine soldierdome” (genuines Soldatentum) that demanded particular qualities and virtues.708 
According to Mosen, this myth rested on particular concepts of femininity and masculinity. 
Representing the first gender analysis of the West German military, Bundeswehr: Elite of the 
Nation? stressed that proponents of military elitism encourage the exclusion of women from 
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armed services, because they considered a woman to be less than a man and thus a lesser human 
being.709 Since women were not men, they lacked the necessary “manliness” that enabled 
soldiers “to endure the physical vigor” of military life.710 As a result, the exclusion of women 
allowed for the development of a particular military culture in which “manliness” was one of the 
soldiers’ most important virtues. Addressing the claims of Albert Schnez and other generals, 
Mosen furthermore stressed that a “hate against all civilizing comfort” fueled this ideal of 
“manliness.” Proponents of the idea that soldiering was a job sui generis, he continued, praised 
the ideal of the “hardened fighter” who was “blessed with sturdy manliness” as the guarantor of 
military combat strength and as the “showpiece of the human species.”711  
Though his monographs represent one of the most elaborate analyses of the arguments 
made by Heinz Karst and others, Mosen, and Baudissin, were seconded by acting officers and 
generals. In 1970, the Lieutenant General Gerd Schmückle, who served at the Supreme 
Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) in Brussels and advanced to the position of 
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe in 1978 as the first German to hold the post, also 
criticized the ways that Albert Schnez and other conservative generals linked combat strength 
and sexuality. In 1970, Schmückle argued that the Bundeswehr’ combat strength depended on 
the military leadership, technical-organizational preconditions, and the morale of the troops.712 In 
order to ensure a good morale, the Lieutenant General argued that soldiers had to be sure of their 
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mission. Arguing against the equation of morale and “martial virtues,” Schmückle criticized the 
ways in which some military commanders linked “combat strength” to the “contentment” of the 
troops. In particular, he opposed the idea that effects of an “affluent society” such as an increased 
appreciation of consumption or even “the sex wave” would result in a reduced combat morale.713 
As he thus joined the contemporary debate about the social benefits and drawbacks of West 
Germany’s economic success, Schmückle opposed the arguments that materialism, consumption, 
and urbanization had turned West German men soft. 
This line of argument was also taken up by Lieutenant Colonel of the General Staff 
Jürgen Schreiber who in 1970 published an article in the military magazine Truppenpraxis. 
Founded by the Darmstadt publisher Wehr und Wissen, Truppenpraxis soon received financial 
support from the Ministry of Defense. Because of this support, the ministry reserved the right to 
censor the magazine’s content.714 Schreiber, whose article the Ministry of Defense sanctioned, 
argued that “parts of the older […] generation” still held on to values of previous centuries.715 
Yet, he wrote, since the Bundeswehr was neither the Reichswehr nor the Wehrmacht, the 
commanders therefore had to think in a more “liberal and modern” Way. For him, this meant 
bidding farewell to the conviction that officers in uniform should not carry shopping bags or 
push a baby stroller.716 As Staatsbürger in Uniform, soldiers and officers should be able to enjoy 
the same social life as a West German man in plainclothes.  
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Although he upheld the ideal that the West German soldiers should be also responsible 
and devout family men, he cautioned that his article should not be taken as an excuse for “sloppy 
appearances.”717 Men who served in the Bundeswehr, he cautioned, should be careful not to 
identify with the “bums and scallywags” that dominated the current West German youth culture. 
Instead, they should always display the “proper, clean [and] educated” behavior that defined 
every respectable man employed in the civilian workforce.718 While he disagreed with Schnez’s 
and Karst’s ideas, Schreiber also made it clear that Bundeswehr soldiers and officers should not 
look like male “hippies” and “beatniks” who defined the youth sub-cultures in France, England, 
the United State and West Germany in the 1960s.719 Instead, they should follow the masculine 
ideal of the clean cut, hard-working middle-class man.  
In publishing his opinion, Schreiber—like Baudissin, Mosen, and Schmückle —
challenged the conservative attempt to redefine the Bundeswehr’s function and to abandon the 
ideals of the Innere Führung and the Staatsbürger in Uniform. Representing a variety of 
opposing opinions, they also questioned the masculine ideals that Heinz Karst and other generals 
propagated. As they continued to value the military reforms of the 1950s, they argued 
vehemently against the return to the soldierly image of the hardened “fighter.” Being also less 
irritated by the cultural changed that altered West German society in the 1960s, they did not 
believe that West German men had to fundamentally change their habits and thinking.  
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Combat Strength, Masculinity, and Sexuality: Military Attempts to Regulate Homosexuality 
Notwithstanding these fundamental disagreements about the function of the Bundeswehr, the 
adversaries had one important point in common. The disputes about the problems of the 
Bundeswehr were largely based on the assumption that West German soldiers and officers were 
heterosexual men. The ways in which military representatives discussed the linkage between 
combat strength, masculinity, and sexuality were built on the premise that the armed forces were 
a homosocial, yet strictly heterosexual men’s society.  
As already discussed in Part II, this understanding was addressed, but rarely challenged, 
during the formation period of the Bundeswehr. The continuing silence was due to Paragraphs 
175, 175a and 175b of the West German Criminal Code (Strafgesetzbuch or StGB), which 
penalized “fornication” (Unzucht) and “severe fornication” (schwere Unzucht) between men. 
Following the introduction of Paragraph 175 into the Criminal Code of the German Empire 
(Reichsstrafgesetzbuch) of 1871, the Nazi regime had tightened the law and introduced new sub-
clauses in 1935. Although the victorious allies set out to repeal all Nazi legislation, this particular 
set of laws remained on the books.720 Since the West German Criminal Code continued to punish 
homosexual intercourse or any activities between men that resembled intercourse, the question of 
how to deal with homosexuality among the troops left little room for interpretation and thus 
rarely represented an issue for contestation.  
This changed, however, in the course of the Great Reform of the Criminal Code (Große 
Strachfrechtsreform). Already in 1954, the Adenauer government initiated the revision of the 
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Criminal Code. In 1962, government-appointed Great Criminal Law Commission, which was 
composed of renowned law professors, judges, and parliamentarians, introduced a new draft of 
the law (called E1962). Its content functioned as the basis for all legal and parliamentary 
negotiations until the first revision of the Criminal Code in 1969. These negotiations were 
intense, because the draft was restrictive. For instance, the Commission favored the 
criminalization of pornography, adultery, and “fornication” between men. E1962 called for the 
continuing punishment of “a man who commits coitus-like acts with another man,” “a man over 
the age of 21 who fornicates with a man under the age of 21” as well as for men who were over 
the age of 18 and who fornicated with men who were under the age of 21.721  
The Commission’s final report stated that the criminalization of male homosexuality had 
to be maintained because the “overwhelming majority of the German population sees sexual 
relations between men as a contemptible aberration that is likely to subvert the character and 
destroy moral feelings.”722 For many conservative members of the Commission, gay men 
represented a “degradation of the Volk” (die Entartung des Volkes) and “a danger to our 
youth.”723 As they thus employed terminology borrowed from the Third Reich, members of the 
Commission also cautioned that gay men were already “tightly organized” (straff organiziert) 
and as such could “penetrate men’s organizations such as the Bundeswehr, police, the state 
system, and the building industry.”724  
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The Commission’s interpretation of public opinion was both right and wrong. It was 
correct in stating that the majority of West German society despised male homosexuality. To be 
sure, throughout the 1960s, West Germans became more comfortable with different forms of 
families life and changing heterosexual roles and activities. Yet, the so-called “sexual 
revolution” did not benefit gay men. As Robert G. Moeller shows, West Germans in 1969 still 
believed that male homosexuality was appalling and that gay men were more despicable than 
female prostitutes.725 However, the Commission missed the point in stating that this aversion 
translated into a comprehensive demand for the complete and utter penalization of male 
homosexuality.726 In 1963, for example, the renowned philosopher and sociologist Theodor 
Adorno published an article in the widely circulated anthology Sexuality and Crime: Comments 
on the Reform of the Criminal Code. Although he railed against the “repulsive homosexual 
paragraph,” he also depicted gay men as “frequently neurotic” and the product of an unresolved 
oedipal complex and “extreme identification with the mother.”727 In his views, Adorno echoed 
many contemporaries’ belief that homosexuality was not a crime “but a faulty attitude.”728  
Following the establishment of the Grand Coalition, leading politicians seconded this 
early extra-parliamentary opposition. One of them was the SPD-politician and newly appointed 
Minister of Justice, Gustav Heinemann. In an interview with the left-wing magazine Der Spiegel 
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in 1967, Heinemann argued for the decriminalization of “simple homosexuality,”729 which 
referred to sexual acts or coitus-like acts between consenting adult men. For the minister, the 
prosecution of adult men who voluntarily engaged in sexual or sex-like acts was unjust, because 
female homosexuality was not considered a crime.730 Indeed, neither the 1871 Criminal Code of 
the German Empire nor the current West German Criminal Code outlawed female 
homosexuality. Given this strong opposition, the reform of the Criminal Code changed 
directions. Shortly after Heinemann’s critique, 16 leading German and Swiss jurists proposed an 
alternative draft of the Criminal Code that not only abandoned the criminalization of “simple 
homosexuality.” It also wanted to prosecute ‘only’ men who engaged in sexual act a minor 
“between the age of 14 and 18.” 731  
This turnaround upset officials working in the Ministry of Defense. Since the Special 
Reform Committee invited various governmental authorities to make suggestions, the ministry’s 
legal experts formulated several alternative drafts of Paragraph 175. All of these drafts proposed 
the continuing criminalization of male homosexuality in the context of the armed forces. For 
example, one proposal stipulated that Bundeswehr soldiers who “fornicated with other soldiers 
during military service or within enclosed military bases” or “fornicated” with their subordinates 
could be punished with up to five years in prison. 732 Based on these proposals, the Ministry of 
Defense officially requested the continuing prosecution of “fornication” if committed by men 
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between the ages of 16 and 21. In addition, it demanded a special sub-clause that addressed 
“fornication” between military superiors and the lower ranks.733  
The ministry’s proposal was based on the common conviction that male homosexuality 
endangered the effective functioning of the military. Representatives of the office “Inner and 
Social Situation of the Armed Forces” (Innere and Soziale Situation der Streitkräfte), for 
instance, were concerned that soldiers and officers, whose homosexual activities were 
uncovered, would face a “grave loss of authority and trustworthiness.”734 This would be 
problematic, the officials argued, because it endangered the troops’ “cleanliness,” “order,” and 
“discipline.”735 Describing homosexuality as “perverted” and “contemptuous,”736 the Office of 
the Inner and Social Situation of the Armed Forces thus stated that heterosexual soldiers would 
not accept their gay comrades.  
The Ministry’s demand that a new Paragraph 175 should contain sub-clauses that would 
explicitly address the Bundeswehr received only limited parliamentary support. On February 13, 
1969, the Committee of Defense of the Bundestag met to deliberate the ministry’s proposal. 
Whereas all nine attending CDU politicians voted for the special restriction, arguing 
“homosexuality would poison the climate,” the eleven attending representatives of the SPD and 
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FDP voted against the provision.737 Yet, the SPD and FDP did not oppose the provision because 
they thought that gay soldiers did not need to be prosecuted. On the contrary, they agreed with 
the CDU that homosexuality in the military had to be “confronted.” They voted against it, first, 
because they feared that a special law addressing the Bundeswehr would “mostly likely stir 
public uproar.  […] The public might get the impression that they are many more homosexuals in 
the Bundeswehr than in the rest of society.”738 The FDP and SPD were thus concerned about the 
image of the armed forces if a special law would pass the Bundestag. Second, the SPD 
politicians opposed the proposal because it could “defame a particular minority […] and there is 
no evidence that gay soldiers achieve less that other soldiers.”739   
Since parliamentarians, military, and legal experts agreed that homosexuality in the 
armed forces needed to be prosecuted in order to preserve the Bundeswehr’s functionality, but 
that no special sub-clause should be added, the First Law to Reform the Criminal Code, which 
the Bundestag passed in 1969, did not explicitly refer to men serving in the armed forces. 
However, in order to make sure that the “threat of punishment” was upheld for young men who 
were eligible for military service, the Special Reform Committee adopted the proposal to 
penalize sexual or sex-like acts between a man who was older than 18 and a man who was 
younger than 21.  
Amid the “sexual revolution” of the 1960s, the idea that the Bundeswehr was a 
homosocial yet strictly heterosexual men’s society was upheld. Although conservative and 
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liberal military leaders disputed the masculine qualities that West German men and soldiers 
should possess in order to turn the Bundeswehr into a full-fledged military force, the different 
opinions focused predominantly on heterosexual men and their relation to women. Although 
military leaders, government officials, and parliamentary wanted to early avoid the impression 
that the Bundeswehr was granted special rights, heterosexuality was considered vital for the 
effective functioning of the armed forces.  
2. Controversies about Image of the Bundeswehrsoldat in West German Civil Society 
The military controversy that erupted in 1966, the obvious conservative surge among leading 
army generals as well as the military calls for the continuing criminalization of male 
homosexuality attracted a great deal of attention. The statements by Heinz Karst and Albert 
Schnez resonated not only with several Bundeswehr representatives and conservative politicians, 
but also with a number of Wehrmacht veterans and conservative journalists. Contemporaries who 
applauded the generals in newspaper articles and by sending supportive letters to the Ministry of 
Defense generally agreed that the Bundeswehr was far from being a respectable military force. In 
addition to blaming the military reforms of the 1950s, supporters of the conservative “counter 
revolution” agreed that West German recruits who entered the barracks in the 1960s and early 
1970s defied any ideal of superb German soldiering, which they valued above all else. Veterans 
and conservative journalists such as Hans-Georg von Studnitz of the highly influential 
Protestant-Christian newspaper Christ und die Welt took offence at the cultural changes that 
gradually transformed West German society in the 1960s. They too complained that young men 
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adhered to masculine ideals that were neither beneficial to the Federal Republic nor to the 
Bundeswehr.740 
In sharp contrast, the generals’ claim that the entire social and political system needed to 
be geared towards military functionality greatly disturbed the growing extra-parliamentary 
opposition. Activists such the Federation of War Resisters and the German Peace Society, who 
carried their 1950s protests into the next decade, considered the conservative military “counter 
revolution” as another sign that the Federal Republic of Germany was becoming an authoritarian 
and aggressive state without a left-liberal, social democratic opposition. APO activists of the 
“New Left” echoed their concerns. The Socialist German Student Union, for example, was 
unsettled not only by the formation of the Grand Coalition and the electoral success of the NPD, 
but also by the escalation of the Vietnam War. Arguing that West Germany’s state apparatus was 
becoming totalitarian and anti-democratic, members of APO regarded the military as a willing 
tool that would aid the political establishment’s implementation of a restrictive agenda at home 
and join the imperialistic powers like the United States.741  
In their fight against the Bundeswehr and the stalled political system, intellectual critics, 
students, and peace activists adopted various forms of protest. These forms of oppositions ranged 
from claims to infiltrate the Bundeswehr and destroy it from within to demonstrations in front of 
military bases to the distribution of pamphlets to the publication of academic monographs. 
Presenting various reasons for why the political and military system had to be overthrown, or at 
least radically altered, APO activists responded directly to the conservative military “counter 
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revolution” and the masculine ideals that men such as Albert Schnez proposed. Seeking different 
ways to battle challenge the political system and to battle the Bundeswehr, activists and left-
leaning intellectuals emphasized that military service produced violent male behavior that was 
closely linked to specific norms of masculinity and sexuality.   
As a result, competing notions of masculinity saturated the controversy that surrounded 
the Bundeswehr between the mid-1960s and the early 1970s. Responding to the military “counter 
revolution” and to each other, conservative journalists, veterans, left-wing intellectuals, student 
protestors and peace activists negotiated not only the Bundeswehr’s function and its right to 
exist, but also debated the armed forces as an institution that required and produced certain types 
of masculinity and sexuality.  
Conservative Criticism of the Bundeswehr and West Germany’s “Affluent Society” Society  
The conviction that the Bundeswehr ridiculed Germany’s longstanding tradition of superior 
soldiering was not limited to conservative members of the army command. Such ideas resonated 
with Wehrmacht veterans and conservative journalists who wished to return to military and 
societal ideals of the pre-1945 period. This becomes especially apparent in the widely read book 
Rescue the Bundeswehr! by Hans-Georg von Studnitz.742 First published in 1967, two more 
editions of the book were produced in the same year alone. Born 1907, Studnitz had been a press 
officer at the foreign office during the Second World War.743 After the war, he worked as 
journalist for newspapers such as Die ZEIT and the regional Flensburger Tagesblatt. In 1961, he 
                                                 
742 See, Hans-Georg von Studnitz, Rettet die Bundeswehr! (Stuttgart: Seewald, 1967).   
743 See, Nils Asmussen, “Hans-Georg von Studnitz: Ein Konservativer Journalist im Dritten Reich und in der 
Bundesrepublik,“ Vierteljahresheft für Zeitgeschichte 45 (1997): 75–119. 
 
 
248 
 
became the deputy editor-in-chief of the highly influential, conservative-protestant newspaper 
Christ und die Welt.  
In Rescue the Bundeswehr!, Studnitz not only echoed Karst’s complaints, but also 
proposed some ideas that were repeated in the Schnez Study. His words were much more drastic 
and metaphorical, however. According to Studnitz, the Bundeswehr needed to be rescued, 
because West Germans disdained anything related to the military.744 The Bundeswehr, he wrote, 
resembled a reluctantly accepted “fruit of the womb” (Leibesfrucht)745 that nobody wanted to 
keep or raise.746 Equating West German troops to “unwanted” fetuses or children, Studnitz 
demanded the return to the “great military traditions of the German Volk.” For him, this this 
meant the return to the glorification of soldierly virtues such as “obedience,” “camaraderie until 
death,” “responsibility for subordinates” and “patriotism.”747  
As he thus scolded West German society, the journalist also condemned the Innere 
Führung. In this attack, he juxtaposed competing notions of masculinity. Belittling Wolf 
Baudissin as a “noble appearance and sympathetic dreamer,” Studnitz criticized that the military 
reforms of the 1950s had diminished the reputation and combat strength of the Bundeswehr. The 
“apocalyptic nature” of the atomic era, he explained, demanded “ultimate toughness from 
soldiers” and utmost “Manneszucht” (strict and manly discipline).748 Even though Studnitz 
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acknowledged the existence of atomic weapons, Rescue the Bundeswehr! still envisioned future 
wars as prolonged battles taking place on European soil between traditionally trained and 
equipped armies.749 Yet, the Bundeswehr was not able to win any of these battles, because the 
military reforms that led to an excessive civilian control of the armed forces.  
According to Studnitz, this excessive control became especially visible in the ways the 
Bundeswehr dealt with complaints registered by married soldiers and officers. Referring to the 
1950s debates about how military life endangered the well-being of West German families, the 
journalist was appalled by demands that officers, whose wives were pregnant, should be 
transferred from one military base to another in order to be near their families. Quite vividly, he 
complained that the Bundeswehr was becoming a “rest center for mothers” in which soldiers’ 
deployment depended on “gynecological considerations.”750 If the Bundeswehr as an all-male 
institution was to fulfill its function, it needed to be protected from any hindering civilian, and 
above all, against any feminine influences. In clear contrast to the official rhetoric that had 
portrayed the West German soldier as a devout family man, Studnitz wanted to make sure that 
West German men in uniform were dedicated only to their military life.  
Moreover, Studnitz—like Karst and Schnez—linked the Bundeswehr’s dire situation to 
the deficiencies of West Germany’s “affluent society.” In particular, West Germany’s male 
students were not to the journalist’s liking. They did not display the masculine behavior he 
expected from them. Reacting to West Germany’s student culture and burgeoning APO protests, 
Studnitz lamented that male students did not live lives worth living, because they were 
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dominated by materialistic-feminine ideals of pleasure as well as a lack of patriotism and 
religiosity. 751 In addition to producing academic publications of inferior “housemaid-standard,” 
West Germany’s male students were only interested in “condoms and anti-baby pills” as well as 
texts that encouraged them to “leave the church [and] shirk their military service.”752 Praising in 
turn the old fraternity (Burschenschaften) cultures “of heavy swords and beer steins,” Studnitz 
argued that the life of male students should be defined by physical endurance, simplicity, and 
devoutness. Men who embraced these qualities would not only elevate West German society, but 
also make for a military that possessed the combat the strength necessary to fight off Soviet 
forces.753  
Although his call for a new Bundeswehr and for new masculine ideals was drastic and 
figurative, Studnitz was not alone in his resentment. For instance, in the mid-1960s complaints 
about the appearance of Bundeswehr soldiers increased.754 Concerned contemporaries 
complained that the West German man in military uniform defied every description. Instead of 
representing “strict discipline, obedience, […] as well as inner and outer cleanliness,” one critic 
wrote, young men discredited the entire Bundeswehr with their “slouched posture,” their long 
hair, and unshaved faces.755 The main reasons for this complaint were the hundreds of men who 
brought the fashion ideals of a changing youth culture into the barracks. Over the course of the 
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1960s, a new hairstyle became increasingly fashionable in different youth sub-cultures around 
the world. In France, England, the United States, and West Germany, male “hippies,” “beatniks” 
and “bums” (Gammler) bid farewell to the traditional routine of clippers, scissors, and 
hairdressers and let their hair and beards grow. For many APO activists like Rainer Langhans, 
who was a member of the famous Kommune 1, their “flowing manes” represented bodily 
expressions of their protest against the repressive West German “establishment” which, in their 
view, cherished a shorthaired “idol of masculinity”.756  
The protest did not miss the mark. In the wake of the radicalization of the extra-
parliamentary protests, young men’s fashion statements aggravated a number of conservative 
West Germans for whom short or flattop haircuts, which did not cover the ears and were cut low 
in the neck, still represented the standard.757 Since the latest hair fashion soon spread through the 
Bundeswehr it caused even greater uproar. Men who identified themselves as veterans of the two 
world wars seemed to have been particularly eager to point out the questionable appearance of 
young soldiers. Arguing that a respectable West German soldier had to appear neat—that is, a 
properly trimmed scalp and no facial hair—these men complained that Bundeswehr soldiers “run 
around scruffy, [with] long sideburns and no accurate haircut [and] some even look like 
bums.”758 Expressing their frustration about the many young soldiers who just “bummed 
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around,” letter writers complained that the Bundeswehr was not a school of proper masculinity 
anymore.759 Whereas the “German Landser” had once been the “epitome of cleanliness and 
Manneszucht,” the Bundeswehr soldier had become a symbol for lacking discipline and 
filthiness.760  
As this discussion shows, the “military counter revolution,” found supporters in civil 
society. Critics like Hans-Georg Studnitz were convinced that the Bundeswehr was in a desperate 
state because of the 1950s military reforms and the changing West German male youth culture. 
Arguing that the effective functioning required orderly, disciplined, and hardened men, whose 
determination and strength was visible in their outward appearance, they called for a 
fundamental change of West German (youth) culture and for implementation of particular 
notions of masculinity.  
Left-Wing Critique against Conservative Military Politics and the Bundeswehr in the mid-
1960s 
The widely publicized demands of military leaders such as Heinz Karst and journalists like 
Heinz-Georg Studnitz enraged West German pacifists and peace activists who carried their 
1950s anti-military protests into the next decade. In their analysis of the development of pacifism 
in the Federal Republic of Germany between 1945 and 1975, historians Andrew Oppenheimer 
and Holger Nehring argue that pacifists and peace activists in the 1960s moved well beyond the 
themes of nuclear weapons and the “the social origins of militarism.” Influenced by the 
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continuing anti-colonial freedom struggles and the escalation of the Vietnam War, activists 
focused increasingly on the totalitarian and repressive nature of Western societies.761  
The function of individual military apparatuses was central to their assessment of states 
as diverse as the Soviet Union, the United States, South Africa, and both Germanys. For leading 
peace activists such as the influential Herbert Stubenrauch, who was the chairman of the 
Federation of War Service Resisters (Verband der Kriegsdienstverweigerer) from 1962 to 1966 
and the co-founder of the Socialist Teachers League (Sozialistischer Lehrbund), military 
institutions such as the Bundeswehr were the instruments of states’ external aggression as well as 
internal, social repression.762 Presenting his ideas as early as 1964, he argued that the closed 
sphere of the barracks enabled repressive, totalitarian states such as the Federal Republic to 
bereave men of their individuality and mold them into “interchangeable victim-murderer-
objects.”763 Instead of being the masters of their own autonomous life, men became both the 
victims and perpetrators of state-sanctioned violence.  
Identifying the mechanisms of totalitarian states, Stubenrauch and other activists who 
published articles in magazines such Zivil and Courage furthermore linked military and state 
violence with masculinity and sexuality. While Zivil was the monthly publication of the 
Federation of War Service Resisters, Courage (today: Zivil-Courage) was the magazine of the 
German Peace Society. In doing so, they developed a counter narrative that accused the military 
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and political system of producing outdated notions of masculinity. Writing in Zivil in late 1966, 
Stubenrauch contended that totalitarian states such as the Third Reich and the Federal Republic 
were guilty of persecuting “all forms of life that deviate from the dubious norms of the ‘healthy 
Volksempfinden.’”764 He thus directly attacked the ongoing reform of the West German Criminal 
Code, which demanded the continuing criminalization of male homosexuality and adultery. 
Stubenrauch argued that regimes and governments resorted to this form of oppression, because 
“sinners” who developed a “bad conscience” were less likely to protest against governmental 
politics. To maintain these conditions, governments propagated and implemented restrictive 
moral norms in all areas of society to which it had access. One of these areas was the 
military.765According to Stubenrauch, military apparatuses like the Bundeswehr were the perfect 
tool for authoritarian governments for propagating their masculine ideals and sexual values. 
In denouncing the Federal Republic as a totalitarian government whose approach to 
sexuality differed little from that of the Third Reich, Stubenrauch’s argument is representative of 
the ways many leftist intellectuals and activists judged the sexual mores of both the Nazi regime 
and West Germany. In the early- and mid-1960s, the world witnessed a second wave of trials 
against Nazi perpetrators. Following Adolf Eichmann’s trial and execution in 1961-62, the so-
called Frankfurt Auschwitz trials took place between 1963 and 1968. The trials caused many 
younger West Germans to question the (wrong-) doings of their parents’ generation.766 This 
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coming-to-terms with Germany’s national socialist past coincided with the “sexual revolution” 
that swept West Germany and other European countries in the 1960s. As discussed before, the 
liberalizing tendencies of the sexual revolution led to a growing acceptance of sexual activities 
that took place outside of the traditional heterosexual norms of marital monogamy and 
reproduction.767 Moreover, they caused a revisiting of the sexual norms that defined the Third 
Reich and the early Federal Republic. Based on the readings of the Austrian psychoanalyst 
Wilhelm Reich (1897-1957), a number of activists interpreted the Third Reich as a “sex-hostile” 
regime and the Holocaust as the result of this sexual repression. Having experienced their 
childhood and teenage years—the 1950s—as sexually and socially restrictive, the many New 
Left activists furthermore viewed the Adenauer era as a continuation of Nazi norms. In order to 
prevent the recurrence of fascism, activists and intellectuals propagated what they considered a 
“free and healthy” approach to sexuality.768 
As Stubenrauch’s article already suggests, the theories that described the Adenauer era as 
sexually repressive also influenced the ways left-wing critics discussed military life in the 
Bundeswehr. Between March and May 1966, the Hamburg-based, leftist magazine Konkret, 
which became an important mouthpiece of the student movement in the late 1960s, published a 
series of three articles that discussed how the military dealt with the social and sexual needs of 
                                                 
Society: The Impact of the 1960s on German Debates about the Past,” in Coping With The Nazi Past: West German 
Debates on Nazism and Generational Conflict, 1955–1975, ed. Philipp Gassert and Alan E. Steinweis (New York: 
Berghahn Books, 2007), 11–30. 
767 Herzog, Sex after Fascism; Dagmar Herzog, “The Sexual Revolution and the Legacy of the Nazi Past,” in Coping 
With The Nazi Past: West German Debates on Nazism and Generational Conflict, 1955–1975, ed. Philipp Gassert 
and Alan E. Steinweis (New York: Berghahn Books, 2007), 161–175. 
768 Herzog, Sex after Fascism, 156.  
 
 
256 
 
its soldiers.769 Repeating the common conviction that young men joined the ranks while being in 
their sexually most active age, the author Hannes-Peter Lehmann, who also worked as a 
respected political journalist for the leading illustrated magazine Stern, argued that men would 
naturally seek contact “with the other sex.” 770 According to him, life in a barracked men’s 
society such as the Bundeswehr could aggravate this behavior, because sexual intercourse 
offered soldiers a form of relaxation, entertainment, or “reassurance of their manhood” amid 
harsh military training.771  
Implying that most men in the military were heterosexual, Lehmann only briefly 
addressed the issue homosexuality in the military by contrasting it with the way that the 
Bundeswehr treated women. He emphasized that although West German society had—unlike 
other European countries—adopted the sentiment “Never Again Female Soldiers!,” the military 
was eager to employ women as kitchen workers and secretaries.772 Whereas the Bundeswehr was 
thus open to female civic employment, Lehmann argued, it was eager to weed out all “men with 
feminine sentience” (feminin empfindenden Herren), because gay men were considered “unfit” 
(untauglich) for service. Yet, in comparison to the considerable number of officers who were 
ostracized by court-martials before and during the First World War, the author stated, cases in 
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which gay soldiers in the Bundeswehr had been exposed were rather rare. Thus, he concluded, 
homosexuality represented “hardly a noteworthy problem” for the armed forces.773 
According to him, the way the Bundeswehr treated soldiers’ heterosexual activities was 
much more problematic. Even though West German commanders would not follow the example 
of their Wehrmacht predecessors and take their men on regimented trips to a brothel, Lehmann 
argued, West German men in military uniform would still “seek enjoyment” and oftentimes find 
it in the arms of “amateur-prostitutes.”774 Identifying—as many before him—an increased need 
for sexual intercourse as a natural by-product of military service, Lehmann argued further that 
the military leadership was not able to deal with the situation properly. The major reason for this 
incapacity was, according to his interpretation, the Bundeswehr’s “suppression of sexual driving 
forces” (Unterdrückung sexueller Triebkräfte).775  
Referencing the renowned Austrian founding father of psychoanalysis, Sigmund Freud, 
Lehmann argued that this form of suppression was apparent in the double standards that defined 
the customs and practices of the Bundeswehr. Analyzing military publications such as the 
booklet Soldat und Liebe, Lehmann criticized that the official guidelines only envisioned the 
soldier as a devout Catholic family man who would only choose a “lady” as the mother of his 
children. To be sure, Lehman’s article suggests that he was in favor of a happy monogamous 
family life. Yet, he argued that by focusing on an outmoded Christian-bourgeois ideal, the 
military leadership ignored young men’s acceptable urges to satisfy their sexual desires through 
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practices like “onanism” or “erotic surges of the imagination”776 By emphasizing sexual 
practices—masturbation—that many contemporaries still frowned upon, Lehmann suggested that 
the West German military needed to rethink its approach to sexuality.777  
While Lehmann thus denounced the Bundeswehr’s official approach as outdated, he also 
criticized the military’s daily practices. In contrast to the “naïve” military publications, the 
author argued, the actual drill practices of military commanders ruthlessly combined 
subordination with the threat of sexual humiliation. According to Lehmann, military 
commanders would not only tolerate images of pin-up girls in the soldiers’ locker, but daily 
military training was most often influenced by the “bawdiest sexual swinishness” (unflätigsten 
Schweinereien sexueller Art), because drill instructors did not follow the rules of the etiquette 
books. Men who did not meet the instructors’ requirements had to endure insults that 
characterized them as lesser, effeminate men.778 Because of this obvious double standard, the 
author concluded that young men who needed help and guidance were left alone with their 
problems or faced ill-treatment. In order to overcome this problem, the Bundeswehr needed to 
rethink its approach to sexuality fundamentally.779 Similar to Stubenrauch, Lehmann’s articles 
exemplify the criticism that denounced postwar West Germany as sexually repressive and 
influenced the ways liberal and left-wing intellectuals and critics evaluated the customs of the 
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Bundeswehr. The armed forces represented a state institution that fostered and practiced 
unhealthy approaches to male sexuality.  
APO’s “Battle” Against the Bundeswehr’s “Repressive and Violent” Masculine Culture in the 
late 1960s and early 1970s  
The criticism that peace activists and intellectuals of the “New Left” leveled at the Bundeswehr 
in the mid-1960s intensified greatly between 1968 and 1972 as the extra-parliamentary 
opposition radicalized.780 As Patrick Bernhard shows, a number of APO organizations took up 
the “battle against the Bundeswehr” and military service during those years.781 Peace activists 
like the Campaign for Democracy and Demilitarization and the German Peace Union (Deutsche 
Friedens Union or DFU), which had roughly 300,000 members in 1968,782 were joined by 
organizations such as the SDS and the Social Democratic University Union 
(Sozialdemokratischer Hochschulbund or SHB), and a number of smaller associations.783 Even 
though the groups had very different political motives, pursued diverse agendas, and oftentimes 
disliked and fought against each other, together they upheld the extra-parliamentary protests 
against the political system and the Bundeswehr. 
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Due to their diverse agendas and convictions, APO groups pursued different methods of 
protest, which built on different notions of masculinity. 784 For instance, in contrast to groups 
such as the German section of the War Resisters’ International, whose members called on West 
German men to file for conscientious objection as soon as they received the draft call, SDS 
activists, like the prominent leader of the student movement, Rudi Dutschke, disagreed. In March 
1968, Dutschke called on his fellow male activists who were truly “strong enough” to enter the 
military as recruits to “weaken” the Bundeswehr from within.785 Such forms of protests would 
not only destroy the military apparatus eventually, but male activists could also advance their 
martial abilities and learn combat strategies, which would allow them to support, for instance, 
the liberation struggles of colonized countries.786 Although this approach found increasing male 
support in several groups of the radical Left, it was primarily discussed internally. 
Much more common than the call for the infiltration of the Bundeswehr, however, were 
demonstrations in front of barrack gates and the distribution of pamphlets. One of the smaller 
APO groups that chose this form of protest was the Circle of Critical Soldiers of the Rheingau 
Barracks Lorch (Kreis kritischer Soldaten der Rheingau-Kaserne Lorch). In June 1969, the 
Circle circulated a widely recognized pamphlet with the title “Sexual Training is better than 
Combat Training.”787 In this particular pamphlet, the Circle lamented that military life would 
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negatively influence the sexual prospects of young soldiers. Using explicit language, the Circle 
stated that young men would generally join the ranks at “an age of blooming sexuality.”788 Yet, 
instead of enjoying their prime, young men would become “impotent.” If young men already 
experienced troubles with satisfying their “natural sexual needs” outside of the barracks due to 
the lack of “prudent contraception,” the pamphlet specified, the situation would become even” 
shittier” as soon as they entered the barracks.789 In denouncing the ways in which both West 
German society as a whole and the Bundeswehr in particular dealt with male sexuality, the 
pamphlet represented a common rhetorical strategy against military service and the Bundeswehr. 
790  
Contemporaries who were angered by the way that the Bundeswehr treated gay men also 
employed this line of argument. In October 1970, Klaus-Peter T.—a young student—wrote 
several letters to the Ministry of Defense stating that the continuing discrimination of gay men in 
society and the Bundeswehr was a “disgrace.”791 Arguing that in Germany “minorities such as 
Jews, gypsies and homosexuals have always been tortured through psychological and physical 
terror,” he emphasized that West German legislation represented a continuation of anti-gay 
legislation that had dominated Imperial, Weimar, and Nazi Germany. In writing to the Ministry 
of Defense, Helmut Schmidt, he hoped to convince the minister “to put an end to the pogrom 
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atmosphere” and special laws that discriminated against homosexuals.792 Although complaints 
like Klaus-Peter T.’s represent a rare discovery, his letter shows the extent to which critics of the 
Bundeswehr denounced the military’s handling of sexuality.  
Such rebukes were oftentimes accompanied by concerns about the violent male behavior 
that military life produced. In 1969, for example, the Cologne section of the extra-parliamentary 
group Republican Club (Republikanische Club RC) distributed a short leaflet that juxtaposed 
violent notions of military masculinity with an irenic ideal of masculinity. With the first RC 
established in 1967 by leading left-wing intellectuals like the editor and author Hans Magnus 
Enzensberger, roughly 60 clubs with about 20,000 organized members had spread across West 
Germany by 1969.793 Like the Circle of Critical Soldiers’ pamphlet, the RC leaflet informed girls 
that if their boyfriends went into the Bundeswehr they would not be forced “to visit brothels.” 
Thus, girlfriends did not need to worry about infidelity. However, the leaflet stated that the 
military leadership would force them “to practice killing.”794 As a result, the “tenderness” that 
girls had experienced at the hands of their boyfriends would soon turn into “brutality.” “Girl,” 
the leaflet warned, “if your boyfriend goes to the Bundeswehr, then they could order him to shoot 
at his friends, siblings and at you!”795 As it thus juxtaposed a sensitive civilian masculinity of a 
loving boyfriend with a violent military masculinity, the leaflet assumed that its female 
readership would want to prevent this vision from becoming reality. Using slogans from the 
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American peace protests against the Vietnam War, it asked the “girl” to remember that “[L]ove 
is always better than war.”796  
This kind of criticism was not only directed at daily military practices, but also at 
Bundeswehr advertisements. As Thorsten Loch shows, the marketing material of the Ministry of 
Defense explicitly emphasized the masculine nature of military service and the soldiers’ 
manliness.797 The campaigns that were successful between 1966 and 1968 stressed that military 
service was a man’s duty. Stating that “men are not always soldiers, but soldiers are always 
men,”798 brochures emphasized that soldierly qualities such as “reason, vigor, and bravery” were 
inherently male.799 Building on this premise, posters and brochures further depicted military 
service as an “adventure” and sporting exercise that offered men the possibility to prove 
themselves and their manliness (“In der Bundeswehr stehen Männer ihren Mann”).800  
For left-wing critics, this advertisement was a cunning attempt of the Minister of Defense 
to disguise the true function of the armed forces and the violent behavior it produced. In 1970, 
Fritz Vilmar, a functionary of the Industrial Union of Metalworkers and chair of the Frankfurt 
Conscientious Objectors, attacked the masculine image depicted in military advertisement. 
Referencing some of the slogans quoted above, Vilmar stated that the Bundeswehr was looking 
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for “true, tough men, with highest soldierly virtues; upright men who happily wear their 
uniforms as ‘honorary gowns’.”801 Yet, according to him, the posters and flyers were highly 
misleading: if lured into the armed forces, the chair continued, men would have their 
“independent thinking” replaced by “obedience” and immediately “learn how to kill.”802 Echoing 
the arguments of activists like Herbert Stubenrauch, Vilmar too criticized the military for 
changing men from self-determined, critical beings into docile killers.803  
As this analysis shows, notions of military masculinity and sexuality played a vital role in 
extra-parliamentary protest against the Bundeswehr and the military leadership. The argument 
that the Bundeswehr produced violent notions of masculinity, which supported the repressive 
governmental system, but hurt society, was vital for APO’s battle against the Bundeswehr. 
Whereas some activist were eager to utilize for their own battle against the Bundeswehr, the 
West German political system and Western Imperials, peace and pacifist vehemently opposed 
these notions, arguing that they would destroy family relations, personal relationships and, 
eventually the entire society. While the statements by Heinz Karst, Albert Schnez, and Hans 
Georg von Studniz were clearly influenced by the escalating APO protests, extra-parliamentary 
activists also reacted to the conservative Bundeswehr generals, journalists, and veterans.  
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3. Parliamentary Responses to the Left- and Rightwing Attacks on the Bundeswehr 
The multifold ways in which pacifists, peace activists, “New Left” intellectuals, conservative 
journalists, as well as conservative and liberal military experts disputed the function and image 
of the Bundeswehr greatly affected parliamentary politics. It influenced the two coalitions that 
governed the Federal Republic between 1966 and 1974. Following Konrad Adenauer’s departure 
and Ludwig Erhard’s three-year chancellorship, Kurt Georg Kiesinger became the chancellor of 
the Grand Coalition of CDU/CSU and SPD in the fall of 1966. In 1969, the Grand Coalition was 
succeeded by Willy Brandt’s social-liberal coalition of SPD and FDP, which left the 
CDU/CSU—for the first time since the founding of the Republic—the role of opposition party.  
Central to the military politics of the Grand Coalition were Notstandsgesetzgebung. 
Negotiated since the late 1950s, these laws—as discussed above—extended the function of the 
Bundeswehr, because they provided for the deployment of the armed forces on West German soil 
if internal or external enemies threatened the Federal Republic. In addition, the new legislation 
reaffirmed the gendered nature of military service, leaving men with the sole duty of defending 
the Federal Republic with arms. But, whereas the radicalization of the extra-parliamentary 
opposition seemed to justify the passing of the Emergency Laws, the skyrocketing numbers of 
conscientious objectors questioned whether the Bundeswehr would be able to even serve its 
purpose. In response to this dilemma, representatives of all leading primary parties felt 
compelled to restate their opinion about the function of the Bundeswehr and men’s military 
duties. This impulse was even stronger following the statements by Heinz Karst, Helmut 
Grashey, and Albert Schnez. Their demands for military supremacy, caused CDU/CSU, SPD, 
and FDP politicians to negotiate once again the true purpose of the Bundeswehr. While they 
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reemphasized the function of the Bundeswehr as a “peace force,” Bundestag delegates also made 
it clear that conscientious objectors endangered the peace and security of the Federal Republic.  
In addition to sparking intense debates in the Bundestag, the extra-parliamentary protests 
forced Willy Brandt’s Social-Liberal Coalition to rethink West Germany’s military service. 
Under the aegis of the two Ministers of Defense, Helmut Schmidt and Georg Leber, the 
government advanced the rewriting of military regulations and handbooks. Moreover, the 
government instated several commissions to analyze West Germany’s military policies. 
Publishing its findings between 1970 and 1972, the commission proposed measures that 
fundamentally altered the nature of military service in West Germany and the masculine image 
of the West German man in military uniform.804 As a result, the military politics of the Social 
Liberal Coalition re-envisioned the West German man in military uniform as an educated, 
reflective soldier whose foremost function was to promote West Germany’s and Europe’s peace 
and stability.  
Parliamentary Debates about Compulsory Military Service  
As discussed above, the Bundestag had negotiated the implementation of new emergence laws 
already in the late 1950s. However, the initial drafts of these new laws were unable to secure the 
necessary majority of votes in the Bundestag. Considering Emergency Laws a necessity, the 
Grand Coalition under Chancellor Kiesinger introduced a new draft in 1967 to amend the Basic 
Law.805 The extent and nature of the proposed changes caused an unparalleled uproar among 
left-wing intellectual and activists who feared that West Germany was on a path to a new 
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“Enabling Act.”806 Despite, and to a certain extent because of, the extra-parliamentary riots, the 
Grand Coalition—enjoying the required two-thirds majority—passed law the in June 1968.807 
One of the many critical aspects of the new laws was the redefinition of the military’s function as 
a defensive force. The amended Article 87 stated that the Bundeswehr could be deployed in a 
“case of defense or tension” if the free democratic order or the existence of the Federal Republic 
was in danger. If the strength of the police or the Federal Boarder Guard did not suffice, military 
forces could be ordered to control traffic and support the “protection of civil objects and the 
combating of organized and militarized [militärisch bewaffnet] insurgents.”808  
Furthermore, the argument that West Germany needed to increase its defenses involved 
the extension of every citizen’s duty to partake in the protection of the Federal Republic. The 
new Emergency Laws amended Article 12 of the Basic Law that regulated citizens’ right to 
choose their profession and workplace freely. While maintaining the right to become a 
conscientious objector—guaranteed by Article 4 of the Basic Law—a new sub-clause was added, 
which stated that men who were eighteen years or older could be compelled to fulfil additional 
service duties. According to another new sub-clause, men who you did not render such services 
or services as conscientious objectors, could be recruited for defensive services such as the 
protection of the civilian population if a “state of defense” was declared.809 The amended Article 
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12 of the Basic Law extended women’s duties as well. Against vehement criticism from the 
FDP, the Grand Coalition voted for the introduction of compulsory service for women. If the 
Federal Republic was unable to recruit enough female volunteers for civilian medical or recovery 
service in “stationary sickbays,” the government could compel women who were between 
eighteen and fifty-five years old to render these services.810 However, the expansion of female 
duties was still limited. While women should take care of the sick and wounded “behind the 
lines,” participating in combat was out of the question. The 1968 emergency laws restated that 
under no circumstances could women could be required to render military services with arms.811  
As the new Emergence Laws expanded the function of the Bundeswehr and 
simultaneously reaffirmed the gendered nature of military service, the aggravating left-wing 
activism troubled the Grand Coalition. Representatives from the CDU/CSU and SPD agreed that 
the widespread protests and the skyrocketing numbers of conscientious objectors posed a threat 
to the free, democratic order of the Federal Republic. Before he became chancellor of the Social-
Liberal Coalition, Chancellor Brandt addressed the extensive extra-parliamentary demonstrations 
against the Emergency Laws in May 1968. For the SPD-politicians, APO protests were an 
expression of the “uneasiness of the younger generation.”812 Over the years, he maintained, 
young men and women had come to “distrust” state institutions such as the Bundeswehr and 
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developed a particular “democratic sensitivity.”813 Although he was sympathetic to these 
feelings, Brandt faulted organized, radical forces within society for using these sentiments and 
the extra-parliamentary protests to foster people’s “indifference to life.”814 According to Brandt, 
the function of the new emergency legislation and, by extension the Bundeswehr, was to preserve 
the wellbeing of the Federal Republic and Western Europe.  
Agreeing with the Chancellor, Gustav Heinemann explicitly criticized the growing 
number of men who refused military service. While he had been the Minister of Justice during 
the Grand Coalition, Heinemann became the Federal President in 1969. In his inaugural speech 
in July, he lamented that many men abused the basic right to resist military service.815 Although, 
he stated, that he had always advocated men’s right to resist military service on religious grounds 
or grounds of conscience, Heinemann maintained that especially male activists abused this right 
“with levity” in their battle against state order and institutions.816 Thus, instead of defending the 
right and freedom that Article 4 of the Basic Law granted, Heinemann concluded that activists 
actually endangered it. This behavior was especially troublesome for SPD politicians, because it 
undermined the true purpose of the Bundeswehr. Over the years, statements by leading 
politicians, military representatives as well as members of the churches had redefined the 
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function of the armed forces. The rhetoric that surrounded the Bundeswehr focused on the 
military and the soldiers as guarantors of peace and stability. Instead of fighting wars, the 
Bundeswehr’s function was to maintain peace.817 
This emphasis increased also due to claims made by Heinz Karst and Albert Schnez. In 
his inaugural address in which he criticized leftist activists for abusing the right to refuse military 
service, Heinemann also rebuked the notion that the Bundeswehr’s main function was to win 
wars. He stated that the first obligation of every state, institution and citizen was to “serve 
peace.” Bidding farewell to what he had learned in school during the 1910s and 1920s, the 
Federal President stated, “[w]ar is not the quintessential emergency in which a man has to prove 
himself.”818 On the contrary, the Federal President argued that “peace” was the situation “in 
which we all have to prove ourselves.”819 According to this line of argument, men who refused 
to fulfill their military duty for—in the view of leading parliamentarians—no good reason 
endangered West Germany’s ability to protect peace.  
In light of this nuisance, some representatives of the Grand Coalition did not show as 
much understanding for conscientious objectors, which led to a rift within the party. While 
discussing the ways in which West German men could apply for conscientious objection, the 
parliamentarians who faulted activists more harshly were two military experts of the SPD, 
Helmut Schmidt and Werner Buchstaller.820 In June 1969, Buchstaller repeated the criticism that 
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many men abused the right to file for conscientious objection. Indeed, he maintained that he did 
not want to curtail this right. However, he also claimed that Article 4 of the Basic Law must not 
be used as a “pretext for shirking […] and subversive actions” against the Bundeswehr. Arguing 
that such actions endangered the successful functioning of the armed forces, he consequently 
demanded that men should remember to fulfill their “civic duty.”821  
Buchstaller’s arguments against the APO were very much in line with the CDU/CSU and 
even with the FDP. Supported by FDP politician Fritz-Rudolf Schulz, Minister of Defense for 
the Grand Coalition, Gerhard Schröder, maintained that a country’s ability to defend itself 
depended on not only the allocation of military machinery, but also the population’s “will to 
defend itself.”822 In West Germany, Schröder stated, this will was hardly noticeable. According 
to the CDU politician Friedrich Zimmermann, this lack of willingness became especially 
apparent in the widespread tendency among young men to “chicken out of military service.”823 
Like Buchstaller, Zimmermann and other Christian Democrats implied that “whole” men, who 
were strong, brave and willing, would not object to serve in the armed forces. 
As they thus questioned men’s willingness to fulfill their military duty, CDU politicians 
agreed with their SPD colleagues that many resisters were steered by radical forces within the 
extra-parliamentary opposition.824 In June 1969, CDU politician and expert in international 
politics, Egon Klepsch, cautioned his colleagues against the written products of the APO’s 
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“invidious botch kitchen”825 (Sudelküche). Addressing left-wing claims that military service 
produced violent male behavior, Klepsch maintained that activists sought to undermine the 
Bundeswehr by portraying soldiers as men who “steamrolled women” and “split skulls.”826 
Despite the conservative surge among Bundeswehr generals, he argued that this criticism was by 
no means justified, because the Bundeswehr represented a “loyal and reliable army.”827 Thus, it 
deserved “more gratitude and respect.”828  
Even though politicians emphasized the importance of men’s military service, SPD 
parliamentarians were especially careful not to give the impression that they wanted to reinstate 
the Bundeswehr as a “school of the nation” for young men. This becomes obvious in the 
reactions to a speech that the chancellor of the Grand Coalition, Kurt Georg Kiesinger held in 
June 1969. Four months before the next parliamentary election, Kiesinger spoke at the annual 
meeting of the Bundeswehr Association in Bad Godesberg. Delivering his speech to an audience 
of soldiers and officers, he called the Innere Führung and the Staatsbürger in Uniform ‘old 
clichés’ in need of revision.829 In addition, the chancellor hoped that the Bundeswehr would 
“become a great school of the nation for our young people” who would help to protect West 
Germany’s “external and internal” peace.830 Although he portrayed the military as a guarantor of 
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peace, Kiesinger also depicted military service as a rite de passage that would turn boys into 
admirable men.831   
Kiesinger’s characterization of the Bundeswehr as a school of masculinity caused a 
journalistic outcry as well as an intense parliamentary debate.832 Since it coincided with the 
claims of Albert Schnez and other generals, Kiesinger faced criticism from FDP-politicians who 
denounced the chancellor as one of those “schoolmasters,” or rather know-it-alls who always 
called for heroism, even though they had never served in the armed forces.833 Members of his 
coalition partner, the Social Democratic Party, also expressed dissatisfaction with Kiesinger’s 
words. Especially Werner Buchstaller rebuked Kiesinger’s notion that military service 
represented a rite of passage that turned West German men into “whole men” (ganze Männer). 
Instead of this outdated notion, Buchstaller maintained, men who served in the Bundeswehr had 
to be “good soldiers and democrats,” but nothing more.834  
Although other SPD politicians such as Karl-Wilhelm Berkhan and Helmut Schmidt 
agreed with Buchstaller, their criticism of Kiesinger was rather reserved as long as they were part 
of the Grand Coalition.835 Yet, in his inaugural address on 28 October 1969, the new chancellor 
Willy Brandt implicitly rebuked his predecessor. In his speech, Brandt outlined his new 
government’s agenda. In this context, the new chancellor stated that he would gear his coalition’s 
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educational politics towards the raising of “critical, judicious citizens.” Maintaining, “The only 
school of the nation is the school,” Brandt indicated that it was not the military’s role to raise 
such citizens.836 As he thus positioned himself in opposition to Kiesinger, Brandt’s statement 
also emphasized the SPD’s stance on the function of the Bundeswehr. The armed forces’ role 
was to protect West Germany’s security, peace and stability, but not produce “whole men.”  
The ways in which West German parliamentarians reacted to Kiesinger’s speech bespeak 
the intensity with which contemporaries discussed military service in the late 1960s. Both the 
conservative “counter revolution” within the Bundeswehr and the escalating APO activism 
promoted representatives of all primary parties to reemphasize the value and meaning of military 
service. In reaction to the claims made by Albert Schnez and other, leading parliamentarians 
stressed once more that the Bundeswehr was a defensive force with the purpose of preserving 
peace. Responding, however, to the increasing numbers of conscientious objectors and APO’s 
battle against the Bundeswehr, the government portrayed these “obstreperous” young men as a 
threat to West Germany’s peace, stability, and security.  
Expanding the Function of the Armed Forces and Changing the Image of the West German 
Soldier  
In addition to influencing parliamentary debates, the escalation of the extra-parliamentary protest 
as well as the reactionary criticism of leading West German generals continued to influence 
parliamentary and military politics well into the 1970s. The obvious division of society left Willy 
Brandt’s Social-Liberal Coalition, which took office in September 1969, in no doubt that West 
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Germany’s military politics and structures had to be changed.837 The most decisive factors in the 
reform of military policies in the years between 1970 and 1974 were the first social-democratic 
Minister of Defense, Helmut Schmidt, and his successor Georg Leber. Although some decisions 
to change certain military regulations had already been made while the Grand Coalition was still 
in office, the two SPD-politicians implemented a number of measures that fundamentally 
changed the function and image of the Bundeswehr. In redefining the image of the Bundeswehr 
soldiers and officers, Helmut Schmidt and Leber were clearly reacting to both the left-wing and 
right-wing criticism.  
This change becomes visible, for example, in the decision to devise a Central Service 
Regulation that would fully explain the concepts of the Innere Führung and Staatsbürger in 
Uniform. The Parliamentary Ombudsman of the Armed Forces and CDU-politician, Matthias 
Hoogen had already suggested in 1968-69 that the fundamental concepts had to be explained 
once more and in more detail.838 His proposal to rewrite of the Handbuch Innere Führung 
(Handbook Inner Guidance) accordingly was accepted by the Bundestag in June 1969. Following 
the formation of the social-liberal coalition, Helmut Schmidt pushed the plan to explain once 
again the leadership principle of the Bundeswehr. However, instead of revising and republishing 
the Handbuch, the Ministry of Defense stopped its production and instead published the Central 
Service Regulation 10/1 Hilfen für die Innere Führung. As a type of “persistent command” and 
guiding principle, the regulation was far more binding than the suggestions and assistance 
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compiled in the previous handbook. It also trumped many of the other already existing military 
regulations.839 
The Central Service Regulation, which Georg Leber put into effect in September 1972, 
reemphasized some of the points that Social Democrats had stressed in the Bundestag debates. 
Restating the Bundeswehr’s “defensive function,” Central Service Regulation highlighted the 
illegality of a “war of aggression” and stressed that the soldiers’ main function was “to secure 
peace, which society wants and needs for its own development.”840 Instead of portraying military 
service as a duty related to warfare, the regulation furthermore stated quite explicitly that the 
soldiers’ “service is peace service” (Friedensdienst).841 Even though Helmut Schmidt had not 
urged Albert Schnez and Heinz Karst to resign from their posts, the regulation stood in clear 
opposition to their claims that the main purpose of the Bundeswehr was to win battles and 
wars.842 
In addition to emphasizing “peace” as guiding principle around which military service 
revolved, Helmut Schmidt and Georg Leber also stressed that the Bundeswehr had to keep up 
with the times and the changing West German society.843 Accordingly, the Central Service 
Regulation embraced a set of values that had become increasingly accepted throughout broad 
strata of West German society: individuality, personal freedom, and participation. Although the 
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military reforms of the 1950s had foregrounded these values already, in light of the right-wing 
critique the regulation reemphasized them. Stating that the Federal Republic was defined by “a 
multitude of interests, opinions, values and objectives,” the regulation specified that the 
Bundeswehr—as part of this society—had to embrace these values as well. In order for conflicts 
of opinions and interests to be resolved “nonviolently,” members of the armed forces also had to 
be poised to embrace “rationality,” “compromise” and “democratic decision making” as their 
guiding principles.844 In this context, the regulations stressed that discussion and obedience were 
not mutually exclusive, but necessary for the successful functioning of a military whose young 
recruits had grown up in a “plural” society.845  
The argument that the values of society were decisive for the workings of the armed 
forces also entailed the claim that the military had to adjust its job descriptions as well as its 
training and educational courses to meet the demands of that society.846 In order to find ways to 
achieve this goal, the Social-Liberal Coalition instated three commissions in 1970. In addition to 
a Force Structure Commission and a Personnel Structure Commission, the government 
established a Commission for Education under the aegis of political scientist Thomas Ellwein.847 
The Commission for Education as well as the other two groups submitted their findings and 
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suggestions in 1971 and 1972, which resulted in more than a hundred provisions that expanded 
the nature of military service and re-envisioned the image of the West German soldier.848 
The major proposals submitted by Ellwein’s commission followed both Willy Brandt’s 
credo “dare more democracy” and Helmut Schmidt’s goal to align the Bundeswehr with an ever-
changing West German society. Supporting the demand for a “democratization” of the armed 
forces, the commission suggested the establishment of military universities for officers.849 The 
commission’s report stated, that university training would allow officers not only to gain a 
“broad basic education,” but would also allow them to learn individual responsibility, theory, 
“critical thinking,” “mental flexibility” and “creativity.”850 According to the report, these skills 
would enable men to be effective soldiers. Moreover, men would also profit from their military 
training well beyond the barracks doors. If officers enjoyed an academic education, they could 
use their knowledge as civilians when they retired from active duty.851  
To be sure, the educational reforms were not only intended to benefit the men who served 
in the armed forces. Given that male graduates from high school graduate were most reluctant to 
serve in the military, as they preferred studying at a university, the Education Commission 
argued that by offering young men the option of pursuing an academic career while 
simultaneously becoming an officer, the Bundeswehr would become an attractive career 
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option.852 If the government improved the military’s educational system, more young men would 
be willing to volunteer for military service.853 While thus trying to re-integrate the Bundeswehr 
into a much-changed society and to make military service more attractive for young men, the 
proposal of the educational reform certainly portrayed the West German officer more as 
“academic[s] in uniform.” This image of the Bundeswehr officer as university-trained, critical 
thinkers stood in clear contrast to the ideas of conservative generals such as Heinz Karst and 
Albert Schnez who called for the return to the soldier as a “nature-boy” who did not need to 
critically reflect on his doing and did not need to concern himself with too much technique.  
Moreover, the attempts to make military service more attractive for West Germany’s 
young men and to prevent the numbers of conscientious objectors from skyrocketing involved 
the “fashion” of the armed forces. As discussed above, the late 1960s witnessed the recruitment 
of more and more longhaired and bearded West German soldiers who were unwilling to sacrifice 
their hair for the Bundeswehr. While the Grand Coalition’s Minister of Defense, Gerhard 
Schröder, had issued instructions, which prohibited beards and “shoulder-length or otherwise 
feminine looking hair style,” because they impaired “the clean and neat appearance of the 
soldier,”854 Helmut Schmidt chose another argument against it. In contrast to his predecessor, 
Schmidt considered the question of soldierly hairstyle to be an issue of military security as well 
                                                 
852 Jopp, Militär und Gesellschaft, 45. See further, Bernhard, “Von ‘Drückebergen,’” 138; Bald, “Die Militärreform 
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853 Jopp, Militär und Gesellschaft, 50.  
854 See G-1 Hinweis quoted in Die Bundeswehr in Staat und Gesellschaft, Jahresbericht 1970 des Wehrbeauftragten 
des Deutschen Bundestages (vorleget am 1. März 1971 von Fritz Rudolf Schultz), ed. Presse- und 
Informationszentrum des Dt. Bundestages (Bonn, 1971), 12. See further, Dörfler-Dierken, “Die Bedeutung,” 65–84. 
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as the soldiers’ individual freedom to follow the “general taste.”855 As he sought to reform the 
military, Schmidt issued the so-called “hair and beard decree” or “hairnet decree” in February 
1971. While the decree henceforth permitted soldiers to wear long hair as long as they kept it 
well and clean, it also stated that servicemen “whose work and safety might be impaired through 
their hairstyle must wear a hairnet.”856  
This decision caused uproar among military commanders and in mainstream newspapers 
and magazines. Conservative newspapers FAZ and Die Welt harshly criticized Helmut Schmidt’s 
decision as an affront against military ideals and values. The FAZ published an article by 
Adelbert Weinstein who railed against the newly introduced hairnets as a “womanish prop” 
(weibische Requisite) that had turned the West German armed forces into “military 
caricature.”857 Weinstein’s assessment was seconded by Gerd Scharnhorst who denounced in Die 
Welt am Sonntag that the West German soldier was an enfant terrible who left law-abiding West 
Germans angered or amused.858 According to his observation, the “core of these troops is soft” 
and the Bundeswehr could not produce any form of “deterrence” with “this type of men.”859 On 
the contrary, Scharnhorst lamented, the “seemingly licentious young men in tatty uniforms” 
                                                 
855 “Interview mit Helmut Schmidt,” Stern, April 25, 1971. See further, Dörfler-Dierken, “Die Bedeutung.” 
856 Schlaffer, Der Wehrbeauftragte, 224. 
857 Adelbert Weinstein, “Die Bundeswehr und ihre Papiertiger: Soldatische Existenz heute,” FAZ, November 11, 
1971, 2. 
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suggested that the Bundeswehr was nothing more than a “defeated, demoralized group in 
retreat.”860 
Although one can assume that the aggressive criticism against longhaired soldiers and 
Helmut Schmidt’s “hair and beard decree” influenced the minister to issue a revised version of 
the decree in 1972 that required soldiers had to cut their hair so that it neither touched their 
uniform or collar nor covered their ears.861 Yet, the official justification for the revision of the 
decree did not mention the strong opposition, nor did it mention that soldiers’ hair had caused 
trouble on an international stage.862 Instead, Schmidt cited hygienic and health problems. 
According to the statement, shortly after the introduction of the hairnets, military officials began 
registering an increase of lice, skin problems and infections among the troops.863 Given these 
health hazards, Schmidt decided that the soldiers had to cut their hair short once again.864  
Although Schmidt eventually bent to “health hazards” and conservative criticism, his 
initial reaction shows that he and Leber were eager to make concessions to the changing 
Zeitgeist. Yet, the concessions were limited. This becomes apparent in the reforms of the law that 
regulated alternative civilian service (Zivildienstgesetz). Because of the skyrocketing numbers of 
men who applied to become conscientious objectors, Willy Brandt’s Social-Liberal Coalition 
                                                 
860 Scharnhorst, “Bundeswehr.” 
861 Die Bundeswehr in Staat und Gesellschaft, 11–15. 
862 According to the military attachés in London and Paris, French and British commanders expressed on various 
occasions a lack of understanding for the “wild hair growths” of West German marines. See Anlage 18, betr. Haar- 
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863 “Weinend auf der Stube,” Der Spiegel, May 22, 1972, 79–80; “Die Truppe ist schlampig und verdreckt,” Der 
Spiegel, March 13, 1972, 36–41. See further, Dörfler-Dierken, “Die Bedeutung des Jahres 1968.”  
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renegotiated how long conscientious objectors had to “serve” and how their reasons to refuse 
military service could be evaluated properly. During these negotiations, Helmut Schmidt argued 
that civilian service should take longer than military service in order to cull “fake conscientious 
objectors.”865 Moreover, Georg Leber stated that conscientious objection should only represent 
an “exceptional case” (Ausnahmefall).866 Due to their interference, Zivildienst was extended to 
16-18 months during Willy Brandt’s chancellorship, whereas military service only lasted 15 
months. 
Furthermore, the limited willingness of Helmut Schmidt and Georg Leber to keep up with 
social change is evident in the ways the Ministry of Defense addressed the soldiers’ social and 
sexual behavior. To be sure, the ministers countered the conservative claims of military 
commanders who argued that officers and soldiers’ family and marital life had to be regulated 
strictly. In 1974, the Ministry of Defense annulled the Marriage Decree of 1958, against which 
Helmut Schmidt had already railed as a young parliamentarian in the 1950s. The Marriage 
Decree that had advised Bundeswehr officers and soldiers to choose their wives carefully did not 
fit the reforms of the two SPD Ministers of Defense.867 Yet, these concessions did not extend to 
gay men. As discussed above, 1969 saw the passing of the First Law to Reform the Criminal 
Code, which continued the criminalization of “fornication” with underage men. Paragraph 175 of 
the revised Criminal Code stated, for instance, that a “man over the age of 18 who fornicates—as 
the passive or as the active partner—with another man under the age of 21,” could be punished 
                                                 
865 Quoted in Bernhard, Zivildienst, 261. 
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with up to 5 years imprisonment. This particular sub-clause received as “Lex Bundeswehr” much 
criticism because legal and medical experts as well as a slowly growing number of gay-rights 
activists criticized “that the legislator wants to smuggle the highly controversial special right for 
the Bundeswehr [into the law] without causing much furor.”868  
This criticism greatly influenced the continuing reform process. In 1970, the new Social-
Liberal Coalition set out to revise the Criminal Code and Paragraph 175 once more. The 
subsequent negotiations were defined above all by the notion that Paragraph 175 created 
inequality between heterosexual and homosexual citizens, which could not be justified. Bidding 
farewell to the notion that the Criminal Code had to preserve West Germany’s decency and 
morality, the members of the Special Reform Committee could not find a valid reason for why 
homosexual men between the ages 18 and 21 had to be treated differently than heterosexual men. 
As a result, Paragraph 175 of the Fourth Law to Reform the Criminal Code, which the Bundestag 
passed in late 1973, ‘only’ stipulated that “a man over the age of 18 who engages—passively or 
actively—in sexual acts with another man under the age of  18 will be punished with 
imprisonment of up to five years.” While the Reform Committee thus continued the argument 
that young men’s sexual development needed special protection, they did not believe that the 
West German Criminal Code should make any special concessions to the Bundeswehr. 
In the Ministry of Defense, this development caused some frowns. During the 
negotiations, Helmut Schmidt and his Undersecretary of State at the Ministry of Defense, 
Johannes Birckholtz, cautioned against the radical revision of Paragraph 175, stating that it 
would entail great problems for the armed forces.869 In arguing that male homosexuality needed 
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to be criminalized for the sake of the Bundeswehr, Schmidt and Birckholtz seconded statements 
by the Chief of Staff of the Bundeswehr, General Ulrich de Maizière, who agreed that 
“homosexual activities” between soldiers in the context of the armed forces needed to be 
punished. 870 As a result, the Ministry of Defense emphasized argued “soldiers’ same sex 
activities” could still represent “malfeasance” (Dienstvergehen), even though it was not 
considered a crime outside of the Bundeswehr.871 Whereas the Ministry of Defense adapted 
society’s changing attitudes towards marriage and family, this liberalization process did not 
extend to the treatment of gay men. Thus the comprehensive military reforms of the early 1970s 
defined the West German soldier and officer as an educated, critical, reflective heterosexual 
young man.  
Conclusion 
Over the course of the long 1960s, contemporaries intensely debated the image and 
function of the Bundeswehr and its soldiers. Beginning in the mid-1960s, West German society 
witnessed a conservative military “counter revolution.” Enraged by what they believed to be an 
overburdening civilian control of the armed forces, conservative generals such as Heinz Karst 
and Albert Schnez called for more military autonomy and the reestablishment of the Bundeswehr 
as community of fate and combat. Maintaining that parliamentary politics and society should be 
geared towards the effective functioning of the armed forces, they demanded the social 
valorization of martial masculinities and the return to the soldierly ideal of the “fighter.” 
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Since this “counter revolution” coincided with the formation of the Grand Coalition, 
which pursued the passing of the Notstandsgesetzgebung, and the electoral victories of the right-
wing NPD, a growing number of pacifists, peace activists, leftist intellectuals, and student 
protesters questioned the Bundeswehr’s function as a guarantor of peace and stability. Fearing 
that the Federal Republic was becoming a fascist and oppressive state, APO activists took to the 
streets of West German cities, demonstrated in front of barrack fences, organized sit-ins, and 
distributed numerous pamphlets and leaflets. Because they considered the Bundeswehr  to be the 
prime instrument of the government’s implementation of oppressive agendas, left-wing protests 
against the Bundeswehr focused on the ways that military service and life would influence the 
behavior and thinking of men who served. For the majority of activists and intellectuals, the 
Bundeswehr produced violent male behavior that endangered the peace and stability of West 
German society.  
The multifold criticism fundamentally influenced parliamentary politics in that all major 
parties felt the need to restate their attitude towards military service. Above all, Willy Brandt’s 
Social-Liberal Coalition instated a series of measures that represented a direct response to 
different lines of argument. As parliamentarians declared that the primary function of the 
Bundeswehr was the protection of West Germany’s stability, freedom and peace, all major 
parties were eager to emphasize the importance of the compulsory military service. 
Simultaneously, the Ministry of Defense under the aegis of Helmut Schmidt and Georg Leber, 
fundamentally altered image of the soldier and the nature of military service by educational 
system. Seeking to adapt to West Germany’s changing male youth culture and APO protests, the 
numerous reforms that the two Ministers of Defense initiated, redefined the West German man in 
uniform as a critical and reflective thinker who served in the Bundeswehr to protect the peace 
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and stability of West Germany and Western Europe. This image was built on the notion that the 
Bundeswehr was a homosocial, yet strictly heterosexual men’s society, and gay men were not 
invited to participate in the military’s defensive function. Whereas the Social-Liberal Coalition 
instated a number of liberal educational ideas, they did not extend all the way to the Bundeswehr.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
287 
 
 
PART V 
CHALLANGED MILITARY MANLINESS: THE QUEST FOR A NEW MAN IN 
UNIFORM, 1977-1989
In the summer of 1977, the West German anarchist-pacifist magazine graswurzelrevolution 
published an article entitled “Männlichkeit und Gewalt” (“Masculinity and Violence).872 The 
authors were the co-founders of the pacifist Movement for a New Society (MNS), George 
Lakeyand Bruce Kokopelli. This U.S.-based network was committed to the principle of 
nonviolence and played a key role in American social movements of the 1970s and 1980s. While 
the article had originally been published by the pacifist magazine WIN, the editors of 
graswurzelrevolution thought that the text was important and translated it. In the article, the 
authors argued that “the battle for a world without wars” had to involve the dissolution of 
patriarchy, militarism and “the military state.” 873 According to Kokopelli and Lakey, military 
violence and patriarchy were closely intertwined, because they both entailed a masculine ideal 
that built upon “the oppression of women and homosexuals.”874 Thus, pacifists and peace 
activists had to challenge the military state and patriarchy in order to achieve a state of complete 
non-violence.  
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In closely linking masculinity, patriarchy, and violence in their agenda to establish peace, 
the authors addressed issues that would dominate West German disputes surrounding the 
Bundeswehr between the late-1970s and mid-1980s. Beginning in 1977/78, the masculine culture 
of the Bundeswehr and the image of the West German soldier were negotiated in novel ways. 
During this time, the Federal Republic witnessed once again debates about whether military 
service was still a truly masculine endeavor or whether women could serve as soldiers too. The 
topic reoccurred because the Social-Liberal Coalition of Chancellor Helmut Schmidt anticipated 
a recruitment crisis. Unsettled by the fact that the number of babies born in West Germany was 
declining since the mid-1960s, the Ministry of Defense feared that the Bundeswehr would soon 
be unable to draft enough young men. Between 1978 and 1982, leading military and government 
officials such as the SPD-politician and Minister of Defense, Hans Apel, proposed the 
recruitment women for military service in order to circumvent any possible problems.875  
These suggestions caused a stir for three main reasons. First of all, they faced a great deal 
of parliamentary resistance. Above all, the majority of SPD parliamentarians refused the idea of 
their colleague. Notwithstanding some dissenting opinions, almost all CDU/CSU politicians 
rejected the call for female soldiers as well. In the wake of the federal elections in 1983, which 
put Helmut Kohls’ conservative coalition of CDU/CSU and FDP into office, opposition was 
furthermore voiced by the newly created left-wing, ecological party Die Grünen (the Greens). 
Rejecting women’s recruitment wholeheartedly, Die Grünen stood, however, in opposition to the 
FDP. Even though a fair number of Free Democrats opposed female soldiers too, the party was 
more open to the idea of recruiting women into the Bundeswehr.876  
                                                 
875 Ahrens, “Verzögerte Anpassung und radikaler Wandel.” 
876 Kraake, Frauen zur Bundeswehr. 
 
 
289 
 
Second, the proposals coincided with an article by Alice Schwarzer, the editor of the 
newly founded, popular feminist magazine, Emma. Spearheading the protests against Paragraph 
218 of the Criminal Code, which penalized abortions, Schwarzer had become one of the leading 
activists of West Germany’s New Women’s Movement in the early 1970s. In June 1978, 
Schwarzer argued in Emma that if women wanted to be fully emancipated they had to serve in 
the Bundeswehr alongside men.877 The fact that the West German Minister of Defense and the 
figurehead of the women’s movement pondered the recruitment of women triggered a 
controversy that was largely dominated by feminist activists.878 For example, representatives of 
the autonomous wing of the women’s movement such as the editor of the feminist magazine 
Courage, Sibylle Plogstedt, disagreed with Schwarzer, arguing that the recruitment would result 
in more discrimination and violence against women.  
Third, this activism intensified due to escalating Cold War tensions. On December 12, 
1979, NATO’s double track decision offered the Warsaw Pact the mutual limitation of nuclear 
missiles combined with the threat that if negotiations failed, NATO would deploy a new 
generation of nuclear rockets in Europe. Since the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan only 13 
days later, the politics of détente came to an end and NATO began preparing for the stationing of 
its new weaponry.879 Because some rockets were to be stationed on West German soil, NATO’s 
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plans caused an unparalleled explosion of peace activism. Between 1980 and 1984, more than 
two million women and men organized protest marches, mass gatherings, and sit-ins in order to 
challenge the international decision and West Germany’s involvement in the arms race. The 
protest, which was driven by a union of church representatives, labor unions, peace activists, and 
women’s groups as well as members of the SPD and Die Grünen, culminated in demonstrations 
in the capital of Bonn in 1982, where more than 400,000 people protested.880 This activism also 
influenced the discussion about female soldiers and led to an outpouring of newspaper articles, 
pamphlets, and monographs, which portrayed the military as place where women would fall 
victim to men’s aggression and violence. 
The opposing views focused largely on two interrelated questions. On the one hand, the 
proposals to recruit women caused contemporaries to reconsider whether military service should 
remain limited to men, because of their particular mental and physical qualities. On the other 
hand, the issue led to new arguments about female emancipation. West German 
parliamentarians, feminist activists, and peace protesters disputed whether military service would 
result in women’s complete emancipation or if it would only add to the discrimination and 
violence against women. As they addressed the gendered nature of military service and war, the 
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different interest groups delineated competing concepts of femininity and masculinity that 
evolved around the antipodes of peace/ irenic/feminine and war/violent/masculine.881 
The two foci—the gendered nature of military service, on the one hand, and military 
service as means of female emancipation, on the other—were moreover central to new 
discussions about how the Bundeswehr dealt with gay soldiers and officers. Beginning in 1977, 
the question occupied the broader public as well as the Bundeswehr and the Bundestag. This was 
due to a rapidly growing number of gay rights activists and a few gay Bundeswehr officers who 
voiced their opinions against the continuing criminalization of gay men in society and the armed 
forces.882 At the beginning, the topic received only limited attention in pacifist newspapers like 
Der Spiegel, magazines such as Rosa that were related to the gay-rights movement, and left-wing 
mainstream publications such as Der Spiegel. This changed slightly during the federal elections 
in 1980 and 1983. Eager to improve the status of West Germany’s gay men, the Free Democratic 
Party and Die Grünen campaigned for the complete abolishment of Paragraph 175 of the 
Criminal Code, arguing that it unjustly discriminated against one social group.883  
The attention paid to the issue of male homosexuality skyrocketed, however, following 
the establishment of Helmut Kohl’s conservative coalition of CDU/CSU and FDP. In December 
1983, the newly appointed minister of Defense, Manfred Wörner, forced the Commander of 
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NATO land forces and deputy to the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe (DSACEUR), 
General Günter Kießling, to retire early. Basing his decision on reports by the West German 
Counterintelligence Service, which accused Kießling of being gay and therefore presented him 
as a security risk, Wörner hoped to discharge the General without any publicity.884 Yet, this did 
not happen. The issue quickly made headlines due to investigative journalism and because 
Kießling pressed charges for libel and slander.885  
In addition to calling into question the workings of the West German Counterintelligence 
Service, the so-called “Wörner-Kießling Affair” led to new debates about male homosexuality in 
the Bundeswehr. Whereas Helmut Kohl’s coalition government was eager to avoid any further 
discussion, the opposition—Die Grünen in particular—addressed the issue vehemently during 
several sessions of the Bundestag, criticizing that the affair had damaged the situation of gay 
men greatly. The Greens’ reproach of Wörner’s actions was echoed by various left-leaning 
newspapers who were critical of the government, including Die ZEIT and Der Spiegel, as well as 
by gay-rights publications such as the magazine Rosa. In addition to this avalanche of media 
reports, the scandal prompted a considerable number of citizens to voice their opinion by sending 
letters to newspaper editors as well as Manfred Wörner, Günter Kießling, and Helmut Kohl.886 In 
contrast to the reasoning of the Ministry of Defense and the Counterintelligence Service, the 
majority of West Germans maintained that the way that military treated gay men in uniform was 
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unjust, because gay men possessed the psychological and physical qualities that allowed them to 
act as military superiors. 
In conjunction with the debates about female soldiers, the issue of gay men in the 
Bundeswehr led to new attempts to define the West German soldier—in particular, his 
masculinity and sexuality. Since the inception of the Bundeswehr in the early 1950s and despite 
repeated quarrels, manliness and heterosexuality had been the explicit and implicit markers of 
the West German soldier. The new push for gay men and women in military uniforms challenged 
this dominant construction once more. Influenced by international developments as well as the 
changing political, social, and cultural landscape of the Federal Republic, contemporaries 
reconsidered whether the effective functioning of the Bundeswehr depended on soldiers’ sex and 
sexuality, whether West German soldiers had to be heterosexual men.  
In order to shed light on this development, this part first turns to the ministerial and 
military debates that took place between the late-1970s and mid-1980s to show how members of 
the Ministry of Defense and military commanders discussed both female soldiers and male 
homosexuality in the armed forces. In a second step, this part turns to the parliamentary debates 
and the ways in which West Germany’s primary parties discussed the two issues. Finally, the 
chapter addresses the ways in which members of the New Women’s Movement and the growing 
peace movement reacted to the parliamentary and military debates as well as the mainstream 
press tackled the issue.  
1. Disputes about Female and Gay Soldiers in the Bundeswehr and the Ministry of Defense 
Beginning in the mid- to late 1970s, West Germany witnessed a new round of military debates 
that evolved around the Bundeswehr and the image of the West German soldier. One of these 
disputes erupted during the government of Helmut Schmidt’s Social-Liberal coalition of SPD 
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and FDP and was caused by the Minister of Defense, Hans Apel, and the Parliamentary 
Ombudsman of the Armed Forces, Karl-Wilhelm Berkhan. In 1978 and 1979, the two politicians 
made headlines by pondering the military recruitment of women in order to avert an anticipated 
and much feared recruitment crisis. Since Apel’s and Berkhan’s considerations were furthermore 
seconded by the government-appointed Kommission für Langzeitplanung der Bundeswehr in 
1982, the proposals prompted critical discussions among military commanders.887 In addition to 
internal deliberations, military personnel and experts addressed the issue in military journals, 
press interviews, and speeches. Although these different sources show that military 
representatives were generally able to conceive the idea of granting women some access to 
positions within the military, they still wanted to set specific boundaries. Stating that they did not 
want to see women in combat positions fighting alongside men, military commanders such as the 
Chief of Staff reaffirmed the image that only men could be compelled to engage in combat.888  
Whereas military officials thus implied that women needed to be saved from the true 
scope and extent of military service, this argument was reversed in the case of gay soldiers. As 
discussed in Part IV, Paragraph 175 of the West German Criminal Code was fundamentally 
revised in the early 1970s. In contrast to its predecessors, the 1973 version of Paragraph 175 
‘only’ stipulated punishment for men older than 18 years who engaged in “sexual acts” with men 
who were younger than 18 years. Due to these legal changes, the armed forces witnessed a slow 
revision of military regulations with respect to homosexuality in the mid- to late-1970s. Whereas 
new regulations stipulated that gay men could become soldiers under certain conditions, military 
commanders and military officials still believed that male homosexuality was a “sexual 
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abnormality,” which would eventually threaten the Bundeswehr’s combat readiness. As a result, 
different groups within the Bundeswehr and the military administrative apparatus were eager to 
prevent gay men from receiving promotions and becoming military superiors.  
This particular understanding of male homosexuality became especially apparent in the 
investigations that led the Minister of Defense, Manfred Wörner, to release the Bundeswehr 
General Günter Kießling, into early retirement in December 1983. The investigations by the 
Office for the Security of the Bundeswehr (Amt für Sicherheit der Bundeswehr, or ASBw) and 
Military Counterintelligence Service (Amt für den Militärischen Abschirmdienst or MAD) 889 
were defined by the understanding that gay men pursued their “abnormal sexual desires” in ways 
that rendered them unable to act as military superiors. Whereas military commanders were able 
to conceive of women in the armed forces, homosexuality still represented a threat to military 
leaders. Men’s heterosexuality was considered vital the effective functioning of the Bundeswehr 
and national security.  
Military Debates about the Recruitment of Women for the Bundeswehr 
In the mid- to late 1970s, government officials of Helmut Schmidt’s Social-Liberal Coalition 
became increasingly concerned about the Bundeswehr’s abilities to recruit enough abled-bodied 
men for basic military training. As discussed in Part IV, the number of men who decided to 
become conscientious objectors rose steeply in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Although 
                                                 
889 The West German counterintelligence service was called Amt für Sicherheit der Bundeswehr until 1984. Because 
of the scandal, the counterintelligence service was restricted and received a new name: Amt für den Militärischen 
Abschirmdienst or MAD. See Kirsten Schmalbach, “Administrativer Verfassungsschutz: Bürger unter 
Beorbachtung,” in Wehrhafte Demokratie: Beiträge über die Regelungen zum Schutze der freiheitlichen 
demokratischen Grundordnung, ed. Markus Thiel (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2003), 415–445, here:  426. 
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numbers remained high throughout the 1970s,890 the development did not pose a threat to the 
Bundeswehr, because the number of registered able-bodied men continued to exceed military 
demands. Yet, in 1978 and 1979, these prospects looked quite different. According to the official 
interpretation, the malaise was caused by the declining birthrate. In the late 1950s and early 
1960s, the Federal Republic witnessed a steady increase in the number of babies born each year. 
In 1964, the year that West Germany’s birthrate spiked, 1,357,304 babies—698,046 of them 
boys—were born (live births). After that, the birthrate for both girls and boys declined 
relentlessly. In 1978, the numbers had dropped to 808 619 babies; 409,749 of them male.891 
Although the birthrate remained relatively steady afterwards, an increase was not in sight. This 
development, to which contemporaries soon referred to as the Pillenknick, because the declining 
birthrate coincided with the increasing availability of birth-control pills,892 military experts 
predicted that Bundeswehr would soon face severe problems. 
In order to prevent a recruitment crisis, government officials pondered different remedies. 
One of the most controversial measures was proposed in 1978. Following the almost unnoticed 
decision of SPD-politician and Minister of Defense (1972-1978), George Leber, to grant female 
volunteers access to the Bundeswehr’s Medical Corps as doctors and pharmacists with officers’ 
                                                 
890 Bernhard, Zivildienst, 206. 
891 For a statistic see “Bevölkerung: Geborene und Gestorbene,” ed. Statistisches Bundesamt: 
https://www.destatis.de/DE/ZahlenFakten/Indikatoren/LangeReihen/Bevoelkerung/lrbev04.html (Last accessed: 
January 20, 2014).  
892 In contrast to contemporary perception, scholars emphasize a multitude of interrelated reasons that caused the 
birthrate to decline. See for example, Frauke Brosius-Gersdorf, Demographischer Wandel und Familienförderung 
(Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2011); Charlotte Höhn, “Bevölkerungsentwicklung und demographische 
Herausforderung,” in Die westeuropäischen Gesellschaften im Vergleich, ed. Stefan Hradil and Stefan Immerfall 
(Opladen: Leske and Budrich, 1997), 71–95. See further, Dagmar Herzog, “Between Coitus and Commodification: 
Young West German Women and the Impact of the Pill,” in Between Marx and Coca-Cola: Youth Cultures in 
Changing European Societies, 1960-1980, ed. Axel Schildt and Detlef Siegfried (New York: Berghahn Books, 
2006), 261–286. 
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rank,893 his successor Hans Apel, made headlines by considering the recruitment of “girls and 
women” into almost all areas of the Bundeswehr.894 In 1979, the minister was second by the 
SPD-politician and Parliamentary Ombudsman for the Armed Forces, Karl-Wilhelm Berkhan, 
who lamented that “ten years from now” the Bundeswehr would suffer from a shortage of 
draftees.895 In light of this plight, Berkhan thought it likely that in about ten years “the Bundestag 
[…] has to consider an amendment to the Basic Law so that women too could be trained with 
weapons.”896   
Given that the Bundeswehr’s faced also enormous financial problems, the Ministry of 
Defense appointed the Commission for Long-term Planning of the Bundeswehr. Composed of 
sixteen Bundeswehr commanders and government officials—including generals, 
undersecretaries, and service chiefs—the commission estimated in 1982 that the Bundeswehr 
would soon be lacking soldiers: 200,000 soldiers per birth cohort until 1995.897 In order to 
compensate this development, the Commission pondered different solutions. In addition to 
deliberating over an extension of the time that male draftees spent in the armed forces and the 
recruitment of “foreigners” (Ausländer) who had lived in Germany for some time and proved 
                                                 
893 See Bea Wildt, “Wir sagen: Nein! Unterrichtserfahrung zum Thema ‘Frauen in der Bundeswehr,’” Die Frauen in 
der Geschichte, vol. 5, ‘Das Schicksal Deutschlands liegt in der Hand seiner Frauen’: Frauen in der Deutschen 
Nachkriegsgeschichte , ed. Anna-Elisabeth Freier and Annette Kuhn (Düsseldorf: Schwamm, 1984), 445–469. 
894 “Amazonen-Armee?,“ DIE ZEIT, September 22, 1978, 1.  
895 “Bundeswehr: Dummes Zeug,” Der Spiegel, August 27, 1979, 32–34.  
896 Ibid. 
897 “Die Vorneverteidigung wird schwieriger werden,” CDU-Dokumentation, August 19, 1982, 1–8. 
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themselves loyal, recruiting female volunteers seemed another viable option.898 Similar to the 
Minister of Defense’s first proposal, the Commission suggested that vacant staff position should 
be filled with women.899  
Although the Ministry of Defense considered the recruitment of women as a remedy 
against structural problems, Hans Apel also praised women’s military service as a way to “break 
up the last bastion of men.”900 According to him, the recruitment of women into the armed forces 
represented another steppingstone for women’s emancipation and equal treatment. In doing so, 
the Minister of Defense was clearly influenced by the feminist activist Alice Schwarzer, who 
argued for women’s service in the Bundeswehr. Although she expressed her utter averseness to 
military service and the military apparatus, she nonetheless stated that female recruitment was 
vital to women’s complete emancipation.901 Although their attitudes towards military service and 
the Bundeswehr differed, the arguments presented by Schwarzer and Apel were similar.  
Notwithstanding Apel’s eagerness, the ministry wanted to ensure that women’s advances 
into the “the last bastion of men” were voluntary. For Apel, women’s roles and function in 
society did not allow the government to draft women into the military. In the late 1970s and early 
1980s, the ministry received hundreds of letters asking about women’s military service. In 
January 1979, for example, Apel received a letter from a middle school girl who thought it unjust 
that only young men were forced to render military service. In response to this letter, he 
                                                 
898 See Ekkehard Lippert and Tjarck Rössler, “Weibliche Soldaten für die Bundeswehr? Zur öffentlichen Diskussion 
eines Personalproblems,” Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte B8 (1981): 15–21. 
899 Fieseler and Ladwig, “Women and the Peace Movement,” 62. 
900 Kraake, Frauen, 177–178;  
901 Schwarzer, “Frauen in die Bundeswehr?,” Emma 6 (1978): 5. See also Lenz, Die Neue Frauenbewegung, 817–
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addressed women’s “double burden” and how it put women at a disadvantage: “Being a mother 
and pursuing very often at the same time a profession is a double-role that women and girls have 
to carry.”902 In light of this lot, he considered it “unjust” to burden women with even more 
“troubles”903 and, consequently, he did not want to introduce compulsory military service for 
women.  
In addition to not wanting to draft women into the armed forces, the minister did not dare 
to consider women as part of combat units handling weapons and killing combatants. For Apel 
and his staff, using weapons violated women’s nature. This becomes clear in some of the 
ministry’s internal documents. Before mailing an official response, the staff of the Minister of 
Defense generally devised several drafts. These drafts had to be rubber-stamped before an 
official letter could be sent out. Many of the initial drafts indicate that Apel and his staff believed 
that military service with weapons conformed neither to women’s “feminine nature” because of 
the “physical burden,” nor to “the woman’s dignity.”904 In their view, carrying weapons, 
engaging in combat, and thus killing an opponent were activities that only a man should endure.  
Interestingly, however, many of the final letters that the ministry eventually sent out 
omitted this understanding. For example, the ministry received another letter in July 1979 asking 
why compulsory military service applied to men only. The ministry’s official letter informed the 
addressee that the Basic Law prohibited women’s compulsory and armed military service. The 
official letter assured its reader that “this decision had nothing to do with discrimination; at least 
                                                 
902 Monika B. to Hans Apel, 19 January 1979 and Apel’s response, 6 February 1979. BArch F, BW I/113868.  
903 Ibid.  
904 See for example drafts of letters in response to a letter by Iris B., 6 and 9 July 1979. BArch F, BW I/113868.  
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this is evident in the debates about the issue that took place back then.”905 The fact that the 
ministry was careful not to address issues such as women’s nature or dignity explicitly in their 
official responses suggest that they were greatly influenced by the heated extra-parliamentary 
debates about women’s role and status in society. Eager to not say anything that critics of the 
Bundeswehr could hold against them, invoking the Basic Law and the legal debates of the 1940s 
and 50s seemed to represent a safe bet for the Ministry of Defense.  
As the case of Karl-Wilhlem Berkhan shows, this was a wise decision. Initially, the SPD-
politicians and Parliamentary Ombudsman of the Armed Forces had pondered the revision of the 
Basic Law so that women could be recruited for armed military service. After all, Article 12 of 
the Basic Law stated that women could not be compelled to render service in the armed forces 
and prohibited women’s employment for armed military service. Berkhan’s deliberations 
triggered a public outcry. In addition to numerous television reports and newspaper articles, 
peace activists and women’s groups immediately rallied against his proposal.906 Although 
women could join the military voluntary and the Bundeswehr accepted women as secretaries and 
kitchen helps as well as doctors and pharmacists in the medical corps, women’s armed military 
service was out of the questions. The outcry was so overwhelming that the Ombudsman soon 
                                                 
905 See the final letter that was sent to Iris B., 13 July 1979. BArch F, BW I/113868. In 1978, the ministry still sent 
more letters stating that armed military service was against “the woman’s dignity.” See for example, letter to C. P., 
26 October 1978. BArch F, BW I/114692. 
906 Achim Schneider, “Politische und gesellschaftliche Aspekte einer generellen Öffnung der deutschen Streitkräfte 
für weibliche Soldaten,” in Frauen im militärischen Waffendienst: Rechtliche, politische, soziologische und 
militärische Aspekte des Einsatzes von Frauen in den Streitkräften unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der 
Deutschen Bundeswehr und des Österreichischen Bundesheers, ed. Armin Steinkamm (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 
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retracted his statement, qualifying that he himself did not want to change the Basic Law, but that 
it might become necessary if the government planned to recruit women.907 
The proposals issued by Hans Apel, Karl-Wilhelm Berkhan, and the Commission for 
Long-Term Planning prompted several Bundeswehr commanders to voice their opinion. One of 
them was General Jürgen Brandt. After serving as the West German military representative in 
NATO’s Military Committee in Brussels, he returned to Bonn in 1978 to serve as the 
Bundeswehr’s Chief of Staff until his retirement in 1983. In an interview with Der Spiegel in 
October 1979, Brandt embraced the idea of recruiting more female staff into the armed forces.908 
In addition to justifying his opinion with the positive experience, he had had with the female 
doctors and pharmacists in the medical corps, Brandt emphasized that other European armies had 
successfully recruited women into their armed forces and the Bundeswehr should follow suit.  
Notwithstanding his openness, the Chief of Staff did not want to see women serving in 
the same capacity as men did. To be sure, Brandt accepted the idea of “nice looking” female 
medical officers who took care of their male comrades and thus conformed to the traditional 
feminine roles as caretakers. Yet he did not support the idea that women should be trained to use 
weapons or should be deployed in military combat missions. Unable to “give rational reasons” 
for his opinion,909 the Chief of Staff stated in 1979 and again in 1982 that he was “too 
                                                 
907 “Bundeswehr: Dummes Zeug.” 
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antiquated” to imagine women killing other people in battle. He experienced, as he stated, “an 
emotional barrier” in this respect.910  
This split opinion was representative of many Bundeswehr representatives who addressed 
the issues in lengthy journal articles and interviews. In 1984, for example, the semi-official and 
scientific military journal Europäische Wehrkunde: Wehrwissenschaftliche Rundschau published 
an article by Captain Lieutenant Peter Rösch, who had studied at the Bundeswehr University in 
Hamburg. According to Rösch, women would most certainly be efficient soldiers even if their 
“physical strength” did not equal that of men. After all, he maintained, many of the positions and 
assignments in modern armies did not require extraordinary bodily strength.911 Thus, modern 
warfare and modern military apparatuses enabled military experts to consider the recruitment of 
women whom they otherwise would have considered unfit for military service. 
In addition to addressing the physical abilities contemporaries traditionally associated 
with male soldiers, Rösch also tackled the mental and intellectual qualities that the military 
deemed important. In his article, he maintained that women generally put a great deal of 
emphasis on “community” and “solidarity.”912 In the context of the military these traits were 
named differently. In the Bundeswehr and other armies, they were valued as a form of 
camaraderie or esprit de corps. Whereas women generally possessed these qualities, the Captain 
Lieutenant argued, men focused generally more on “individuality” and their “personal 
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advantage.”913 Consequently, one of first lesson that military superiors had to teach new male 
recruits was a lesson in camaraderie. In the case of female recruits, he concluded, this would not 
be necessary. In contrast to predominant descriptions that defined camaraderie as traditionally 
and exclusively masculine, Rösch described group cohesion as a feminine trait, which allowed 
him to consider women as effective soldiers.914  
In spite of these advantages, military commentators also saw various reasons for why 
female soldiers could prove to be a challenge. In 1983, Lieutenant Colonel Dieter Farwick, a 
close aide to the newly appointed CDU Minister of Defense Klaus Wörner, discussed the pros 
and cons of female soldiers. According to him, women were less as desirable soldiers because of 
West Germany’s traditional gender roles.915 In his analysis, Farwick questioned whether the 
male partners of female soldiers would be willing to understand the demands of the military. 
“Will he change his civilian workplace,” Farwick asked, “in order to follow her?”916 To be sure, 
he argued, such problems existed already for male soldiers and officers. After all, more and more 
women joined the civilian labor force and were unwilling to follow their male partners. Yet 
because of the ways that society defined the roles of men and women, the “occupational 
advancement of the man still takes precedence over the contributing female partner” 
                                                 
913 Ibid.  
914 For a discussion of “masculine” and “feminine” connotations of camaraderie in the Wehrmacht, see Thomas 
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(mitarbeitende Partnerin).917 Emphasizing that families in which men were the main 
breadwinner still represented the West German standard, he concluded that female soldier were 
less reliable.918 In contrast to previous discussions, Farwick’s argument was not based on an 
interpretation of women’s nature and dignity. Influenced by the contemporary political debates 
about motherhood and women’s role in society, he considered women’s social roles that society 
attributed to them. 
 Only a few commanding officers moved beyond this argument. In 1983, Colonel 
Jannsjörn Boës sent a letter to the editors of Europäische Wehrkunde arguing that female soldiers 
were a necessity. Boës, who had worked in the Ministry of Defense under the aegis Hans Apel, 
maintained that the Bundeswehr had to recruit women if it did not want to shrink in size.919 He 
reiterated the arguments of Apel, Berkhan and the Commission for Long-Term Planning, the 
Colonel and added that the heightened tensions between NATO and the Soviet Bloc Federal left 
the government without a choice. If Chancellor Kohl’s government did not recruit women, Boës 
maintained, the Bundeswehr would no longer be able to function as deterrent. Although he thus 
argued that the Cold War demanded female soldiers,920 he cautioned that it was unreasonable to 
recruit women immediately. After all, the Basic Law still prohibited women’s armed services 
                                                 
917 Ibid. For the development of the male-breadwinner model in West Germany see for example,  Kolbe, 
Elternschaft, 376–394; Ursula Münch, Familienpolitik in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Maßnahmen, Defizite, 
Organisation familienpolitischer Staatstätigkeit (Freiburg: Lambertus, 1990); Bettina Paetzold, “Eines ist zu wenig, 
beides macht zufrieden”: Die Vereinanbarkeit von Mutterschaft und Berufstätigkeit (Bielefeld: Kleine, 1996). For 
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even “for self-protection.”921 In conclusion, he argued for changing the Basic Law so that female 
soldiers could defend themselves.922 
Boës’ and other statements bear testimony to the willingness of some military 
commanders to considered women in military uniforms. However, even these considerations had 
their limits. Whereas military leaders could envision female soldiers and officers, they refrained 
from considering women in arms and as members of combat units.923 Although a few 
acknowledged that women could be attacked in any position and should therefore be able to 
defend themselves, such a scenario was described in rather passive terms. The active part of 
using weapons in order to fight back and kill enemy forces was still considered a masculine act. 
Thus, the masculine image of the West German soldiers was only challenged marginally. A far 
more threatening challenge seem to have been the demand of an equal inclusion of gay soldiers 
and officers. 
Gay Soldiers and Officers in the Bundeswehr: Debates and Policies  
Similar to the discussions about female soldiers, the ways in which military commanders 
considered gay soldiers changed too. But, these changes were even more limited. As stated 
before, Paragraph 175 of the West German Criminal Code was fundamentally revised in 1973. It 
now stated that ‘only’ men who were older than eighteen years and engaged—actively or 
passively—in “sexual activities” with men who were younger than eighteen years could be 
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punished with up to five years in prison.924 Although the revision of the Criminal Code 
drastically reduced the threat of punishment for gay men, this liberalization did not extent to the 
Bundeswehr. Given that high-ranking officials in the early-1970s still considered homosexuality 
to be an “abnormality” that, if not sanctioned, would endanger the effective functioning of the 
Bundeswehr, military regulations still stipulated that gay men should be barred from serving in 
the armed forces. One of the regulations was the Central Service Regulation 46/1 (ZDv 46/1), 
which structured, for example, the ways in which medical examination of draftees were 
conducted in order to determine whether they were fit for military service.925 The versions of the 
ZDv 46/1 that were printed between 1970 and 1972 still classified homosexuality as a personality 
trait that could render a man permanently unfit for military service (dauernd untauglich). The 
ZDv 46/1 of August 1971, for example, listed “severe psychopathy (also sexual perversion, lack 
of sociability, alcoholism…)” as reasons for a man’s disqualification.926 
Over the course of the mid- to late-1970s ZDv 46/1 was revised, however. In contrast to 
the previous editions, Section Five—“Assessment of Mental Capability”—of the new 1977 ZDv 
46/1 included a lengthy discussion of homosexuality. To be sure, the new regulation still 
associated homosexuality with “neurosis” and “psychopathy,” just like previous versions had 
done. Yet according to the new edition, homosexuality did not necessarily render a man unfit for 
                                                 
924 See Part IV.  
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service. It was not important, the regulation noted, whether a soldier actually ‘suffered’ from 
such conditions as long as he was “adaptable,” “efficient,” able to work in a team and able to 
work under pressure and in stressful situations.927 It “matters little if a man had on occasion 
same-sex contacts,” the regulation specified. It was more important for the medical examiner to 
investigate if a man “is able to integrate himself into a men’s society despite his sexual 
abnormality.”928 The medical examiner should assume a “sexual deviation” and declare a man 
unfit for service only if the patient was driven by his “abnormal sexuality” and not able to live 
among other men.929 Even though military regulations still considered male homosexuality 
“abnormal,” this was no longer a reason to exclude men from basic military training.  
This assessment would not hold true, however, for officers. Between 1976 and 1979, the 
Federal Administrative Court’s First Senate responsible for issues relating to military service 
rendered judgments, which stated that “homosexual dispositions” would preclude the promotion 
of “a military superior—notably of an officer.”930 The 1979 verdict came about, because a 
plaintiff, who wanted to promote the emancipation of gay men and did not accept the argument 
that gay man could not be military superiors, sought to bring about a court decision. The senate’s 
verdicts were influenced by three major considerations. Headed by Federal Judge Jürgen 
Saalmann, who had been appointed to the position in 1972, the senate explained first that gay 
men could not function as military superiors because they viewed their subordinates as “possible 
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sexual partners.” Attributing to gay men a greater sex drive than heterosexual men, the senate 
maintained that officers’ behavior towards their subalterns could be “influenced by unobjective, 
namely sexual motives.”931 Second, the senate maintained that if the homosexual tendencies of a 
military superior became known, this could lead to “gossip” and “suspicions,” because “in men’s 
societies such as the Bundeswehr homosexuality is predominantly not accepted.”932 However, 
the senate saw no reason for the military to counteract such an attitude. An attempt to foster the 
emancipation of gay men, the judges cautioned, would eventually “weaken the combat strength 
of the troops and thus compromise their defense mission.”933 Finally, the Federal Administrative 
Court’s First Senate was displeased with the petitioner’s decision to report his homosexual 
tendencies in an attempt to “publicly” promote the emancipation of homosexuals.” Without 
giving any further information, the verdict stated that the man’s “blatant exhibition” of his 
homosexuality was unacceptable.934  
Notwithstanding these decisions, the treatment of gay officers was not always consistent 
as the case of the gay Captain Michael L. shows. Born in 1944, L. had joined the Bundeswehr 
voluntarily at the age of 17. Being eager and apt, he became the youngest Staff Sergeant of the 
army only 4 years later.935 Since the spring of 1974, he served as a company commander and 
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934 Ibid. 
935 See “Berufliches,” Der Spiegel, July 6, 1981, 176. While the draft applied only to men who were eighteen years 
and older, the Wehrpflichtgesetz stipulated that men who were seventeen years and older could volunteer for military 
service.  
 
 
309 
 
was responsible for the basic training of so-called ABC-Abwehrsoldaten.936 According to a 1979 
evaluation of the company, Michael L. was a “resolute, strong-willed officer.”937 More 
importantly, the evaluation stated that the captain possessed “natural authority,” was 
“comradely” and “thus fully accepted by the [soldierly] community.”938 Michael L. thus 
represented a fully integrated, successful functioning military superior who was accepted by his 
equals and subordinates.  
Despite his success, L. requested in December 1979 to be treated at the military hospital 
in Hamburg and retire from active duty. According to his statement, his condition was caused by 
the “Minister of Defense’s attitude towards homosexuals” and the continuing unclear status of 
gay soldiers and officers.939 Although sources do not clearly show to what extent his sexual 
preferences were known prior to 1979, he revealed his homosexuality to his military superior and 
the medical examiner that year.940 At first, L.’s retirement request was not granted. Following the 
necessary medical examination, the responsible doctor concluded in February 1980 that he was 
“fully fit” for military service. Due to this decision, which stood in stark contrast to the verdict of 
the Federal Administrative Court’s First Senate from October 1979, Michael L. was sent back to 
lead his company.941  
                                                 
936 The term refers to military personnel responsible for defensive measures against an attack with nuclear, 
biological or chemical weapons (NBC).  
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By L.’s own account, the very different evaluation of homosexuality in the Bundeswehr 
caused his health to decline further and he was eventually sent back to the hospital. This time, his 
brigade's commander questioned whether the gay captain was truly fit for active service and 
requested a second medical examination.942 Written in September 1980—only 7 months after the 
first examination—the second report marked him “permanently unfit for service.”943 Since this 
decision was “significant” for Michael L.’s career, the military’s staff department arranged for a 
“decisive expert opinion” (Obergutachten) and the captain was transferred to the military 
hospital in Koblenz in January 1981.944 For L., the result of this decisive examination was 
shattering. The responsible medic at the military hospital diagnosed the captain with 
“psychopathy” and “neurotic aberration” (depressive neurosis).945 These were the two medical 
conditions that ZDv 46/1 associated with homosexuality and listed as conditions that would 
render a man unfit for military service. Because of this expert opinion, the Ministry of Defense 
sent Michael L. into early retirement in the summer of 1981.  
Although the captain himself had requested his retirement in 1979, he probably did not 
aspire to leave the Bundeswehr classified as a neurotic psychopath. Released from duty, the 
Michael L. expanded his advocacy for gay rights. While he had already tried to call attention to 
the discrimination against gay men in the West German armed forces during the months he was 
                                                 
942 Der Bundesminister der Verteidigung, P II 5, 7 Januar 1981. BArch F, BW 1, fol. 115011.  
943 Ibid. 
944 Ibid. 
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examined in Hamburg and Koblenz,946 he became more active in the wake of his retirement. 
First, he joined the FDP, because the Free Democrats were one of the only primary parties in the 
late 1970s that had argued for the complete elimination of Paragraph 175 and had shown interest 
in Michael L.’s case.947 Second, the former captain, together with other activists, initiated a 
counseling service for gay soldiers and their families. The support service was associated with 
the newly founded, registered society Independent Homosexual Alternative (Unabhängige 
Homosexuelle Alternative e.V.). One of its fist initiatives was to open the magnus hirschfeld 
centrum in Hamburg, a culture and counseling center, which started its work in July 1982.948  
As Michael L.’s case shows, a few years after the revision of Paragraph 175 in the early 
1970s, the Bundeswehr had to deal increasingly with the issue of gay military superiors. 
Although military regulations stipulated that gay men could—under certain conditions—be 
recruited for basic military service, this decision did not apply to military superiors. Attributing 
gay men with an unrestrained sex drive military, legal, and medical officials argued that gay 
superiors would weaken the Bundeswehr’s combat readiness and strength. According to the 
military leadership and administration, men’s heterosexuality was vital for the Bundeswehr’s 
ability to fulfil its function. Thus, the West German officer was defined as a heterosexual man. 
This was even more so the case for generals as the debate about the so-called “Wörner-Kießling-
Affair” in the Bundeswehr demonstrates. 
                                                 
946 See his letter to the Ministry of Defense’s official weekly newspaper for the armed forces, Bundeswehr aktuell, 1 
October 1980. BArch F, BW 1, 115137.  
947 Michael L., “Stellungnahme zu der Absicht,” 8 and 11. 
948 Brochure “Die UHA bietet an: Streitkräfte Betreuung”, o. D. Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis, Petra Kelly Archiv. 
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A Gay General? The Wörner-Kießling-Affair in Military and Ministerial Perception 
The conviction that men’s heterosexuality was fundamental to the effective functioning of the 
military apparatus, became even more apparent in one of the biggest scandals that rocked the 
Federal Republic only a few months after Helmut Kohl’s coalition of CDU/CSU and FDP had 
taken office in 1983: the Wörner-Kießling-Affair. As stated above, the newly Minister of 
Defense, Manfred Wörner, forced General Günter Kießling in December 1983 to retire early due 
to reports from the West Germany’s Counter Intelligence Service that accused Kießling of being 
gay. Having served as the Commander of NATO’s Headquarters Allied Land Forces Schleswig-
Holstein and Jutland (HQ LANDJUT) since 1979, Kießling became Commander of NATO land 
forces and deputy to the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe (DSACEUR) in 1982.  
The incident turned into a scandal, because the West German media soon reported about 
it and Kießling—who was enraged allegations and the ways in which the Minister of Defense 
handled his case—pressed charges for libel and slander. As a result of these actions, the 
Committee for Defense of the West German Bundestag was constituted as an inquiry committee 
to investigate the matter. The proceedings of the committee as well as the investigations that 
followed Kießling’s decision to press charges shed light not only on the questionable workings 
of West Germany’s counter intelligence service, but also revealed the different ways in which 
military and civilian personnel in the Ministry of Defense viewed and judged the sexual 
orientation of high-ranking military commanders who possessed a high security clearance.  
According to the records of the inquiry committee, investigations into Kießling’s life 
began because of talks between the Deputy Chairman of the Employee Committee at the 
Ministry of Defense, Werner Karrasch, and two staff members of Office for the Security of the 
Bundeswehr—Artur Waldmann and Manfred Schmidt-Trenck—on July 27, 1983. Although the 
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topic of discussion was Waldmann’s promotion, the three men addressed rumors about General 
Kießling’s sexual orientation. According to the conversation, “Kießling had been seen holding 
hands with a Colonel and that the Supreme Commander of NATO General Rogers did not 
receive [Kießling] because of his homosexual disposition.”949 Having seemingly a good deal of 
knowledge about the case, the men also stated that in contrast to this gossip a recent medical 
examination of Kießling had not produced any proof in this regard.950  
In spite of, or perhaps because of, the lack of medical “proof” was lacking, the meeting 
prompted Artur Waldmann to report to his supervisor at the Office for the Security of the 
Bundeswehr, Colonel Schröder. In consultation with his superior, Waldman requested an 
investigation, because “homosexuality is as a matter of fact a security risk.”951 According to the 
safety guidelines of the Ministry of the Interior, security risks were “circumstances that prohibit 
entrusting a […] person with security sensitive functions for reasons of national security […].”952 
Counted among the long lists of security risks were “grave mental and emotional disorders,” 
“alcoholism and drug addiction,” “compulsive gambling” and “abnormal sexual disposition.”953 
Since the Bundeswehr viewed homosexuality as abnormal, it represented a threat that needed to 
be scrutinized.  
                                                 
949 “Beschlußempfehlung und Bericht des Verteidigungsauschusses,” 16.  
950 Unterlagen der Staatsanwaltschaft Bonn, Bl. 1, Bd. I d.A. BArch F, Nachlass Kießling, Akte STA Bonn, Anzeige 
Kießling.  
951 “Beschlußempfehlung und Bericht des Verteidigungsauschusses,” 17.  
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In August 1983, the West German counterintelligence service called the police 
headquarters in Cologne to investigate, because Kießling had “two addresses in Cologne during 
the 1970s” and “was known in Cologne’s homosexual scene.”954 Equipped with a picture of 
Kießling, police officers began their investigations on September 5 and 6. They visited two 
taverns: Café Würstchen and Tom Tom. According to the final report of the parliamentary 
inquiry commission, the barkeeper of Café Würstchen indicated that he remembered the man in 
the picture, “but had not seen him since ten or twelve years.”955 Subsequently, the police went to 
the Tom Tom where they spent about 5 to 10 minutes.956 Whereas the owner of Tom Tom did not 
recognize Kießling, a bartender maintained that the person in the picture was a frequent visitor 
who answered to the name of Günter and worked for the Bundeswehr.957 Within a day, the police 
officers reported to their superior and to the ASBw. 
In the days to come, the initial findings of the police became much more incriminating 
form. In a first report, the Counter Intelligence Service stated that at Café Würstchen Kießling 
had been “positively identified as ‘Günter from the Bundeswehr’” who had been a “good guest 
twelve years earlier, but had rarely been visiting in the last years.”958 Concerning the second 
tavern—Tom Tom—the report noted that the staff identified Kießling as well: “To this day, 
                                                 
954 See Unterlagen der Staatsanwaltschaft, Bl. 2, Hefter ASBw, 9. BArch F, Nachlass Kießling, Akte STA Bonn, 
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955 “Beschlußempfehlung und Bericht des Verteidigungsauschusses,” 16–20. 
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958 Ibid. 
 
 
315 
 
Günter frequents [the Tom Tom] monthly and has contact with young hustlers for money.”959 In 
sharp contrast to police findings, these statements portrayed Günter Kießling not only as a 
regular visitor of gay bars, but also as a person who would pay to have sexual intercourse with 
young men.  
The newly appointed Minister of Defense, Manfred Wörner received this information in 
September 14, 1983 and immediately summoned a meeting with Kießling. Greatly unsettled by 
the investigations, Kießling refuted the information and gave the minister his “word of honor” 
that he was not gay.960 Following the discussions and a few days respite, the men decided that 
Kießling would retire as planned on March 31, 1984. Since Kießling was scheduled for 
hospitalization, Kießling and Wörner agreed that he would refrain from resuming service until 
his retirement, citing his health as the reason. In addition, Wörner instructed the head of the 
ASBw to stop all investigations.961 
If Wörner’s decision suggested that the case was closed, this was not the case for two 
major reasons. First, the West German press began to investigate the issue, because reporters in 
Brussels were intrigued by the general’s prolonged absences and the scope of his illness.962 
Second, the tenured State Secretary at the Ministry of Defense, Joachim Hiehle, returned to his 
post on November 2, 1983 after some medical leave. In contrast to Wörner, Hiehle did not 
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approve of the idea to stop the investigation.963 According to Hiehle, the arrangement was not in 
line with the current security regulations and he immediately warned Wörner that he—as the 
Minister of Defense—could encounter great problems if this became public.964 Consequently, he 
advised that the responsible staff should conclude the security check as initially planned. 
Although Wörner followed Hiehle’s advice, the ASBw did not continue the 
investigations. Because of the case’s delicate nature, the head of the ASBw, Helmut Behrendt, 
had reservations about the plan to treat Kießling like “any other soldiers.”965 Consequently, no 
new investigations were instigated. Instead, Artur Waldmann dictated a final report on December 
6, which affirmed that Kießling was “doubtlessly” gay and listed various reasons for why his 
behavior was unacceptable. According to the final report, the ways in which the general pursued 
“his abnormal sexual disposition” showed “that he is not qualified to be a superior.” Waldmann 
maintained that “his contacts to the hustler/criminal scene […] call into question his personal 
integrity and official reliability and trustworthiness.”966 In contrast to the initial police report, 
this final version reinforced the statement that General Kießling frequented the “criminal” gay 
scene and participated in homosexual prostitution. Moreover, the report addressed the full 
meaning of homosexuality as a security concern. In light of the increased tensions between 
NATO and the Soviet Bloc in the early 1980s, the Waldmann argued that “homosexuals are 
target subjects of enemy intelligence services.” Since homosexuality was not only ostracized, but 
                                                 
963 Ibid. 21. See also, Rolf Zundel, “Der unbarmherzige Samariter: Wie ein General zu einer Sache wurde,” DIE 
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also outlawed by the West German military, gay officers and soldiers who kept their sexual 
desire and practices a secret open to blackmail and other enemy activity. Consequently, gay men 
who served in the Bundeswehr and possessed a high security clearance represented a great 
national security risk.  
Interestingly, however, the report also listed one way in which Kießling’s alleged 
homosexuality could have been tolerated. According to Waldmann, the security concerns could 
have been deferred if “Dr. K lived in a relationship similar to marriage with another homosexual 
and this person had no security relevant qualities.” Yet since Günter Kießling was “apparently 
promiscuous and up to now unwilling to provide concrete verifiable information” he represented 
a security risk.967 Waldman’s assertion that Kießling would not represent a security threat if he 
lived in a publicly known, monogamous relationship with another man is important. It shows that 
in the early 1980s gay men had no chance of making a career in the West German armed forces. 
After all, military jurisdiction as enforced by the Federal Administrative Court’s First Senate 
stated that gay men were not fit to become military superiors. If Kießling had been gay and lived 
in a monogamous relationship, he would never have been able to keep his position as a high-
ranking general. Counterintelligence officers would not have considered him a security threat, 
but would most likely have dismissed him as a military superior. Either way, Kießling would 
have been sent into early retirement.  
And that is what happened. Based on Waldmann’s final report, State Secretary Hiehle 
requested another meeting with Manfred Wörner during which he recommended that Kießling be 
sent into early retirement on December 31, 1983. In addition, he thought it necessary to ensure 
that the General neither returned to his office in Brussels nor was granted any access to classified 
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material.968 Convinced by Hiehle, Wörner contacted Chancellor Helmut Kohl and the federal 
cabinet to inform them of his decision and plans. After Kohl and the federal cabinet sanctioned 
Wörner’s decision, Hiehle handed Kießling—in the absence of Wörner—his discharge papers on 
December 23, 1984.  
Outraged and frustrated by the allegations and the ways the Ministry of Defense handled 
his case, Günter Kießling filed a motion at the Ministry of Defense to institute disciplinary 
proceedings against him in order to fully clarify the allegations. This request required the 
Ministry of Defense—and not the West German Counter Intelligence Service—to investigate 
whether Kießling had done anything that violated the Bundeswehr’s disciplinary code. 
Responsible for this type of issue, the Staff Department P II 5 and Department for Investigation 
of Special Cases began their investigation immediately on December 23, 1983, by questioning 
Kießling’s staff in Brussels as well as Chief of Staff General Altenburg.969 Reporting about their 
findings on January 14, 1984 the two departments stated that they had found no evidence that 
proved either Kießling’s homosexuality or his “contacts to infamous milieus.”970  
By the time the Staff Department P II 5 and Department for Investigation of Special 
Cases presented their findings, the affair was already all over the news.971 Given the abundant 
press coverage, which alarmed the West German Bundestag and caused parliamentarians from 
all parties to demand “complete clarification,” Wörner was in a precarious situation. As a result, 
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he met with Cologne’s Criminal Police, who had conducted the initial investigations in Cologne 
in late 1983. This meeting revealed that the final report that Waldmann had produced on 
December 6, 1983 was incorrect. Since both the police officers and the findings of the Staff 
Department P II 5 and Department for Investigation of Special Cases underlined the clear lack of 
evidence to justify the actions against Kießling, the Minister of Defense found himself in an even 
more tenuous situation. In order to find the necessary proof, Wörner agreed to a series of 
interviews with new witnesses. Since the story was all over the news, the investigating criminal 
police had no trouble finding new witness who were willing to testify that Kießling was a known 
guest in Cologne’s gay scene.972  
Hearing in the news about the new suspicious witnesses and the fact that Manfred 
Wörner was willing to talk to them, Günter Kießling “lost faith” in the Minister of Defense. He 
was not convinced anymore that Wörner conducted its investigations “objectively,” but 
speculated that the minister only wanted to find some kind of proof to support his false 
allegations.973 In reaction, Kießling pressed criminal charges on January 16, 1984 against a 
person unknown for libel and slander. The investigations that followed reemphasized the ways 
that staff members of the counterintelligence service accepted vague suspicions and reports, 
turned them into irrevocable proof and advised Kießling’s removal from office.  
Given the revelations that all the allegations against Kießling were based on rumors, the 
extensive press coverage, and the proceedings of the parliamentary inquiry committee, Wörner 
eventually met with Chancellor Helmut Kohl not only to inform him about the developments, but 
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also to offer his resignation, which Kohl refused.974 In a letter to Kießling, Wörner moreover 
apologized for his actions and stated that he would ask the Federal President of West Germany to 
reappoint Kießling. The General accepted Wörner’s offer and apology, and the Minister of 
Defense handed him his reappointment on February 1, 1984. Almost two months later, Kießling 
retired with all honors as initially planned on March 31, 1984.  
Notwithstanding Kießling’s reinstatement, the investigating into his private life as well as 
case of Michael L. show, male homosexuality in the armed forces was an important and 
controversial topic in the late 1970s and early 1980s. The two cases show that military 
representatives and government officials working in the Ministry of Defense and in the West 
German Counterintelligence Service considered gay military superiors as a threat not only to the 
Bundeswehr’s functioning, but also to West Germany’s national security. Although recruitment 
regulations in the late 1970s stipulated that gay men could be recruited if they were able to fit 
into the all-male, homosocial environment of the Bundeswehr, this would not hold true for 
military superiors, especially those with a high security clearance. Gay officers were seen a 
security risk, because they had to hide their sexuality and could thus become the targets of 
blackmail and enemy espionage. In the realm of military and national security, heterosexuality 
represented a fundamental requirement for military superiors.  
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2. Party Controversies over Women and Gay Men in the Bundeswehr 
The ways in which the Ministry of Defense and the Bundeswehr addressed the issue of gay 
generals and officers as well as the proposals to recruit women for military service in order to 
prevent an anticipated recruitment crisis also caused intense parliamentary debates between the 
late 1970s and mid-1980s. First, the proposals made by Hans Apel, Karl-Wilhelm Berkhan, and 
the Kommission für Langzeitplanung der Bundeswehr stirred disputes among West Germany’s 
primary parties. The reactions were strong, because parliamentarians disagreed greatly, and the 
friction did not run along party lines. Countering Apel and Berkhan, several politicians of the 
SPD, CDU, and FDP argued that the recruitment of women would result not only in new forms 
of discrimination against women, but also in the remilitarization of the entire West German 
society. In contrast, parliamentarians who supported the idea maintained that female recruitment 
would foster women’s emancipation and avert any structural problems for the Bundeswehr.  
The question of whether military service represented a possibility for underprivileged 
groups to achieve emancipation also influenced the discussions of male homosexuality in the 
armed forces, which gained new political importance in the early 1980s. This was largely due to 
the electoral campaigns of the FDP in 1980 and Die Grünen in 1983. Spurred by the extra-
parliamentary gay-rights movement, the two parties campaigned for the complete 
decriminalization of male homosexuality and thus for the abolition of Paragraph 175 of the West 
German Criminal Code. Whereas these attempts did not cause any stir, this changed after 
Manfred Wörner sent Günter Kießling, into early retirement. While this move resulted in intense 
debates about the working of the West German Counter Intelligence Service, it also caused new 
negotiations about the discrimination of gay men in the armed forces. Even though the 
government and the Bundestag addressed the two topics separately, the question of whether the 
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Bundeswehr should recruit women and gay men evolved around similar issues. Both questions 
caused parliamentarians to reconsider the whether military positions and functions required 
Bundeswehr soldiers and officers to be heterosexual men who possessed specific masculine 
qualities.  
Political Debates about the Recruitment of Women for Military Service  
The proposals by Hans Apel, Karl-Wilhelm Berkhan and the Commission for Long-Term 
planning prompted numerous responses from all primary parties.975 In contrast to the Minister of 
Defense and the Ombudsman, a considerable number of female politicians such as the Vice 
President of the Bundestag, Annemarie Renger, and Herta Däubler-Gmelin, who became the 
chair of the Bundestag’s Judiciary Committee in 1980, vehemently opposed the proposals. The 
two parliamentarians viewed the recruitment of women into the armed forces as another step 
towards the “militarization” of the entire society.976 Referring to the practices of “the Nazi 
system and other regimes,” Renger maintained that women’s exclusion from military service 
should be “part of our civilization.”977 The Vice President of the Bundestag, born in 1919 and 
part of an older generation, thus continued a line of argument that had begun to develop after 
World War II due to West Germany’s rearmament. Looking back into Germany’s violent past 
and beyond the Iron Curtain, West German parliamentarians had argued against female soldiers 
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in order to distinguish the Federal Republic from the Nazi regime and from East Germany. For 
Renger, this principle still held true. 
In addition to the fear that West Germany would become a militarized regime, some 
female SPD-parliamentarians such as the former high school teacher Brigitte Traupe opposed 
Apel and Berkhan, stating that the ombudsman and the minister only wanted to “fill the gap.”978 
Arguing that they would only become “makeshifts,” Traupe complained that women in uniform 
would never enjoy equal rights and duties, because the Bundeswehr command would assign 
women only to “supportive functions.” Although men could fulfill these supportive functions 
just as well, the SPD-politician maintained, they would cede them to women, because they were 
unpleasant or boring.979 As she countered the argument that women’s recruitment would 
represent another step towards equality between the sexes, the parliamentarian asserted that 
military service would only add to the “already existing discrimination of women.”980  
As these examples indicate, Apel’s and Berkhan’s proposal were refuted by the SPD.981 
Since the Social Democrats were united in this position, the party’s attitude would not change 
over the course of the early 1980s. For instance, three years after the 1983 elections that put 
Helmut Kohl’s coalition of CDU/CSU and FPD into office, the SPD reaffirmed this position. 
During the official 1986 party congress in Nuremburg, the Social Democrats penned an official 
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statement. The resolution that would define the party’s peace and security politics for years to 
come stated clearly that the Social Democrats “reject the recruitment of women as soldiers.”982 
By SPD definition, the West German soldier was and remained a man.  
Similar to the SPD, the majority of CDU/CSU politicians also repudiated the recruitment 
of women for military service. For instance, a number of parliamentarians such as the leader of 
the CDU’s Women’s Union, Helga Wex, argued that women should be allowed to join the armed 
forces voluntarily, especially if it would avert the Bundeswehr’s recruitment crisis.983 Yet, 
according her and the majority of her colleagues, compulsory military service was out of the 
question. Women, Wex argued, already contributed to society by “giving birth and by raising 
children” and these contributions did not “rank behind the military service of men.”984 
Countering the arguments that women should contribute to society in the same ways as men, 
Wex’s standpoint resembled the party’s family and social politics. Emphasizing the “soft power” 
of family and motherhood, CDU/CSU continuously stressed women’s role in the family and as 
mothers.985 In this context, Wex and Heiner Geißler, who became the Minister for Youth, Family 
and Health in 1983, also disapproved of women’s weapon training. After all, women as armed 
combatants contradicted their vision of women as caretaking child-bearers.986 
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A small faction of CDU/CSU politicians argued, however, for women’s usage of 
weapons. Although the CSU-politician and member of the Bundestag’s Committee for Defense, 
Ursula Krone-Appuhn, did not want to draft women into the armed forces either, she 
nevertheless maintained that if women joined the military voluntarily, they should learn how to 
use weapons.987 For Krone-Appuhn, who trained at the military base in Munsterlager for a week 
in order to experience military service firsthand,988 history—and especially World War II—
provided ample evidence that women were able to operate heavy weaponry.989 Whereas the 
Third Reich functioned as an argument for SPD politicians to oppose women’s recruitment, she 
cited World War II as an argument in favor of female soldiers.  
In contrast to Krone-Appuhn, the negative attitude that CDU/CSU politicians expressed 
became and remained the parties’ main line of argument for years to come. After the 1983 
elections, for instance, Chancellor Helmut Kohl criticized the agitation over the Pillenknick and 
the predicted recruitment crisis. Brushing aside the politics of his Social Democratic 
predecessors, he deemed it unnecessary to consider female soldiers. Although the new chancellor 
and his staff in the Ministry of Defense were certainly concerned about the future of the West 
German armed forces, recruiting women as soldiers did not represent the right answer.990  
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In contrast to the SPD and the CDU/CSU, the FDP was more open to the idea of 
recruiting women for military service. Already in 1980, the party published a Position Paper 
about Foreign and Security Politics (Grundsatzpapier zur Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik), which 
stated that women should be granted greater access to the armed forces.991 Although the FDP did 
not call for female draftees, the document argued that opening the gates for women who wanted 
to serve voluntarily in the Bundeswehr was “equality’s demand.”992 According to Ursula Seiler-
Albring, who entered the Bundestag in 1983, women should have the right to pursue the same 
“career models as men” and consequently be allowed to serve in the military.993 Focusing on the 
West German labor market and economic situation, many of the Free Democrats like Seiler-
Albring approached the issue of female soldiers in terms of employment policies and 
opportunities.  
For the majority of the FDP, however, having the same career options did not mean 
fulfilling the same duties. For Free Democrats like the former Vice President of the Bundestag 
(1969-1972), Liselotte Funcke, drafting women into the Bundeswerhr was unthinkable, because 
military service involved the act of killing. Seizing the slogan “equal, but not the same,” Funcke 
stated that “women are destined to give life” and thus could not be compelled to serve and 
possibly kill. Maintaining that only men could be required to serve and kill, Funcke too 
employed arguments that had defined the parliamentary debates of the early 1950s. During the 
negotiations of West Germany’s rearmament, the leading FDP politician Marie-Elisabeth Lüders 
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argued vehemently that only men, not women could be compelled to serve and handle weapons. 
994   
In the early 1980s, a few FDP politicians embraced women’s armed military service more 
eagerly. In 1980, Gisela Nischelsky, a younger party delegate from Bremen, stated in Neue 
Bonner Depesche that women’s exclusion was based on outdated gender norms.995 To be sure, 
Nischelsky, who became the head of Bremen’s branch of the Federal Agency for Technical 
Relief (Technisches Hilfswerk, or THW) in 1982, rejected compulsory service for women too. 
Yet she criticized her contemporaries who argued entirely against women’s military service 
because they “feared for the glory of manliness and heroism.”996 Terms such as “bravery, 
courage, endurance, intelligence, […] and strength,” she maintained, “cannot be classified as 
gender specific.” Criticizing traditional notions of masculinity and femininity, the FDP delegate 
concluded that there was no reason to exclude women from the Bundeswehr.997 Moreover, she 
asserted that in case of an attack were forced to “defend life and limb” just like men.998 Thus, for 
Nischelsky serving in the armed forces represented an opportunity for women to defend 
themselves.  
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Eventually, the Free Democratic Party adopted Nischelsky’s line of argument.999 By 
1984, leading FDP politicians even argued that if women joined the armed forces they should be 
granted the status of combatants and be trained in how to use weapons. Although he still opposed 
women’s military armed service, Jürgen Möllemann, who became the FDP’s chairman in 
1984,1000 came to embrace the idea. The nature of modern warfare, the politician stated, rendered 
any arguments against women’s armed services unrealistic.1001 It was this understanding that the 
Free Democrats would eventually adopt during their federal party convention in September 
1987. The final resolution emphasized that women should be able to join the Bundeswehr 
“voluntarily and on equal terms, in other words with weapons.”1002 
As they argued for women’s armed military service, the FDP stood in clear opposition to 
Die Grünen who entered the Bundestag following the elections in 1983. Emerging from West 
Germany’s extra-parliamentary and peace activism, a major component of the party’s platform 
was the complete mental and physical demilitarization of West German society, the 
circumvention of future wars, and the establishment of world peace. In this context, Die Grünen 
considered the recruitment of female soldiers not as a steppingstone for women, but as another 
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step toward the complete militarization of society.1003 The party’s chairwoman and co-founder 
Petra Kelley argued, for instance, that West German women already “suffered” from a number of 
duties: “We give birth to and raise children, we produce cannon fodder, we preserve the family 
[…] and we carry the threefold, oftentimes fourfold burden of household, partnership, family and 
work.”1004 In contrast to women’s duties as mothers, wives, and homemakers, Kelly stated, men 
did not have to carry so many burdens. Consequently, the politician asked her audiences if the 
government had made any plans that would compel men “to raise their children” and take on 
“household chores.”1005 While focusing on the women’s military service, the figurehead of Die 
Grünen questioned traditional gender relations and the gender division of labor that still defined 
the Federal Republic. 
Given this agenda, the party had every reason to portray the Bundeswehr as a place for 
women’s “pseudo-emancipation” and female military service as a “continuing militarization of 
society.”1006 In order to fight this battle Die Grünen eventually published an argumentation aid in 
1988. The document entitled Neither Uniform Jacket nor Nurse’s Dress: Against further 
Militarization of Women and Compulsory Service included Kelly’s arguments and moved well 
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beyond the party’s 1980 platform.1007 The 1988 argumentation aid would represent the party’s 
position well into the 1990s.  
In arguing against the recruitment of women for armed military service, Die Grünen like 
the majority of West German parliamentarians reaffirmed the notion that only men could be 
compelled to render military service. Although most parties did not object to women who wanted 
to serve voluntarily and without weapons, the SPD, CDU/CSU, FDP, and above all Die Grünen 
still maintained that combat and the act of killing was only suitable for men. As such, the notion 
that the West German soldier was by and large a man was confirmed, even though the contours 
of this definition were not as clear as they had been in previous decades.  
Parliamentary Discussions about the Treatment of Gay Soldiers and Officers  
At the same time, that West German politician were reaffirming the Bundeswehr was by and 
large a “men’s society,” the sexual orientation of the West German soldier became the object of 
yet another debate. During the electoral campaigns of 1980 and 1983, the FDP and Die Grünen 
addressed Paragraph 175 of the West German Criminal Code and the continuing criminalization 
of male homosexuality.1008 In doing so they responded to the demands of the gay rights 
movement, which had greatly expanded its activism after the reform of the Criminal Code in 
1973. In addition to a growing number of publications that documented the lives of gay men and 
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women in West Germany and other parts of the world, the reforms also prompted new and 
stronger activism for the complete abolishment of Paragraph 175.1009 
Responding to these cultural changes and the new activism, a number of FDP 
parliamentarians and party delegates demanded the complete repeal of Paragraph 175 and the 
emancipation of gay men. For the FDP’s chairman, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, who served as the 
Foreign Minister and Vice Chancellor from 1974 and 1982, abolishing Paragraph 175 was a vital 
step towards the “legal and social equality of homosexuals.”1010 Moreover, the FDP’s 1980 party 
platform stated that “same-sex partners have the right to live together without discrimination.” In 
order to achieve this goal, the party program stated that Paragraph 175 of the West German 
Criminal Code had to be eliminated.1011 In order pursue this agenda, FDP members organized 
several conferences and workshops that addressed male homosexuality. In addition to forming a 
“Working Group on Homosexuality,” the FDP’s parliamentary group organized a hearing in 
1981 that reemphasized the need for revising the Criminal Code.1012  
It was in this context that the Free Democrats tackled the issue of gay soldiers. On June 
13 and 14, 1981, the Hamburg regional office of the Friedrich-Naumann-Stiftung—the party’s 
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foundation—held a seminar addressing “Homosexuals at the Workplace” (Homosexuelle am 
Arbeitsplatz). During the seminar, participants analyzed the situation of gay men and women in 
the media, military, schools, churches, and unions. The participants also discussed 
“Homosexuals in the Bundeswehr” and developed a 12-point catalogue of demands that focused 
on delineation of clear regulations and the education of military psychiatrists and medics, 
military ministers as well as the different ranks of commanding officers.1013 In addition to calling 
for the “integration,” equal treatment, and protection of gay soldiers against harassment, the 
catalogue demanded that gay officers should have the same career options as their heterosexual 
comrades and should be considered equally for promotion. After all, the catalogue stipulated that 
there were “no known surveys about if and how the service performance of homosexuals differs 
from those of heterosexuals.”1014 
However, not all FDP-parliamentarians supported the party’s official stance on gay 
rights. For instance, Hans Arnold Engelhard, who would become Minister of Justice in 1982, and 
Hildegard Hamm-Brücher, who served as a Minister of State in the German Foreign Office from 
1977 to 1982, opposed the complete abolition of Paragraph 175. Stating in 1980 that “I would 
like to save the young men from the old men,” Hamm-Brücher like many of her contemporaries 
associated homosexuality with pederasty, and thought it necessary to prosecute men who were 
older than 18 years and who engaged in sexual acts with men who were younger than 18.1015 For 
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the politician, keeping Paragraph 175 on the books was a question of child protection. Arguing 
that boys should have the right to develop their heterosexual orientation without any disruption, 
Hamm-Bücher and others maintained that underage men needed to be shielded from homosexual 
men until they had sexually matured. 
Given her opinion, Hildegard Hamm-Brücher must have been satisfied when the FDP 
increasingly abandoned its vehement argument for the emancipation of gay men in the early 
1980s. This change was mainly due to the party’s role as a coalition partner. Even though leading 
SPD-politicians such as Gustav Heinemann had pushed for the decriminalization of sexual acts 
between consenting adult men in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the party was unwilling to move 
beyond the 1973 reforms of the Criminal Code. To be sure, SPD-politicians like the former 
chancellor Willy Brandt continued to advocate for the complete decriminalization of male 
homosexuality.1016 In addition, members of the SPD’s youth organization, the Young Socialists 
in the SPD (Jungsozialisten in der SPD) founded the Working Group of Gay Social Democrats 
(Arbeitskreis schwuler Sozialdemoraten), which continued to fight against the discrimination of 
gay men.1017 Yet, a considerable number of party leaders were less inclined to support gay-
rights. One of them was Helmut Schmidt, who had succeeded Brandt as chancellor in 1974. 
While negotiating a possible coalition with the FDP after the federal elections in 1980, Helmut 
Schmidt rebuked some of Genscher’s claims. During the negotiations, the FDP-politician 
promoted the abolition of Paragraph 175, reminding Schmidt of the persecution of gay men 
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during the National Socialists regime. Schmidt refused, however, stating that he was not the 
“chancellor of the homosexuals.”1018  
One reason that Schmidt was against the complete decriminalization of homosexuality 
was his understanding of child protection. Like many others, he argued that if Paragraph 175 was 
completely abolished, “homosexuality between adults and teenagers” would be exempt from 
punishment.1019 For Schmidt, this was not acceptable. In addition to his argument about child 
protection, we can also speculate that the chancellor’s position was informed by the situation of 
the Bundeswehr. After all, during his time as Minister of Defense, Schmidt had opposed the 
decriminalization of male homosexuality maintaining that it would endanger the combat 
readiness of the Bundeswehr. As a result of these convictions, Schmidt informed Genscher that 
the FDP would have to look for another coalition partner if they wanted to pursue their agenda to 
decriminalize male homosexuality completely. Eager to continue the coalition, the FDP stopped 
arguing for the abolition of Paragraph 175.1020 
The collapse of Helmut Schmidt’s chancellorship in the fall of 1982 and the 
establishment of Helmut Kohl’s conservative coalition in 1983 did not change this situation, 
because the majority of CDU and CSU politicians did not want to decriminalize male 
homosexuality either. To be sure, members of the Junge Union—the political youth organization 
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of CDU/CSU—supported the abolition of Paragraph 175.1021 In contrast to this younger cohort 
of politicians, the majority of older party members rejected the idea. For instance, leading 
representatives of the CSU such as 68-years old Franz Joseph Strauß, who had ran for the 
chancellorship against Helmut Schmidt in 1980, were in favor of the existing Paragraph 175. 
Associating “homosexual relations” with “evil” (das Böse),1022 Strauß stated that Paragraph 175 
needed to remain on the books, for it would guarantee the “undisturbed sexual development” of 
minors.1023 Like Helmut Schmidt and the FDP-politician Hildegard Hamm-Brücher, the CSU-
politician implied that the heterosexual development of young men under the age of 18 should 
not “disturbed” by any homosexual influences. As a result of these rebukes, the FDP did not 
resume its advocacy for the complete decriminalization of male homosexuality.  
The only party that vehemently argued for the repeal of Paragraph 175 was Die Grünen. 
Before gaining enough votes to enter the Bundestag in 1983, the Greens addressed the issue in 
their first party platform in 1980. The party program asserted that the “findings of modern sexual 
science” showed that “homosexuality and heterosexuality are equal expressions of human 
sexuality.”1024 Therefore, the unequal treatment of homosexual and heterosexual relationships 
had to stop. As a result, Die Grünen recommended the abolition of Paragraph 175 of the 
Criminal Code and also argued for an amendment of Article 3, Sub-Section 3 of the Basic Law. 
This section of the Basic Law stated that “Nobody shall be favored or discriminated against 
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because of his sex, his descent, his race, his language, his home [Heimat] and origin, his beliefs, 
his religious or political views.”1025 Given their political agenda, Die Grünen wished to alter the 
section in a way that it would read, “nobody shall be favored or discriminated against because of 
his sex, his sexual orientation […].”1026  
Although Die Grünen thus argued vehemently for the equal treatment of gay men, their 
arguments had little impact. In addition to joining the Bundestag only in 1983, their agenda had 
few supporters outside of the party. Even though the FDP addressed the issue of gay men in the 
Bundeswehr and society, the SPD as well as the CDU/CSU showed little to no interest in 
negotiating the issue and moving beyond the 1973 reform of Paragraph 175. There ambivalent 
position became evident in the parliamentary debate of the Wörner-Kießling-Affair. 
Conflicts over the Wörner-Kießling-Affair in the Bundestag  
The ways in which West German parties addressed the issue of gay men in the late 1970s and 
early 1980s greatly influenced the ways they reacted to the Wörner-Kießling-Affair. The scandal 
became the topic of several Bundestag sessions and the Committee for Defense of the West 
German Bundestag was constituted as an inquiry committee in late January 1984 to investigate 
the matter. During the subsequent debates, Die Grünen addressed the issue of homosexuality in 
the armed forces above all others.1027 The party’s Parliamentary Secretary and former APO-
activist, Joschka Fischer tackled the situation of gay men in both society and the military. In a 
widely publicized speech on February 8, 1984, Fischer suggested that Wörner and his staff 
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believed that the Bundeswehr’s role as a “deterrent,” depended on the manliness of the West 
German soldier.1028 A gay general such as Kießling did not fit Wörner’s image of “hardened, 
virile masculinity.” Luckily for the Bundeswehr, Fischer contended, Manfred Wörner, was a 
manly man who delighted in the Bundeswehr as a “men’s society.”1029 As he thus used rhetoric 
that was common among APO and peace activists who protested against the Bundeswehr in the 
1970s and 1980s, Fischer concluded that Wörner’s actions were not only motivated by his 
affinity for the, but also by a particular ideal of masculinity.1030  
While Fischer thus ridiculed Wörner, the party also condemned the minister’s actions 
because they had harmed not only Günter Kießling, but also “all […] same-sex lovers” 
(gleichgeschlechtlich Liebende) in West Germany. Based on the party’s platform, Fischer and his 
colleague, the retired Major General Gert Bastian, criticized the ministry for wrongly associating 
homosexuality with “criminal” activities. This connection, Bastian stated in June 1984, caused a 
“moral devastation […] for all homosexuals”1031 and increased prejudices against “a minority in 
need of protection.”1032 As Die Grünen hence second the claims of gay-rights activists, Joschka 
Fischer reminded his fellow parliamentarians of the “tens of thousands of homosexuals who 
were murdered, […] tortured and imprisoned” in Nazi concentration camps. Faulting the Helmut 
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Kohl’s coalition for not changing its politics towards gay men,1033 the Die Grünen maintained 
that the politics of the current government presented a continuation of Nazi policies. 
In contrast to Die Grünen, the SPD, FDP, and the CDU/CSU were less eager to address 
the role male homosexuality had played in Wörner’s decision to send Kießling into early 
retirement. Instead, the other parties focused almost exclusively on the workings and 
wrongdoings of the West German Counterintelligence Service. Deeming the overhaul of the Amt 
für Sicherheit der Bundeswehr more important, the SPD rarely addressed the issue during the 
Bundestag sessions. To be sure, politicians such as Willy Brandt, who had a long standing record 
of supporting gay rights, complained that the affair had led to a skewed image of gay men. 
Contemporaries who did not consider homosexuality a crime, the former chancellor stated, were 
depicted as if they embraced the “criminal milieu of young hustlers.”1034 In doing so, Brandt 
reacted to the widespread belief that Kießling was not only gay, but that he had also engaged in 
same-sex prostitution with underage men. Although he agreed that same-sex prostitution, which 
involved young men, was unacceptable, Brandt drew a clear line between these activities and 
male homosexuality in general.  
Whereas Brandt continued to argue for the integration of gay men into society, his 
colleague Horst Jungmann, who had previously worked as Inspector for the Armed Forces 
Administration Department (Regierungsinspektor der Bundeswehrverwaltung), described male 
homosexuality as “an abnormal sexual disposition.”1035 Although he stated that homosexuality 
should not be viewed as a security threat, he furthermore faulted Die Grünen for focusing too 
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much on homosexuality. According to him, the commission that investigated the scandal should 
scrutinize the workings the Counterintelligence Service, because it clearly violated the 
fundamental rights and freedom of every West German soldiers.1036 For Jungmann, the problem 
was not limited to the stigmatization of gay men in the armed forces, but included the ways in 
which Kießling’s private life had been investigated.   
Similar to the SPD, the issue of homosexuality and the role it played in Manfred 
Wörner’s decision to remove Kießling was generally absent from statements made by 
representatives of Helmut Kohl’s government. Given that Manfred Wörner and Helmut Kohl 
were at the center of the scandal, it does not come as a surprise that the CDU/CSU did not tackle 
issue of homosexuality. After all, government officials were not very eager to address any aspect 
of the Wörner-Kießling-Affair. For instance, on February 10, 1984, a parliamentarian of Die 
Grünen, Antje Vollmer, asked during a session of the Bundestag what Helmut Kohl’s 
government intended to do in order to “recoup […] the damage done to the honor and reputation 
of the homosexual citizens of the Federal Republic of Germany.”1037 Responding to the inquiry, 
the CDU politician and Parliamentary State Secretary at the Ministry of Defense, Peter Kurt 
Würzbach regretted the ways in which the scandal had progressed. Without giving any further 
explanation, he stated that “for those citizens it would be probably best if the topic would not 
been discussed in such a matter any longer.”1038 Although he thus admitted that the Wörner-
Kießling-Affair damaged the reputation of gay men, his short answer can also be read as an 
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indicator that the Ministry of Defense and Helmut Kohl’s government did not want to continue 
any discussions in this regard.  
 The ways in which the affair unfolded and the fact that homosexuality was at the center 
of it, also put the FDP in a difficult position. As discussed above, until 1982 leading 
representatives of the Free Democratic Party had pressed for the abolition of Paragraph 175. In 
the wake of forming a coalition with the CDU/CSU, however, the issue was soon swept under 
the rug. Thus, instead of criticizing the government and especially the Ministry of Defense for 
the ways in which it dealt with gay men in the Bundeswehr, the Free Democrats likewise focused 
instead on the general workings of the Office for the Security of the Bundeswehr. Yet, shortly 
after the inquiry commission published its proceedings in June 1984, the FDP-parliamentarian 
Uwe Ronneburger stated that the Free Democrats demanded new laws that would clearly 
regulate the workings of the West German Counterintelligence Service in order to insure the 
“protection of personal privacy.” In addition, the Free Democrats demanded a revision of the 
security guidelines so that they would neither “discriminate against minorities” nor crate 
potential reasons for “blackmail.”1039 Thus, without naming it explicitly, the FDP wanted to 
ensure that male homosexuality was erased from the list of security threats.  
Notwithstanding this claim, West German politicians addressed the issue of male 
homosexuality in the society and Bundeswehr only implicitly. Although parliamentarians such as 
Willy Brandt, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, and Die Grünen called for the abolition of Paragraph 
175, their demands found little acceptance. Since the majority of SPD, FDP, and CDU/CSU 
wanted to keep Paragraph 175 on the books in order to ensure young men’s heterosexual 
development, little efforts were made to publicly and explicitly address the situation of male 
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homosexuality in the armed forces. This also did not change much during the scandal. Except for 
the vehemence of Die Grünen, the other primary party showed little interest in addressing the 
situation of gay men in society and the in the armed forces.  
3. The Debate about the Military Service of Gay Men and Women in West German Society  
In addition to triggering new parliamentary debates, the question of whether gay men and 
women should be recruited for military service attracted a great deal of attention in civil society. 
First, the different arguments for the recruitment into all areas of the Bundeswehr upset large 
numbers of peace activists, leftist intellectuals, and members of the autonomous wing of the 
women’s movement. Voicing strong opposition, they argued that the recruitment of women 
would not lead to female emancipation, but to more violence against women. Agitated by 
NATO’s double track, which stipulated the stationing of nuclear weapons on European soil, 
activists moreover reemphasized the standpoint that the recruitment of women would lead not 
only violence against women, but also to the militarization of the Federal Republic.1040 
Simultaneously, but initially more quietly, the situation of gay men who served in the 
Bundeswehr as officers or soldiers became an object of contestation as well. Paying close 
attention to cases such as the one of Captain Michael L., leftist intellectuals, gay rights activists, 
and peace activists criticized military legislation as an aggravation of discriminatory practices. 
This initial interest skyrocketed over the course of the Wörner-Kießling-Affair in 1984. Given 
the weight and meaning of the affair, male homosexuality in the armed forces was now discussed 
by a broader public. In addition to mainstream newspapers such as the Frankfurter Allgemeine 
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Zeitung, the Süddeutsche Zeitung, Der Spiegel or Die ZEIT, concerned citizens send letters to 
editors, their political representatives, and to Günter Kießling and Manfred Wörner. In light of 
the liberalization of Paragraph 175, commentators overwhelmingly discussed the treatment of 
General Kießling as another sign that the Bundeswehr clung to outdated notion of aggressive 
heteronormativity. Arguing that male homosexuality was not “faulty,” contemporaries also 
raised the question of whether the emancipation and civic rights of gay citizens could be 
sacrificed for West Germany’s national security.  
Female and Male Soldiers and the Gendered Nature of Military Service in Feminist and 
Pacifist Debates  
“Now, if I were a man, I would be a conscientious objector too,” wrote Alice Schwarzer in 
Emma in June 1978.1041 Military customs and practices had shocked her when she was still a 
little girl. Yet, she had learned over the years that weapons and power were closely related. 
Instead of allowing women to serve in the Bundeswehr, she maintained, society and government 
sent women home to the kitchen propagating the idea that a country’s “defense and fighting” 
were naturally a man’s domain.1042 Even though history revealed that women could be “just as 
militant as men,” women were excluded from an important center of power. The result of this 
exclusion, Schwarzer summarized, was, on the one hand, “the solidification of the male craze” 
(Männlichkeitswahn) through military service and, on the other, the consolidation of women’s 
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helplessness and dependency.1043 Consequently, she demanded that women be granted access to 
all centers of powers, including the military. 
In conjunction with the deliberations of Hans Apel and Karl Wilhelm Berkhan, 
Schwarzer’s article came as a bombshell. Responses were—to use the words of historian Belinda 
Davis—“immediate and extended, intense and conflicted.”1044 Members of the New Women’s 
Movement who did not share Schwarzer’s idea of complete and utter equality voiced the harshest 
and most comprehensive criticism. Contrary to contemporary perceptions in the late 1970s and 
early 1980s, the New Women’s Movement that had emerged in the late-1960s was far from 
crumbling. Over course of the 1970s, diverse blocks and groups formed within the New 
Women’s Movement that expressed different, but related opinions about the meaning of 
emancipation and feminism as well as the goals and strategies of the Women’s Movement.1045 
During this time, the New Women’s Movement increased its literary output and their number of 
campaigns. As a result, the movement’s impact spiked in the late 1970s and early 1980s. 1046  
The extensive scope of feminist activism was closely related to the burgeoning peace 
movement, even though from the start this relationship was not an easy one.1047 The peace 
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movement of the early 1980s was impressive not only because its size, but also because it drew 
in and built upon multiple strata of society. The decision to station medium-range missiles on 
West German soil brought together groups as diverse as the ecological and anti-nuclear 
movement, nuclear scientists, the Protestant Church, the German Communist Party, and 
members of the New Women’s Movement.1048 In the context of these protests, the Bundeswehr 
and the proposal to grant women greater access to the military remained a prime object of 
resistance.  
One group that contradicted Schwarzer, Apel, and Berkhan were the authors of Emma’s 
feminist ‘rival’, the magazine Courage. Founded in 1976, Courage functioned as the mouthpiece 
of the autonomous, leftist, and mainly academic wing of the New Women’s Movement. In 1980, 
one of the cofounders of Courage, Sibylle Plogstedt, responded to Schwarzer by arguing that 
military service would not help women to become more emancipated, independent and less 
subjected to male violence. Analyzing the situation of female soldiers in the United States, 
Plogstedt maintained that women’s recruitment would lead to a continuation of physical violence 
against women. After all, she stated, “physical assaults” and “harassment” were common 
practice in military barracks.1049 Portraying the military as a place where women would 
experience violence at the hands of men, Plogstedt suggested that the struggle over women’s 
recruitment represented a continuation of the feminist battle against “violence against women,” 
which had become a prime concern of the New Women’s Movement in the mid-1970s.1050 The 
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proposals to recruit women raised the question of how to prevent violence against women in a 
state-run, male dominated, quasi-public, yet separate militarized sphere. The answer that 
feminists such as Plogstedt gave was to keep women out of the Bundeswehr.1051 
The issue of state-sanctioned male violence led some activists to argue that female 
recruits would become the symbols of West German patriarchy. For the much-traveled feminist 
and pacifist author of the graswurzelrevolution, Bernadette Ridard, the Bundeswehr facilitated 
militarism and reinforced patriarchal structures. While serving in the armed forces, men had 
access to the tools of powers: weapons and state-sanctioned violence. This, the activist stated, 
reaffirmed the conviction that “violence and power” were inherently “masculine.”1052 Asserting 
that human interactions were generally defined by the “right of the mighty,” Ridard argued that 
the equation of power with masculinity put women into a subordinate position. For her, this 
meant that the military was structured around the same principles that patriarchy was built 
upon.1053 Given this obvious connection and the fact that feminist had sought to fight patriarchy 
for so long, she could not understand why some feminists wanted to get into the barracks. After 
all, she maintained, the Bundeswehr was a “school of the nation” where self-determination and 
common responsibility did not exist. By drafting cohorts of young men into this “school,” the 
government allowed military principles such as hierarchy, orders, obedience and the willingness 
to wage war to spread through society. If women were recruited too, Ridard argued, this trend 
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would certainly accelerate.1054 In addition to upholding patriarchal structures, the recruitment of 
women would foster the militarization of society. 
As Ridard’s example shows, opponents of Schwarzer, Berkhan and Apel focused not 
only on how military service would affect female recruits, but also on what happened to men 
who served. Many women who became active in the peace and women’s movement in the late 
1970s and early 1980s also foregrounded the brutalization and dehumanization that their 
husbands and brothers, or other family members, had experienced during military service.1055 
The early 1980s saw the production of several anthologies that peace and feminist activist 
published in order to foster their cause.1056 According to these anthologies, older women who 
joined the protests recalled the mutilated and broken men who returned after World War II, while 
younger generations of women emphasized the experiences of their male friends who had served 
in the Bundeswehr. In these stories, military service was not depicted as a rite of passage that 
turned boys into real men, but rather as an institution that “humiliated” and “dehumanized” men 
and as result created “hate” and “barbarity.”1057 Given these prospects, opponents of female 
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military service stated that women should not join the Bundeswehr thinking they would achieve 
full emancipation. Rather men should “emancipate themselves” and refuse to serve.1058 
The discussion among peace and feminist activists also led to new scholarship that 
explicitly analyzed the links between violence, military service, and masculinity. On example for 
this new scholarship is Hanne Birkchenbach, who is now a professor for Peace and Conflict 
Studies at the Justus-Liebig-University in Germany. In the 1970s and 1980s, Birckenbach was 
actively involved in the burgeoning peace and feminist activism.1059 In addition to publishing 
articles and commentaries in the leftist, worker’s self-managed newspaper die Tageszeitung 
(Taz), Birckenbach wrote her 1986 study With a Bad Conscience – The Willingness of 
Adolescents to Render Military Service. The “starting point” for the study, Birckenbach stated in 
her introduction, was her “astonishment about the extent to which young men were willing to 
render military service.”1060 In 1982, polls by the Institute for Applied Social Science revealed 
that, despite the continuously increasing number of conscientious objectors and the growing 
peace activism, two-thirds of young men, who were between 16 and 18 years old, were still 
willing to render military service.1061 The author’s research hence focused on the “psychosocial 
developments that allowed the capitalistic and democratic industrial societies to cling to the 
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continuous existence of big military apparatuses, even though bourgeoisie reasoning had long-
since discerned them as nonproductive, harmful, dangerous and obsolete.”1062  
Analyzing the writings by and interviews with 381 boys and 241 girls, Birckenbach 
argued that young men who were willing to serve were nonetheless against the war and 
expressed reservations against military service.1063 In order to overcome this division, 
Birckenbach’s subjects used several mechanisms that built upon specific notions of masculinity. 
According to the researcher, young men focused, on the one hand, on the nuclear nature of 
modern war, which rendered any kind behavior—both military service and conscientious 
objection—inadequate and thus enabled them to repress any notion of a “culpable participation 
in war.”1064 On the other, Birckenbach stated, her interview partners ignored the “absurdity” and 
fatality of warfare by focusing on war as a stage for the “imaginative enactment of traditional 
masculinity.”1065 This traditional concept of masculinity built upon the notion that military 
service had always been a male prerogative, because men possessed all the physical and mental 
features necessary to fight, defend and govern.1066 If a young man thus passed the military’s 
medical examination, he could rest assured that he possessed valued masculine traits. In this 
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context, combat then functioned as an activity that could affirm his seemingly superior 
masculinity.1067  
However, this understanding did not equal the traditional notion of military combat as the 
area in which men could stand the test of manliness. According to Birckenbach, the majority of 
the interviewees linked military service and masculinity with the demands of their civilian work 
and private life.1068 Viewing military life as a positive challenge and not as a form of 
disfranchisement, the interviewees expected that military service would equip them with the 
masculine traits they needed to prevail and succeed in the civilian work force.1069 Hence military 
service did not represent a gateway for the young men to succeed on the battle fields of Europe, 
but in the civilian working force of West Germany. 
As Birkenbach’s research interests and findings show, the late 1970s and early 1980s 
witnessed new and intense debates about the nature of military service and the image of the West 
German soldier. Prompted by the numerous proposals that the Bundeswehr should open its gates 
to female soldiers and by the exploding new peace activism, activists disputed whether military 
service and war were inherently masculine or whether women should be recruited as well. 
Wherea`s some feminists such as Alice Schwarzer argued that military service would allow 
women to become emancipated, her opponents argued that female soldiers would soon lead to 
new forms of oppression and violence against women. While thus discussing the Bundeswehr as 
a palladium of state-sanctioned violence and patriarchy, some activists argued once more that 
military service brutalized and depraved men. Protesting for a more just and peaceful world, the 
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feminist and peace activists of the late-1970s and early-1980s wholeheartedly rejected the 
military apparatus arguing that neither men nor women should serve in the Bundeswehr.   
Gay Soldiers and the Wörner-Kießling-Affair in the Public Debate   
They ways in which feminist and peace activists disputed the recruitment of women for military 
service bore some similarities to the ways that contemporaries debated the situation of gay 
soldiers and officers. Following the reform of the Criminal Code in 1969 and 1973, the living 
situation of gay men in the Federal Republic remained a controversially debated issue. This was 
due first of all to the blossoming gay rights movement. Although proponents of gay rights had 
demanded and fought for emancipation in earlier years, the far-reaching decriminalization of 
male homosexuality in the late 1960s and early 1970s opened up new spaces for protest and 
demands.1070 While members of the gay community expanded their activism, they found 
advocates among the political parties. As discussed earlier, members of the Free Democratic 
Party ensured that gay rights and emancipation remained part of the political discourse in the late 
1970s by fighting for the complete abolishment of Paragraph 175. In addition to the FDP’s albeit 
short-lived eagerness, the press was certainly a third factor that prevented the topic from sinking 
into oblivion. The situation, status, and activism of the gay-liberation movement as well as the 
push of some political parties in favor of gay rights filled the pages of local, regional, and 
national newspapers.1071  
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Amid the increasing interest in the lives of gay men (and women) in the Federal 
Republic, the ways that the Bundeswehr treated gay men attracted growing attention as well. In 
1979, for example, Der Spiegel reported about the practice of the West German police to spy on 
and registered gay men on so-called “pink lists.”1072 Beginning in the 1950s, the West German 
police stored the information about special bars and convicted gay men—including pictures and 
finger prints—in an extensive system of note cards. Dating back the mid-nineteenth century, 
gay-rights activists in the 1970s soon referred to these cards as rosa Listen (pink lists) in memory 
of the pink triangles that gay men had to wear in Nazi concentration camps.1073  Documenting 
the life and hardship of gay men, the magazine also informed its readers that “West Germany’s 
homosexuals have to face occupational bans [only] in exceptional cases.” One of the few cases, 
Der Spiegel noted, was the Bundeswehr. Criticizing military practices, the magazine rightly 
stated that gay men could not become officers, because considered “disruptive factor[s]” and 
thus were prohibited to become officers.”1074  
In addition to sporadic articles in the West German mainstream press, pacifist 
publications such as Rosa or Schwuchtel: Eine Zeitung der Schwulenbewegung, which were 
closely related to the West German gay-rights movement, addressed the issue as well.1075 While 
the individual publications addressed the topic for various different reasons, the majority of 
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articles viewed anti-gay sentiments, on the one hand, as indicative for the entire West German 
society and, on the other, the result of a particular military male culture. In 1977, the newly 
founded magazine Rosa published an article entitled “The Gay Officer,” which argued that anti-
gay sentiments were the result of a particular masculine culture that permeated the Bundeswehr. 
The author of the article asserted that “all the intolerances, all the mistakes, which also exist in 
the rest of society, surfaces much more” in the Bundeswehr, for it was a “mere men’s 
society.”1076 In addition to viewing military practices as just one example of the discrimination 
gays had to face throughout the country, for the gay magazine, the anti-gay sentiments that 
permeated the Bundeswehr were the result of a particular male culture. 
This argument was seconded by the pacifist magazine graswurzelrevolution that turned 
towards the topic, because it viewed the Bundeswehr’s discrimination against gay men as 
evidence of its militaristic tendencies.1077 The magazine stated that gay men faced a great deal of 
problems in both military and civilian service. Focusing on the Budneswehr, the magazine 
maintained in 1980 that the situation for gay men was “very often insufferable.”1078 In reaction to 
the 1979 verdict of the Federal Administrative Court’s First Senate’s that gay men were 
generally neither welcomed nor accepted by heterosexual comrades, the magazine asserted that 
this insufferable situation stemmed from the constant reprisals that gay men had to face in this 
“super-men’s world” (Supermännerwelt).1079  
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By arguing that military discrimination against gay men was the result of a military 
culture that favored vigorous heterosexual masculinity, the discussion by Rosa and 
graswurzelrevolution bore great resemblance to the ways that the leftist press addressed the issue 
of female soldiers. Rejecting women’s recruitment for military service, left-wing activist and 
journalists portrayed the military as a hyper-masculine and overly aggressive institution in which 
women would not find expected emancipatory deliverance, but discrimination and oppression. If 
women would suffer from the Bundeswehr’s hyper-masculine culture as soon as they entered the 
barracks, gay men in uniform already did.   
The two arguments—that Bundeswehr practices were indicative of both a particular 
military culture and the entire society—continued well into the 1980s and underlined the 
discussion that accompanied the Wörner-Kießling Affair. Commenting on the reasons for why 
Wörner had send Kießling into early retirement, Thomas Trempnau—an author and eager critic 
of NATO’s arms build-up in the early 1980s—complained that the scandal represented an 
“attack on homosexuality” as a whole.1080 Writing in the pacifist magazine antimilitarismus 
information, which enjoyed a circulation of roughly 3,500 copies, Trempnau argued that a gay 
general was only considered a security threat because homosexuality still offended the “healthy 
popular sentiment” (gesunde Volksempfinden). By using the term gesundes Volksempfinden, 
Trempnau implied the continuation of Nazi ideology. When reforming the Criminal Code in 
1935, the National Socialist regime introduced the term into the legal text and provided their 
judges with almost absolute discretion.1081 Since the “defamation of homosexuals” defined the 
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educational measures of many families, schools and academia, Thomas Trempnau was not 
surprised that military superiors could not expect “the ‘necessary respect’ from their 
subordinates.”1082 In light of this problem, he maintained that it was time to “counteract the 
discriminatory behavior against gays and dispel prejudices.” Yet, since scandal seemed to be 
“another indicator for the moral change” that defined the politics’ of Chancellor Helmut Kohl’s 
conservative government, Trempnau was not convinced that the situation of gay men would 
improve anytime soon.1083  
The ways in which the Wörner-Kießling-Affair unfolded led to an increased interest in 
the situation of gay men in the Bundeswehr. Male homosexuality was no longer a topic that only 
filled the pages of pacifist magazines and publications related to the gay rights movement. The 
affair triggered not only a volley of television shows and newspaper articles, but it also caused 
numerous contemporaries—of German and foreign nationalities—to send letters to newspaper 
editors or to the main participants of the affair: Günter Kießling, Manfred Wörner, and Helmut 
Kohl. Between January and May 1984, Kießling alone received more than 2,000 letters. 
Analyzed together the press coverage and letters show that the Wörner-Kießling Affair and the 
role homosexuality played in it offered contemporaries an opportunity to discuss not only 
military practices and customs, but also the politics of the new CDU/CSU government as well as 
the ‘moral compass’ of the West German society.  
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Focusing on the affair, the left-leaning press such as Die ZEIT criticized the ways in 
which the Ministry of Defense, the Bundeswehr, and the counterintelligence service dealt with 
male homosexuality was unacceptable. Authors such as Bernd Nitzschke, who was an assistant 
lecturer in the department for psychotherapy at the University Düsseldorf, complained that the 
Ministry of Defense sought to fight a “homemade crime.”1084  If the Ministry of Defense had not 
declared homosexuality a “security threat,” the affair would never have happened. Moreover, he 
maintained that the action of the minister and his counterintelligence service represented a return 
to the morality and “the muff of the 1950s.” Arguing that Wörner and his experts could only 
think in two categories—“the good, the normal, and the just,” on the one hand, and “the evil, the 
bad, and the abnormal” on the other—he concluded that the workings of the ministry were 
defined by extreme paranoia.1085   
Yet, it was not only the leftwing press that challenged the chancellor’s politics. Both 
Helmut Kohl and Manfred Wörner received numerous letters that questioned the moral beliefs 
that apparently underpinned the government’s politics. Outraged by what had happened to 
Kießling, a 63-years old man from an old aristocratic family sent an angry letter to Helmut Kohl 
asking the chancellor whether he or his Minister of Defense had “heard anything about the 
conventions on human rights.”1086 In addition to stating that the government had violated 
Kießling’s rights, the letter writer also pointed out that the action of the Counterintelligence 
Service and the Minister of Defense belittled the reform of the West German Criminal Code. 
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Thus, he did not only demanded for the “ostracism of homosexuality” to stop, but he also 
expressed a sense of shame. Informing the chancellor that his ancestors were once part of 
Germany’s government and “held high military positions,” the letter writer stated: “I am 
ashamed for the government and I am ashamed for the country.”1087  
The sense that Helmut Kohl’s government had acted in a distasteful and unworthy 
manner even caused contemporaries who did not see themselves as gay-rights advocates to state 
their opinions. On January 27, a woman sent a letter Wörner to inform him that she was shocked 
by his “way to discredit people in public.”1088 While asserting that she was neither gay “nor do I 
speak up for these people in any particular way,” the woman wanted to remind Wörner that “we 
live in a society in which these people are recognized completely and with all rights […].”1089 
The woman’s attitude was exemplary of several letters that contemporaries mailed during these 
days. Although the majority of correspondents ignored the issue or expressed some form of 
indifference towards homosexuality, they nonetheless were enraged by the actions of 
counterintelligence service and the Minister of Defense.  
For a number of letter writers, the affair not only reflected badly on the government, but 
also reflected badly on the norms of the West German society. On January 17, 1984 a women 
wrote to Kießling informing him that “[t]he father of my daughter was a soldier too” and that she 
therefore knew that it was common for military superiors to be “affectionate.”1090 Yet to “label 
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somebody as homosexual” just because he did not always behave like the “inapproachable” 
superior was “very humiliating,” the woman stated.1091 Drawing a line between ‘normal’ 
affectionate camaraderie in a homosocial environment and homosexual behavior, the woman 
also maintained stated that Kießling had suffered all the injustice because of his marital status. 
“If one is quiet, and single at that [alleinstehend], one already gives enough reason for imprudent 
tattle.”1092 If the general had married, he woman was sure, he would not have to deal with such 
humiliation: “[B]eing married seems to be the standard in our modern times.” In addition to 
addressing male homosexuality, the scandal represented an opportunity for contemporaries to 
criticize the contemporary focus on heterosexual marriage and family as the ideal way of life.1093 
Addressing the seemingly wrong-headed moral compass of the Federal Republic, few 
correspondents furthermore emphasized the wrongdoings of heterosexual men and the security 
threat that women in the Bundeswehr could pose. Focusing on the political realm, a female letter 
writer sought to assure Kießling that even if he was gay, he could never pose as much as a threat 
as “some of the superior figures who amuse themselves with call girls and ‘hostesses’ during or 
after so-called party festivities” (Parteifeiern).1094 According to them, such heterosexual liaisons 
posed a particular threat, because some of these “female persons” could be systematically 
deployed as spies.1095 “[I]t should be historically well known,” stated another letter writer, “that 
                                                 
1091 Ibid. 
1092 Ibid. 
1093 Heindrun E. to Günter Kießling, 17 January 1984. BArch F, Nachlass Kießling, Postpaket: Skandal Zuschriften. 
1094 Margot B. to Günter Kießling, 13 January 1984, BArch, Nachlass Kießling, Postpaket: Skandal Zuschriften, 
Nachlass. 
1095 Else A. to Professor Dr. Bedeker, 23 January 1984. BArch F, Nachlass Kießling, Akte Briefe mit Durchschlag 
von Briefen an Kohl, Wörner, usw. Skandal. 
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99,9 % of all spy affairs […] did not arise because of homosexually oriented people, but—in 
defiance of all bourgeois stereotypes—because of heterosexually oriented people.”1096 In light of 
this situation, some contemporaries came to the radical conclusion that only “eunuchs” should 
serve as military superiors and receive the highest security clearance.1097 This way, all the 
troubles that resulted from human sexuality could be avoided. As this letter shows, some West 
Germans did not agree with official arguments that gay men posed a greater threat to the 
Bundeswehr and national security.  
Notwithstanding this wholehearted criticism, a few contemporaries expressed the 
conviction that gay men should not be allowed to serve as military superiors. “A general, who 
resides over an army of ‘male creatures,’” wrote a female reader to the editors of the Frankfurter 
Allegemeine, “should be above all suspicions of homosexuality.”1098 Yet such public 
announcements were rare and among the more than 2,000 letters that Kießling received only one 
stands out as harsh and critical. The general received an anonymous and undated letter from an 
“old German woman” asking Kießling why he was not ashamed of himself. Stating that in the 
past “a decent officer would have taken the pistol,” the woman was obviously convinced that an 
officer who was or had been accused of being gay would put an end to his obvious shame by 
committing suicide.1099 
                                                 
1096 Gottfried R. to Günter Kießling, 28 January 1984. BArch F, Nachlass Kießling, Postpaket: Skandal Zuschriften, 
Nachlass. 
1097 Dr. Friedrich Biedermann, FAZ, 26 January 1984, 6. See also the letter to the editor in Stern. Barch F, Nachlass 
Kießling, Akte Skandal Zeitsausschnittssamlung Teil 2 (January 26-August 7, 1984).  
1098 Gudrun Schäfer, letter to the editor, FAZ, January 20, 1984, 9. 
1099 Anonyms and undated letter. BArch, Nachlass Kießling, Akte Briefe mit Durchschlag von Briefen an Kohl, 
Wörner, usw. Skandal. 
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The women’s harsh letter points moreover to an issue that the scandal also brought to the 
fore: the question of military honor and camaraderie. The fact that the Minister of Defense had 
eventually disregarded Günter Kießling’s word of honor became a topic of intense dispute. The 
general, Wörner, and Kohl received numerous letters from Kießling’s companions, friends, 
veterans, and active military personnel, who were dismayed at how Wörner treated one of his 
highest generals. For many it was unbelievable that the Minister of Defense “didn’t give a damn 
about” his general’s word of honor and instead believed “untested suspicions and allegations, 
testimonies from young hustlers and shady characters.”1100 On January 12, 1984 Kießling 
received another letter from a “seriously war disabled” veteran who—“as a man”—felt the need 
to assert to the general that “you have proven yourself a true soldier” and that he was not without 
support: “There are still soldiers who savor a word of honor […].” The envelope also included a 
copy of another letter that the man had mailed to Manfred Wörner. In this letter, the former 
“front-line soldier” argued that the Minister of Defense had not only insulted “the man” and 
“general,” but also the entire “officer’s caste and all men of the Bundeswehr.”1101  
The reason why a considerable number of men who had served in the Bundeswehr or in 
previous German armies, were so enraged about the issue of Wörner’s disregard for Kießling’s 
affirmations was the meaning and weight that an officer’s word of honor had carried over 
centuries. According to numerous military guides, an officer’s word of honor had “absolute 
                                                 
1100 Hermann F. to Manfred Wörner, 12 January 1984. BArch Kießling Nachlass, Akte Korrespondenz nach 
Skandal: Zuschriften von Soldaten & Ehemaligen Soldaten. See also, Dr. Paul Simas, letter to the Editor, FAZ 24, 
January 28, 1984, 24. 
1101 Bernd L., to Günter Kießling, 30 January 1984. BArch F, Nachlass Kießling, Akte Brief emit Durchschlag von 
Briefen an Kohl, Wörner usw. Skandal. 
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validity” and had to be strictly upheld.1102 If a man departed from his word only a little, the 
author maintained, he could no longer be an officer. In 1984, this understanding of honor still 
bore meaning. Many male correspondents who sent letters to Wörner and Kießling expressed a 
strong understanding of social hierarchies and ranks. For them, nightclub owners and hustlers 
presented by definition the dregs of society and could not be trusted. A Bundeswehr general, in 
contrast, was trustworthy and high on the social ladder.1103 Consequently, Kießling’s words were 
supposed to count much more than those of barkeepers and hustlers. Yet since Wörner had 
obviously ignored Kießling’s asseveration, several letter writers thought that the minister had 
harmed the Bundeswehr and questioned his qualifications to keep his position. 
In contrast, contemporaries who did not believe that officers occupied a special position 
energetically refuted the opinion of these letter writers. In light of the 1950s military reforms that 
had introduced the Staatsbürger in Uniform, one man complained that it was not possible to on 
the one hand “abolish the monarchy whose first—and preferred servants were officers and, on 
the other, to concede special status to officers in a democracy and in which no citizens enjoys 
special privileges.”1104 If the current government wanted to uphold the principles of the 1950s 
military reforms and not move back to the military ideals of the nineteenth century, Günter 
Kießling’s word of honor could not carry a special weight and meaning.  
                                                 
1102 Se for example Julius von Wickede, Die Rechte und Pflichten des Offiziers: Leitfaden für junge Männer, welche 
sich dem Offiziersstande gewidmet haben oder noch widmen wollen (Stuttgart: Hallberger, 1857), 51–52. 
1103 Hermann F. to Manfred Wörner, 12 January 1984. BArch F, Nachlass Kießling, Akte Brief emit Durchschlag 
von Briefen an Kohl, Wörner usw. Skandal. 
1104 A. von Kalm, letter to the Editor, Die Welt, January 27, 1984, 6. See also, Friedrich Karl Fromme, “Überbleibsel 
einer Affäre,” FAZ, February 2 1984, 1; Walter Görlitz, “Mut zur eigenen Meinung,” Die Welt 19, January 23, 1984, 
2. 
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Similar to the disputes about the recruitment of women, the Wörner-Kießling-Affair led 
to new negotiations about the function of the Bundeswehr and the image of the West German 
soldier. The two controversies led contemporaries to address not only military practices, but also 
the gender and the sexual orientation of the West German soldier.  As the above discussion 
shows, the Bundeswehr represented a palladium of outdated and overly aggressive notions of 
masculinity. While this caused many peace and women’s activists to oppose the recruitment of 
women, it also led to claims that the Bundeswehr had to overcome its homophobia and accept 
gay soldiers, officers, and generals.  
Conclusion 
In the late 1970s and early 1980, the gendered nature of military service as well as the 
masculinity and sexuality of the West German soldier were disputed in an unprecedented scope 
and manner. First, official consideration and the push to recruit female soldiers into the 
Bundeswehr triggered nation-wide discussions about whether military service—especially 
military service with weapons—was still a masculine duty or weather women could be affective 
soldiers too. Coinciding with increased activism by members of the New Women’s Movement 
and a burgeoning peace movement, which developed as a reaction to the rising tensions of the 
Cold War, contemporaries focused on whether military service would represented a 
steppingstone of emancipation for women or as a gateway to female oppression and complete 
social militarization.  
In contrast to earlier decades—especially the negotiations of West Germany’s 
rearmament—the image of the West German woman in military uniform was generally thinkable 
and more broadly discussed. Yet, similar to the debates in the 1950s, the conviction that only 
men should be compelled to render compulsory and armed military service was still wide spread. 
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Although women were accepted in Bundeswehr cantinas, as secretaries, and as doctors and 
pharmacists, the idea that women could be trained and fight alongside men was not thinkable. 
Compulsory and armed military service was still against women’s nature and constitution. The 
proposal to recruit, or even draft, women for regular military service was not only refuted by 
peace and feminist activists, but also by the majority of the West German parliamentary. As a 
result, women in the 1980s did not enter the barracks in the same capacities as men did.  
In addition to discussing the sex and gender of the Bundeswehr soldier, contemporaries 
discussed once more soldiers’ and officers’ sexuality. Despite the reform of the Criminal Code in 
the late 1960s and early 1970s, the West German military apparatus upheld the notion that the 
ideal Bundeswehr soldier was heterosexual. Indeed, regulations stipulated that gay men could—
under certain conditions— be eligible for service, which Yet they could never serve as military 
superiors or occupy commanding positions. Over the course of the late 1970s and early 1980s—
especially in the wake of the Wörner-Kießling-Affair a number of contemporaries questioned 
this understanding. Asking the Bundeswehr to stop their discriminatory practices, numerous 
contemporaries called for the emancipation of gay men in the realm of the military. For members 
of the peace movement and gay rights activists, military practices were indicative of a 
discriminatory male culture, which hand to be changed.    
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CONCLUSION 
MILITARY, MASCULINITY, AND SOCIETY IN WEST GERMANY 
“What’s wrong with the unified Germans? Are they really all slackers, sissies, softened by 40 
years of peace in Central Europe?” asked the weekly newsmagazine Der Spiegel in February 
1991.1105 The magazine felt compelled to address this question because of the overwhelming 
pacifism it sensed among Germans. While peace activists took to the streets of German towns 
and cities during the first weeks of 1991, an increasing number of German men filed applications 
for conscientious objection. The numbers of applications jumped from 74,309 in 1990 to 150,722 
in 1991. This represented an increase from 15,5 percent to 30,7 percent of the men registered 
eligible for military service.1106 This steep rise also included a growing number of active soldiers 
who decided that they did not want to serve in a military that was about to go war. Whereas 
2,641 soldiers applied for conscientious objection in 1990, 4,576 did so in 1991.1107 
The events that triggered this behavior were the First Gulf War and Operation Desert 
Storm. On January 17, 1991, coalition forces from thirty-four nations led by the United States 
waged war against Iraq in response to Saddam Hussein’s invasion and annexation of Kuwait. 
The war planning in Washington also envisaged the deployment of Bundeswehr troops. In 
addition to dispatching a fleet of airplanes to protect US bombers, proposals stipulated the 
                                                 
1105 “Den Ernstfall nicht wagen,” Der Spiegel, February 11, 1991, 18–26.  
1106 In 1990, 509,000 men were registered eligible for military service. In 1991, that number had shrunk to 491,000. 
In the years to follow, numbers remained steady. In 1992, 133,856 or 31 percent out of 432,000 men registered filed 
for conscientious objection. See Bernhard, Zivildienst, 416. 
1107 Ibid. See also, Seifert, Militär, Kultur, Identität, 95. 
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deployment of German Tornado fighter aircrafts to the Turkish border with Iraq to support 
Turkey’s fighting units. Whereas Chancellor Helmut Kohl’s government was eager to comply 
with Washington’s ideas, most Germans—as the protests and refusal to serve show—were not.  
According to Der Spiegel, the reason for Germans’ unwillingness to participate in a war 
was to be found in the history of the (West) German armed forces: the Bundeswehr. Ignoring the 
developments in East Germany, the newsmagazine stated, that over the years the Bundeswehr 
had been defined as a defense and peace force. Following the credo of former Chancellor Willy 
Brandt—“Peace is the Challenge”—Bundeswehr soldiers had only learned how to fight so that 
they did not have to go to war.1108 Consequently, West German men in military uniform had 
been trained in “work and adventure, camaraderie and mutual support.”1109 Despite the attempts 
of conservative traditionalists to rehabilitate the image of the “forceful fighter,” West Germans 
had come to see the military as a peaceful “training school” for young men. Hence, the 
Bundeswehr fit neatly into a society which had by and large bid farewell to values such as 
“manly bravery and honor, fatherland and courage.”1110 As much as this understanding of 
military service was therefore homemade, Der Spiegel determined, it was also caused by West 
Germany’s integration into NATO. The Western Alliance and the role of the United States as 
Europe’s watchdog had enabled West Germans to believe that they were thoroughly protected 
and that they did not need to prepare for their defense, let alone war.1111 
                                                 
1108 Ibid., 22. 
1109 Ibid. 
1110 Ibid., 26. 
1111 Ibid. 
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As the findings of this dissertation show, the interpretation of Der Spiegel was not wrong. 
To be sure, the fact that the newsmagazine drew its conclusion in 1991 without acknowledging 
East Germany and the National People’s Army (Nationale Volksarmee, or NVA) is problematic. 
In the wake of Germany’s unification, the NVA was demobilized. While the majority of the 
remaining 36,000 NVA officers and non-commissioned officers were discharged, 3,200 men 
were absorbed into the Bundeswehr. Yet, with respect to the West German side of the story, Der 
Spiegel points to important developments that took place in the four decades following the end of 
World War II.  
Themes and Trends, 1945–1989 
From their very inception, the West German armed forces were defined as a defense force. The 
international agreements of the early postwar years and the West German constitution permitted 
the deployment of Bundeswehr troops only if the Federal Republic was under attack and 
defensive actions became necessary. This definition was due to different interlinked 
circumstances. In addition to representing a reaction to the devastating experience of German 
aggression during World War II, Cold War tensions and the division of Germany contributed to 
this development as well. The discord between NATO and the Soviet Union enabled the 
portrayal of the Bundeswehr as a bulwark against the Communist threat and as the protector of 
the “free” West. Embracing this image, the West German government under the auspice of 
Chancellor Konrad Adenauer eagerly depicted the Bundeswehr as a guarantor of peace in order 
to distinguish the Federal Republic from its East German counterpart.1112 
                                                 
1112 Large, Germans to the Front, 74–77. 
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In the following decades, this definition gained more footholds. Upon becoming the 
chancellor of West Germany’s first Social-Liberal Coalition in 1969, Willy Brandt declared not 
only that the Federal Republic had to “dare more democracy,” but also that war was not the event 
during which men, societies, and nations had to prove themselves. The challenge that West 
German society and the Bundeswehr had to meet was the establishment and preservation of 
peace. While setting the tone of his chancellorship, Willy Brandt was able to make these 
statements because the Federal Republic had neither experienced an enemy attack nor had it been 
deploying troops abroad like its European neighbors, who had been engaged in anti-colonial 
freedom struggles.1113  
While the definition of the Bundeswehr as a defensive peace force was hence due to West 
Germany’s international position, Willy Brandt and his government also reacted to the 
tumultuous 1960s. Following the resignation of several Bundeswehr generals in the mid-1960s, 
the Federal Republic witnessed a series of statements issued by conservative Bundeswehr 
commanders who called for a repurposing of the military. Distancing themselves from the 
rhetoric of the 1950s, men such Heinz Karst and Albert Schnez argued that the preservation of 
peace was the task of the political leadership. The purpose of the Bundeswehr was to function as 
a deterrent and, if deterrence did not work, to fight and win wars. These claims collided, 
however, with the opinions and ideals of extra-parliamentary activists who were unsettled by the 
negotiations and ultimate passing of the Notstandsgesetze in 1968. Arguing that the Federal 
Republic was becoming an authoritarian state, APO activists also sought to battle the West 
German military apparatus. Due to this multifold criticism, the Social-Liberal Coalition 
                                                 
1113 Kutz, Reform und Restauration, 103–147. 
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developed new military policies and regulations that reemphasized the military’s role as a 
defensive, peacekeeping force.1114  
This credo, which stuck despite repeated attacks, also enabled the development and the 
perpetuation of a new soldierly image. Already the initial plans to rearm West Germany in the 
context of the European Defense Community (EDC) required government officials and military 
experts to conceptualize an ideal image of the West German soldier. They had to delineate both 
the duties that servicemen had to fulfill and the rights they could enjoy. Notwithstanding his role 
as an outsider in the Amt Blank and the Ministry of Defense, Wolf Graf von Baudissin’s work 
was crucial for the development of the Innere Führung and Bürger in Uniform. Developed to 
break new ground, these concepts aimed at conflating citizen’s rights with military demands. 
Although they were criticized ab initio and by different groups inside and outside of the Ministry 
of Defense, the Innere Führung and the Bürger in Uniform became the guiding principles of the 
West German military.1115  
Anticipating that West German soldiers would have to engage in a defensive battle with 
the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact at one point, the Bürger in Uniform was defined as a full-
fledged soldier. But, in order to distinguish West German troops from the atrocities committed 
by previous German armies and from the “ruthless” behavior of Soviet troops, Baudissin and his 
colleagues maintained that the Bürger in Uniform had to be a fully trained, yet restrained and 
merciful soldier. Moving beyond battlefield behavior, the new ideal also portrayed the West 
German soldier as a “free man” and “good state citizen.” In the context of the Cold War, 
defending the Federal Republic and Western Europe against the totalitarian Soviet regime also 
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required that West German troops had to withstand an ideology that was based on “denying 
personal values” and the “total submission of the individual.” Proponents of the Bürger in 
Uniform and the Innere Führung thus believed it imperative that the West German soldier 
became part of the democratic and pluralistic system he was supposed to defend. West German 
troops had to be—as much as possible—integrated into the democratic structure and the social 
fabric of the Federal Republic of Germany.  
The initial definitions of the West German military as a defensive force as well as the 
conceptualization of the Bundeswehr soldier as a Bürger in Uniform furthermore invoked 
particular concepts of military masculinity. From the very beginning, government and military 
officials made every effort to ensure that only West German men could be compelled to serve in 
the armed forces. In particular, women had to be kept away from armed military service and the 
state-sanctioned act of killing. Although women were allowed to serve voluntarily and gained 
greater access to the ranks and files of the Bundeswehr over next decades, this particular 
limitation was never lifted. Since the Bundeswehr was defined as a defensive force, this gendered 
construction of military service labeled the acts of defending and protecting as masculine. 
Although women’s recruitment for civil defense and auxiliary measures considered repeatedly, 
the spheres and values that needed protection were defined predominantly feminine.  
By limiting armed military service to men and assigning women to the sphere in need of 
protection, the Federal Republic continued a tradition that developed in late eighteenth and early 
nineteenth century Europe. Beginning with France’s levée en masse in 1793, European powers 
resorted to mass conscription of young men to fight the wars during the age of revolution. In 
Prussia and elsewhere, this form of mass mobilization led to patriotic discourses that “evolved 
around the idea that men were duty-bound as citizens, fathers, and brothers to defend their 
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families, homes, and country.”1116 As part of this process, women were assigned to the 
domestic/private sphere where they were supposed to loyally perform their patriotic duties as 
mothers and wives. The Prussian nation was defined as a valorous “Volk family,” in which all 
members had to fulfill their duties according to “rank, gender, age, and marital status.”1117 
In postwar West Germany, the gendered division of military service and the soldierly 
ideal of the Bürger in Uniform closely linked masculinity and family ideals as well. As scholars 
have emphasized, West Germany’s reconstruction involved the re-negotiation family structures 
and gender roles. Central to this process was the ideal of “complete” nuclear family, which was 
based on the gendered division of the male breadwinner and the female homemaker.1118 This 
social construct greatly influenced the ways contemporaries negotiated the ideal West German 
soldier. In the context of the Cold War, the West German government in the 1950s and early 
1960s deemed it essential that the Bürger in Uniform was not only a soldier, but also a 
heterosexual man who pursued the life of a faithful family breadwinner. Digressions from this 
path were seen as threats to the Federal Republic’s ability to defend itself against the Soviet 
Union and the temptations of Communist ideology.  
In the following decades, this definition would not forfeit meaning. The attempts of 
conservative Bundeswehr generals, Wehrmacht veterans, and journalists in the 1960s and early 
1970s to countermand the military reforms of the 1950s involved the redefinition of masculine 
qualities. In order for the Bundeswehr to fulfill its mission as a fighting force, they argued, the 
                                                 
1116 Karen Hagemann, “The Military and Masculinity: Gendering the History of the French Wars, 1792-1815,” in 
War in an Age of Revolution, 1775–1815, ed. Roger Chickering and Stig Förster (Cambridge and New York: 
Cambridge University Press), 336–337. 
1117 Hagemann, “Military, War, and the Mainstream,” 69. 
1118 Moeller, “'The Last Soldiers.”  
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masculine sphere of the military had to be detached entirely from the feminine domestic sphere. 
Upon entering the barracks, West German men had to be completely absorbed into the 
military—its ideals and customs—in order to protect their families, home, and country. While 
critics like Albert Schnez thus called for the return to hardened, martial masculinities, the 
Bundeswehr eagerly continued to declare gay men unfit for military service. Reaffirming the 
heterosexuality of West German soldiers, military and government officials argued that gay men 
would endanger the Bundeswehr’s group cohesion and thus its combat readiness.  
This conception of ideal military masculinities collided, however, with the convictions of 
extra-parliamentary protesters who took the streets in the late 1960s and early 1970s to rally 
against the political system and the military apparatus. In their battle against the Bundeswehr, 
APO groups formulated a variety of competing concepts of military masculinity. Whereas some 
leading leftist intellectuals argued that APO activists should enter the Bundeswehr as recruits to 
destroy the system from within, the majority maintained that military service produced overly 
aggressive forms of male behavior—including pernicious ideals of sexuality—that would 
endanger the social fabric of the Federal Republic of Germany. Calling on men to resist military 
service and to embrace irenic notions of masculinity, most extra-parliamentary actions, 
pamphlets, and placards also invoked the image of the West German soldier as a heterosexual 
man. Only a limited, yet growing number of activists addressed the ostracism of gay men as 
another symbol for the military’s destructive ideals of masculinity.1119 
In addition to prompting the West German government under Willy Brandt to reaffirm 
the role of the Bundeswehr as a defensive force, this protest also caused the redefinition of 
soldierly ideals. Reacting to both leftist and right-wing criticism, government planning and 
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changes emphasized the image of the West German soldier as a reflective and critical thinker 
who served in the Bundeswehr to protect the peace and stability of the Federal Republic and 
Western Europe. This image built once more on the notion that the Bundeswehr was a 
homosocial, yet strictly heterosexual men’s society. Although the government countered 
conservative demands for the stricter separation of the masculine military and the feminine 
civilian sphere by lifting marriage regulations, gay men were still not invited to participate in the 
Bundeswehr’s defensive function. To be sure, gay men were considered fit for basic military 
service, if they were did not display their “homosexual tendencies” and were able to integrate 
themselves into the military men’s society. Yet receiving a promotion and becoming a military 
superior was not possible. Though challenged, the initial gendered construction of military 
service and national defense remained intact.  
Since the conviction that West Germany’s military and armed defense rested mainly on 
the shoulders of its heterosexual, male population was upheld, it figured greatly in the disputes 
that surrounded the Bundeswehr in the late 1970s and early 1980s. The considerations of 
government officials to recruit women into the Bundeswehr for regular military service triggered 
a new debate about whether only men could be compelled to rendered armed military service and 
thus perform the act of state-sanctioned killing. Although women gained access to the 
Bundeswehr’s medical corps as doctors and pharmacists, and female volunteers in military 
uniform were generally thinkable, scenarios in which West German women would drafted into 
the Bundeswehr, bear arms, and fight at the front to defend the Federal Republic were not. 
Likewise, the Wörner-Kießling-Affair that shook West Germany in 1984 reaffirmed the notion 
that armed military service was rendered predominantly by heterosexual men. To be sure, the 
public discussion that ensued clearly shows that large segments of society generally tolerated 
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homosexuality, even in the military. But, this would not hold true for the Bundeswehr and the 
politics of Helmut Kohl’s government. Although gay men were accepted as soldiers as long as 
they did not display their homosexuality and could function in a barracked men’s society, the 
actions of the West German government showed that gay men were considered unfit to serve as 
military commanders and possess high security clearance. In times of Cold War espionage and 
NATO’s double-track decision, homosexuality was depicted as a security threat that would 
endanger West Germany’s ability to defend itself. Even though the image of the West German 
soldier had been repeatedly negotiated, the gendered nature of military service that was also built 
on specific notions of sexuality was not challenged. As the internal discussions surrounding 
Kießling show, the dominant military discourse still portrayed the “normal” military commander 
as a heterosexual man. 
For scholars working in the fields of modern military and gender history, these findings 
are important because they underscore the argument that the successful establishment and 
functioning of modern armed forces rest heavily on the gendered construction of the military 
sphere and military service. West Germany’s rearmament led to a clear gendered distinction 
between the military as an all-male entity that was separate from and responsible for the 
protection of the civilian sphere of home and family. Although this construction was repeatedly 
questioned, it was never seriously challenged. As a result, the Bundeswehr became both 
quantitatively and qualitatively an institution that was predicated on masculinity. Masculinity as 
a discursive construct became a natural marker of the West German soldier.1120  
This process was perpetuated, however, by various forces in society and by specific 
historical circumstances. As this dissertation shows, the negotiation of military masculinities in 
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West Germany took place at the cross-section of parliamentary politics, the military apparatus, 
and civil society. First, they were the result of demands made by the changing political 
leadership. Reacting to national and international currents, West German government officials 
and parliamentarians formulated masculine ideals that corresponded to their political agenda and 
convictions. Second, West German concepts of military masculinity were defined by military 
representatives and experts. Depending on the national and international scenarios at hand, 
military leaders postulated masculine ideals that they believed to be essential to the effective 
functioning and combat readiness of the Bundeswehr. Finally, various individuals and groups in 
civil society partook in the process of attributing specific mental, physical, and behavioral traits 
to the men serving in the Bundeswehr. Hinging on the groups’ political interest and opinion 
about the military, these attributes corresponded or competed with the masculine ideals 
formulated in realm of the military and parliamentary politics. As the Bundeswehr constantly 
negotiated and evaluated, the West German armed forces remained part of the constantly 
evolving West German society and the soldier and officers remained men of their times.   
In tracing the development of military masculinities at the intersection of parliamentary 
politics, the military apparatus, and civil society, the findings of this dissertation are ultimately 
an essential supplement to the literature, which seeks to gauge how West Germans distanced 
themselves from the military and militarism, and embarked on a path towards civilization or re-
civilization.1121 If Bonn was not Weimar—to use Fritz René Allemann’s dictum—the 
Bundeswehr was neither the Reichswehr nor the Wehrmacht. To be sure, the Bundeswehr was 
not turned into an institution in which men enjoyed the same rights and freedoms as their civilian 
counterparts. Moreover, West German society witnessed repeated attempts to turn the 
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Bundeswehr into an institution that reigned supreme above parliamentary politics and civil 
society. In this context, conservative military commanders, parliamentarians, and ‘ordinary’ 
citizen sought to define the Bundeswehr as a fighting force and the Bundeswehr as hardened and 
fearless fighter. Even though these counter arguments were persistent and upheld by certain 
conservative groups, they could not seriously challenge the dominant narrative that portrayed the 
Bundeswehr as defensive force, which would not wage war and only protect peace.  
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